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Introduction 
 
 
The eleven papers presented here are the outcome of the research activity 
undertaken by the participants in the project—The return to Keynes. Speculation and 
stabilization policies: money and commodities—financed by the Italian Ministry of 
Education in 2010,1 whose aim was: 
to carry out philologically accurate analysis of Keynes’s views regarding regulation of 
the raw material and money markets—to assess how relevant they are today in the light 
of the proposals to regulate the financial markets and the international economic order 
consequent upon the crisis that has broken out over the last few months, in a climate of 
opinion where the ‘back to Keynes’ spirit is gaining ground. More specifically, we 
intend to examine, not separately, as so often happens, but in close connection, two 
issues which preoccupied Keynes throughout the whole of his theoretical and practical 
activity: monetary reform and the stabilization of commodity prices. From the 
methodological point of view we will not confine our attention to Keynes’s published 
writings, but also take into account the unpublished material, at the level not only of 
theoretical reflection but also of Keynes’s concrete experience as a speculator, mainly 
on the futures markets for raw materials and money. 
In accordance with the guidelines described above the research of the last two years2 
focussed on four main areas of investigation: Keynes’s ideas on speculation, case 
studies of Keynes speculative activity in selected commodity markets, measures of 
commodity price volatility and proposals for stabilizing commodity prices in the context 
of a wider macroeconomic framework.  
In her paper Marcuzzo analyses Keynes’s ‘extremely wide practical acquaintance’ 
with organized market as a way to understand his practice as speculator and his 
evolving views on speculation which eventually led him to argue against ‘unfettered 
competition’ and in favour of regulation of commodity markets. 
                                                 
1 In fact, although launched in 2010, the formal denomination of the programme was PRIN (Programmi 
di ricerca scientifica di rilevante interesse nazionale) 2008. 
2 The preliminary findings and early versions of the papers collected here were presented in five 
Workshops held at Bocconi University (October, 2010, October 2011, January 2012), University of 
Rome, La Sapienza (April and September 2012) and in various conferences and seminars: at the 
European Society for the History of Economic Thought Conferences (ESHET 2011, 2012), Storia 
dell’Economia Politica Conferences (STOREP 2011, 2012), History of the Economic Thought Society 
Conference (HETSA 2011), World Economic History Conference (WEHC 2012); seminars at Paris I 
Sorbonne and London City University. We are indebted to our discussants and commentators for 
helpful suggestions and criticism. 
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He relied heavily on information relative to each individual market and commodity, 
weighing up the quality and reliability of that information through calculation of the 
relevant data, the advice of experts, and his own assessment of market conditions and of 
other participants’ opinions. The grasp of ‘business psychology’ became an increasing 
important element both in his investment strategy and in his views on speculation 
His own investment philosophy seems to have changed in the early 1930s, following 
heavy losses in the commodity market, the 1929 crash and possibly progress in his new 
theoretical developments which culminated in the General Theory. The role of informed 
opinion about the relevant data gave way to evaluation of market sentiment, 
conventions and herd behaviour. In the end the ability of the speculator rested, for 
Keynes, on individual judgment, as opposed to the average market view. In the case of 
the commodity markets, which played an important role in sustaining or depressing the 
level of effective demand worldwide, Keynes became increasingly worried about the 
effect of adverse or excessively optimistic market opinions and ever more apprehensive 
of the dire consequences of trusting them to ensure the smooth working of the economic 
system.  
In 1923, Keynes published the first formulation of the theory of futures contracts, 
often labelled ‘normal backwardation theory’, which he later incorporated in his 
Treatise on Money. This theory hinges upon the idea that speculators provide a 
protection against price fluctuations and, on average, earn a risk premium determined by 
the working of the market. In their paper, Cristiano and Naldi assess to what extent 
Keynes, or any other speculator, could ever have used this theory as the guiding 
principle of his investment strategy and how such an analysis may illuminate 
speculative behaviour. They focus their attention on the case of the cotton market, 
reaching the conclusion that:  
During the period considered in this paper, the cotton market went through two main 
periods, one of relative scarcity until 1925 and one of abundance afterwards, with a 
peak of excessive supply in 1926-27. Throughout these two periods, Keynes very rarely 
abandoned his strategy of staying long. However, it is only from 1921 to the spring of 
1923, when the Manchester Guardian article appeared, that Keynes’s behaviour can be 
taken as a good representation of the idea of routine speculation as risk-bearing as well. 
When the scheme of sales and repurchases was abandoned after 1923, it seems that 
Keynes made some attempts at using the information he had, adapting his strategy to a 
changing outlook.  
From 1921 to 1930 Keynes was also active in the London tin market and drew up 
seven Memoranda on Stocks of Staple Commodities which included a section on tin. 
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Cavalli and Cristiano argue that both Keynes’s analysis and his market behaviour bear 
witness to a highly specific context for speculation, characterized by limited sources of 
supply and a small number of agents, imperfect information and information 
asymmetries, frequent attempts at manipulating prices (including one in which Keynes 
took part), and no clear separation between the cash and the futures markets. At least 
until the tin cartel was formed in 1931, the tin branch of the London Metal Exchange 
had looked very attractive to well-informed and well-connected speculators. However, 
making money with tin proved to be a difficult endeavour, even for a speculator placed 
in a privileged position.  
They conclude by stating that Keynes 
certainly was a competent and relatively well-informed speculator, and could also avail 
himself of good connections in the industry and the London Metal Exchange. 
Nonetheless, his decisions about when to step in or out of the market were frequently 
ill-timed, and he was continually exposed to heavy losses even when his outlook proved 
on the whole correct. 
Foresti and Sanfilippo reconstruct Keynes’s investments in the wheat futures 
markets in the decade 1925-35, on four different market places (Chicago, Winnipeg, 
Liverpool and Buenos Aires). They find that Keynes adopted a completely different 
strategy when operating on the North-American markets from the line he followed 
trading on the Liverpool market. In the former case he tried to anticipate reversal in the 
price trend, aiming at ‘beating the market’. In the latter, he followed a roll-over strategy 
(renewal of long positions), which is a behaviour more consistent with his own 
theoretical representation of the speculator as a ‘risk-bearer’. This attitude confirms that, 
in his investment activity, Keynes paid great attention not only to the general economic 
conditions of the wheat futures trade—i.e. the volumes of production, the stock levels 
and, obviously, the spot and futures prices—but also to the institutional characteristics 
and the specific conditions of each market place in which he operated. 
Naldi discusses a methodological question that originated in an exchange between 
Sraffa and Keynes in December 1931 as to whether the commodity rates of interest 
must be calculated by dividing the monetary cost of borrowing a commodity by the spot 
price or by the forward price of the commodity in question. Keynes maintained that the 
concept of commodity-rate of interest was to be expressed in terms of forward 
quantities. On the other hand, since an implicit observation that commodity-rates are to 
be expressed in terms of spot quantities can be attributed to Sraffa, there appears to be a 
marked difference in the approaches taken by the two authors. Naldi argues that 
Keynes’s definition, based on the analogy between commodity-rates of interest and 
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currency-rates of interest, even though formally correct, generates a concept void of 
operative content because in a monetary economy commodities, unlike currencies, 
cannot be directly borrowed. On the contrary Sraffa’s implicit suggestion seems more 
apt to be applied to a monetary economy. 
The following set of papers deals with commodity price volatility and considers 
what the most suitable theoretical framework should be to analyse it. 
Cristiano and Paesani look at the theory of storage initially proposed by Kaldor and 
further developed, between the 1940s and the 1960s to explain the relationship between 
spot and futures commodity prices in alternative to the Keynes-Hicks theory of normal 
backwardation. They reconstruct how it came about that Kaldor’s and Keynes’s paths 
parted on the theory of forward markets when the former meant his theory to be a 
generalisation of Keynes’s own. Their main conclusion is that the separation took place 
when H. Working grafted the notion of convenience yield onto a non-Keynesian 
theoretical corpus based on carrying costs and efficient markets rather than on risk 
perception and heterogeneous expectations as the main determinants of commodity 
prices. 
The theory of storage provides the theoretical reference for the analysis of the 
relationship between commodity price volatility and market fundamentals by Cifarelli 
and Paesani, who compare the 1920s with the present decade, focusing on cotton and 
tin. They show that the series have widely differing properties which reflect the more 
rapid diffusion of information in the markets today. Furthermore, they argue that, based 
on full sample correlations, the theory of storage captures the dynamics of data with the 
exception of historical tin. Rolling correlations, however, qualify this result and show 
that dynamic correlation for historical tin largely corroborates the theory of storage 
while recent inroads made by financial agents in the commodity markets seem to have 
affected the cotton market, giving prominence to financial risk factors.  
Growing volatility incommodity prices has been both a symptom and a factor of 
instability over the past years. The problem, however, is not new. In the interwar period 
it had already attracted the attention of Keynes, who ascribed it to the lack of storage for 
surplus stocks. According to Keynes, markets for raw materials and foodstuffs are 
inherently unstable: a change in demand can hardly be met in the short term by an 
adequate change in supply, since new production takes time and storage of old 
production is expensive. Compared with other forms of wealth, particularly financial 
assets, commodities are unattractive for private agents since they do not give rise to a 
positive yield but entail high carrying costs. In order to supplement inadequate private 
storage and set a buffer between production and supply and between consumption and 
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demand, Keynes proposed that public storage of commodities in buffer stocks should be 
arranged under the management of an international organization. Between 1942 and 
1944, his plans for a Commodity Control, as it was to be called, were widely discussed 
and repeatedly redrafted, but, like the Clearing Union proposal, they were eventually set 
aside. Fantacci analyses the peculiar institutional design of Keynes’s post-war 
commodity schemes and explains how they were conceived and revised, why they were 
not implemented, and what suggestions can be drawn today from a plan that was 
conceived as ‘a middle course’ between competition under laissez-faire conditions and 
planned controls. 
Rosselli reconstructs Kahn’s plea for the creation of buffer stocks managed, for each 
commodity in question by—in his own words—an ‘authority, endowed with suitable 
financial backing, which can buy the commodity when, in some sense or other, it is 
cheap—or appears to be so—, can hold it in stock, and can then sell from its stock when 
the price appears to be relatively high’. Kahn’s approach to the establishment of a 
Buffer Stock as the means to stabilize commodity prices is entirely original, differing 
both from Keynes’s proposal and from the prevailing views of the times, which obliged 
the Buffer Stock managers to intervene whenever the price of the commodity hit certain 
given limits. Kahn’s analysis and experience of the working of commodity markets 
persuaded him that the Buffer Stock managers can be successful only if they are 
endowed with much greater freedom of action than Keynes had envisaged and do not 
have to buckle under any pre-defined rule. Their unpredictable behaviour must increase 
the uncertainty under which traders and speculators act, influence market expectations 
and exploit bearish or bullish sentiments in order to stabilize prices. In other words, the 
managers of the Buffer stocks must become speculators among other speculators, not 
for their own profit, but in the general interest.  
The last two papers take a wider angle, viewing commodity markets and speculation 
in commodity within the context of the issues confronting the working of an orderly 
international monetary system.  
Amato and Fantacci draw a comparison between two alternative visions of the 
international financial system, embodying two alternative principles: the first aiming at 
producing international liquidity on the basis of a reserve currency and the second 
aiming at providing a pure means and measure for the multilateral clearing of current 
accounts in the form of a currency unit. In fact, the principle eventually embodied in the 
Bretton Woods system, and persisting even after its demise, tends to identify money 
with a reserve asset, making possible, and even necessary, the accumulation of global 
imbalances, despite original intentions to reabsorb them. On the contrary, the principle 
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which inspired the alternative (Keynes’s plan) was intended to deprive money of the 
character of a reserve asset, thus making it the yardstick for international exchanges, 
rather than an object of regulation among others. The paper argues that the latter is 
unquestionably the most appropriate way to manage global imbalances.  
The emergence and persistence of large trade imbalances, as well as the volatility of 
financial flows among countries, have been attributed, at least in part, to the inadequacy 
of the current international monetary system after the breakdown of Bretton Woods. 
From a different perspective, the current Euro zone crisis is also the result of a flawed 
institutional setting. These problems—Valdecantos Halporn and Zezza argue in their 
paper—are calling for reforms which would temper or obviate the recessionary bias 
which is the outcome of current systems, as Keynes predicted in the discussion 
preceding the Bretton Woods agreements. They introduce a set of models based on the 
stock-flow-consistent approach and discuss how to use these models to explore potential 
reforms of the international monetary system. 
 
It is fair to say that while our research work has fulfilled some of the objectives we 
set out to accomplish, more needs to be done to complete the task; however, we feel 
confident that our starting hypotheses have been confirmed. These were originally 
stated as follows: 
i) there are strong links between fluctuations in prices of primary commodities and 
agricultural products on the one hand, and financial crisis and structural trade 
imbalances on the other; 
ii) in the absence of buffer stocks for commodities, and with insurance against price 
volatility based only on market mechanisms the system is doomed to instability;  
iii) any policies aiming at stabilizing commodity prices and currencies must go hand in 
hand with reform of the international monetary system.  
As a result, we remain all the more convinced in our ultimate aim of taking the 
original proposals put forward by Keynes as a basis for reforms designed to cope with 
the current crisis. 
 
Rome, 31 October 2012     Maria Cristina Marcuzzo 
 
  
 
PART   I 
 
Keynes as speculation theorist and practical speculator 
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From speculation to regulation: Keynes and primary 
commodity markets 
Maria Cristina Marcuzzo* 
 
 
1. Premise 
Keynes was a speculator in commodity markets from 1921 to 1939 (from 1926 
through his company, Tilton), when foreign trading was suspended because of the 
war; from then on he regarded these markets from the point of view of a regulator, 
putting forward a Buffer Stocks scheme to curb the volatility of commodity prices; 
this would represent part of his more general proposals to stabilize the international 
monetary system and foster general growth and prosperity. Clearly his practice as 
speculator had a bearing on his views on speculation and the remedies to counter its ill 
effects.  
In a letter to Hawtrey about a month before the publication of the General Theory, 
Keynes wrote, ‘I know a great deal’ about ‘commodity markets and their habits’, since 
‘I have been in constant touch for many years past with dealers in a great variety of 
commodities and have constantly been engaged in sizing up the significant factors from 
a practical point of view’ (CWK XIII: 627-8). 
In this paper I will trace the evolution of his ideas on the matter, which developed 
from his intimate knowledge of primary commodity markets and his practice as an 
active player on them. I also present some preliminary findings on his speculative 
activity, examining two examples of his trading behaviour in the tin and wheat markets, 
in 1924-25 and from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s respectively, which are of interest 
as representative examples of his dealings in the commodity markets.  
Here two important points emerge which are worth underlining: 1) in the 1920s 
and 1930s organized commodity markets were sophisticated trading places in which a 
variety of derivatives were traded, which could attract shrewd, highly leveraged 
speculators who could exert a great impact on prices. 2) Keynes was one of them, 
                                                 
* (University of Rome, La Sapienza). Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the HETSA 
Conference, Melbourne (July 2011), University of Paris, Paris (February 2012), Hyderabad (March 
2012), Gide Association, Nice (June 2012). I wish to thank Carlo Cristiano for help and assistance, 
Eleonora Sanfilippo and Paolo Paesani for comments to a previous draft. Any errors and omissions are 
mine alone. 
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heavily speculating in options (mainly metals) and in futures (mainly crops). While 
further investigation is needed to fully assess his success with commodities, we can 
provisionally agree with Moggridge’s conclusion that his performance was mixed, 
varying according to the year and the type of commodity (CWK XII: 15-19). 3) The 
same mixed results were attained in his dealing in shares for King’s College, 
according to a recent study (Chambers and Dimson 2012), showing that his 
performance was not as ‘stellar’ as has often been claimed. Be that as it may, after 27 
years of activity as a speculator in commodity markets Keynes turned into a regulator, 
championing the creation of an international agency which would regulate these 
markets through a system of buffer stocks financed by the Clearing Union.  
It is a straightforward conclusion that his ‘extremely wide practical acquaintance 
with commodity markets and their habits’ (Keynes to Hawtrey, 6 January 1936, in 
CWK XIII: 627-8) left a mark on his views on the perils of ‘unfettered competition’ and 
the importance of regulation. 
 
 
2. Trading in the futures market 
The commodities Keynes most traded in the futures market were: cotton, copper, 
tin, lead, spelter, sugar, jute, rubber, wheat, maize, cotton oil, lard and linseed oil. The 
selection of the commodities might have been influenced by the knowledge he was 
acquiring as a professional economist. Between 1923 and 1930 he authored a series of 
Memoranda for the London and Cambridge Economic Service (Keynes 1923-30) on 
some of the commodities he traded in (cotton, copper, tin, lead, spelter, sugar, jute, 
rubber, wheat) as well as a few others (nitrate, coffee, tea, petroleum, wool) that he does 
not seem to have traded. The Memoranda structure followed a similar pattern for the 
supply of information: the level of stocks and consumption, the flow of production and 
the trend of prices; these were always presented with assessment of the quality and 
reliability of the data. So it would be fair to say that the main interest of Keynes’s 
analysis lies in the evaluation of the amount of information available for each individual 
commodity and the degree of uncertainty about the future course of the main factors 
underlying it.  
Collection of the ‘relevant information’ available was the premise to evaluating the 
‘weight’ of any argument that could be inferred from it, according to the conceptual 
framework which Keynes used in his Treatise of Probability to illustrate any decision 
making process.  
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From this viewpoint, i.e., the amount of information and the degree of uncertainty, 
(which affects the confidence that could be accorded), commodities can be divided into 
three groups: a) copper, tin and rubber, information being abundant but of variable 
quality, so that it was difficult to predict the pattern the stocks would show; b) nitrate, 
lead and spelter, with a low degree of uncertainty and thus possibility of reliable 
predictions; c) cotton and wheat, for which there was plenty of reliable information, but 
much uncertainty due to the unpredictability of extra-economic factors (weather, 
parasites). 
There is a further distinction, important in Keynes’s opinion, between extracted 
commodities (metals) which are produced throughout the year and those (textile and 
food crops) that are harvested in a particular season. The distinction matters for the 
level of financial facilities required in the passage from production to consumption, 
namely credit: low in the case of extracted commodities and high in the case of crops. 
When credit plays an important role in the production process, recourse to the futures 
markets for the purpose of hedging was even more important and in certain cases even 
mandatory for the borrower, since lending by banks was often conditional upon it. 
Before analysing Keynes’s views and practice, it helps to recall the behaviour and 
the financial instruments which were typical of the futures markets in Keynes’s own 
times, although in many respects they prevail even today. 
In organized markets it is not easy to draw a line between hedgers and speculators, 
but it would be fair to distinguish the class of market players who do not wish to 
possess (nor use) the commodity they buy forward, nor produce (or own) the 
commodity they sell forward. It is a class of players, the speculators, who—unlike 
hedgers—deal in future contracts only, i.e., they do not buy and accept delivery of 
commodities, nor do they sell or deliver commodities.1 Instead of settlement by 
delivery, futures contracts are offset by contracts which are the reverse of the previous 
commitments. Speculators who have sold (bought) a future contract of a given 
maturity, before expiration must buy (sell) the same amount of the same future. If they 
have sold, they are ‘short’ of a given contract, if they have bought, they are ‘long’ of a 
given contract. Hedgers of stocks of cash commodities and speculators who expect a 
                                                 
1 This definitions correspond roughly to the distinction between commercial or a non-commercial trader 
according to the US Commodity Futures and Trading Commission. A commercial trader is one who is 
‘commercially engaged in business activities hedged by use of the futures or option markets. This 
would include production, merchandising, or processing of a cash commodity, asset/liability risk 
management by depository institution, security portfolio risk management, etc.’ (CFTC Form 40). All 
other large traders who do not meet these criteria are classified as non-commercials. Commercials are 
normally referred to as hedgers, while non-commercials have no underlying cash business and are 
hence treated as purely speculative traders (see Sigl-Grüb and Schiereck 2010: 47). 
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decline in the price of the underlying commodity sell futures in that commodity (they 
become ‘short’), while hedgers against forward sales of cash commodities or 
speculators who expect a rise in the price of the underlying commodity buy futures in 
that commodity (they become ‘long’) (see Stewart 1949). 
Profit in the futures market is made whenever there is a positive difference 
between the buying and the selling price of any futures contract. If prices fall, the 
‘short’ who has sold the future at higher price can buy it (‘covering’ his/her position) 
at a lower price, making a profit. The ‘long’ who has bought the future at higher price 
and sells it (‘liquidating’ his/her position) at a lower prices, bears a loss. Conversely, 
if prices rise, the ‘short’ suffers a loss and the ‘long’ makes a profit. So speculators 
who expect future prices to rise, are on average ‘long’ and those who expect prices to 
fall are ‘short’. 
Besides futures contracts, options were also typically traded in commodity 
markets. An option in futures is a contract to buy or sell a future contract at a future 
time. There are two types of options: a) call options, giving the right to buy the 
underlying futures at a specified price within a specified time; (b) put options, giving 
the right to sell the underlying future at a stipulated price at a specified time. If a 
trader expected an increase in the market price of a given future, he/she would buy a 
call option, which entitles the purchaser to buy the future at a specified price. If the 
price actually rises above the stipulated price during the specified period, the trader 
makes a profit exercising the option, i.e., buying the future at the lower stipulated 
price and selling the future at the higher price. Conversely, if a trader expects a fall in 
the price of the future, he/she would buy a put option, which entitles to sell the future 
at a given price. If the price actually falls, he/she can make a profit by buying the 
future in the market and exercising the option, i.e., selling the future at the higher 
stipulated price. If prices do not match expectations the option is not exercised and the 
loss is only the premium, i.e., the price paid for the option. 
While the buyer of the option has the right to buy or sell the underlying future at the 
stipulated price and time, the seller of the option has the obligation to sell or to buy the 
underlying future at the stipulated price and time. Sellers of put and call options have 
typically a corresponding position (‘long’ in the case of a call option and ‘short’ in the 
case of a put option) in underlying futures and they trade in the expectation that the 
option expire worthless so that they can pocket the price of the option (the so called 
‘premium’) as profit.  
To buy (sell) options is less expensive than buying (selling) futures since only the 
price of the option is lost when the option is not exercised. 
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Finally we need to mention the types of options in which Keynes traded, especially 
in tin and copper, but also in lead and linseed oil: the ‘buyer’s option to double’ (BOD), 
the ‘seller’s option to double’ (SOD) and the ‘double’. 
For a given sum over the future price the buyer of a BOD had the right to buy, and 
the seller the obligation to sell, double the amount specified, giving notice a few days 
before the expiration of the option.2 For a sum below the future price, the seller SOD 
has the right to sell, while the buyer has the obligation to buy, double the amount. The 
BOD is the combination of an ordinary purchase of a future and a call option, while 
SOD is an ordinary sale of a future with the purchase of a put option attached. The 
double3 is a combination of a put and a call, giving the right to exercise only one of the 
two at the expiration date.4 
Assuming that the price of a futures contract at the time of maturity fully converges5 
to the future spot price of the commodity, because of the arbitrage opportunity that 
would otherwise arise, the relevant variables in the speculator’s decision-making 
process are the price of the future contract of a given maturity (FP), the spot price (SP) 
of the commodity, the expected spot price (ESP), and the expected future price (EFP) 
until maturity.  
Prices of futures reflect opinions as to future demand and supply of the commodity, 
as well as differences between different markets for the same commodity and between 
different points in time; in turn demand and supply of options reflect opinions as to the 
prices of futures. In both cases opinions about the opinions of market participants at any 
point in time matter a great deal.6 
How did Keynes describe expectations formation? How did he form his own 
expectations? How is the behaviour of the speculator best explained? How can 
                                                 
2 How these options worked was explained to Keynes in 1921 by Ruper Trouton, who at the time was 
with his broker’s firm, Buckmaster & Moore (JMK papers: SE/2/1/126-7). 
3 ‘A combination of a put and a call is termed a “straddle” on the American exchanges’ (Smith 1922: 46). 
4 The cover necessary to carry a position with a broker varied according to the instrument and the 
underlying. For instance in July 1922, Buckmaster & Moore gave Keynes the following quotes: ‘We 
expect the following proportions to cover to be maintained intact at all times on open positions at their 
current valuation: in exchange 20%, in Commodities 30%, on Call options Payment in full. We are 
content that not only cash balances standing to your credit and securities deposited with us (reckoned at 
their current market value), but also book profits on your open position, should count towards the 
proportions of cover required’ (JMK Papers SE/2/2/25). 
5 ‘In a perfect market with costless delivery at one location and one date, arbitrage should force the 
futures price at expiration to equal the cash price. Otherwise a violation of the law of one price would 
exist. In reality, delivery on commodity futures contracts is not costless and is complicated by the 
existence of grade, location, and timing delivery options’ (Bose 2009: 20). 
6 As it has been nicely put: ‘the speculator is more interested in what average market opinion thinks 
average market opinion is going to think about demand to consume three months hence, than in demand 
to consume itself’ (Eastham 1939: 108-9). 
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Keynes’s behaviour best be analysed? These are the questions I will attempt to address 
in the following sections.  
 
 
3. Keynes on speculation 
There is no systematic treatment of speculation in Keynes’s work7 and the question 
of his views on the matter is best dealt with by examining, in roughly chronological 
order, the observations on the subject which can be found scattered here and there in his 
writings.  
We can start from the manuscript notes for the preparation of his Lectures on the 
Stock Exchange (1910),8 to which Anna Carabelli (2002) has drawn attention, 
providing interesting and useful comments. Here Keynes is careful to distinguish 
between gambling and speculation, applying the former term to situations in which 
risk is not calculable or not normally distributed, such as the game of roulette, and the 
latter to situations in which the risk is calculable and normally distributed, such as life 
insurance. The dividing criterion is in the amount of knowledge possessed by the actor 
in both cases: ‘the possession of superior knowledge [is] the vital distinction between 
the speculator and the gambler’ (Keynes 1910: 98). 
Superior knowledge confers the speculator with an advantage over the market. To 
Keynes this is a matter relevant not to measuring comparative success in gambling and 
in speculation, which may be dependent on other factors, but to evaluating the nature of 
the action in the two cases. Unlike speculation, gambling is not reasonable because is a 
behaviour which has no basis in knowledge, notwithstanding the fact that a gambler 
may at times be a winner and a speculator a loser. 
The next question is whether this ‘superior knowledge’ allows the speculator to 
predict the future course of events. There are passages in the Lectures which seem to 
confirm it:  
– ‘speculation [is a] reasoned attempt to gauge the future from present known data’ 
(Keynes 1910: 95);  
– ‘the speculator [is] a person who endeavours to make a profit by means of a 
power of forecasting the future superior to the ordinary’ (Keynes 1910: 95); 
                                                 
7 In the literature Dardi and Gallegati (1992) have argued that Keynes’s approach to speculation can be 
traced back to Marshall. On the other hand Carabelli and Lanteri (2011) argue that there are varieties of 
‘beauty contest’ behaviour, namely acting on the basis of forecasting average opinion, and insist on the 
peculiarity of Keynes’s approach in which the beauty contest in a noncooperative game. 
8 MSS, UA/6/3, Notebook, 8 Lectures on Company Finance and Stock Exchange, Lent Term 1910. 
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– ‘speculation consists in the use of superior skill in forecasting changes of value to 
take advantage of them by buying and selling’ (Keynes 1910: 100). 
This approach is akin to what we would call today the ‘forecasting theory’, whereby 
there is no clear trend of price movements in futures markets and profits are determined 
by the ability of speculators to forecast prices accurately (Lee and Zhang 2009). 
The next phase in Keynes’s thinking—as he became more closely acquainted with 
the working of markets—is the analysis of speculation in futures (currencies and 
commodities) presented in his ‘The Forward Market in Foreign Exchanges’ (1922), 
incorporated in the Tract of Monetary Reform (1924) and in his 1923 article ‘Some 
Aspects of Commodity Markets’ (CWK XII: 255-65). The point of speculator as risk-
bearer is reiterated in the Treatise on Money, where he gave a more refined version of 
his theory.  
Not only is the speculator not a ‘gambler’, but his ability, through superior 
knowledge, to forecast the future is downplayed. He is not ‘a prophet’ (CWK XII: 260), 
but rather a risk bearer: ‘The most important function of the speculator in the great 
organized “future market” [is that of] a risk bearer...’ (CWK XII: 260). 
Profits are the remuneration for risk-bearing, not for forecasting skill. 
Here we find the theory of normal backwardation/contango, associated with 
Keynes’s name, according to which to earn positive profit either the speculators are net 
long (backwardation) or the hedgers are net long (contango). In the former case futures 
prices normally rise in the duration of each contract, while in the latter the prices of the 
futures will tend to fall over their life. The theory predicts that future prices have an 
upward (backwardation) or falling (contango) trend.  
In the case of backwardation, if futures prices are downward-biased estimates of 
expected prices, then they should be seen to rise as the contracts approach maturity. The 
excess of the expected spot price over the future price decreases as the futures contract 
approaches maturity because the risk of unanticipated price changes decreases with 
time, and so does the risk premium hedgers are willing to pay to speculators. Assuming 
spot prices to remain constant, then futures prices must rise. The price increase, which is 
brought about by hedgers being long in the underlying commodity and short in the 
futures commodity, provides the inducement to the speculators to be long in commodity 
futures. 
In the case of contango, if future prices are upward-biased estimates of the expected 
price, then they should be seen to fall as the contracts approach maturity. 
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Assuming that the expected price (EP) at the date of stipulation of a futures contract 
is equal, on average, to the spot price at the date of maturity of the future contract 
(FSP), i.e., 
[1] EP = FSP 
Keynes defines, ‘the remuneration of risk-bearing is measured by the average 
excess of the spot price three or six months hence [FSP] over the forward price today 
[FP] for three or six months delivery’ (CWK XII: 263). In other words,  
[2] r = FSP–FP 
When supply and demand are balanced and there are no redundant stocks nor 
shortage of supply, FP is below SP, i.e., the situation is that of backwardation. 
Otherwise, when there are redundant stocks or abundance of supply, FP is above SP, 
i.e., the situation is that of a contango. Note the difference between the futures basis, 
which compares futures prices to contemporaneous spot prices, and the risk premium, 
which is the difference between futures prices and expected future spot prices. In order 
for commodities to be stored, futures prices have to exceed spot prices to compensate 
inventory holders for the cost of storage. Only when stocks fall below the expected level 
can the spot price exceed the futures price. 
So if there is a contango, the risk premium must be higher than in the normal 
backwardation: ‘the additional element of uncertainty introduced by the existence of 
stocks and the additional supply of risk bearing which they require mean that [the 
producer] must pay more than usual’ (CWK V: 129). So we have 
[3] r = (FSP–SP) + (SP–FP) 
 
 
4. Keynes’s investments in tin and wheat 
In which ways did Keynes use his knowledge of the relevant data to speculate on 
commodities? I examine Keynes’s investment in two commodities, tin and wheat, in 
two different time intervals, 1924-6 for tin, 1937-8 for wheat. Keynes traded heavily 
in these two commodities in the two periods under consideration, and these are 
therefore representative examples of his trading behaviour. 
 
4.1 Tin 
Cash, futures, and ordinary and double options in tin had been traded in the London 
Metal Exchange (LME) since 1877, and from 1928 on tin futures could also be traded at 
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the National Metal Exchange in New York (Reitler 1931). 
Keynes dealings in tin began in September 1921 and continued until 1929, with only 
modest trading in the 1930s; tin was the largest commodity (measured by the value of 
transactions) in his portfolio. His dealings were speculative, with heavy trading in 
options during 1924-1925, as we shall see below. 
The main problem that Keynes faced throughout the 1920s was the lack of any 
reliable set of data as to the world ‘liquid’ stocks, i.e., available for immediate 
consumption. In fact in the 1920s in the tin market the amount of information at the 
traders’ disposal was variable in quality, mainly due to the long distance at which the 
production sites lay. 
The largest tin producing area was in Southeast Asia, mainly in the Federated Malay 
States, under British control, and the Dutch East Indies. Other important supplies came 
from Bolivia, while minor sources were China, Siam, Nigeria, Congo, Australia, India 
and Cornwall. (Eastham 1939: 17-8). With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, the 
United Kingdom had been importing large tonnages from abroad, but after the First 
World War the lead was taken by the United States.  
Since production was concentrated so far away, it was very difficult to know what 
the price would be at the time of the ships’ arrival some months later. With the 
invention of the telegraph, intercontinental lines of communication were established 
between the countries of the world and merchants were able to anticipate the time of 
arrival of a cargo of metal. They were able to sell it forward for delivery on a fixed date, 
thus protecting themselves against a fall in price during the voyage.9 
In the 1920s the market trend was dominated by the parallel but uneven growth of 
both production and consumption. Price movements were considerable and widely 
attributed to the extreme rigidity of both supply and demand, a characteristic of the tin 
market that Keynes frequently noted (e.g. in CWK XII: 377 and 421).  
After the post-war slump, consumption grew faster than production and a period of 
rising prices culminated in the boom of 1925 and 1926, when consumption exceeded 
production. Then, for six months, prices remained in the neighbourhood of the peak 
reached in October 1926, while a sharper fall began in 1928.  
When tin consumption began to move upward after 1921, the presence of large 
stocks in the hands of a pool formed in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies (the 
                                                 
9 ‘In 1869 the opening of the Suez Canal reduced the delivery time of tin from Malaya to match the three 
months delivery time for copper from Chile. This gave rise to LME’s unique system of daily trading 
dates for up to three months forward which still exists to this day’ (see http://e-bursa.ro/burse-de-
marfuri-2/burse-marfuri-europa/london-metal-exchange-lme/) 
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Bandoeng Agreement)10 retarded the adaptation of production to increased 
consumption. Then, in 1925, when the effect of the Bandoeng scheme was over and 
prices were reaching an unprecedented level, new investments were made and new 
techniques adopted. As a result, and although the consumption trend remained on the 
whole positive, the situation was finally reversed when production overtook 
consumption in 1928 and new restriction schemes began to be adopted (Eastham 
1936); the fall in price lasted until the end of 1930. 
A relatively small error in the estimates of liquid stocks, which were normally 
very low (below on month consumption) could generate erroneous forecasts of the 
persistence in time of a surplus of stocks. With regard both to the matter of assessing 
inventories, and the more general issue of trying to catch the drift of the market in the 
long run, Keynes could rely on a wide range of sources of information, including 
journal articles, informal letters circulated by Keynes’s broker, Buckmaster & Moore, 
and miscellaneous data derived from private correspondence with other authorities in 
the field. Between 1923 and 1926 Keynes adopted the figures of ‘visible’ supply 
reported by A. Strauss & Co. As from 1925, however, he began to doubt this source of 
information, as it included no accurate analysis of the ‘visible’ supply that was ‘afloat’ 
(and therefore not immediately available for consumption), and because it lacked an 
estimate of the large accumulations in Southeast Asia—or, at least, of their trend 
variation. Accordingly, from 1927 onwards, in the Memoranda Keynes made 
reference to the London Metal Exchange definition and figures of visible supply, 
though not without adding a host of further qualifications of his own. 
One episode that prompted Keynes’s efforts in refining his assessment of stocks was 
the emergence of a backwardation in the tin market after a long period of contango, due 
to surplus stock, which had lasted until the Autumn of 1925. At that time Keynes began 
to share the general opinion of a tin ‘famine’ in the very long run and singled out tin as 
the commodity for which an increase in production was the least probable in the near 
future (CWK XII: 359-60). In the end new elements came to be known which 
progressively brought to an end the period of strong bullish expectations and by 1928 
the trend in prices fully reverted.  
Now let us look more closely at his trading behaviour in 1924-1925. Figure 1 shows 
the weekly account of Keynes’s open interest according to his ledgers, recording date 
and price at which each position was opened and closed, the quantity purchased or sold 
and the type of contract. For each future contract the price is given per ton, while for 
                                                 
10 This was a scheme ‘designed to take over 19.000 tons of surplus tin off the market in order to raise the 
price to £240 per ton’ (Eastham 1936: 18). 
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options we have the purchase price and the strike price. The price of the typical three 
months future has been derived from the Times on line Archives as recorded for each 
Friday. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Cavalli and Cristiano (2012). 
 
Keynes’s tin position began to rise with a series of purchases (call options, BOD and 
futures) in March 1924. In May 1925 he took a share in a private pool which had been 
formed to prevent price from falling; from the correspondence we know that Oswald 
Falk, Rupert Trouton and Jack Budd (son of Cecil) were part of it and, from the ledgers 
we can infer that Keynes’s participations lasted until October 1925, while it is likely 
that the pool was dissolved at the end of that year. 
The cycle of investment initiated in March 1924 resulted in heavy losses, which 
were only partially offset by the rise in prices that began in August 1924. Although the 
loss on the position opened in March was over £3000 early in the summer, Keynes kept 
his long position practically unchanged until November 1924. This move earned him a 
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substantial recovery before the end of the year, when he decided to increase his position 
to an unprecedented level. However, the higher risk associated with this enlarged 
position, along with the price volatility experienced so far, suggested to Keynes (and, 
probably, to his broker as well) a more prudent strategy of combining purchase of future 
with SOD contracts. Possibly also as a consequence of his concern about the true level 
of inventories, when adding a series of purchases throughout December 1924, he 
hedged each new long position with a corresponding short position of half the quantity 
purchased. In order to hedge the amount of futures purchased Keynes bought options 
and sold SOD (traded at discount price) which that he eventually exercised in March. 
His expectations of an upward trend in prices was frustrated by the short-term events, 
but the SODs proved decisive in putting a limit to his losses. In fact in March 1925 tin 
future price turned out to be not only lower than in December, but lower that the 
discount price at which SODs were traded. 
Cavalli and Cristiano, who have studied Keynes’s investment in tin over the whole 
period 1921-30, have found that  
Keynes made appreciable profits between May and December 1925, in a context of 
steadily surging prices, possibly influenced by the pool itself. Then some minor losses 
came during a momentary fall in prices in the first half of 1925. Finally, in the ensuing 
period the boom the market had been expecting eventually took place, with prices 
reaching their peak between September and October 1926. Meanwhile, favoured by the 
period of backwardation, Keynes began to take delivery on some of his futures and to 
stock tin in the LME warehouses, thus moving part of his operations onto the spot 
market. By means of this technique, Keynes was able to extend the time horizon of his 
speculations beyond the three months of a standard future contract, with substantial 
returns in most of the cases. By the end of this crucial period, Keynes aggregate profit 
had topped £17,000, thanks mainly to the gains made during the 1926 boom, but, as 
soon as prices fell off their peak, Keynes started losing money. (2012: 67-8)11  
We can conclude by saying that his speculation in tin showed a combination of 
strategies, based on a guess about inventories and ‘inside’ information, where hedging 
his position in future both in the cash and the options market played a huge part. 
 
 
4.2 Wheat  
An important characteristic of the wheat market was the huge amount of 
information at the traders’ disposal. All the statistics and data related to the volumes of 
production by country, the net imports, the carry-overs, the shipments throughout the 
                                                 
11 It must be remembered the double nature of the LME which was both a hedging market and a delivery 
market. 
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world, the different qualities of wheat, even the weather and soil conditions in different 
areas, as well as reports containing prospects, analyses, and forecasts, were regularly 
published by many institutions. Thus, as far as information is concerned, this market 
was near to being a ‘perfect’ one in the sense that everyone involved in trading—
farmers, merchants, owners of grain elevators, speculators, and even consumers—could 
have access to the information they needed to make their decisions.  
The most important source of information used by Keynes was George Broomhall’s 
Corn Trade News, a specialized journal providing statistics, reports, and forecasts not 
only on production, shipment, and prices of wheat, but also on futures trading. The 
second important source of information, particularly for the North American markets, 
lay in official reports published by leading American and Canadian institutions, while 
the third source consisted in information and suggestions from an American 
correspondent of Keynes, the banker Walter Case. 
This was a market that saw great price volatility. Prices, which had risen between 
1921 and 1924, declined slowly in the second half of the 1920s, sharply in the 1930s in 
connection with the Great Depression (Table 1; see Foresti and Sanfilippo 2012). 
Table 1: Averages annual prices of imported wheat in United Kingdom, 1922-38 
(in shillings per quarter of 480 lb.) 
Crop Year Manitoba No. 3 Arg. Rosafè Australian 
1922-23 43.1 44.5 47.8 
1923-24 43.5 44.1 46.8 
1924-25 61.2 60.10 61.2 
1925-26 55.3 54.7 57.9 
1926-27 53.11 52.5 55.0 
1927-28 50.8 49.6 52.4 
1928-29 45.6 42.3 45.11 
1929-30 45.2 40.3 43.6 
1930-31 25.4 23.5 26.4 
1931-32 24.10 23.8 26.3 
1932-33 25.2 23.2 25.9 
1933-34 24.6 19.5 23.10 
1934-35 28.5 22.4 26.4 
1935-36 30.5 28.9 30.2 
1936-37 43.6 39.4 43.4 
1937-38 41.10 38.2 37.7 
1938-39 23.11 22.11 24.4 
  Source: De Hevesy (1940: 828). 
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According to Keynes, there were two fundamental reasons for the difficulty in 
matching demand and supply on wheat markets and, hence, in keeping prices stable: 1) 
the systematic excess of supply over demand, and 2) the wide fluctuations in supply. As 
he saw it, the former derived from the subsidies and tariffs implemented by 
governments to support domestic wheat prices and counteract the fall in the purchasing 
power of producers and farmers, and from the stimulus to increase production resulting 
from occasional years of high prices. The section of wheat of the Memoranda five times 
out of seven opens with the following comment: 
Wheat is a baffling commodity to the compiler of comparative stock statistics, because 
it is a seasonal crop, coming from many different sources, and harvested at different 
times of the year. As in the case of other commodities, the statistics regularly available 
month by month are those of ‘visible’ supplies in ‘second hands’; but, owing to the 
large amounts held on farms and elsewhere ‘out of sight’ and to the seasonal irregularity 
of supply, these figures are moderately useful in the case of wheat. (CWK XII, passim) 
In the third, fourth and fifth Memoranda the ‘particularly unsatisfactory’ is 
substituted for ‘moderately usual’ as to signal increasing uncertainty on the level of 
stocks. 
The great volatility of prices made wheat a perfect market for dealing in futures, for 
both hedgers and speculators.  
The main markets in which Keynes operated in the decade 1925-35 were Liverpool, 
Chicago and Winnipeg. These markets presented different characteristics, not only in 
terms of geographical location. Chicago and Winnipeg were close to large wheat-
producing and exporting areas. Hence, futures contracts on these markets, although 
specified in terms of generic contract wheat, were related to the specific qualities of the 
wheat produced in North America (in particular, Hard Winter and Spring wheat in 
Chicago, and Manitoba wheat in Winnipeg). Moreover, both these markets were 
endowed with a well-developed storage system (Santos 2006). As a consequence, carry-
over costs had a major role in determining the difference between spot and futures 
prices on these markets. On the other hand, Liverpool was the chief port of arrival for 
wheat imported from all over the world and bound not only for British markets but also 
for Continental ones. This market was not equipped with capacious storage facilities, 
but relied on arrivals from various producers all year round (Working 1942). The 
difference between spot and futures prices was then influenced more by the succession 
of arrivals, and, hence, by the conditions of production, than by the carrying costs of 
stocks. Continuity in arrivals was guaranteed by the succession of harvests from the 
southern to the northern hemispheres along the year, starting from Australia in October 
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to conclude in the UK the following September. Each market dealt in futures of various 
maturities, broadly corresponding to the timing of harvest and delivery to the market of 
tenderable wheat. 
Keynes’s ledgers record trading in wheat futures from 30 December 1924 to 3 
August 1926 and from 17 October 1929 to 9 December 1935, with a gap of three years 
which is not easy to interpret. 
His activity was characterized in the first cycle of investments (1925-6) by a series of 
short sales, both on the Winnipeg and Chicago markets, which brought to him some 
profits. During this period the wheat market was quite stable and his was able to 
anticipate a slight decrease in prices, looking at the increasing accumulation of stocks 
that started in November 1924 and lasted for the first semester of 1925. (See CWK XII: 
401) 
As far as the second period is concerned (1929-35) Keynes’s investment strategy 
appeared more complex and sophisticated. He traded at the same time on four markets 
(including Buenos Aires), adopting a different strategy according to the specific 
conditions of each market-place (see Foresti and Sanfilippo 2012). 
Indeed, it appears that Keynes carried out three different types of trading 
alternatively: (1) long commodity futures, aimed at earning the normal risk premium; 
(2) time-varying long commodity futures, so as to have larger exposures when the 
premium is large relative to the risk, and smaller exposures when the premium is small 
relative to risk. (This strategy might also involve closing a position on one specific 
market and/or commodity if the risk premium was too low compared to other 
investments); (3) outright speculation on future prices or price differentials, when the 
market is deemed to be making a mistake. (This strategy would suggest assuming a 
short position rather than a long one, or hedging a long with a short position on a 
different market; i.e., making a straddle). 
A straddle is the combination of two opposite positions on two different markets 
(and possibly two different dates) with a view to closing the positions simultaneously, 
speculating on the price differential. One reason for a speculator to engage in a straddle 
may be the lower volatility in price differentials between two markets as compared with 
the volatility of prices on either market. 
Only from 1935 onwards (at least until 1937, as shown in Fantacci, Marcuzzo and 
Sanfilippo 2010), we can observe a systematic prevalence of long positions, i.e., 
purchasing a certain quantity of wheat for a certain maturity and, as the maturity 
approaches, putting it forward to a later date.  
18 
We may conclude this overview by saying that speculating in metals—besides tin he 
traded heavily in copper, lead, and soft pig irons, as well as rubber—Keynes was 
dealing with simple and double options, which were exercised most of the time. They 
were a less expensive means than futures to make forecast about prices in the future and 
spot markets. It must be remembered that Keynes carried half of his portfolio on 
borrowed money, the margin requirements in his dealings in futures being at the lowest 
20 per cent, and at the highest 30.12 These forecasts were greatly dependent on 
information about stocks, both ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’, and the prevailing production 
arrangements (cartels, quotas and restriction agreements), which he sometimes worked 
out himself. In both aspects Keynes kept informed through his broker, Buckmaster & 
Moore, relying on the advice of friends associated with B&M, such as Rupert Trouton 
and Oswald Falk who had been his assistants at the Treasury during the First War 
World, and people in the tin trade.  
As for his speculation in crops—besides wheat he traded heavily in corn and 
cotton—where options were not available in Keynes’s time, he had a combination of 
trading strategies, basing his decisions on the massive amount of information he 
collected on production and market conditions.  
 
 
5. A change of view 
In the General Theory, Chapter 12, the analysis of speculation marks a departure 
from Keynes’s previous views, as the following quotations show: ‘the term speculation 
[is appropriated] for the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market’ and it is 
distinguished from enterprise which is defined as the ‘activity of forecasting the 
prospective yield of assets over their whole life’. And Keynes adds: ‘As the 
organization of investment market improves, the risk of the predominance of 
speculation […] does increase’ (CWK VII: 158). 
Thus ‘speculation’ is no longer an attempt to gauge the ‘prospective yield’, on the 
basis of the fundamentals but a bet on a ‘favourable change in the conventional basis of 
valuation’ (CWK VII: 159). The conventional basis is of course average market opinion 
as described in the ‘beauty contest’ example, so gambling—as in the casino—rather 
than informed opinion is likely to account for ‘the success attained by Wall Street’. 
In his speech to the Annual Meeting of the National Mutual, on February 20, 1938, 
Keynes made another comment in the same vein: ‘Speculative markets […] are 
                                                 
12 On margin requirements before the 1929 crash, see Rappoport and White 1994. 
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governed by doubt rather than conviction, by fear more than forecast, by memories of 
last time and not by foreknowledge of next time’(CWK XII: 238). 
This explains why speculation does not promote price stability in those markets. 
Unlike the efficient market theory, according to which by buying low and selling high, 
speculators push up the low prices and push down the high prices, Keynes points out its 
possible destabilizing nature. The destabilizing effects of speculation can be described 
as a sudden and large increase in open interest positions, unrelated to new information 
about fundamentals coming to the market: futures prices go up if the increase is in 
demand (an increase in long positions) and down if the increase is in supply (an increase 
in short positions). So accumulated net long positions in futures, constituting as they do 
a bet that prices will rise, actually make spot prices rise. Conversely, accumulated net 
short positions would make spot prices fall. 
In 1938 Keynes pointed out that for four commodities (rubber, cotton, wheat and 
lead) ‘which are representative of raw materials marketed in competitive conditions, the 
average annual price range over the decade before 1938 was 67 per cent. An orderly 
programme of output, either of raw materials themselves or of their manufactured 
products is not possible in such conditions’ (CWK XXI: 459).  
The need to regulate commodity markets become imperative, to Keynes’s way of 
thinking, on the outbreak of war, but this may also have reflected his changed view on 
the nature of speculation, which grew out of his experience as a speculator.13 
Although Keynes had been advocating government storage of foodstuffs and raw 
materials since 1926, it was only in 1938 with his article on ‘The Policy of Government 
Storage of Foodstuffs and Raw Materials’ that he began to elaborate various buffer-
stock schemes, as a means to stabilize prices. By the end of 1941 Keynes was fully 
engaged in work on a scheme for international buffer stocks, the so-called Commodity 
Control, drafting nine different versions between January 1942 and February 1943 
(Hirai 2008). 
The Fifth draft contains the buffer-stock plan that Keynes hoped to get through; it 
proposed the establishment of international organizations (named Commod Controls), 
which would deal in individual commodities and would be made up by representatives 
of the major producing and consuming countries and managed by independent 
specialists. The task of each Commod Control was to fix the initial basic price at a level 
reflecting the existing conditions and thereafter to make the price adjust as stocks 
exceeded or were short of the target rate by selling or buying at a price within 10% 
below or above the basic price. The finance necessary for the operations would come 
                                                 
13 The discussion of Keynes’s Buffer Stocks scheme draws on Fantacci et al. (2012). 
20 
either from the profit deriving from the difference between selling and buying prices, or 
be supplied on the basis of arrangements between Central Banks or of overdrafts 
provided by the International Clearing Union (CWK XXV: 190). 
The underlying principle of the plan was that: ‘to combine the long-period 
advantages of free competition with the short period advantages of ensuring that the 
necessary changes in the scale and distribution of output should take place steadily and 
slowly in response to the steady and slow evolution of the underlying trends’ (CWK 
XXVII: 126). 
Why was the market mechanism unable to do this? Keynes’s answer was that: 
The competitive system is in its ideal form the perfect mechanism for ensuring the 
quickest, but at the same time the most ruthless, adjustment of supply or demand to any 
change in conditions, however transitory […]. If demand fluctuates, a divergence 
immediately ensues between the general interest in the holding of stocks and the course 
of action which is most advantageous for each competitive producer acting 
independently. (CWK XXVII: 131, emphasis added) 
The reason why speculators may be unable to make the adjusting mechanism work 
steadily and slowly, generating a stable price environment, is that since there is no 
incentive to buy surplus stocks in a falling market, ‘it is safer and more profitable to 
await a further decline’ and long-term holding of stocks by speculators ‘can only be 
called into action on a sufficient scale by a drastic fall in prices which will curtail 
current output substantially and appears to be a long way below any probable normal 
cost of future production’ (ibid.: 132-3).14 
Since it takes time to increase supply, speculators may act as amplifying factors in 
pushing up prices and stimulating ‘uneconomic and excessive output’. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper I have endeavoured to analyse Keynes’s ‘extremely wide practical 
acquaintance’ with organized market as a way to understand his practice as speculator 
and his evolving views on speculation which eventually led him to argue against 
‘unfettered competition’ and in favour of regulation in these markets. 
He relied heavily on information relative to each individual market and commodity, 
weighing up the quality and reliability of that information through calculation of the 
relevant data, the advice of experts, and his own assessment of market conditions and of 
                                                 
14 This passage is reproduced verbatim from the 1938 article (see CWK XXI: 457). 
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other participants’ opinions. The grasp of ‘business psychology’ became an increasing 
important element both in his investment strategy and in his views on speculation. 
In the General Theory he made it clear that in his opinion ‘the energies and skill of 
the professional investor and speculator are mainly occupied […] not with making 
superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an investment over its whole life, 
but with foreseeing changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of 
the general public’ (CWK VII: 154). 
On the inside cover of a booklet in which Kahn kept a record of his Stock Exchange 
transactions was penned the following motto suggested to him by Keynes in 1934: ‘The 
principles of successful stock speculation are based on the supposition that people will 
continue in the future to make the mistakes they have made in the past’ (RFK papers 
15/1). 
His own investment philosophy seems to have changed in the early 1930s, following 
heavy losses in the commodity market, the 1929 crash and possibly progress in his new 
theoretical developments which culminated in the General Theory. The role of informed 
opinion about the relevant data gave way to evaluation of market sentiment, 
conventions and herd behaviour. In the end the ability of the speculator rested, for 
Keynes, on individual judgment, as opposed to the average market view: ‘My central 
principle of investment’—he explained in 1944 to a banker who was critical of his 
suggestions about how to manage Eton’s finances—‘is to go contrary to general 
opinion, on the ground that, if everyone is agreed about its merits, the investment is 
inevitably too dear and therefore unattractive’ (CWK XII: 111). 
In the case of commodity markets, which had an important role in sustaining or 
depressing the level of effective demand worldwide, Keynes became increasingly 
worried about the effect of adverse or excessively optimistic markets opinions and ever 
more apprehensive of the dire consequences of trusting them to ensure the smooth 
working of the economic system. With the primary commodity bubble close to 
bursting,15 it is high time for this, among so many other insights of Keynes which have 
proved relevant in the present crisis, to be taken seriously and acted upon. 
                                                 
15 Standard & Poor’s (S&P), in a 22-page report issued on June 1, 2011, entitled The Potential Risk of 
China’s Large and Growing Presence in Commodities Markets, warns that record high commodity 
prices may represent an unsustainable bubble, subject to sudden correction, especially if the Chinese 
economy is hit by a significant deceleration or downturn. 
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Keynes’s activity on the cotton market and the theory of the 
‘normal backwardation’: 1921-1929 
Carlo Cristiano and Nerio Naldi 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1923, Keynes published the first formulation of the theory of futures contracts, 
often labelled ‘normal backwardation theory’ (Keynes 1923), that he later incorporated 
in his Treatise on Money (CWK VI, chapter 29). This theory hinges upon the idea that 
speculators provide a protection against price fluctuations and, on average, earn a risk 
premium determined by the working of the market. In this paper, we try to assess to 
what extent Keynes, or any other speculator, could ever have used this theory as the 
guiding principle of his investment strategy and how such an analysis may illuminate 
speculative behaviour. In order to do so, we focus our attention on the case of the cotton 
market, and this mainly for two reasons. First, Keynes himself in his 1923 article (and 
the same point also emerges in more descriptive analyses he published in the same 
decade) suggested that cotton is one of the markets where it is more plausible that a 
speculator could simply behave as a risk bearer. Second, cotton is one of the markets in 
which Keynes was more active during the 1920s, when his own theory was elaborated, 
and one of the few in which he had already been investing even before the 1923 article 
was published.1  
                                                 
 Carlo Cristiano (University of Pisa), Nerio Naldi (University of Rome, La Sapienza). The authors are 
grateful to Cristina Marcuzzo, Paolo Paesani and Chiara Talamo, for their comments and suggestions. 
They also wish to thank Viviana Graziano, whose research assistance provided a decisive contribution 
to the preparation of this paper. Nerio Naldi has been responsible for writing Sections 2 and 3; Carlo 
Cristiano for Sections 4 and 5. Introduction and Conclusions reflect the joint contribution of the 
authors. Financial support from Miur (Prin 2008) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers 
apply.  
1 Keynes’s involvement in the debate on the rationalization of the Lancashire cotton industry during the 
late 1920s (Marchionatti 1995; Belussi and Caldari 2011) could be a further reason for choosing this 
commodity as a case study. However, as no direct relation can easily be found between this episode in 
Keynes’s public life and his investments in commodity markets, we did not place much emphasis on 
this point. More direct evidence of Keynes’s outlook on cotton prices can in fact be found in the data 
considered in Sections 4 and 5.  
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After a preliminary survey of the cotton market in the 1920s (Section 2), we 
consider the hypothesis of an investing strategy based on the theory of the ‘normal 
backwardation’ in more abstract terms (Section 3). In Sections 4 and 5 we compare the 
same hypothesis with the trend of prices that Keynes could observe from 1921 onwards 
and, finally, with Keynes’s behaviour on the cotton market over the period 1921-1929. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
The different approaches we have employed converge on the same result. Our 
general conclusion, in fact, is that even if a speculator has a strong belief in the validity 
of the ‘normal backwardation theory’, he/she must pay constant attention to the 
prospects of spot price variations and cannot take for granted that futures prices quoted 
in the market will incorporate correct forecasts of future spot prices. Indeed, records of 
spot and futures prices over the period 1921-1939 show that a speculator who relied 
exclusively on market valuations as expressed by futures prices would have had only a 
50 per cent chance of earning a positive risk premium. Not surprisingly, available data 
on Keynes’s purchases and sales suggest that only for a short period at the onset of his 
activities on the cotton market he might have relied upon the prospect of earning a 
positive profit in the form of risk premium as indicated by his theory (even though, also 
in this case, his behaviour reveals a special caution). Afterwards he seems to have relied 
much more heavily on information on the fundamental tendencies of the market which 
he did his best to collect. 
 
 
2. The cotton market in the 1920s and 1930s 
The development of organized cotton markets as existing in the 1920s and 1930s 
started in late XVIII century, when British cotton trade begun to grow quickly in 
volume, importance, and technical organization and when cultivation of cotton was first 
attempted in North America, to lead the USA soon to become the most important 
producer in the world. A crucial evolution in cotton markets, however, took place from 
mid XIX century when a regular steam service (first trip accomplished in 1840) was 
established between England and the USA and when a transatlantic cable was 
successfully laid (1866). The steam service reduced the time necessary to cross the 
Atlantic from about seven weeks to nine days, thus increasing the speed at which crop 
reports from the USA could reach Liverpool, and allowing samples of raw cotton to be 
delivered to Liverpool merchants long before the bales sent from America in ordinary 
cargo ships. This improvement in transportation caused the development of a market for 
cotton to arrive which gradually replaced auctions of cotton on the spot or on 
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consignment. A formal regulation of contracts of cotton to arrive was issued by the 
Liverpool Cotton Brokers’ Association in 1869, but by that time, thanks to the 
transatlantic cable, which allowed for virtually instantaneous communication between 
England and America and crucially contributed to establishing an extremely close 
connection between the price of cotton in different and distant markets, another kind of 
contract—contracts for shipment or for future delivery—had acquired such an 
importance and had evolved in such a manner that in 1871 the same Association made a 
clear distinction between contracts for specific cotton shipments and general contracts 
in terms of cotton of standard quality for shipment to be made in named months (Rees 
1972: 89-91).2 
The latter distinction was essential to the development of hedging operations (i.e., 
protection of farmers, merchants and consumers from price fluctuations) as a different 
activity from that aimed at actual cotton delivery.3 Hedging consists of a set of practices 
which allow both a subject who owns or will own a quantity of cotton of a specific 
quality and means to sell it at a precise date (or when opportunity arises) and a subject 
who wishes to purchase cotton (not necessarily in the same quantity, of the same quality 
and at the same future date as the other subject may allow) to take protection against 
fluctuations in the price of cotton even if they cannot directly agree an exchange of 
commodities because none of them is in the position of providing a suitable counterpart 
to the other. The subjects who allow to bridge the gaps between these two parties may 
be called speculators, and the instrument they use is the contract for future delivery of 
cotton of standard quality, which we have just seen to have emerged as a result of 
improvements in transport and communication technologies. 
In order to obtain such a protection, the subject who owns cotton may sign a sale 
contract for future delivery, while the subject who wishes to purchase cotton at a certain 
future date may sign a purchase contract for future delivery, both at specified prices. If 
they cannot directly match these contracts, speculators find two opportunities to offer 
their own services. For instance, if a cotton merchant (the same would apply to a cotton 
producer) has acquired 100 bales of cotton of x quality, the futures market allows 
him/her to hedge against this purchase by selling for future delivery 100 bales of cotton 
of standard quality at a named date (i.e., signing a futures contract), where reference to 
standard quality makes easier to place such a contract in the market—but, as a rule, the 
                                                 
2 Cotton futures exchange were established in New York in 1870, in New Orleans in 1880, in Liverpool 
and Le Havre in 1882. The first cotton futures exchange, however, seems to have been the Alexandria 
Cotton Exchange, active from 1861 to 1961 (Baffes and Kaltsas 2004: 154-64). 
3 Of course, the same applies to any commodity for which similar market arrangements exist. 
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subject who buys the contract is not interested in actual delivery. If, on or before 
delivery date (maturity) specified in the futures contract, the merchant finds a buyer for 
the 100 bales of cotton of x quality, then the futures contract may be closed out by 
buying back the same contract—i.e., paying or pocketing the difference between the 
current futures price for cotton of standard quality and the price specified in the futures 
contract (in fact a Cotton Market Clearing House—later Liverpool Cotton Bank—was 
established in Liverpool in 1876 exactly for this purpose). If the latter price is higher 
than the former (i.e., if, assuming that approaching maturity spot and futures prices tend 
to converge, spot prices have gone down), the merchant makes a profit on closing the 
futures contract; but such a profit is approximately offset by the loss in the sale of the 
100 bales of cotton of x quality, which must be sold at a price lower than expected (i.e., 
lower than the one agreed in the futures contract); the opposite would be the case if 
prices had gone up. The merchant will make no profits nor losses due to price 
fluctuations, and for the conduction of his/her activity may rely on ordinary commercial 
profits as calculated with regard to the price accepted in the futures sale contract. 
Exactly the same would apply (mutatis mutandis) to the case of a spinner who wishes to 
purchase a certain amount of cotton at a future date. 
Crucial to these developments—to facilitate the operation of the whole system—was 
the distinction between two markets: one dealing with transactions in specific types of 
cotton in view of its actual delivery, the other dealing with transactions in a general type 
of cotton which may lead to actual delivery, but where the parties involved are more 
often interested in closing the contract before actual consignment. Obviously, the 
existence of a common system of grading cotton by quality, which, in general, is 
essential to the good functioning of a market, is also a premise to the use of the latter 
type of contracts, because it allows to establish a known relationship between x quality 
and standard quality. 
The same separation and development of two such markets also allowed, on the one 
hand, bull speculation (speculation based on the expectation of an increase in prices) to 
free itself from the need to accept actual delivery of the produce, and, on the other hand, 
bear speculation (speculation based on the expectation of decrease in prices) to emerge, 
given that, otherwise, it would have been restricted to those who actually owned a stock 
of cotton and to the magnitude of that stock (Rees 1972: 92). 
Obviously, in principle, what facilitates speculation also makes hedging easier, 
because an active speculative market may make it easier for the hedger finding a subject 
interested in the purchase or sale of the necessary contracts. Indeed, Hubbard suggests 
that, when a thorough examination of all the outstanding contracts of firms active in the 
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New York Cotton Exchange could be accomplished, only 15 per cent of market 
operations could be described as purely speculative (e.g., futures purchases guided by 
an expectation of future price rises which could be fostered by events such as a report 
on a drought in an important cotton growing area), while the remaining 85 per cent 
could be described as strictly trade business, i.e., hedging (Hubbard 1928: 318-22).4 
This happened in 1914, just after the outbreak of WWI, when, in a particularly severe 
market crisis, brokers were willing to disclose any aspect and motive of their positions 
and allowed them to be scrutinized in the greatest detail, and also in 1918, just after the 
Armistice, when a similar investigation was undertaken. Indeed, a keen observer (and 
actor) of the cotton market such as Hubbard strongly maintained that the two poles 
around which every component of the cotton trade rotates are producers and consumers 
(i.e., farmers and spinners). A significant part of the activity of those engaged in futures 
markets must simply answer the two symmetrical needs of producers and spinners. 
Nevertheless, purely speculative behaviour, even if covering only a limited portion of 
total exchanges, may exert an extremely strong influence on short term price 
movements, if not on longer period trends too (see for instance Hubbard 1928: 392-4). 
 
 
3. Keynes’s theory of speculation on commodity markets 
Strictly speaking, it may be argued that Keynes did not present his approach to 
speculation as a discussion of futures markets but of forward markets. That is to say of 
markets where actual delivery of the commodities dealt with, rather than closing out of 
contracts, was expected to take place at maturity. However, given that forward markets 
are conceptually close to futures markets, we may take for granted that his analysis may 
be extended to futures trading as described above. But Keynes’s papers also show that 
he was fully aware of speculation on futures markets and it would be inconceivable that 
he did not mean to apply his analysis also to those markets—or primarily to those 
markets. Indeed, behind this peculiarity of his writings there may be a terminological 
ambiguity: in those years the terms forward and futures were often used as 
synonymous. 
Following Keynes’s approach, the activities of speculators may be distinguished in 
two main categories. On the one hand, speculators may expect to earn a profit by 
forecasting price movements better and before than other subjects active in the market. 
                                                 
4 Garside, on the contrary, argued that, in general, tracing a neat distinction between hedging and 
speculative transactions would be impossible, and that for this reason computing the percentages of 
trading of hedging and of speculative character would also be impossible (Garside 1935: 340-1). 
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In this sense, speculators act as prophets. On the other hand, speculators are seen as 
bearing a risk: they do not act upon the expectation of obtaining a profit because they 
believe they can forecast future price variations better than other operators in the 
market; what they expect to gain is a risk premium that (if cotton is the commodity we 
refer to) farmers, spinners or merchants are prepared to pay to protect their ordinary 
monetary incomes from price oscillations. This we may take to have been what Keynes 
saw as the proper field of activity of the speculators, who provide such a protection—
i.e., hedging—by selling contracts for future purchase on the futures market to 
producers or stock owners and contracts for future delivery on the same futures market 
to spinners or people who want to acquire a stock. Agents belonging to the latter groups 
are prepared to pay a premium in the form of difference between the spot price they, 
individually, expect will be established at the time of maturity of the futures contract 
(expected future spot price: FSPexpected) and the price agreed for in that very contract 
(futures price: FP).5 The mechanics of the hedging operation is such that, as we have 
already seen, if on maturity the contract will be closed out at a price equal to the then 
current spot price, irrespective of actual price movements, these agents will face no 
profits nor losses, except for those profits (or losses) they may have already reckoned 
accepting FP as their selling price. 
From the point of view of the speculators who offer such futures contracts, on the 
other hand, the risk premium is given by the difference between the spot price they, 
individually, expect will be established at the time of maturity of the futures contract 
(FSPexpected) and the price agreed for in that very contract (FP). But if a speculator has 
sold a farmer a futures purchase contract and, on maturity, the contract is closed at a 
price equal to the current spot price (FSP), the speculator will be able to obtain a reward 
higher than the risk premium originally envisaged if current spot prices turn out to be 
higher than initially predicted, or lower than that very risk premium if current spot 
prices turn out to be lower than initially predicted. In this sense, a speculator, even if 
pursuing a reward as a risk bearer, is also bound to act as a prophet. 
This difference between the monetary outcomes of the hedging operation for the 
farmer and the speculator may be explained considering the third class of subjects active 
in the market: the buyers of the commodity (in our case, the cotton spinners, or agents 
who wish to acquire a stock of the commodity). Spinners wish to protect their industrial 
monetary incomes from price fluctuations and do so by signing futures contracts for 
purchase of cotton—i.e. contracts approximately symmetrical to those signed by 
                                                 
5 As already mentioned, it may be assumed that, approaching maturity, spot and futures prices tend to 
converge. 
31 
farmers. If, at maturity, a contract will be closed out at a price equal to the then current 
spot price, the spinner will reckon no extra profits nor losses. The speculator, on the 
contrary, will obtain a reward higher than the risk premium he/she had originally 
envisaged if current spot prices turn out to be lower than initially predicted, or lower 
than that very premium if current spot prices turn out to be higher than initially 
predicted. Speculators as a class (i.e. considering the average results of their dealings 
with both farmers and spinners), in any case, will close their positions with no extra loss 
nor extra profits beyond the risk premium. 
If farmers and spinners could directly exchange the futures contracts which would 
grant both of them the desired insurance against price movements, speculators would 
have no risk bearing function to exert. As a matter of fact, however, according to 
Keynes, farmers and spinners do not exactly seek for the same (symmetrical) kind of 
contracts: ‘generally speaking the producer needs to look much further ahead than the 
spinner, and whilst the latter may provide a good deal of assistance as regards the near 
future he is not so much help for more distant months’ (Keynes 1923: 261).6 This 
discrepancy justifies the presence of speculators as a group mediating between needs 
which are not perfectly symmetrical—where the gap to be bridged requires them to buy 
forward larger quantities than they sell forward, i.e., it requires speculators as a class to 
be going long.7  
Following Keynes, we may assume that ‘market opinion of the future course of 
prices, as expressed in current quotations, is as likely to err in one direction as in the 
other’, and we may conclude that ‘the remuneration of risk-bearing is measured by the 
average excess of the spot price three or six months hence over the forward price today 
for three or six months delivery’ (Keynes 1923: 263), which may be expressed in the 
following terms: 
assuming FSPexpected = FSP 
the risk premium r = FSPexpected – FP 
becomes: r = FSP – FP 
                                                 
6 This point probably explains why, answering a comment on his article, Keynes wrote: ‘As regards the 
general tendency towards a “backwardation” in the price of contracts for distant months, I was 
comparing distant months with near months, not distant months with spot’ (Keynes 1923: 266). This 
remark may alert us to the fact that representing backwardation (which in the 1923 article, unlike in the 
Treatise on Money, is only mentioned and not discussed in depth) as difference between SP and FP 
may be a simplification of a more complex picture which involves at least three groups of actors 
(farmers, spinners, speculators) and at least three prices (spot price and futures prices for near and 
distant months). 
7 As Kaldor puts it, ‘hedging will be predominantly on the selling side’ (Kaldor, 1980 [1939]: 27, see also 
27 fn. 2). 
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In this sense, a speculator engaging in sales or purchases of futures contracts may 
rely upon market valuations and expect to earn a profit equal to the risk premium as 
defined by the market. But as we shall see later in this section, the same approach also 
allows to justify a behaviour of the same speculator relying less heavily upon market 
valuations. 
The results expounded above are essentially based upon Keynes’s views on 
speculation as may be recognized in his 1923 article, but in his Treatise on Money 
Keynes also developed an analysis which takes into account forces—essentially 
determined by the existence of redundant stocks of commodities—which may cause 
current and future spot prices to be above or below futures prices by an amount different 
from the magnitude of the risk premium. 
In particular, Keynes considered that the difference between SP and FP may be 
either positive or negative: if it is positive (SP – FP = b > 0), the case is called 
backwardation; if it is negative (SP – FP = –c < 0), the case is called contango. Within 
the case of backwardation, in turn, Keynes distinguished a case of ‘normal 
backwardation’, where the difference between FP and SP is given by r. 
‘Backwardation’ emerges when there are no redundant stocks of commodities 
(hence no particular pressure tends to depress the current spot price) and, on the 
contrary, supply turns out to be in shortage. In such a situation, if the current shortage of 
supply is regarded as ‘capable of being remedied in six months but not at once, then the 
spot price can rise above the forward price to an extent which is only limited by the 
unwillingness of the buyer to pay the higher spot price rather than postpone the date of 
his purchase’ (CWK VI: 128). In this sense, backwardation, if based upon an upward 
pressure on spot price, has no limit. 
But Keynes also noted that  
it is not necessary that there should be an abnormal shortage of supply in order that a 
backwardation should be established. If supply and demand are balanced, the spot price 
must exceed the forward price by the amount the producer is ready to sacrifice in order 
to ‘hedge’ himself, i.e. to avoid the risk of price fluctuations during his production 
period. Thus, in normal conditions, the spot price exceeds the forward price, i.e. there is 
a backwardation (CWK VI: 128).8  
In this case, backwardation may be indicated as ‘normal backwardation’ (CWK VI: 
129), and the spot price may be treated as ‘normal supply price’ (CWK VI: 128), which 
                                                 
8 As to the downward pressure on futures prices due to a desire to hedge, backwardation finds a limit in 
average total costs of production in the long period and in average variable costs of production in the 
short period. 
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may be said to include ‘remuneration for the risk of price fluctuations during the period 
of production, whilst the forward price excludes this’ (CWK VI: 128): 
 SP – r = FP 
 SP – FP = b* = r 
This discussion may be taken to reflect the content of Keynes’s 1923 article and 
amounts to saying that the magnitude of normal backwardation (b*) is set by the risk 
premium: given that 
 b = SP – FP = (FSP – FP) – (FSP – SP)9 
if in normal conditions prices may be taken to be stable   (FSP – SP = 0) 
then FSP – FP = r  implies that the value of b* depends on the value of r. 
 
After this discussion, Keynes considered the case in which redundant liquid stocks 
do exist. In such a case the forward (or futures) price may be above the spot price: a 
situation which is called contango, where (SP – FP) = –c < 0.10 
Nevertheless, Keynes added, SP < FP does not imply that no risk premium will be 
paid to the speculator who assists the producer in bearing price risks. Implicitly 
assuming that the risk premium cannot be lower than b* (i.e., it cannot be lower than in 
normal conditions) he concluded that  
the quoted forward price, although above the present spot price, must fall below the 
anticipated future spot price by at least the amount of the normal backwardation; and 
the present spot price, since it is lower than the quoted forward price, must be much 
lower than the anticipated future spot price (CWK VI: 129): 
 FSPexpected – FP = r ≥ b* > 0 
 FP < FSPexpected 
 SP < FP 
                                                 
9 This equation may also be written as b = SP – FP = r – (FSP – SP). In such a form it has been 
interpreted (Fantacci, Marcuzzo, and Sanfilippo 2010: 8) as underlying Keynes’s statement that ‘the 
fact that there is a “backwardation” in the price of a commodity, or in other words that the forward 
price is below the spot price, is, therefore, not necessarily an indication that the market takes a 
“bearish” view of the price prospects’ (Keynes 1923: 262), where a bearish view would imply that 
(FSP – SP) is expected to be negative. But it might also be argued that that statement, seen within its 
context, does not appear to rely upon considerations concerning the role that r might play as 
complement of (FSP – SP) in the definition of b. 
10 According to Keynes the magnitude of ‘c’ will be equal to the carrying costs (CWK VI: 129). Indeed, 
‘c’ cannot exceed carrying costs, otherwise it would pay to buy spot and sell forward; an opportunity 
which would be immediately eliminated by arbitrage operations. However, it may be argued that, if the 
amount of commodity currently offered on sale is not large enough, ‘c’ may be smaller than carrying 
costs (Rees 1972: 439-40). 
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 SP < FP < FSPexpected 
(or, less formally, SP << FSPexpected) 
In general, however, in contango, in order to cover the risk premium it will be 
necessary to pay ‘more than usual’ (i.e., the risk premium will be higher than b*), 
because of ‘the additional element of uncertainty introduced by the existence of stocks 
and the additional supply of risk bearing which they require’ (CWK VI: 129), which 
further increases the difference between FSPexpected and SP. 
Following the proof of the dependence of the value of b* from the value of r that 
may be recognized as implicit in Keynes’s discussion of the magnitude of normal 
backwardation, and following the lines developed in Fantacci, Marcuzzo and Sanfilippo 
(2010), the analysis considered above may be reformulated by defining the risk 
premium in terms of a comparison between variations of spot prices (FSP – SP) and 
differences between spot and futures prices (SP – FP). 
Assuming that 
 r = FSPexpected – FP 
may be written as: 
 r = FSP – FP 
we obtain r = (FSP – SP) + (SP – FP) 
In a situation in which backwardation does persist in time,11 if the risk premium 
must be positive, spot prices cannot increase more than the risk premium (they may rise 
less than the risk premium, be constant or decrease), because 
 r = (FSP – SP) + (SP – FP) 
implies 
 b = r – (FSP – SP) 
Similarly, in a situation in which contango does persist in time, if the risk premium 
must be positive, spot prices must increase more than the risk premium, because 
 r = (FSP – SP) + (SP – FP) 
implies 
 –c = r – (FSP – SP) 
                                                 
11 Obviously, b and –c may persist but change their magnitude through time, which would add to the 
complexity of the results we may reach. 
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To put it in other words, persistence of contango is consistent with positive risk 
premium only if the relevant rate of price variation is higher than in the case of 
persistence of abnormal backwardation (assuming b = c). 
But to extract information about the profits of individual speculators from the 
relationships concerning the potential range of price variations consistent with earning 
positive profits (risk premium) over contracts signed in cases of contango or of 
abnormal backwardation, we have to see what the above relationships imply in terms of 
specific contracts. In the case of contracts signed in abnormal backwardation those 
relationships imply that actual profits will depend on the initial value of b and on actual 
price variations: 
 r = (FSP – SP) + b 
which means that a speculator who has bought forward can earn a positive profit for 
any value of  
(FSP – SP) > 0 and also for –b < (FSP – SP) < 0  (if the speculator has 
sold forward,   r > 0 for any (FSP – SP) < b). 
On the other hand, actual profits on contracts signed in contango, will depend on the 
initial value of c and on actual price variations: 
 r = (FSP – SP) – c 
which means that a speculator who has bought forward can earn a positive profit 
only for (FSP – SP) > c (if the speculator has sold forward, r > 0 for any (FSP – SP) < 0 
and also for 0 < (FSP – SP) < c). 
These results may be developed with regard to the analysis of a speculator’s 
behaviour. In a given situation of contango or of backwardation, a speculator may opt 
for an active participation in the market: rather than relying upon the conviction that 
market valuation allows for a positive risk premium, he/she may decide whether a given 
futures contract may offer an adequate risk premium according to his/her forecast of the 
future course of spot prices. Indeed, the fact that, as we shall see in the next section, 
records of spot and futures prices show that a speculator who relied exclusively on 
market valuations as expressed by futures prices would have had, in the years 1921-
1939, only a 50 per cent chance of earning a positive risk premium may be seen as 
evidence of the wisdom of maintaining an active attention to market prospects.12 In this 
sense, speculators must do their best to understand if the situation is going to evolve 
towards higher or lower spot prices and the degree of such variations. However, as 
                                                 
12 This view had been taken also by Garside, who stressed that even though no figures on aggregate 
speculative profits could be compiled, it could be argued that ‘speculative traders in the aggregate over 
a period of years about break even’ (Garside 1935: 343). 
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noted above, if a speculator has bought forward, the ranges of price variations consistent 
with positive profits seem to be more stringent in the case of contango than in the case 
of backwardation, because such range (given b = c) is larger in backwardation than in 
contango (the opposite if the speculator has sold forward). 
But if on a market a particular FP is established, this means that it equilibrates 
demand and supply of futures contracts—that is to say, producers and consumers who 
hedge in opposite directions, speculators who pursue profits as risk bearers and 
speculators who intend to go long (bulls) or short (bears) because their expectations are 
different from those reflected by the value of FP. Predicting the behaviour of a 
particular speculator without knowing anything about his/her personal views and 
characteristics would then be impossible. But if we know the behaviour of a particular 
speculator in a specific context, an attempt to infer an outline of those personal 
characteristics may be ventured. 
If a speculator—as seems to be the case for Keynes’s investment in the cotton 
market (see end of Section 4 below)—is observed to buy forward more substantially in 
contango than in backwardation, this may be interpreted as due (but other explanations 
could be conceived) to an assessment of predictions over the future course of spot 
prices, within the relevant time horizon (11 months in the case of cotton futures 
contracts), as more reliable in contango than in backwardation. If a speculator—again: 
as seems to be the case for Keynes’s investment in the cotton market—consistently 
avoids going short both in contango and in backwardation, it may be supposed that 
he/she considers expectations of price reductions as less reliable, within the relevant 
time horizon, than expectations of price increase. 
But we must also add that similar considerations apply to potential variations of 
futures prices, which we have ignored because we have implicitly assumed that futures 
contracts were closed out only at maturity. Broadly speaking, these variations might be 
ignored by a speculator who is confident of his/her predictions on future spot prices and 
determined to close his/her contracts only at maturity. But can a speculator really 
presume that such variations will not reflect or influence movements of spot prices at 
maturity? If the answer is negative, as it may necessarily be, speculators should consider 
the possibility of closing out their positions before maturity, when this must be done at 
prices not necessarily equal to current spot price, which is something which was and is 
commonly done. This implies that to the definition of r considered above (r = FSPexpected 
– FP) we must add consideration of the possibility of calculating a rate of profit as FP1 
– FP0 (where 0 is the time when the futures contract is signed and 1 is the time—before 
maturity—when it is closed out). Therefore, we may presume that observing Keynes’s 
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behaviour as a speculator we may see that he closed his positions before maturity or at 
maturity according to how he assessed the prospects of futures and spot price 
movements. 
 
 
4. Keynes’s activities in the cotton market (1921-1939) 
Among Keynes’s investments in commodity markets, American cotton occupied a 
significant position. Keynes dealt continuously in American cotton and sometimes in 
Egyptian cotton on the Liverpool market throughout the 1920s and more sporadically in 
American cotton in New York and Liverpool during the 1930s. For their relative 
dimension and their continuity in time and, in the following sections we focus on 
Keynes’s dealings in American cotton on the Liverpool market during the 1920s, which 
may be taken as the best sample upon which to test our hypothesis that the theory of the 
normal backwardation may have influenced Keynes’s investment strategy. 
The present reconstruction is based on the records of Keynes’s dealings in 
commodities preserved in the Keynes Papers13 (KP). The available data are provided by 
the ledgers in which Keynes reported his transactions (KP/SE/11/2), by his 
correspondence with the broker Buckmaster & Moore (KP/SE/2/1-6) and, from April 
1926 onwards, by the weekly statements of the Tilton Co., Ltd (KP/TC). The ledgers 
are the main source. For each transaction, these documents report the dates and prices at 
which each position was opened and closed, the quantity purchased or sold, and the type 
of contract. 
The financial instruments used by Keynes in his operations on the Liverpool cotton 
market were ordinary futures contracts of purchase or sale, which could be signed for 
delivery on one of the coming eleven months but not for later dates. These contracts 
were constantly regulated through weekly settlements of the debits and credits on both 
open and closed-out contracts, so that heavy liabilities would not build up (Smith 1922: 
51-2, 57-8; Rees 1972: 95-6). In principle, in addition to these contracts, Keynes could 
also make use of options (also called privileges). Put options implied the right to claim 
a sale and call options implied the right to claim a purchase of a given quantity of 
cotton, within a given period, at a price previously agreed and based upon an official 
closing price of the day before the option was exerted. Double options (also called 
straddle) implied the privilege to either buy or sell or do neither (Rees 1972: 442-3). 
Use of these instruments, however, was regarded as a sign of ‘highly speculative 
transactions of a gambling nature’ (Smith 1922: 47). Indeed it was officially accepted in 
                                                 
13 The Keynes Papers are kept at King’s College, Cambridge. 
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Liverpool but prohibited in the New York Cotton Exchange (Smith 1922: 45-7; 
Hubbard 1928: 232), and Keynes’s broker clearly refused to assist him in embarking in 
such operations (KP SE/2/1/143). As it results from the ledgers, unlike in his dealings in 
metals, investing in cotton Keynes only used ordinary futures contracts. Keynes’s 
correspondence with his broker (Buckmaster & Moore) and the ledgers regularly 
updated by Keynes’s himself on his activity on the cotton market give us a fairly 
complete picture of his operations.  
Figure 1 shows Keynes’s open interest in the Liverpool market for American cotton 
and the trend of prices along the period 1921-1929. The FP considered is the price of 
cotton for delivery in six months. As it is clear from the figure, Keynes was almost 
uninterruptedly long in the cotton market. In the period 1921-1929 he opened 129 
positions, only 7 of which were short. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Sources: Keynes’s ledgers (KP/SE/11/2); The Times online Archive.  
 
With these investments, Keynes cumulated a net positive difference of £13,488 
along the period, with a peak of £15,833 in December 1927 and a minimum of –£1,288 
at the beginning of his dealings in 1921. From 1922 onwards, Keynes’s cotton account 
always remained positive. For the period from February 1921 to April 1926 we have 
calculated a cumulative positive difference of around £6,300. A document of the Tilton 
Company reports a cumulative profit on Cotton of £4,970 for the period from April 
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1926 to November 1929 (KP TC/3/5), but the Tilton account included several dealings 
in Egyptian cotton that are not included in our calculation.  
The fact that Keynes made profits staying almost systematically long on cotton is 
not inconsistent with the hypothesis of speculation as risk-bearing. Moreover, an 
analysis of the relation between FP and FSP carried out on the 122 long positions 
opened by Keynes shows that, in the majority of cases, FSP turned out to be higher than 
FP. This is shown in Figure 2 below, where FP is the price actually paid by Keynes 
while FSP is the spot price that Keynes would have obtained taking each position to 
maturity. The figure describes a hypothetical situation in which Keynes would have 
acted on the basis of a strict application of his theory, routinely closing each position at 
maturity instead of choosing the moment when to close it. As FSP was higher than FP 
in most of the cases, this would have resulted in a positive difference.  
 
Figure 2 
 
Sources: Keynes’s ledgers (KP/SE/11/2); The Times online Archive.  
 
However, once the same test is made on contracts taken independently of Keynes’s 
choices, the relation between FSP and FP becomes less clearly defined. In order to test 
this difference we have calculated the monthly average of FP for each month from 1921 
to 1939. Then, we have compared this average prices with the corresponding level of 
FSP: for example, the monthly average price of cotton for delivery six months hence 
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(FP) in January 1921 has been confronted with the average spot price in July 1921 
(FSP), the monthly average price of cotton for delivery six months hence in February 
1921 with the average spot price in August 1921, and so on. The results are shown in 
Figure 3 below, where the blue line represents the trend of the price of cotton for 
delivery in six months and the red line represents the corresponding level of spot prices 
(monthly averages). On the whole, at least after 1923, no clear downward bias of FP 
relative to FSP emerges.  
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Source: The Times online Archive.  
 
This can be compared with Keynes’s 1923 article. On this occasion Keynes 
estimated that ‘in the largest and most organised market the cost of a hedge-sale works 
out at less than 10 per cent per annum (e.g., 5 per cent for a sale six months forward) 
and often rises to 20 per cent per annum […] and even much higher figures’ (Keynes 
1923: 263). It is plausible that Keynes had cotton in his mind when he wrote this 
sentence (indeed, few lines later he wrote ‘if we take the example of cotton […]’), and 
the above chart shows that, throughout the period 1921-1923, cotton futures prices 
frequently corresponded to an underestimation of the corresponding level of spot prices 
at the time of delivery. More in detail, taking the prices of the six months future contract 
from January 1921 to December 1922 and the corresponding levels of FSP, the average 
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difference is 1.87 points (1 point = £2) on an average price of 10.64, this corresponding 
to a positive difference of 17.5 per cent.  
However, once the same analysis is extended until 1929 or 1939, the results are 
different, because after 1923 there is a less marked tendency of FSP to turn out higher 
than FP. Taking the values of FP in the period from January 1921 to February 1929 
(and thus excluding from observation the values of FSP after the Wall Street crash of 
October 1929), the average difference is 0.49 points, corresponding to +4.3 per cent on 
average FP price. Finally, extending the analysis to the FP quotations in February 1939 
(FSP until August 1939, immediately before the outbreak of WWII), the average value 
of FSP – FP falls to 0.09 (1.05 per cent on an average FP of 8.50 points). Interestingly 
enough, over this longer period, the number of cases in which the value of FSP – FP is 
positive is the same number, 109, of the cases in which the same difference is negative.  
Another aspect that we have tried to consider is the relation between Keynes’s 
dealings and the level of backwardation (contango) observable in the market. Figure 4 
below shows the level of SP and FP on each day in which Keynes opened a new 
position.  
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Sources: Keynes’s ledgers (KP/SE/11/2); The Times online Archive.  
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It can be noticed that Keynes’s positions were most frequently opened in a period of 
backwardation (SP>FP), the only exceptions being two short periods, the first at the 
beginning of 1921 and the second in the last three months of 1926.14 On the other hand, 
it can also be noticed that Keynes usually remained long in both cases, and that 15.5 per 
cent of Keynes positions (20 positions on a number of 129) were opened during a 
contango. Considering that contango is quite rare, this is quite a high percentage. 
 
 
5. Keynes’s investments more in detail 
In order to obtain a more detailed analysis of Keynes’s dealings, we have subdivided 
his 129 operations into 38 cycles of investments, one for each specific contract 
(contracts being classified according to their expiry date). For instance, the first cycle 
consisted of one future on July cotton bought on 25 February 1921 and the second 
included two futures on October 1921 bought in July and September 1921. A large part 
of Keynes’s cycles, especially in the earlier period, consisted of small positions of a few 
hundreds bales (100 bales being the minimum). As time went on, however, Keynes 
happened to cumulate larger positions on the same contract: the two largest cycles 
included cumulative long positions, of 2,600 bales each, for delivery on July 1925 and 
July 1927 respectively. 
A closer analysis of these cycles shows that while staying almost uninterruptedly 
long, Keynes changed his investing technique along the way. More specifically, the 
period 1921-1929 can be divided in two sub-periods, one in which Keynes’s 
investments followed a well-defined pattern, and a second one, in which Keynes’s 
technique became less definite and more complex. From a strictly chronological point 
of view, the dividing line between the two phases corresponds to the publication of the 
1923 article and of the first issue of the London and Cambridge Economic Service 
Special Memoranda on Stocks of Staple Commodities (Keynes 1923-30, CWK XII, 
henceforth: Memoranda). In what follows, the possibility that there may be a nexus of 
cause and effect between the two events—the change in Keynes’s market behaviour and 
his debut as an expert in matter of commodities in general and cotton in particular—has 
been taken into account. Another aspect we take into account is that 1923 also 
corresponds to the peak of prices during the period we have considered: after December 
1923 prices on the whole declined until 1927 and never recovered to their maximum 
level (ca. 20 points). 
                                                 
14 Early in 1921, the contango was a consequence of the crop of 1920 being much larger than expected 
(Hubbard: 1928: 58). In 1926, contango set in as a result of a bumper crop (CWK XII: 403-13). 
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5.1 Period 1: 1921-1923 
For more than two years, between February 1921 and August 1923, an exception 
being made for two short positions, Keynes’s most frequent technique consisted in 
buying a contract of relatively long duration that he then sold and repurchased (the two 
operations being made every time on the same day) at intervals along the period until 
quite close to maturity. Keynes used this method with nine of the first eleven contracts 
he dealt with (the last one was the future on August 1923 bought in September 1922). 
For example, in May 1921 Keynes bought 100 bales for delivery in March 1922. 
Afterwards, the same quantity on the same date was sold and repurchased three times—
on 16 August 1921, 3 October 1921, and 13 February 1922—and then closed 14 days 
later. After a small gain in August and a considerable positive difference of £966 in 
October, Keynes incurred in a heavy loss (–£866) on 13 February, that he partially 
recovered two weeks hence with a gain of £136. The cumulative difference on this cycle 
of investments was +£300.  
The cycle on cotton for delivery in January 1923 is another example of this 
investing technique, but for a small variation on the same theme. Keynes opened this 
position with a contract of the maximum duration (11 months) on 100 bales in February 
1922, and then he renewed the same position in March, May, and July. The small 
variation is that, in September, the quantity was taken at 200 bales before the position 
was finally closed in October. The outcome was a positive difference of £1,004 on an 
initial investment of £1,940 that had been taken to £4,752 in September, after a series of 
alternate results: –£4 in March, +£274 in May, +£252 in July, –£86 in September, 
+£464 in October (this time on a doubled amount). 
Another example shows that the results could be much more alternate than that, but 
that, on average, Keynes’s technique was working quite well. In June and July 1921 
Keynes opened a cumulative position on 400 bales for delivery in May 1922. This 
position was closed and re-opened for the first time on 16 August 1921, at a positive 
difference of £116. On 3 October, Keynes sold this contract at a positive difference of 
£3,504, repurchased the same amount on May 1922 and kept it until 13 February, when 
he once again sold and repurchased the same amount on May 1922. This time, however, 
he sold at a loss of £3,096. In the end, when the position was definitively closed in 
April, after another sale and repurchase on 27 March, Keynes obtained a cumulative 
positive difference of £952 on an initial investment of £7,132. Keynes did the same with 
the futures on July and October 1922, and with the contracts on, March, July 1923 and 
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August 1923. The differences earned on these contracts were very satisfactory.15 
Afterwards, however, profits (and prices) began to fall, while the sale and repurchase 
technique was abandoned in favour of other ways of staying prevalently, but not 
systematically, long.  
 
5.2 Period 2: 1923-1929 
In this second phase Keynes’s behaviour became less uniform and more elaborate, 
even though the strategy of being prevalently long was abandoned only in 1928, when 
the open interest was sometimes short. The Table A1 in the Appendix is a year-by-year 
reconstruction of Keynes’s investments in cotton from 1923 to 1929. As the period 
considered in the Table corresponds to the publication of six Memoranda, a concise 
reference to these documents has been included for each year in which a report was 
issued, together with a short account of the actual trend of prices (all prices indicated are 
for delivery six months hence). In the remaining part of this section, a tentative analysis 
of the correlation between Keynes’s information and behaviour is provided. This 
analysis may be read as a comment to the Table A1 in the Appendix.  
One thing that can be noticed is that Keynes’s open interest frequently included 
relatively large positions on July (old crop) and October (new crop), and that the 
positions on July were usually larger than those on October. This may depend on the 
fact that investments on old crop (July) could be based on known factors (the size of the 
last harvest plus the carryover from the previous one) while speculation on new crop 
(October) could only be based on a more uncertain outlook. Moreover, positions on July 
were always long, even in periods of falling prices, while those on October were 
sometimes short. 
In general, it doesn’t seem that Keynes was employing any routine strategy in this 
period, and that, as it is quite obvious, he made use of the information he had. For 
instance, it was perhaps not by chance that Keynes closed his large short position on 
October 1925 as early as January 1925 (see Appendix). This in fact is the month when 
information about the new crop (concerning, for instance, acreage) begins to circulate. 
Not unlikely, Keynes opened this position at the end of 1924 in the expectation of a fall in 
                                                 
15 Keynes started with an initial investment of £4,040 on the October 1923 contract—200 bales bought for 
the first time on 28 April 1923 as a roll-over of the position on May cotton—and obtained a positive 
cumulative difference of £1,042 at the end of September after two sales and re-purchases in May and 
July. A gain of £1,004 on an initial investment of £1,940 was the cumulative result of the cycle on 
cotton for delivery in January 1923, a position that Keynes opened on 27 February 1922 and renovated 
four times in March, May, September, and on 13 October, before closing it on 23 October. The positive 
differences on the positions on March, July, and August 1923 were £1,202, £282, and £301 
respectively.  
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prices in 1925, but new information suggested him that this would not have happened. 
Another possibility is that the trend of prices he could observe was different from the one 
he expected. Whatever the case, the decision to close so early the short position on 2,000 
bales, on the whole, proved sound. The price of cotton for delivery in October 1925 never 
fell significantly below the level at which Keynes had sold it. In general, the above 
chronology shows that Keynes made relevant exceptions to the July + October rule. Only 
a minor position on July 1926 and no positions at all on July 1928 were opened, and in 
1928 Keynes’s behaviour changed completely, as he dealt with only one contract (January 
1929) with frequent switches from long to short positions. Finally, it may also be 
observed that, unlike in period 1, Keynes’s profits are not evenly distributed along time: a 
large part of the profits made in this period came from two big positions on July and 
October 1927 and a smaller one on January 1928 that were all closed in 1927.  
Some conjecture could also be made on the rationale for Keynes’s investments 
along this second period. In the first Memorandum, issued in April 1923, Keynes had 
come to the conclusion that ‘unless the “up-country” stocks have been much under-
estimated’, stocks would have fallen below the ‘working minimum’ before the next 
crop:  
It would seem, therefore (1) that the price of present-crop cotton must rise to a sufficient 
premium over new-crop prices to induce spinners to reduce their stocks below what 
they ordinarily consider convenient, and (2) that the price of American cotton must rise 
to a level which is to some extent deterrent, that is to say, which will cause a diversion 
or postponement of demand. (CWK XII: 274-5)  
For a while after this Memorandum was issued, Keynes went on making profits 
purchasing new crop cotton with contracts of relatively short duration,16 before the new 
crop came on the market and Keynes decided to stay long on it cumulating futures on 
500 bales of cotton for delivery in July 1924. However, during the successful cycle on 
July 1924, Keynes began to lose money staying long on small amounts (100 bales each) 
of cotton. He lost money on a contract on December bought in October 1923 and on a 
contract on May purchased in February 1924. When the second Memorandum appeared, 
in June 1924, prices were still going downwards. Nonetheless, Keynes still described a 
situation of scarcity and wrote that ‘some curtailment of consumption is inevitable’ 
(CWK XII: 321) before the next crop. Keynes’s based this view on his own estimate of 
the minimum current crop that would have avoided a state of famine—that he fixed at 
                                                 
16 A couple of futures on cotton for delivery in October 1923, bought in March and April 1923 and closed 
in August and September, and another contract on January 1924 , which was bought at the end of June 
1923 and closed in September. 
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11,500,000 bales—and on the ‘first official estimate of conditions (as on May 25)’, that 
indicated ‘a crop of less than 11,000,000 bales’ (CWK XII: 321-4). We don’t know 
what Keynes came to know about the new crop after 25 May 1924. What can be 
observed is that he kept until maturity three contracts on October 1924 that were opened 
between February and June of the same year losing money on them, that he lost £732 on 
a replica on a larger scale of the previous year investment on July cotton (2600 bales on 
July 1925), and that this happened while prices continued to fall. On the other hand, this 
time, the investment on July cotton was not followed by another long position on 
October. Rather than that, Keynes went heavily short on new crop (October 1925). In 
turn, the loss on July 1925 and the way Keynes rapidly closed the short position on 
October 1925 seem to suggest that, late in 1924, Keynes was overestimating the fall of 
prices of the new crop and, at the same time, that he was underestimating the fall of 
prices of the old crop.  
After that, Keynes opened only a minimum position (100 bales) on July 1926, and 
bought 400 bales October 1926. On the basis of what Keynes wrote in the third and 
fourth Memoranda, the insignificant position on July does not come unexpected. Being 
issued in July 1925, the third Memorandum came in a crucial period of the year for 
cotton. Here Keynes noticed that, even though the rate of consumption in the six months 
before 31 January 1925 had been higher than in the previous two periods, ‘if the rate of 
consumption is maintained during the current half-year, there will be left on 31 July 
next, roughly 3 1/2 million bales. The necessary minimum world carryover may be put 
at 2 million bales. There is, therefore, no reason why consumption should not be 
maintained and even increased somewhat, provided that the world is content to risk a 
minimum carryover’ (CWK XII: 366-9). A similar trend is confirmed in the fourth 
Memorandum of February 1926. Keynes reported of a ‘fairly comfortable carryover of 
rather more than 3 millions bales’, estimating at 19 million bales the ‘available supply 
of cotton for the current season’ (CWK XII: 411-12). Keynes only took notice of an 
element of uncertainty that was emerging, pertaining the supply of high grade-cotton, 
because it was becoming clear as the season proceeded that ‘the current crop 
include[ed] an unusually large proportion of low-grade cotton untenderable against the 
future contract’ (CWK XII: 412). In addition to this, Keynes noticed that ‘a large carry-
forward would be advisable in view of the present being a bumper crop and of the 
probability that if the existing low prices continue, the expenditure on labour and 
fertilisers will be curtailed, even if the acreage is maintained’ (CWK XII: 412). On the 
whole, and apart from minor uncertainties, the situation had turned from one of scarcity 
to one of relative plenty.  
47 
While this view is perfectly consistent with Keynes’s decision of not cumulating too 
large a combination of long positions on July and October, the same predictions cannot 
explain why Keynes did not decide to stay short, as he had tried to do with the October 
1925 contract. It is possible that the 400 bales on October 1926 were a bet (that Keynes 
lost) on the few elements of uncertainty in a context in which a state of plenty over the 
next future was the most probable outlook. But it could also be observed that Keynes 
seemed to have some kind of bias against staying short. He did it only sometimes, 
usually with bad or scarce results, and his more usual alternative to staying long was to 
go out of the market. 
Figures 5 and 6 below show the trend of prices and the evolution of Keynes’s 
position in 1925 and 1926. Keynes kept staying long while observing a downward trend 
of prices in presence of a large supply and of a ‘bumper crop’. With the minor exception 
of a small profit made on 100 bales on July 1926, Keynes went on losing money with 
long positions opened between 1925 and 1926 on cotton for delivery in January and 
October 1926 and on January, March and May 1927. Then Keynes progressively 
reduced his position, and even exited the market in the summer of 1926, before 
cumulating his largest position afterwards, which, again, happened in a period of falling 
prices.  
Figure 5 
 
Sources: Keynes’s ledgers (KP/SE/11/2); The Times online Archive.  
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Figure 6  
 
 
Sources: Keynes’s ledgers (KP/SE/11/2); The Times online Archive.  
 
 
 
Figure 6 suggests that Keynes had probably predicted the rebound of prices that 
happened in 1927. In fact, the two big positions on July and October cotton that gained 
Keynes a large part of his total profits on cotton during the 1920s were cumulated while 
prices were still falling, but when Keynes liquidated these positions the prices of July 
and October futures had risen from a minimum below 7 points to a maximum of around 
10.5 points. After exploiting this great opportunity, Keynes again brought his open 
interest down to zero in July 1927. 
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Figure 7 
 
Sources: Keynes’s ledgers (KP/SE/11/2); The Times online Archive.  
 
Meanwhile, in the Memorandum of March 1927, that was prepared when the open 
interest was at its peak before rapidly falling to zero in July, Keynes had confirmed that 
the available supply for 1924-25 had been of 19 million bales. Assuming a ‘comfortable 
carryover of 3 million bales’, still there were 16 million bales left for current 
consumption. In addition to this, Keynes could now avail himself of the data about 
consumption during the same period, which had been as low as 13,75 million bales. 
This resulted in a carryover of 5,5 million bales, that was to be added to the ‘record 
crop’ of 17,7 million bales, with an available supply that reached 23 million bales 
(CWK XII: 455-60). Even worse, while the low level of prices had lead to an increase in 
US consumption, the coal stoppage had reduced consumption in UK. Thus, with a price 
of cotton below the cost of production for many producers,  
a campaign is on foot throughout the Southern States to secure a reduction of acreage in 
the coming season. A figure of 25 per cent is aimed at, but a reduction of 10 per cent 
will probably prove to be nearer the mark. Even so supplies should be ample through 
1927-8 as well as 1926-7. (Ibid.) 
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The period that followed this Memorandum was therefore quite uncertain, as it was 
not clear whether the suggested plans would have been implemented, or to what extent 
they would have been successful. In this phase, the only cycle that deserves some 
attention is the curious one on January 1929, which resulted in a loss of £1,638, mainly 
due to the short positions it included. As it is clear from figure 8 below, when Keynes 
cumulated a net short position early in 1928, prices began to rise. Later adaptations did 
not give good results. 
 
Figure 8 
 
Sources: Keynes’s ledgers (KP/SE/11/2); The Times online Archive.  
 
6. Conclusions  
Daily price determination in cotton markets is a very complex process (see Çaliskan 
2009), and such complexity was not inferior at the time when Keynes was active as a 
speculator (see Garside 1935: 345-65). If, broadly speaking, data relating to world 
demand and supply may exert a dominant influence on price trends over a time horizon 
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of some months—and Keynes’s approach to selecting the information he published (and 
presumably deemed most relevant) in the Special Memoranda on Stocks of Staple 
Commodities for the London and Cambridge Economic Service suggests that he was 
persuaded of the importance of this influence—more strictly speculative influences may 
certainly be crucial in shorter time horizons. More specifically, being cotton an annual 
crop, the period when the crop actually reaches the market and the fact that its use in 
industry would spread over the whole year are important elements which may be seen as 
introducing a somewhat regular trend component in price movements, but also 
complicating a more straightforward and general comparison between annual supply 
and demand. Furthermore, the importance of accumulated stocks and their influence in 
the determination of actual annual supply must be considered—and the Memoranda 
show that Keynes gave importance to all these elements. But also rumours, estimates, 
forecasts and facts relating to the amount of land (acreage) annually devoted to cotton 
cultivation, to weather conditions from winter, when land is prepared for the cultivation, 
till the end of the picking season (cotton fruits over an extended period, and in the USA 
the picking season approximately starts in August and ends in January) had (and still 
have today) an important influence on prices in both spot and futures markets. Similarly 
important were data relating to the presence of pests, and in particular of the boll 
weevil.17 Reports relating to these elements were crucial to assess the size of each year’s 
crop, but they were also subject to much approximation and to provide indications 
which could be corrected or reversed by further information.18 And somewhat similar 
arguments may be applied to estimates of world demand for cotton and to its evolution 
through time. 
The links we had attempted to establish at the end of Section 2 between the theory of 
speculative markets as elaborated and published by Keynes during the 1920s and his 
activity on the cotton market are not disproved by the analysis of the data we have been 
able to collect. But what may be stated with sufficient certainty is, so to speak, much 
less pretentious. During the period considered in this paper, the cotton market went 
through two main periods, one of relative scarcity, until 1925, and, afterwards, one of 
abundance, with a peak of excessive supply in 1926-27. Throughout these two periods, 
Keynes very rarely abandoned his strategy of staying long. However, it is only from 
1921 to the spring of 1923, when the Manchester Guardian article appeared, that 
                                                 
17 Since its first appearance in the USA in 1892, the boll weevil had caused damages to the cotton crop as 
high as 34 per cent (Hubbard 1928: 40-1, 124; Garside 1935: 23-6). 
18 For instance, estimates of acreage may involve considerable approximation; a wet autumn and early or 
late frost at the end of the picking season may cause large crop estimates corrections (Hubbard 1928: 
19-37; Garside 1935: 13-28). 
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Keynes’s behaviour can be taken as a good representation of the idea of routine 
speculation as risk-bearing as well. When, after 1923, the scheme of sale and repurchase 
was abandoned, it seems that Keynes made some attempts at using the information he 
had, adapting his strategy to a changing outlook.  
Immediately after 1923, Keynes observed the change from a state of scarcity to one of 
increasing plenty, and the earlier Memoranda suggest that this change was perceived 
with some delay; nonetheless, it seems that Keynes tried to adapt to the new situation, 
reducing his long positions and even making some attempt at staying short. After 1925, 
however, during a period of falling prices quite consistent with the outlook given in the 
Memoranda, Keynes did not go short. Rather than that, at intervals, he entered and 
exited the market staying prevalently long, as he was waiting for the rebound of prices 
that eventually happened in 1927. What can be very tentatively concluded is that 
Keynes followed a sort of asymmetric strategy, consisting in staying systematically long 
when the expectation was for a rise in prices but not necessarily short in the opposite 
situation. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Analysis of Keynes’s investments in phase 2, 1923-29 
Year 
Keynes’s outlook 
(as from 
Memoranda) and 
trend of prices 
Keynes’s investments 
1923 
April, Memo No. 
1: scarcity 
 
Prices rising to the 
peak of 20 points 
in December 
March and April: two purchases (100 bales each) for delivery in October. 
These positions will be closed in August and September at a positive 
difference of £ 362. 
In June Keynes buys 200 bales for delivery in January 1925 (this will result 
in a considerable gain of £1176).  
In Autumn, a new long position for 300 bales on July 1924 is opened (it will 
be increased to 500 bales during 1924) 
On 20 September, a long position on 100 bales for delivery in August 1924 
is opened (it will be taken to delivery). 
1924 
June:  
Memo No. 2: 
scarcity 
 
Prices falling from 
the peak of 20 
points to 13 points 
at the end of the 
year 
The long position on July is increased to 500 bales. 
Another long position, 400 bales on October, is cumulated between 
February and June.  
The long position on July closed between April and July at a positive 
difference of £482. 
On 1 August the contract on 100 bales for delivery in this month purchased 
on 20 Sept. 1923 is closed. The difference is +£622.  
The long position on October is closed very closed to delivery at a loss (–
£358) 
In October Keynes opens a long position on 200 bales for delivery in 
December. The position will be closed in December at a loss (–756). 
A new and larger cycle on July 1925 is opened during the Autumn: 2100 
bales (that will grow to 2600 in April 1925).  
In November Keynes opens a 2000 bales short position on October 1925 
(that will be closed early in 1925).  
A new small position on 100 bales for delivery in May 1925 is opened in 
December. 
1925 
July, Memo No. 3: 
scarcity is less 
than expected  
 
The decline of 
prices continues: 
below 10 p.ts at 
the end of the year 
January and a December: very small gain closing the short position on 1000 
bales for delivery in October this year. 
August: a long position on 300 bales for delivery in October is opened (it 
will closed in September at a positive difference of £664). 
Between March and July the big long position (2600 bales) on July is closed 
at a cumulative loss of –£732). 
In October Keynes purchases 300 bales for delivery in January 1926. The 
position is closed on 31 December at a negative difference of –£696. 
At the end of December Keynes bought 400 bales for delivery in October 
1926). 
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1926 
February, Memo 4: 
plenty. 
 
Prices barely 
above 6 p.ts at the 
end of the year 
after constant 
decline 
A minor position (100 bales) on July opened in March  
Open interest reduced to zero in July 
New long position on 300 bales, delivery January (1927), opened between 
July and October (and new losses: –£618).  
September: purchase of 100 bales for delivery in March (this will be closed 
at a loss in January 1927). 
400 bales for delivery in May 1927 purchased in August and September 
(this will be closed in 1927 at a loss).  
June and July: Keynes closed at a negative difference of £404 the October 
cotton bought in December. 
Between August and September Keynes buys 2000 bales for delivery in July 
1927 (to which 600 bales will be added before the end of March: this 
cumulative position of 2600 bales will result in a profit of £7156, the largest 
ever). 
New large position on October 1927 (600 bales, it will gain Keynes another 
relevant profit of £2300).  
In December Keynes buys 200 bales on December 1927 (and again this will 
result in a good profit of £1884). 
1927 
March, Memo No. 
5: plenty and 
regulation.  
 
Gradual recovery 
of prices: above 10 
p.ts in December 
Keynes brings the open interest on July to 2600 bales (from 2000) and then 
realises the relevant profits on this position and the other two on October 
and December opened in 1926. The cumulative gross profits from these 
three contracts amounts to £11340. 
The open interest is zero in July. No new position is opened until December. 
1928 
No Memorandum 
for this year.  
 
Fluctuations of 
prices between a 
min. just above 9 
p.ts and a max. just 
below 12 p.ts 
January and February: sales of 600 and 500 bales on January 1929. As a 
result Keynes is net short for a while. All these short positions are closed 
before the end of April at a loss of –£1138. 
In May Keynes opens two long positions, again on January 1929, closing 
them in June and thus obtaining a small gain. 
In June, a new short position on January 1929 is opened. It will be closed in 
July and August with new losses of –£442.  
In August, another small long position on January 1929 (100 bales) is 
opened, and a new small loss comes (–£42) when this position is closed 
(very soon, on 27 September). 
1929 
Memo No. 6. 
 
Price quite stable 
at around 10 p.ts 
–£485 cumulative losses on minor long positions on July and October 1929. 
 
Minor losses from two small long positions on March and January 1930.  
Sources: Keynes’s ledgers, London and Cambridge Economic Service Special Memoranda on Stocks of 
Staple Commodities: The Times online Archive.  
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Keynes’s speculation in the London tin market: 1921-1930 
Nicolò Cavalli and Carlo Cristiano* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The present research considers the tin branch of the London Metal Exchange (LME) 
in the years before the formation of the Tin Producers’ Association in 1929 and the first 
Tin agreement in 1931 (Fox 1974; Hillman 2010). The market is viewed from the 
particular standpoint of an economist-speculator, our analysis being largely based on the 
Collected Writings and the Papers of John Maynard Keynes (henceforth CWK and KP), 
who dealt with tin both as a speculator on the LME and, from 1923 to 1930, as editor of 
the London and Cambridge Economic Service Special Memoranda on Stocks of Staple 
Commodities (henceforth Memoranda, CWK XII, 267-506 and 512-647).  
Section 2 presents an overview of the tin market during the 1920s which is largely 
based on the Memoranda and related material in the KP, while references to more 
recent literature are given in order to fill the gaps, or for comparison with Keynes’s ‘on 
the spot’ view. In addition to the Memoranda, Keynes wrote at least three other notes on 
tin: the first, dated 1 December 1926, is a private typescript focusing on tin shares, with 
relevant information about Keynes’s expectations as to the production and consumption 
of tin; the second, a manuscript note based on the same scheme as the Memoranda, was 
sent to Oswald Falk on 7 July 1928; finally, a third Memorandum, on ‘The production 
and consumption of Tin’, was drawn up in September 1928. Unlike the other two, this 
document was published and is now included in the CWK (XII, 506-512). Originally, it 
appeared in Recueil Mensel de l’Institute International du Commerce on 20 October 
1928.  
The analysis of Keynes’s investments presented in section 3 is based on the ledgers 
in which Keynes recorded his transactions (KP/SE/11/2), on the correspondence with 
the broker Buckmaster & Moore (KP/SE/2/1-6) and, for the period after its foundation 
in April 1926 onwards, on the weekly statements of the Tilton Co., Ltd (KP/TC). The 
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ledgers are the main source. For each transaction, these documents show the date on and 
prices at which each position was opened and closed, the quantity purchased or sold, 
and the type of contract. For future contracts, the ledgers record the price per ton. For 
options, Keynes recorded the purchase price and the strike price.  
Another resource we employed is The Times online Archive, from which a series of 
tin prices from 1921 to 1930 was derived. The series of prices we employed consists of 
the tin quotations at the LME on each Friday during the period as they were published 
in The Times newspaper on the following Saturday. Under the heading ‘Home 
Commercial Markets’ the newspaper reported the cash price and the prices of a range of 
five different contracts for future delivery: prices for delivery before the end of the 
current month, for delivery before the end of the first, second and third month hence, 
and finally the price of ‘three months’ tin, i.e. for delivery 90 days thence. The ‘three 
months’ future was the standard contract, and the fact that it arrived at maturity on a 
specific day, and not a whole month, reflected the nature of the LME, which remained 
first and foremost a delivery-terminal market (Gibson-Jarvie 1976). The list of prices 
also reflects the limited time horizon (three months) within which the speculator was 
bounded.  
 
 
2. The tin industry during the 1920s 
A large part of the world’s tin is mined in a few areas located far from the centres of 
consumption. During the 1920s, the Federated Malay States and the Netherlands East 
Indies controlled approximately one half of the world production of tin concentrates 
(cassiterite); Bolivia could claim one quarter of the whole production, while China, 
Siam and Nigeria were minor but still relevant sources. The mining industry in 
Cornwall, the leader until the end of the eighteenth century, was now reduced to a very 
low quota of the world market, while the capital that used to be invested in the Cornish 
mines was flowing in new directions. In part, it financed the smelting industry in the 
United Kingdom, where a significant quota of the Asian tin and almost all the Bolivian 
tin was refined; in part, these and other resources raised in the London market came to 
finance both the mining and the smelting sectors of the Malayan tin industry, thus 
favouring a process of vertical integration in these areas. However, the process of 
vertical integration proved slower in the tin industry than in the other non-ferrous metal 
industries, and was never extended from the production of tin metal to its consumption. 
Another peculiarity of the tin industry was that the methods and costs of tin mining 
could vary significantly from one place to another, depending on the nature of the 
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deposits and on the available techniques and financial resources, thus creating 
significant differential rents in the most efficient sites (CWK XII: 377-8; Hillman 1984: 
404). Finally, another key feature of the tin industry during the 1920s was the 
emergence of the United States as the most important of the consuming countries, with 
a quota that grew by over 50 per cent over the period under scrutiny.1 
The ‘problem with tin’, as described by Hillman (2010, chap. 4), was that 
determination of the proper level of investments vis-à-vis the marked fluctuations of 
prices proved overwhelmingly difficult after the First World War. Thus, for instance, 
nobody knew whether the peak of prices over £350 in 1926, after a minimum below 
£200 only a few years before, could be taken to be a momentary boom, the long run 
price, or even an underestimation of what the price was to be a few years thence. What 
was clear, on the other hand, was that tin represented an extreme case of the boom-bust 
cycle that is typical of commodities in general, while the organization of the industry 
lagged behind that of other sectors in the process of ‘rationalization’ that characterized 
the period following upon the First World War.  
Commodity prices volatility also attracted Keynes’s attention, not only as a 
speculator but also as an economist. Keynes first described the cycle of commodities—
in which the time lag between a fall (rise) in prices and the moment when producers 
reduce (increase) their investments leads to violent oscillations of prices—in an article 
for the Manchester Guardian Reconstruction supplement of March 1923, and put forth 
the first proposal for governmental control of raw materials in 1926, thus preparing the 
ground for the analysis of commodity price volatility in chapter 29 of the Treatise on 
Money (CWK VI) and for the more refined schemes of commodity control from 1938 
onwards (Fantacci et al. 2012). In this respect, tin was very interesting as a case study. 
Hillman (2010: 90) describes Keynes as the author of ‘some of the most careful 
assessments of the market’, highlighting the 1928 note on ‘The production and 
consumption of tin’ as ‘particularly revealing’.  
In this note, Keynes reconstructed the trend of the tin industry as from 1920: at an 
early stage,  
[t]he slump of 1920-21 caused enormous accumulations of the metal and a crisis in the 
producing countries, calling for the intervention of the Straits and Dutch Indies 
Governments in the market. From 1922, however, to the middle of 1927 the 
consumption of tin regularly exceeded production and the redundant stocks were 
                                                 
1 For more detailed analysis of the tin industry during the 1920s see Furness (1926; a copy of which is 
extant in KP LCE/3/60-73), Eastham (1936), Myers (1937), Fox (1974: chap. 1) and Hillman (2010: 
chaps. 2-4 ). 
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steadily absorbed. By the end of 1926 supplies had, indeed, reached a dangerously low 
level, and the price of the metal was correspondingly high. (CWK XII: 507) 
As Hillman (2010: 57-9) has shown, as from 1923 the latter opinion tended to 
prevail. However, the spell of rising prices subsequent to 1922 had stimulated new 
investments in the Federated Malay States, and it was not clear whether the new 
investments were filling a gap or creating surplus capacity. When Keynes wrote his note 
of September 1928, symptoms of a situation of overproduction were emerging. On the 
other hand, in Keynes’s writings, a doubt still remained in the Memorandum of August 
1929, while the existence of surplus capacity was clearly admitted only in the last report 
of September 1930.  
The intervention of the Malay and Netherlands Indies governments mentioned by 
Keynes began in December 1920 and was based on the Bandoeng Agreement, a scheme 
for the purchase and accumulation of tin during the period of depressed prices that 
followed upon the end of the war. According to Hillman (2010: 56), on its formation in 
1921 the pool held 19,700 ton of tin, amounting to 34 per cent of the world stocks. The 
Memorandum of April 1923 reported that 16,200 tons were still in this pool on the 1 of 
January 1923, being a part of a total world stock of 40,000 tons at the same date, 
concluding that, on the whole, ‘present stocks do not show much surplus over the 
working minimum of (say) 20,000 tons’ (CWK XII: 289). On supply, Keynes wrote that 
‘[t]he production of Tin in recent years has ranged approximately from 110,000 tons to 
125,000 tons per annum’ (CWK XII: 288), giving no indication about the trends in 
consumption and prices, but other commentators were less cautious. In January 1923, 
The Mining Journal was placing strong emphasis on the recent fall in the costs of 
production, arguing that, notwithstanding an average price of £159 10s. 6d. in 1922, 
against £165 6s. 6d. in 1921, ‘supplies were […] heavy’. The same article accounted for 
this situation with the increasing consumption in the United States, and a further 
increase in American demand expected to occur in 1923. The Mining Journal 
anticipated prices at around £220 or £230, and therefore high enough ‘to bring out these 
[of the Eastern Pool] stocks’.2 Eighteen months later, in June 1924, Keynes’s second 
Memorandum would confirm this outlook:  
world’s output in tin in the past six years has been very steady […] and does not at 
present show much response to higher prices. The falling-off in European consumption 
since 1913 has been balanced by increased consumption in the United States, which 
now takes about 60 per cent of world output. (CWK XII: 337-8) 
                                                 
2 Press cutting in KP LCE/3/9. 
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The liquidation of the Asian pool was one of the factors taken into consideration in 
adapting production to increased consumption, and Hillman has argued that ‘[s]ince the 
size of the [Bandoeng] pool was public, as was its release policy, the tin market could 
easily see the extent to which rising consumption was outstripping available production’ 
(2010: 57). However, evidence in the KP suggests that not all the adjustments of the 
release policy that were made along the way were promptly communicated to the 
market. The scheme for the liquidation of the Bandoeng pool was published in the same 
month, April 1923, as the first Memorandum, when the fall in prices had come to a halt 
and all signs suggested an outlook remaining positive for the near future. In the second 
Memorandum of June 1924, Keynes reported that sales had come to a momentary halt 
in April 1924, because the price was below the minimum fixed in the plan. Nonetheless, 
Keynes wrote that ‘[t]he whole quantity will have been released from the agreement by 
November 1924’ (CWK XII: 335). Again, in the July 1925 Memorandum Keynes 
affirmed that ‘[t]he whole quantity […] had been released from the agreement by 
November 1924, and had been actually sold by the end of the following month’ (CWK 
XII: 375) . However, in October 1925, Buckmaster & Moore informed Keynes that a 
residuum of 3985 tons still remained at the end of 1924, and that this amount had 
‘probably’ been ‘shipped in the first eight months of 1925’ (KP LCE/3/40). Meanwhile, 
in June 1924, Keynes’s own outlook had remained prudently concealed behind a 
quotation from the Engineering and Mining Journal, in which no clear position was 
taken as to the probable famine of tin (CWK XII: 337). In the ensuing issue of July 
1925, Keynes gave no indication of what the trend of prices would have been over the 
next future (CWK XII: 373-8). 
Quite possibly, Keynes’s reluctance in publishing his own forecasts reflected the ups 
and downs of his performance as a speculator, as that will be shown in Section 3, as 
well as some lack of transparency in the Bandoeng pool liquidation scheme. Along with 
these circumstances, however, other and more permanent reasons suggested that any 
attempt at forming a reasonable expectation as to the price of tin over the near future 
would have been very difficult. One of these reasons—which Keynes understood quite 
early—was that tin mining and the consumption of smelted tin were particularly 
inelastic, and even perfectly rigid within a large range of prices, while the demand for 
tin stocks tended to fall very rapidly as soon as stocks grew over a very low working 
minimum. Along the way, Keynes discovered a second and connected reason for this 
feature, namely the fact that the information on the level of existing stocks of tin was 
fundamentally unreliable. Taken together, these factors led to a situation in which price 
oscillations were at the same time extremely wide and very difficult to predict. 
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On the inelasticity of demand and supply, in July 1925, Keynes quoted from a report 
circulated by ‘A firm of stockbrokers’ (most likely Buckmaster & Moore): 
The cost of tin in the Straits is very low. The average company whose shares are quoted 
in the London Stock Exchange producing in the East has an all-in cost of less than £50 
per ton of black tin (60 per cent pure). The lowest producer of all is at £23 a ton. Even 
with tin at a price as low as £200 a ton these companies make very large profits and 
naturally turn out as much as their dredge capacity. There is, therefore, no need for fear 
that an increase in price will be followed by an increase in production. There are only a 
few negligible producers, such as the Cornish mines, whose production is much 
influenced by the price of the metal. Between 40 and 50 per cent of the tin consumed in 
this country, and a somewhat smaller percentage of that consumed in America, is in the 
tin plate trade, whose prosperity is in no way dependent on the price of tin. The demand 
for tin for other uses, such as in white metal bearings, is practically independent of the 
price. The future course of the price of tin will, therefore, be determined almost 
exclusively by the progress of consumption, and especially by the absorption in the 
United States. (CWK XII: 377-8)  
In the same Memorandum, Keynes observed that ‘violent price fluctuations ensue 
whenever the difference between the [production and consumption] has to be absorbed 
into or out of stocks’ (CWK XII: 377; see also 421) but offered no further clarification 
on this point. Quite plausibly, this was connected with the position of the smelters in the 
chain from mining to consumption. In fact, while the smelters usually financed the 
miners, sometimes through vertical integration but mainly through advances on the 
price of tin ore, no such relationship existed between the smelters and the consumers3. 
In addition to this, when tin in excess (be it in the form of tin ore or smelted tin) 
remained in the hands of the smelters, this surplus could not be easily disposed of 
through a fall in prices, because the demand for smelted tin was extremely inelastic. In 
this situation, smelters could find themselves in the position of having to finance large 
stocks of tin for a long time, and probably for this reason they had an interest in keeping 
their inventories at a very low level.  
In chapter 29 of the Treatise on Money Keynes offered an explanation of price 
volatility based on the supposedly high carrying costs of involuntarily held surplus 
stocks, which looks very much like a generalisation of the above hypothesis as to the 
possible reason why the tin smelters used to keep their inventories at a very low level. 
In particular, by identifying liquid capital with redundant stocks it is possible to account 
for the behaviour of agents, e.g. the tin smelters, whose choices are predominantly 
driven by the need to avoid/get rid of any accumulation of surplus stocks—even though, 
                                                 
3 See Eastham (1936: 15-6) and Fox (1974: 13). 
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obviously, there is no reason to suppose that Keynes’s generalization was exclusively 
based on the tin smelters. And the same could be said of Keynes’s definition of carrying 
costs, in which he included—along with interest charges, warehouse and insurance 
charges, and allowances for deterioration—the ‘[r]emuneration against the risk of 
changes in the money value of the commodity during the time through which it has to 
be carried by means of borrowed money’ (CWK VI: 121). Arguing on the basis of these 
definitions, Keynes explanation of commodity price volatility was that when 
involuntary stocks of any commodity accumulate, producers begin to sell at a very low 
price in order to get rid of inventories, and the more inelastic demand is and the higher 
the carrying costs (including the remuneration against risk), the lower the price will fall 
(CWK VI: 121-7; 129-30). 
In turn, this relates to the speculator’s point of view. Any variation in the level of 
stocks in the hands of smelters was a key indicator of the level of consumer demand, 
but, as Keynes showed, information on this indicator was by no means readily 
accessible. Keynes understood this difficulty during his editorship of the Memoranda. 
The earlier issues were based on data pertaining to the ‘visible supply’ of tin, but in the 
1926 report Keynes began to question these figures as ‘extremely misleading’ (CWK 
XII: 417) because, as he explained again in 1927 (CWK XII: 468), the ‘visible supply’ 
did not correspond to the stocks of tin actually available for consumption, for it included 
the tin ‘in transit’, or ‘afloat’. Moreover, Keynes introduced a distinction between 
stocks of tin concentrates withheld by the miners and the smelters’ stocks, with the 
further complication that some smelters were located far away from the consuming 
countries while others were not.  
In the 1927 Memorandum, Keynes published his own estimate of the stocks that had 
been readily available in the United Kingdom, United States, and Holland from January 
1923 to February 1927, coming to conclusion that inventories were rarely above the 
quantity needed for one month’s consumption. The February 1927 level represented an 
absolute minimum during the period: 3,962 tons against a ‘visible supply’ of 14,221 
tons and an average consumption of 10-11,000 tons per month. On the whole, this 
revealed a situation in which any small change in the levels of production and 
consumption could result in marked price fluctuations, and in which there was no 
widely accepted estimate of the level of stocks ready available for consumption.  
Keynes’s ongoing research on tin stocks influenced his outlook. As early as July 
1925, he had noticed that ‘in some cases, e.g. tin and rubber, the volume of stocks is 
now approaching the irreducible minimum’, and tin in particular was singled out as a 
very special case: ‘[i]t is not suggested that in all these cases production cannot be 
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increased if a substantial incentive is offered, except, perhaps, the production of tin’ 
(CWK XII: 359-60). Consistently with this analysis, the long-term outlook on tin was 
for a rise in prices. A few months later, on 29 October 1925, Keynes received a report 
(KP LCE/3/34) for private circulation by Buckmaster & Moore which amounted to a 
substantial confirmation of his outlook in the July Memorandum. Then, in the fourth 
Memorandum of February 1926, Keynes quoted almost verbatim from a Buckmaster & 
Moore report of 1 February to describe a situation in which everything depended on the 
trend in consumption : 
It hardly seems possible that enough tin can be found in 1926 to satisfy a consumption 
on as high a scale as in 1925. On the other hand, there will probably be more than 
enough tin to satisfy a consumption on the scale of the previous years. If consumption 
in 1926 shows signs of maintaining the 1925 level, the price may rise sensationally; but 
if it falls off to the level of 1924, the price may fall sensationally. (CWK XII: 421) 
Ten months later, Keynes’s private note of 1 December 1926 followed the same line 
of argument, focused on the trend of consumption in Europe and the United States. 
Keynes noted that the level of activity in Germany during 1926 had been unexpectedly 
low, while Britain’s weak demand had been mainly the result of the coal strike. Now 
that the coal strike was over and Germany was recovering, with no significant reduction 
in US demand in view, Keynes concluded that no fall in prices could be expected in 
1927. Most significantly, at this date Keynes still believed in the ‘longer period 
prospects of the exhaustion of Tin supplies over the next five years’ (KP LCE/3/115). 
Meanwhile, the tin market began to show a marked backwardation.4 In itself unusual, 
this was indirect confirmation of the dramatically low level of inventories, and a further 
obstacle in the way of adapting supply to increasing demand. As Keynes explained, the 
premium of the spot price over the future price ‘afforded a considerable incentive 
during the year to economize stocks of ore in the hands of smelters and stocks of tin in 
the hands of consumers, with the result that the real excess of current consumption over 
current production has probably been somewhat greater than has appeared’ (CWK XII: 
474). These remarks are followed by a gap in the papers until June 1928, when 
Keynes’s long-term outlook on the tin fundamentals had begun to change. Then, in ‘The 
production and consumption of Tin’ of September 1928, Keynes observed that even 
with consumption at a very satisfactory level, output was running too fast: ‘Since April, 
1928, production has been definitely ahead of consumption in spite of the very 
satisfactory level of the latter’ (CWK XII: 507-8). In August 1929 (sixth Memorandum) 
                                                 
4 A ‘backwardation’ corresponds to an excess of the spot price over the forward price, the opposite 
situation being a ‘contango’. 
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Keynes registered an increasing level of liquid stocks (12,046 tons), which after the 
very low levels of 1927 and 1928 (3,962 and 2,876 respectively) looked much like a 
step back to normality, but was in fact the beginning of the long depression that lead to 
the cartelization of the tin industry after 1929. Only in September 1930, when restriction 
schemes were already under way, was the existence of surplus capacity taken for 
granted in Keynes’s seventh Memorandum. 
The last two Memoranda also made reference to the existence of a private pool for 
the manipulation of prices that had been in operation in 1928 and 1929. This is 
revealing, for it offers a further reason—barely mentioned in Keynes’s analysis but very 
clear in the papers related to his investments—why tin represented a very special case 
among staple commodities. In itself, the very low level of tin stocks, usually below one-
month consumption and sometimes as low as ten-day consumption, made the tin market 
rather susceptible of manipulations, because any small amount of privately owned 
stocks could suffice to exert an influence on prices. In addition, the very low level of 
daily tin turnover in the LME was a further element in favour of manipulation. This 
aspect, almost completely overlooked in Keynes’s writings, has been noted in the 
literature (Gibson-Jarvie 1976; Hillman 2010) and finds further original confirmation in 
the KP. However, before the ‘bull pool’ mentioned in the Memoranda, there had been at 
least one other bull pool, in which Keynes himself took a share in May 1925.  
The information we have about this episode is far from complete but of some 
interest. We know that Keynes entered the pool when it was formed on 14 May 1925, 
that his maximum quota of 266 tons was 1/11 of the total amount (KP SE/2/5/95), and 
that the participants aimed at exerting an influence on the market, preventing any fall in 
prices while waiting for the boom to come. But we do not know if it was a success, nor 
is it clear how long it lasted. The pool is mentioned in Keynes’s correspondence up to 
August 1925. Then there is a gap in the correspondence, while in the later 
correspondence that exists for the period from February 1926 onwards no reference to 
the existence of a pool can be found. Only a few members of the pool are mentioned in 
the KP, but we know that, along with Keynes’s friends and associates like Oswald Falk 
and Rupert Trouton, one who certainly took part in the operations was Jack Budd, the 
son of Cecil Budd. 
Cecil Budd has been described as ‘the British government main interlocutor on 
nonferrous metals’ (Ball 2004: 459). After a career in Vivian Younger & Bond, Budd 
became chairman of the LME in 1902, and then the Minister of Munitions during the 
war. He was the first managing director of the British Metal Corporation (BMC), when 
it was formed in November 1918, with the aim of putting the supply of tin from within 
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the empire directly under British control, while at the same time reducing the German 
influence (Harrison 1959; Ball 2004). In 1929 Cecil Budd retired, leaving the BMC to a 
triumvirate of three managing directors. His son Jack was one of them. 
Fragments of the correspondence between Keynes and his associates show how the 
pool operated day by day. For instance, on 15 May 1925 someone from the Buckmaster 
& Moore office in London informed Keynes that ‘[t]o-day Falk was away and Trouton 
and I had to arrange a plan of campaign with Jack Budd’. The plan went thus: ‘We 
decided that he [Jack Budd] should buy up to 200 tons or in an emergency up to 300, 
the former with the object of putting up the price £1, the latter in order to avoid a crash’ 
(KP SE/2/5/87). Keynes’s correspondence with Falk gives us the general outline of the 
pool strategy as it was decided in June. On 28 May Keynes wrote:  
[…] it may be important to have plenty of ammunition on Tuesday. I suggest that the 
present members of the Pool be asked to agree to an increase of 500 tons in the Pool 
maximum, pending additional resources obtained from elsewhere. […] On the other 
hand, there is, in my opinion, something to be said for stopping where we are and 
buying no more for the present, but taking tin steadily off the market we now have 
enough to be almost sure of producing an impression in time. If we buy more, we 
diminish our strength to hold tin in a falling market. We must not get into our heads that 
it is in any way [unreadable word, perhaps ‘important’] for tin to be at any given level 
of height quickly. (KP SE/2/5/97-8) 
The question was settled on June 2, when Keynes received a letter from the broker: 
I had a note from Falk this morning, in which he says that he and Trouton agree that our 
best plan is to hold the tin we have got and wait for America and the bears to buy. Then, 
if we are right about fundamentals, we shall win in the end. We must make sure that we 
can see tin down a long way, and avoid if possible selling to encourage the bears. (KP 
SE/2/5/113) 
Other details could be gleaned from the KP, but nothing that can tell us if and when 
the members of the pool did ‘win in the end’. The trend of prices showed as from May 
1925 suggests that they probably did. Prices of tin, cash and three months, were £243 
and £246 respectively when the bull pool was formed: they had risen above £280 by the 
end of the year and never fell back to the May 1925 level until 1928. On the other hand, 
the cost of seeing ‘tin down a long way’ remains unknown, and the peak in prices was 
reached only 17 months after the formation of the pool, in October 1926. But what is 
probably more interesting in analysing Keynes’s overall investments in tin during the 
1920s is that, notwithstanding his personal skills as an economist and his sound 
information as a market analyst, and despite his good connections in London and his 
share in the pool, Keynes did not make very much out of his investments. As we will 
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see in the remaining part of the paper, Keynes took a series of ill-timed decisions. This 
resulted in heavy losses that eventually wiped out the bulk of the profits he had realized 
during the market upswing. Not even a well-informed and well-connected investor like 
Keynes could succeed in coming to terms with the extreme volatility of the tin market, 
and even the huge profit that he made during the 1926 boom was swallowed by the 
losses that came after 1927.  
 
 
3. Keynes’s dealings 
Keynes’s dealings in tin began in September 1921 and went on almost 
uninterruptedly until 1930. The ledgers reveal that tin took the largest share in Keynes’s 
commodities portfolio during the 1920s, representing 48 per cent of the whole value of 
Keynes’s purchases—the second largest commodity being cotton, which accounted for 
12 per cent only.  
The correspondence with the broker reveals an earlier phase of ‘learning-by-doing’, 
Keynes simply getting an idea of how the market worked, and then a few years of 
bullish expectations in tune with the market sentiment. Then, after four years of 
considerable exposure to market volatility, with cyclical depletion of the profits made 
during the upswings, Keynes developed two different strategies: first of all, we see a 
clear pattern emerging as from the end of 1924 onwards, when Keynes started hedging 
his long positions by means of put options (and ‘seller’s options to double’, as explained 
below). Later on, in May 1925 he joined the pool, and so was able to exploit (rather than 
being exposed to) information asymmetries, at the same time reducing the risk of 
exposure to downswings while betting on a boom. It is not easy to assess the impact of 
the pool on Keynes’s performance and behaviour. We can observe, however, that 
Keynes made appreciable profits between May and December 1925, in a context of 
steadily surging prices, possibly influenced by the pool itself. Then some minor losses 
came during a momentary fall in prices in the first half of 1925. Finally, in the ensuing 
period the boom the market had been expecting eventually took place, with prices 
reaching their peak between September and October 1926. Meanwhile, favoured by the 
period of backwardation, Keynes began to take delivery on some of his futures and to 
stock tin in the LME warehouses, thus moving part of his operations onto the spot 
market. By means of this technique, Keynes was able to extend the time horizon of his 
speculations beyond the three months of a standard future contract, with substantial 
returns in most of the cases. By the end of this crucial period, Keynes aggregate profit 
had topped £17,000, thanks mainly to the gains made during the 1926 boom, but, as 
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soon as prices fell off their peak, Keynes started losing money. Showing some 
indecision, he first reacted by changing the composition of his long bet into options 
rather than futures, but the downswing proved to be persistent. Consequently, albeit 
with a certain delay, Keynes stepped off the market while continuing to incur in 
considerable losses.5  
A relevant aspect of the market is the ample use that could be made of options, in 
the form of call, put, and double options, buyer’s option to double (BOD), and seller’s 
option to double (SOD). This cannot be gleaned from The Times archive, probably 
because options were dealt in only over the counter, but is apparent in the KP. 
Classically, a future contract entailed the obligation to buy or sell a specified quantity at 
a fixed price on a specific date, a call (put) option permitted its holder to purchase (sell) 
a specific amount of tin at a predetermined price (the strike price, or ‘basis’, as reported 
in the KP) on or before the expiration date of the contract, and a double option was a 
combination of a put and a call. All these conventional options were connected with the 
‘three months’ price, which was their strike price, while the BOD and SOD strike prices 
respectively stood at a premium and a discount on the three months prices. A 
handwritten letter in the KP explains what a BOD was:  
In exchange for a sum at present about £3 over the forward price for tin the buyer 
purchases tin much like the ordinary forward purchase but has the additional right to 
double the amount he takes or not, as he pleases, having to notify 3 days before the end 
of the 3 months what his intention is.6  
The explanation of a SOD option is summed up in another letter that Keynes 
received from the broker:  
                                                 
5 Unless explicitly stated, all estimates of Keynes’s profits and losses given in this paper were derived 
from the data available in Keynes’s ledgers. In a simple accountancy scheme, Keynes’s ledgers 
recorded the purchases on the left-hand side and the sales on the right-hand side, with the 
corresponding date and prices. Crosschecking with other archival material confirmed that this source is 
satisfactorily reliable and complete. In particular, all the transactions documented in the correspondence 
with Buckmaster & Moore are recorded in the ledgers (while there are transactions in the ledgers of 
which no trace has remained in the correspondence). Moreover, the data available in the ledgers are 
perfectly consistent with Keynes’s position as it can be reconstructed through the weekly statements of 
account the Tilton Company. Our estimates of Keynes’s profits are also compatible with, though not 
perfectly corresponding to, the estimates reported in the Tilton papers. However, as Tilton Co. was 
created only in April 1926, such comparison could not be made for the previous period. As neither 
brokerage fees nor interest costs are recorded in the ledgers, all the figures that appear in this paper 
indicate gross profits (losses). From the correspondence with the broker we learn that brokerage fees 
amounted to 0,1 per cent on each transaction and that the required margin on each position was quite 
low, varying from 20 per cent of the negligible positions at the very beginning of Keynes’s dealings in 
tin and other non-ferrous metals to a more prudent 30 per cent throughout the period. 
6 Handwritten letter, undated and unsigned (KP SE/2/1/126-7). 
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If you buy an SOD you get the tin cheap but you give the seller the right to put an 
equivalent amount on you if the price falls. That is to say you get your tin cheaper if you 
are prepared to run the risk of having double the amount if the market goes against you 
[…] if you sell an SOD […] you sell the tin for a low price with the option of selling 
double the amount if the price goes in your favour.7 
In figure 1, Keynes’s dealings are shown in detail, drawing upon the data available 
in the ledgers. The figure presents a week-by-week account of Keynes’s open interest, 
divided by type of contract and by long (positive y-axis) or short (negative y-axis) 
positions, offering an overview of the complete history of Keynes’s speculation in tin 
over the period 1921-1930 which will serve as basis and reference point in the 
remainder of the paper.  
 
  
Keynes’s first purchase was a three months future on 45 tons of December tin which 
he continued for a further three months on December 2, seventeen days before delivery, 
gaining a difference of £371 5s. On 19 January1922, Keynes decided to sell his March 
tin in advance, at a small loss, and bought a BOD on a higher quantity—65 tons. With 
prices rising from £156 in September 1921 to £166 in January 1922, Keynes may well 
have thought that a further rise was to be expected in the first part of 1922, and an 
upswing eventually occurred, but only in third quarter of the year, when cash tin rose 
above £170 and Keynes had already exited the market. The loss on the first BOD 
                                                 
7 Dated 11 December 1924 (KP SE/2/4/195-6).  
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amounted to £1,551.5s. Possibly for this reason, a third and less risky way of betting on 
a price rise was inaugurated on 7 April, when Keynes bought a call option on which he 
earned a difference of £48. Keynes also attempted a bolder strategy: on the same day his 
first BOD was closed at a heavy loss, he bought another BOD, this time on 50 tons. The 
new BOD was exercised on its last day, gaining a gross profit of £278. Keynes then 
rolled over the same position, this time with a gross profit of £550. Thus, on 7 October 
1922, when Keynes exited from the market, his tin account registered a small gain of 
about £265.  
At that time, prices—both cash and three months—were around £164, while the 
trend had on the whole been positive since March, when tin had bottomed at £142. This 
was just the beginning of the long period of unstably rising prices that would top £300 
in October 1926. Apparently, it was very difficult to guess when it was the time to step 
in and when it was better to keep out of the market. The loss on the first BOD had 
shown Keynes that sound mid-term expectations could easily be frustrated by short-
term volatility. But there was also the opposite problem. For instance, from October 
1922 to March 1923 tin prices rose steadily and fast from around £164 to £225 (three 
months), and Keynes took advantage of this favourable situation, making a profit of 
£1,253 simply by buying a call option on 50 tons on 4 December 1922, closing it on 
February 28 and doing nothing else before May. On the other hand, following a less 
conservative strategy, he could have gained much more.  
Meanwhile, the trial and error process was continuing. In May 1923, one month 
after editing the first Memorandum, Keynes tried a new strategy, buying a future on 25 
tons and a double option on the same amount. He repeated this operation in June, 
probably trying to create a combination of contracts that could work as a BOD in the 
case of a rise in prices, while limiting the losses in the opposite situation. In the end, the 
small losses that came from these dealings (£58) were offset by a gain of £300 on an 
ordinary call option on 50 tons bought on 21 June. Keynes rolled over and increased his 
position in October, with an additional purchase of 25-tons futures. Closing these 
contracts in December, Keynes realized a gross profit of £2,506, and decide to roll over 
the same position three months hence, realising another good difference (£2,635). At the 
beginning of 1924 Keynes was making money with tin, and as from March 1924 his 
long position began to grow to an unprecedented level. While Keynes as an analyst was 
still cautious in his assessments of market prospects, his speculation reveals that his 
expectations were undoubtedly bullish. 
This behaviour seems consistent with the scenario that Keynes was observing. 
Consumption was still growing faster than production, and even if the liquidation of the 
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Bandoeng pool probably hindered the surge in prices it also represented a built-in 
mechanism that decreased the probability of too rapid a fall: had prices dropped below a 
certain threshold,8 the monthly supply would accordingly have fallen by 880 tons. 
Therefore, Keynes kept staying long, and only at the end of 1924 did he begin to hedge 
his growing long positions systematically. This may have been due to the fact that the 
liquidation scheme of the Bandoeng pool was expected to be over by January 1925: the 
exhaustion of the pool created the conditions for a faster growth of prices, at the same 
time depriving speculators of the reassuring mechanism described above; another 
possibility is that Keynes began to hedge his long position in December 1924 because 
his open interest was growing much higher than ever before, thus entailing a heavier 
burden for him.  
The first of three major cycles of investments started on 20 March 1924 with a 
purchase of five call options, four BODs, and two futures, continued in May with the 
purchase of three more BODs, and was not a success. Early in August, Keynes had 
incurred an aggregate loss of approximately £2,700. In the second cycle, Keynes rolled 
over to November the BODs bought in May for delivery in August, made another 
purchase in September, and did nothing in October. Thus, at the beginning of 
November, Keynes’s open interest included two futures on the same month and two 
BODs plus two call options on December: these positions resulted in a gain of over 
£2,000. Then, during the third cycle (December 1924-March 1925) Keynes’s open 
interest almost doubled, a considerable risk compensated for with a combination of 
futures and SODs, the latter type of contracts being, in the words of the broker, ‘a hedge 
against your straight tin’: during December, Keynes sold 150 tons SOD for delivery in 
March as a hedge against corresponding purchases of 300 tons futures on March. Early 
in March the price fell below £250, so the use of SODs as a hedge proved to be a happy 
idea. Keynes’s loss was around £1,800, but would have exceeded £5,000 without 
hedging.  
Bullish expectations, apparently based on sound mid-term considerations about the 
state of demand and supply, were producing alternate results. On the whole, by March 
1925 Keynes had lost all the profits made since September 1923 and the cumulative 
account of his speculations on 29 May 1925 was negative at around minus 300£. The 
end of this earlier phase coincided with the change in the tin section of the Memoranda, 
when Keynes became increasingly sceptical about the quality of the available 
information on stocks, and this entailed new doubts and uncertainty. Therefore, with 
                                                 
8 In the early 1923, Keynes’s sources indicated that the threshold was probably around £230 (KP 
LCE/3/9). 
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negative profits up to date and an obvious dilemma between risk and profitability, it 
does not come as unexpected that Keynes joined a pool in May 1925. In a narrow 
market such as tin, a relatively wide pool could provide insurance against volatility by 
managing it through market operations drawing upon good quality information from 
insiders. As it happened, Keynes’s tin account had turned from a loss before the pool to 
a cumulative profit of about £5,000 by the end of December 1925, on top of a rising 
pattern of prices that was followed by a momentary decline in early 1926. We can rule 
out the possibility that Keynes’s pool could have determined the positive trend that 
lasted until December 1925, but it could certainly have reduced volatility along the 
trend. Compared with the 19,000 tons of the Bandoeng pool, its size—almost 3,000 
tons9—was relatively small, but not negligible in a context in which the stocks available 
for consumption sometimes dipped below 3,000 tons. Accordingly, from May to 
December 1925, the operations outside the pool,10 which we can trace in the ledgers, 
provided Keynes with an outstanding positive difference of more than £8,500, the 
outcome of a strategy predominantly based on a long exposure of about 400 tons split 
between futures (from 225 to 325 tons) and options (call and BOD), hedged by a 
relatively small amount of put options.  
Despite the pool, however, hedging by means of options grew in the third quarter of 
1925, when Keynes bought put options for about £1,700, probably also as a 
consequence of the state of growing uncertainty that would emerge in the Memorandum 
of February 1926. Keynes attributed quite a substantial value to his hedging policy—
which eventually would prove pointless, as Keynes had to drop these options incurring 
the corresponding losses. In any case, this was the cycle when Keynes’s strategy paid 
off better than ever: his long positions afforded him a positive difference of more than 
£8,000, of which more than £3,000 came from the liquidation of 200 tons spot: for 
example, on 26 November 1925 Keynes bought 150 of tons due on 5 March 1926 at a 
price of £281, accepted delivery and then sold the whole amount on the spot market, in 
tranches of 10 or 25 tons at prices of even £320 when the backwardation was at its peak. 
He concluded the liquidation of this amount a year later, in November 1926. This 
successful strategy was carried through in the first part of 1927, when world production 
was shrinking despite the boom in prices, depleting stocks and allowing for further 
                                                 
9 Keynes’s quota amounted to 266 tons, corresponding to one eleventh of the pool.  
10 The ledgers provide an account of Keynes’s personal movements, which in a very few cases were ‘from 
the pool’, while we scarcely have any evidence of the pool operations, except for some documents that 
cover the period until 30 July 1925 (See KP SE/2/5). 
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appreciation coupled with backwardation.11 By carrying substantial amounts of stocks 
in the LME warehouses and selling them spot when the price was high enough, Keynes 
made good profits, even if discounted for the fees required by the London Metal 
Exchange for use of its facilities, which seem to have been fairly modest.12 
Before the boom at the end of 1926, however, the first part of 1926 had provided 
another example of tin market unpredictability. Keynes ended August losing about 
£2,300 on a substantial bull position opened before and during a temporary fall in 
prices. As there was no timely inversion in the price trend, and in order to limit the 
losses, Keynes later decided to buy some put options—just in time to witness a dramatic 
upswing leading to the original price level and to further losses for Keynes. Then, the 
long expected boom came underway. At this time, in the last part of 1926, Keynes’s 
open interest was composed of nine different futures due on October and December, for 
a total amount of 200 tons, and two calls, due on November and December, for a total 
amount of 50 tons. Keynes also stopped hedging until 1927. On the first tranche of 
futures, with delivery in October, he ended up completely offsetting the losses of the 
first cycle, gaining around £6,000. Prices, in fact, reached their peak (£310 as an 
average level) in the third quarter of 1926. By the end of this period, Keynes’s 
cumulative profit topped £17,000—the highest value that he was able to reach over the 
whole decade. A document in the Tilton papers dated 15 December 1925 (KP 
TC/4/1/84), confirms that a large part of this cumulative profit, £10,528, came from 
positions that were opened in a period of eight months subsequent to the creation of the 
Company.  
As shown in Section 2, the crucial issue at this point was to guess whether the peak 
of prices was just a momentary boom or part of a longer trend leading to the exhaustion 
of the world supply of tin, as predicted in many quarters during the 1920s. In this 
connection, Keynes opened a smaller cycle in December 1926 on March 1927, when he 
rolled over his long position, this time hedging it by means of a put option on 10 tons 
and a SOD on 50 tons. It seems that Keynes feared that the downswing in prices would 
further continue, as eventually proved to be the case in January 1927, before prices 
started raising again in March: the put options purchased in March were not taken up 
and Keynes made a profit on his long positions of about £900. 1927 was also the year in 
                                                 
11 ‘Throughout 1926 and 1927, the average premium paid for spot over forward was around £6/16/-, 
rising on occasion to as much as £17’ (Hillman 2010: 58; see also CWK XII: 473 and 602). Our data 
substantially confirm the average level of backwardation, while the maximum level we could find is 
higher at over £22 on 15 October 1926. 
12 The amounts reported in the correspondence with the broker during the pool were negligible. As a 
matter of example, two pool warrants on 50 tons each reported rents of £7 and £16, the latter probably 
corresponding to a longer (but not specified) period of storage than the former (KP/SE/2/5).  
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which Keynes published the first Memorandum with assessment of ready available 
stocks, having raised serious doubts about the visible stocks data in 1926. Probably as a 
consequence of a more uncertain long run outlook and of his doubts about stocks data, 
Keynes became a little more cautious, shifting towards call options although raising his 
aggregate long position at the same time. Eventually, no further significant surge took 
place and, from April 1927, the price trend inverted, now showing a fairly steady 
decline punctuated by momentary increases instead of the positive trend interrupted by 
momentary falls that had prevailed so far. Along this trend, tin fell from about £298 on 
1 April 1927 to £198 in May 1929, the only appreciable interruption coming in the 
period July-November 1928.  
Meanwhile, in May-June 1927 Keynes’s open interest was again quite considerable, 
reaching 350 tons long, of which 125 futures. These positions resulted in some losses. 
Then, in August and September 1927, Keynes greatly reduced his long position as 
prices fell sharply. In doing so, his losses exceeded £5,000. In November, while 
experiencing the fall in his cumulative profits, Keynes continued the liquidation of his 
open interest up to April 1928, when was left with no open positions at all. However, it 
was not last long before Keynes came back on the market, buying a call option, two 
BODs and a double option with delivery date between July and August 1928. However, 
he ended up losing about £1000, choosing to sell off his options well before their date of 
expiration, most likely fearing a further fall in prices. What Keynes could not know was 
that the downward trend of 1928 would be letting up for a spell, right from July to 
November, when prices rose by £20, most likely consequent upon the intervention of a 
bull pool, as was to emerge only at the end of 1928.13  
In September 1928 Keynes wrote: ‘The present weakness of the market may become 
more accentuated, but it is essentially a passing phase due to new dredger production 
having matured a little faster than is wise’ (CWK XII: 512, quoted in Hillman 2010: 
90), and this offered a clue to Keynes’s behaviour on the market. From July 1928, 
Keynes had gone short but he had to close the bulk of his positions early because of the 
temporary surge in prices due to the distortive intervention of the above-mentioned 
pool. However, Keynes did not reconsider his short bet until much later in the year. 
Then, Keynes exited from the market for about a year, while prices were continuing to 
drop steadily. On stepping in again, from April 1930, he acquired a bull position for 
about 185 tons, probably considering at the on-going cartelization, but again closed 
these contracts at a loss of about £1,800. This was the last episode in Keynes’s 
                                                 
13 Howeson’s pool (see Hillman 2010: 91). Keynes’s only reference to the bull pool is that of August 
1929 (CWK XII: 537).  
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speculation in the tin market as studied in the present analysis. At this point, Keynes’s 
gross nominal profit on the whole period covered in this paper came to £4,613. This is 
indirectly confirmed in the papers of Tilton Company: of the £10,528 registered after 
the first 8 months, in December 1926, only £919 were left in February 1929. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
Keynes’s analysis and direct experience of the tin market are on the whole 
indicative of a highly specific, and in some ways extreme speculation context. The tin 
branch of the LME during the 1920s was far from showing the characteristics that 
textbooks on organized markets usually prescribe. Rather, it was a very imperfect 
market, with limited sources of supply, a relatively low number of buyers and sellers, 
imperfect information, and even attempts at manipulating prices. Moreover, the usually 
very low level of stocks and limited access to relevant information about inventories, 
together with the high volatility of prices and limited time horizon provided for with the 
standard ‘three months’ futures contract and connected options, concurred in making 
speculation in tin a potentially very profitable but in practice very complex and risky 
endeavour. Keynes’s dealings represent an interesting case-study in this respect. He 
certainly was a competent and relatively well-informed speculator, and could also avail 
himself of good connections in the industry and the LME. Nonetheless, his decisions 
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about when to step in or out of the market were frequently ill-timed, and he was 
continually exposed to heavy losses even when his outlook proved on the whole correct. 
Without the hedging techniques afforded by the wide range of available options (and, 
possibly, without entering a pool), Keynes would probably have kept his open interest at 
a lower level. Otherwise, he might have incurred heavy losses. More specifically, 
Keynes’s behaviour reveals a pattern, which seems to emerge after 1924, when he 
began to cover his long positions with more or less marked (and costly) forms of 
hedging. This continual modification of the mix of contracts employed, in the attempt to 
apply long/mid-term expectations to short period volatility, is consistent with Keynes’s 
analysis. In particular, we noticed that the increasing use of hedging ran parallel to a 
growing concern about the scanty available information on inventories. However, it is 
worth noting that neither the more refined investment techniques elaborated during the 
period nor Keynes’s in-depth analysis of market fundamentals sufficed to constitute 
superior performance. In the end, about 60 per cent of his highest cumulative profits 
over the whole period (£10,500 on £17,000) came between May 1925 and December 
1926—that is, when Keynes’s pool was active and during a generalized boom in prices. 
Subsequently much of this profit dwindled away.  
Another plausible conclusion to this paper is that, compared to his dealings as a 
speculator, Keynes’s analysis of the tin market might have been more fruitful. It is in 
fact possible, and even probable, that Keynes’s experience with tin offered much of the 
evidence upon which the analysis of commodity prices volatility in chapter 29 of the 
Treatise on Money was based. As we saw in section 2 above, the very low level of 
working stocks, the particularly marked rigidity of supply and demand, and the high 
carrying costs (including the remuneration against price risk), made of tin a sort of 
extreme case of the relation between redundant stocks (‘liquid capital’) and price 
variations. On this point, however, and just because tin was an extreme case, it would be 
well worth also evaluating what Keynes could learn from his speculation in other 
commodities, like cotton and wheat among crops, lead and copper amongst non-ferrous 
metals, all of which had a section in the Memoranda and a significant part in Keynes’s 
portfolio.  
On the other hand, and just because tin was such a limiting case of Keynes’s theory, 
it may well be worth noting what this theory has to say about the tin industry before 
regulation set in during the 1930s. In this respect, chapter 29 of the Treatise on Money 
and Keynes’s own specific analysis of the tin industry in the lesser known textual 
evidence, such as the sections on tin in the Memoranda and related papers in the KP, 
seem to suggest that a more detailed analysis of the smelting branch of the tin industry 
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could be of some help. While most of the analysis and historical reconstruction from 
Furness (1926) to Hillman (2010) has put a great deal of emphasis, on one hand, on tin 
mining and, on the other hand, on the consumption of tin, the intermediate process of 
smelting might have not received all the attention it would deserve. In fact, in the 
perspective that can be derived from Keynes, the smelters’ decisions on inventories 
could generate wide price variations over the short period, thus determining a situation 
of great uncertainty as to the use that could be made of prices as an appropriate indicator 
of the relative scarcity of tin in the long run.  
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An analysis of Keynes’s investments in the wheat futures 
markets: 1925-1935 
Tiziana Foresti and Eleonora Sanfilippo 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Between 1914 and the late 1930s Keynes carried out increasingly intense investment 
activity on the foreign exchange, securities and commodity markets, operating on his 
own behalf and on that of many institutions (Moggridge 1983). It was during those 
times, on the basis of his first-hand knowledge of speculative behaviour, that Keynes 
worked out a theory of speculation, which we find dispersedly in his published writings 
(Keynes 1923, 1930). This theory, known as the theory of ‘normal backwardation’, was 
elaborated by Keynes with particular reference to the functioning of commodity futures 
markets.1  
Keynes’s theoretical interest in commodity markets arose from the need to account 
for the great price fluctuations which occurred in the years immediately after World 
War I. Following in the tracks of Emery (1896), Keynes2 saw organized markets as 
having emerged to meet the demand for hedging transactions against risk of price 
changes. In particular, Keynes grounded his speculation theory on producers’ and 
speculators’ different attitudes towards risk. In his own words: ‘What the producer 
requires of speculator is not so much someone who knows better than he does the future 
prospects of cotton, as someone who will take off his shoulders at reasonable 
probability of profit such part of the risk as he cannot afford to bear himself’ (Keynes 
                                                 
 Tiziana Foresti (University of Rome, La Sapienza), Eleonora Sanfilippo (University of Cassino). We 
wish to thank our referees, Carlo Cristiano and Fabio Bientinesi for their comments as well as all the 
participants in the research project PRIN 2008 on ‘The return to Keynes. Speculation and stabilizing 
policies: money and commodities’, and in particular Luca Fantacci, Cristina Marcuzzo and Annalisa 
Rosselli for their useful suggestions. We are also very grateful to Nicolò Cavalli for his precious help. 
We are, finally, very indebted to Paolo Paesani without whom this paper would have never been 
written. All remaining errors and mistakes are our own responsibility. 
1 The literature on the theory of ‘normal backwardation’ is quite extensive. For a full reconstruction of the 
evolution of this theory in Keynes’s writings see Fantacci, Marcuzzo and Sanfilippo (2010). For a 
detailed analysis of Keynes’s different views on speculation and the theoretical debate on the subject 
see Marcuzzo (2012), and Cristiano and Paesani (2012) both in this volume. 
2 Keynes’s first encounter with Emery’s Speculation on the Produce and Stock Exchanges of the United 
States (1896) dated back to the Autumn of 1905, during his economic apprenticeship with Marshall 
(Raffaelli 2000: 128). 
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1923: 262). In Keynes’s view, under the hypothesis that producers and speculators 
shared common expectations, ‘for the sake of certainty the producer, not unnaturally, is 
prepared to accept a somewhat lower price in advance than what, on the balance of 
probability, he thinks the price is likely to be when the time comes’ (Keynes 1923: 261).  
Backwardation is an excess of the current spot price over the forward price, which 
represents remuneration for the speculator’s risk-bearing (Keynes 1923: 263).3  
In the Treatise on Money (CWK VI: 128), Keynes distinguished between a 
backwardation due to an abnormal shortage of supply, and a ‘normal backwardation’,4 
which instead occurs when supply and demand are balanced (i.e. under ‘normal 
conditions’).5 When current market conditions are not normal, as in the case of 
redundant stocks, ‘the forward price [rises] above the spot price […] This contango 
must be equal to the cost of the warehouse, depreciation and interest charges of carrying 
the stocks’ (CWK VI: 129). In this framework, speculation emerges as a long-run 
activity, based on continual renewal of long positions,6 finalized to earn profits by 
averaging out results over different years.  
The link between this theoretical representation of speculative behaviour and 
Keynes’s own practice as an investor in commodity markets is a deep and complex one, 
and mutual influences certainly exist between them. This paper aims to provide a 
contribution to investigation into this relation, focusing on Keynes’s transactions on the 
wheat futures markets.7 
The fact that Keynes traded on four different market places (Chicago, Winnipeg, 
Liverpool and Buenos Aires) makes analysis of his investments in this commodity 
particularly interesting and affords us full appreciation of the variety of his investment 
strategy and its evolution through time.8  
This research develops upon Fantacci et al. (2010), our main reference study, along 
three broad lines. First, we consider the entirety of Keynes’s operations, between 1925 
                                                 
3 Keynes underlines that: ‘The fact that there is a “backwardation” in the price of a commodity […] is not 
necessarily an indication that the market takes a “bearish” view of the price prospects’ (Keynes 1923: 
262). 
4 According to Blau (1944: 23) ‘a state of affairs corresponding to the Keynesian theory of the “normal 
backwardation” is not more than one of many possible constellations in the futures market, and there is 
no reason to assume that it is the most probable one’.  
5 Hicks (1939: 138) interpreted Keynes’s normal conditions as those in which ‘demand and supply 
conditions are expected to remain unchanged’. 
6 This behaviour describes a roll-over strategy (see section 4 below). 
7 For analysis of Keynes’s trading on the tin and cotton markets, see respectively Cavalli and Cristiano 
(2012), and Cristiano and Naldi (2012) both in this volume. 
8 It is worth noting that during the 1930s wheat acquired a growing weight in Keynes’s portfolio, reaching 
by June 1937 the quota of 34 per cent of the total of his commodity investments (Fantacci et al. 2010: 5 
fn. 7). 
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and 1935, whereas Fantacci et al. (2010) concentrated on May-September 1937. 
Second, we reconstruct Keynes’s trading activity on the wheat futures markets, building 
on a larger number of sources. These include unpublished archival material like 
Keynes’s ledgers and papers relating to the Tilton Company,9 and the correspondence 
with his broker Buckmaster & Moore and with Walter Case, an American banker. 
Third, we employ data on spot and future prices for a better understanding of Keynes’s 
investment strategy. These data are mainly drawn from George Bromhall’s Corn Trade 
News,10 one of Keynes’s main sources of information. In fact, explicit references by 
Keynes to this bulletin appear not only in the Special Memoranda on Stocks of Staple 
Commodities (Keynes 1923-30) but also in the 1937 correspondence with Kahn (Kahn 
Papers, RFK/13/57/223-24) attesting to the fact that Keynes took the Corn Trade News 
as a reliable source on the wheat market over time. 
The interval of time considered in this analysis is mainly the decade 1925-35, 
although we also provide some insights into Keynes’s dealings beyond 1935, and more 
precisely up to August 1936. The main source from which we have drawn the relevant 
information about dates, quantities, maturities, prices, markets and the kind of 
operations (forward sales or purchases) performed by Keynes are his ledgers (Keynes 
Papers,11 KP hereafter, SE/11/2/31, 37, 55, 59 and 60), which exactly cover the period 
1925-35. The papers relating to the Tilton Company (KP, TC/1-4) represent a 
subsidiary source (which proved particularly useful to check the operations recorded in 
the ledgers) and offer data on open positions and book and realized profits and losses. In 
fact, although the opening and closing of the same position are recorded on the same 
line in the ledgers, the handwriting or material mistakes made by Keynes occasionally 
give rise to some doubts or difficulties in interpretation: in these cases the weekly 
statements of the Tilton Company have been fundamental to correct certain ambiguous 
or erroneous dates, prices, or month of delivery. This was the case especially for the 
operations conducted by Keynes from July 1931 to November 1932 (KP, SE/11/2/55), 
exact reconstruction of which would have been hard without cross-checking the 
information contained in the ledgers with that contained in the Tilton Company 
accounts for the same period (KP, TC/4/2/88-156). Furthermore, the Tilton Company 
                                                 
9 This is the company created by Keynes in 1926, for the management of part of his own wealth, through 
which he specifically operated in the commodity futures markets (CWK XII: 9). 
10 The Corn Trade News, a daily review of the grain trade, was founded in 1888 by George Broomhall 
(1857-1938), a grain broker based in Liverpool. Starting as a small local sheet, in few years it became 
one of the leading world sources of information on the grain market. It provided tables with prices (spot 
and future) on the different markets, volume of productions, shipments, and a reliable and highly 
considered grain trade weekly review on market prospects written by Broomhall himself (Corn Trade 
News, Jubilee Issue, 1938: 5-7). 
11 The Keynes Papers are kept at King’s College, Modern Archives, Cambridge, UK. 
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statements represent the sole source of information on the operations carried out in 1936 
to offset the positions Keynes opened in the second half of 1935 (KP, TC/4/3/101-133). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
functioning and characteristics of the wheat futures markets at the time of Keynes’s 
investments. Section 3 presents a description of the international wheat market and 
Keynes’s view of this market as drawn from his Special Memoranda on Stocks of Staple 
Commodities (CWK XII: 267-647). Section 4 contains a detailed reconstruction of 
Keynes’s operations and provides a representation of his investment cycles in the 
decade considered. Finally, Section 5 suggests an interpretation of Keynes’s behaviour 
in the wheat futures markets which helps better to qualify his view of the functioning of 
the commodity futures markets. 
 
 
2. Wheat futures trading: an overview 
Wheat had represented one of the main agricultural products exchanged in the world 
market since the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, world wheat production 
was divided into two areas, 1) northern hemisphere production: North America (the US 
and Canada), eastern Europe (surplus area), western Europe (deficit area), and India;12 
and 2) southern hemisphere production: Argentina and Australia.13 
The development of transport and communication systems played a crucial role in 
favouring the growth of the dealings in this commodity. A seasonal supply (depending 
on unpredictable factors such as weather conditions, infestations and rusts) had to cope 
with demand which was, by contrast, continuous and uniform throughout the year. The 
huge fluctuations in world wheat prices afforded greater scope for the development of 
an organized market. 
Broadly speaking, at least five conditions must be fulfilled by any product before it 
can be the object of dealings in an organized market: (i) durability, (ii) measurability, 
(iii) the possibility of grading (all these three conditions amounts to saying that the 
commodity ‘must be fungible’); (iv) high frequency of exchanges and finally (v) being 
subject to price fluctuations (Smith 1922: 4-5). The fact that supply cannot rapidly be 
                                                 
12 India was basically an import country, which exported wheat only when the world wheat price was 
rising. 
13 In general, a cereal year dates from 1 August to 31 July in the Northern hemisphere, and practically 
coincides with the calendar year in the Southern hemisphere. The crops of the southern hemisphere 
were harvested in December and January, while the crops of the northern hemisphere were harvested 
basically from May to September, with the exception of the Indian crop, which was harvested in March 
and April. In North America, in particular, the harvesting period was in July and August (Timoshenko 
1928: 26).  
83 
adapted to demand makes room for the professional dealers and recourse to futures 
contracts as producers’ hedging instruments. As we know, commodity futures are, in 
fact, contracts to sell a given commodity at a future date for the price agreed when the 
contract is stipulated. Of the various agricultural products, wheat in particular met these 
requirements.  
By the interwar period, the US and the Canadian governments—two of the four big 
export countries—had adopted a grading system, which standardized the different 
qualities and types of wheat exchanged on the market. This made it possible for the 
North-American producers to sell abroad on the basis of grades rather than samples 
(Boyle 1929: 17) and favoured the use of futures contracts as the major instruments for 
world wheat trading. The object of the dealings was not a specific lot of wheat but, 
rather, a given quantity of wheat of a defined (and generally recognized) quality, with 
the proviso that any difference in the quality actually delivered allowed for variations in 
the pre-fixed price. The seller was given the option to decide the actual day and grade of 
delivery, and was free to tender the wheat on any day between the first and the last day 
of the month of maturity of the futures contract. The futures contracts seldom gave rise 
to actual delivery of the commodity and usually offsetting was achieved by 
buying/selling an opposite contract before the date of maturity14 (Fantacci et al. 2010). 
In the mid-1920s—when Keynes began to invest in wheat futures—Chicago, 
Winnipeg and Liverpool were the three main trading places in terms of exchanges 
volume and importance.15 During the 1930s Buenos Aires also became a favourite 
trading place for wheat futures in accordance with the growing quota acquired by 
Argentina in the world production and its growing role among export countries.16 
Chicago and Winnipeg were close to large wheat-producing and -exporting areas. 
Hence, futures contracts on these markets, although specified in terms of generic 
contract wheat, were related to the specific qualities of the wheat produced in North 
America. 
The completion of the Illinois-Michigan Canal (1848), the growth of the Lake 
Michigan commerce that followed, the establishment of the Chicago Board Trade 
                                                 
14 This characteristic distinguishes the futures from the forward contracts. 
15 Different measurement systems for quantities traded are adopted in the different markets: bushels (lots 
of 5000, 10,000, 15,000, 20,000 or 50,000) in the North-American markets, loads (1,2,5 or 10) in the 
Liverpool market and tons in Buenos Aires. The forward prices are expressed in the currency in which 
the contract is actually denominated, respectively dollars (cents) for Winnipeg and Chicago futures; 
sterling for Liverpool futures and pesos for Buenos Aires. 
16 In the period 1927-36 grain export represented more than 50 per cent of all Argentine exports. In 
contrast to the United States, Canada and Australia, where wheat often had to travel a thousand and 
more miles before it reached its port of exportation, wheat production in Argentina was almost entirely 
confined to an area within no more than 150 miles from the principal seaports (De Hevesy 1940: 333). 
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(1848), and a confluence of innovations, including grain elevators, railroads and grain 
exchanges had been boosting trading by means of forward contract as far back as 1863 
(Santos 2013). In May 1865, the Chicago Board Trade turned traded forward contracts 
into futures contracts (Hieronymus 1977). By the late-nineteenth century, the Chicago 
Board Trade had become the US’s premier organized grain and provision futures 
exchange, bringing the Chicago market, during the 1920s, to a leading position in the 
world market (Chandler 1977: 212). 
The standard maturities of the wheat futures contracts exchanged on Chicago were: 
May, July, September, December (KP, SE/11/2/31-59). Six classes of wheat were 
quoted: Hard Red Spring, Durum, Hard Red Winter, Soft Red Winter, Common White, 
White Club, five being further sub-divided into two or three other classes. Each of these 
sub-divisions in turn could embrace two or more grades, e.g. No. 1 or 2 or 3 Dark Hard 
Winter. Thus on futures contracts in Chicago the seller had a choice of seven (actually 
fourteen) grades (Smith 1922: 23).  
Winnipeg was the other major trading place in the North American market. The 
region of Manitoba produced a special quality of wheat (which took the same name) 
that became famous all over the world for its high quality (Boyle 1929: 13). Unlike 
Chicago, during 1920s Winnipeg had no Board but three Wheat Pools of farmers of 
Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchwan, which operated in concert through a jointly owned 
Central Selling Agency. Pooling was a system in which ‘farmers voluntarily signed an 
agreement to deliver all their wheat to the pool for five years and would receive, in 
return, an initial payment per bushel and the remainder in interim and final payments 
based on the actual return for that grade’ (Friesen 1984: 334). Until 1929 the pools 
handled over 50 per cent of all Canadian grain; subsequently overestimation of the final 
market price of wheat led the pools to the bankruptcy (1931) and placed the Central 
Selling Agency under federal control. The Canadian Wheat Board was established only 
in 1935 as an alternative to the open market.17  
The Canada Grain Act (1912) defined four grades for Manitoba Spring Wheat: No 1 
Hard, and Nos 1, 2 and 3 Northern; three each for Alberta Red and White Winter 
Wheat, and two for Alberta Mixed Winter Wheat (Smith 1922: 22). The standard 
maturities for the Winnipeg future contracts were: May, July, October, December (KP, 
SE/11/2/31-59). 
In the 1930s Liverpool represented the leading world market for the wheat trade. 
Wheat was an important crop in the arable areas of the Eastern Counties, where it was 
not grown alone, but as a part of a rotation which included root crops, rotation grasses 
                                                 
17 It became compulsory to use this government agency in 1943 (Ankli 1982). See also Levine (1987). 
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and other grain crops like barley and oats (De Hevesy 1940: 636). This shortage of 
home production together with, as from the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846), a free trade 
policy made Great Britain the major import country for wheat. Nevertheless, in 
response to the drop in wheat price due to the Great Depression—as well as for military 
reasons—at the beginning of the 1930s the Government decided to increase wheat 
production. Thus, in 1932, the British Wheat Act provided for a duty of 2s per quarter 
on non-Empire wheat and direct subsidy to British wheat-growers.18  
The standard maturities for the Liverpool wheat futures contracts were: March, 
May, July, October and December (KP, SE/11/2/31-59; TC/4/3/115). The maturity of 
March was linked to the harvesting time of the Indian crop. 
The development of futures markets went with an increasingly widespread attitude 
of suspicion towards the ‘evils of speculation’. From the very outset, the press had 
questioned the legality—as well as the morality—of futures contracts. In June 1887, for 
instance, the New York Tribune concluded that ‘holding speculation in food products 
hostile to public welfare and the gambler in grain an enemy of the American producer’ 
(quoted in Stevens 1887: 37). Similarly, that year the Londoner St James Gazette, 
asked: ‘At what point does legitimate trading suddenly become transformed into mad 
speculation, involving the public in the greatest inconvenience and entailing loss or ruin 
upon thousands of innocent people?’ (Ibid.: 38). The main point under discussion lay in 
the destabilizing effects of speculation on prices, which in the case of wheat, because of 
its paramount importance in the livelihood, made the debate particularly heated. Not 
surprisingly, the first American legislation on futures (Hatch and Washburn Bills 1892) 
aimed at the ‘short seller’ because the ‘illimitable’ quantities of ‘fictitious’ products that 
could actually be offered on the market ‘must reduce the price’ (quoted in Emery 1896: 
71). American Congress made repeated attempts to find some appropriate means of 
regulation of future trading (Lower 1978).  
Legislation and regulation of the wheat futures markets developed along different 
lines in Great Britain, the US and Canada (Santos 2006). A professional trader operating 
on the three main market places had to be well aware of their institutional 
characteristics. 
 
 
                                                 
18 This duty was abolished as from 1 January, 1939. On the impact of Britain’s trade policy change in 
1932 on its economic growth see Kitson and Solomou (1990). 
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3. The international wheat market in the 1920s and 1930s 
Immediately before World War I, the combined wheat exports of the USA, Canada, 
Argentina and Australia amounted to 50 per cent of the world’s wheat trade. This 
percentage would reach a peak of almost 90 per cent in the early to mid-1920s as a 
consequence of the disruption and destruction of agricultural production, especially in 
Europe due to the World War I and the Russian Revolution (De Hevesy 1940). As 
shown in Table 1, Canada was always the largest exporter followed by the USA 
between 1922 and 1927 and by Argentina and Australia in the late 1920s and 1930s.  
 
Table 1: Principal exporters per cent share of world wheat trade,  
five-year annual averages 
 1909-10 to 1913-14 1922-23 to 1926-27 1927-28 to 1931-32 1932-33 to 1936-37 
United States 16.0 23.2 17.7 9.0 
Canada 13.9 36.9 34.6 37.4 
Argentina 12.3 17.05 20.4 24.1 
Australia 8.0 11.03 13.7 19.1 
TOTAL 50.2 88.9 86.4 89.6 
Source: De Hevesy (1940: Appendix 10). 
 
The combined share of the four largest exporters would decline slightly, after the 
mid-1920s, due largely to the rise in protectionism as countries tried to defend home 
agricultural markets and producers. In those years, many European importing countries 
tried to cover their national consumption with increasing substitution of home-grown 
for foreign wheat. The introduction of these protective measures had severe 
consequences. Wheat producers in the exporting countries encountered difficulties in 
adjusting production quickly. The degree of specialization of these wheat growing areas 
made it impossible to convert wheat acreage to alternative agricultural production. 
Moreover, Argentina and Australia did not have such extensive grain storage capacity 
as the United States and Canada. The former countries were then forced to export wheat 
irrespective of market conditions. The latter countries, experiencing severe balance of 
payments problems, were driven to sell immediately, contributing to the downward 
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spiral in wheat prices that characterized the months before the New York stock market 
collapse of October 1929. 
Stocks were never a significant share of world trade levels. In the years from 1890 
to 1913 wheat stocks had covered 17.6 per cent of world production, while from 1922 to 
1928 wheat stocks accounted for only 14.7 per cent of world production. 
 
Table 2: World wheat stocks, Big Four exporting nations and World, 1922-39 
(million bushels) 
 22-26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
USA 120 111 115 232 294 329 391 382 274 148 142 83 155 275 
CAN 37 56 91 127 127 139 136 218 203 214 127 37 24 105 
ARG 63 69 95 130 65 80 65 75 118 85 65 51 65 180 
AUS 29 35 36 41 49 60 50 55 85 57 43 41 50 70 
BIG4 249 271 337 530 535 608 642 730 680 504 377 212 294 630 
WRD 622 669 726 993 934 1023 1022 1125 1186 942 784 567 630 1194
Source: De Hevesy (1940: Appendix 25). 
 
As table 2 shows, from 1927 through the years of the Great Depression there was a 
glut of wheat. By 1929, wheat stocks were, in fact, 37 per cent above the average of the 
years from 1922 to 1926. The reverse in this trend was due to the drought which 
brought the Canadian and American crops short in 1934-1935. Another surfeit, due to a 
bumper crop, occurred in 1939. 
The accumulation of surplus stocks (1929-35) went with a striking fall in wheat 
prices (1930-35), as shown in table 3.19 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 On the impact of overproduction on wheat carryovers in the years 1930-35, see Malenbaum (1953). 
88 
Table 3: Averages annual prices of imported wheat in United Kingdom, 1922-38 
(in shillings per quarter of 480 lb.) 
Crop Year Manitoba No. 3 Arg. Rosafè Australian 
1922-23 43.1 44.5 47.8 
1923-24 43.5 44.1 46.8 
1924-25 61.2 60.10 61.2 
1925-26 55.3 54.7 57.9 
1926-27 53.11 52.5 55.0 
1927-28 50.8 49.6 52.4 
1928-29 45.6 42.3 45.11 
1929-30 45.2 40.3 43.6 
1930-31 25.4 23.5 26.4 
1931-32 24.10 23.8 26.3 
1932-33 25.2 23.2 25.9 
1933-34 24.6 19.5 23.10 
1934-35 28.5 22.4 26.4 
1935-36 30.5 28.9 30.2 
1936-37 43.6 39.4 43.4 
1937-38 41.10 38.2 37.7 
1938-39 23.11 22.11 24.4 
  Source: De Hevesy (1940: 828). 
 
With regard to the situation of the stocks, in his 1923 article on ‘Some Aspects of 
Commodity Markets’, Keynes (1923: 263-264) emphasized that: ‘The present position 
as regards stocks of many stable commodities is abnormal and interesting in a high 
degree. It has certainly been a feature of the recent trade depression […] that the 
production of staple raw materials has fallen off much more than the consumption’. The 
need to analyse the influence of the volume of stocks on price changes in detail drove 
Keynes to draw up seven Special Memoranda on Stocks of Staple Commodities between 
1923 and 1930 (CWK XII: 267-647).20 In his view, this statistical enquiry was ‘of the 
utmost interest both to the businessman and to the economist […]. [It] may […] throw 
                                                 
20 Keynes authored the Memoranda on behalf of the London and Cambridge Economic Service, which 
was a joint venture between the London School of Economics and Cambridge University established in 
1923. It aimed to support business by providing the existing statistics in a usable form and developing 
new indicators. Longer Special Memoranda were produced on particular subjects. The LCES was 
directed by an Executive Committee consisting of William Beveridge and Arthur Bowley from LSE 
and John Maynard Keynes and Hubert Henderson from Cambridge. The Memoranda were published in 
April 1923, June 1924, July 1925, February 1926, March 1927, August 1929, September 1930. 
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much light on the hidden mechanism lying behind cyclical movements’ (CWK XII: 
268). 
In his first Memorandum (1923), comparing different sets of data on wheat stocks 
and current supplies of the Big Four plus India and UK, Keynes observed how:  
The general effect of these figures is to show that the aggregate supply of wheat to 
importing countries has been fairly steady in the last three years and that the stocks now 
on hand are fully as adequate as they have been at any time since the War. […] Wheat 
is, however, relatively cheap compared with other commodities, perhaps too cheap; and 
it remains to be seen whether the present level of relative prices is high enough to 
continue to call forth adequate supplies from the countries of export. (CWK XII: 313-
314)21 
This state of affairs continued until 1926, as documented by Keynes in the second, 
third and fourth Memoranda. In all cases, Keynes provided limited information on 
stocks, referring readers to the Corn Trade News and to the Wheat Studies and venturing 
no conjecture on possible price developments.22 The 1927 Memorandum reported 
growing stocks in the USA and an otherwise balanced situation in Canada, Australia 
and Argentina (CWK XII: 505). In 1929, the gradual increase in stocks and traded 
volumes, which had been recorded between 1923 and 1928, in connection with low 
prices, was ‘dramatically reversed as a result of poor harvest reports from all four of the 
leading export countries […] In two months the price of Canadian wheat has risen by 
more than 70 per cent. Sharp, if less spectacular, increases have also occurred in 
American, Australian and Argentine prices’ (CWK XII: 570). Three months later, the 
situation was to change once again under the negative impact of the Great Depression. 
In 1930 Keynes concluded that ‘the price of many commodities today (e.g. sugar, 
rubber […] even wheat) bears little or no relation to total costs of production, and may 
rather be said to represent the current conditions on which the existing and prospective 
surplus can be held’ (CWK XII: 577).  
Even though Keynes’s analysis is grounded on a careful account of the world stock 
levels, he appears to be well aware that these data are not sufficient to fill out a 
complete picture of the wheat market conditions. In fact, from 1925 on, Keynes, 
reminded readers that, especially in the case of wheat, comparative stock statistics—
                                                 
21 His sources were the International Institute of Agriculture, founded in Rome in 1905 under the 
patronage of the King of Italy and taken over by FAO after WWII, George Broomhall’s Corn Trade 
News (see footnote 10 above), the US Department of Agriculture. 
22 Wheat Studies was an accurate monthly review of grain trade published by the Food Research Institute 
of the Stanford University. 
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representing the visible supplies—were ‘particularly unsatisfactory’ because the large 
amounts held on farms and elsewhere kept ‘out of sight’(CWK XII: 401, 445 and 504).  
 
 
4. Keynes’s trading activity in the wheat futures markets 
The first operation in the wheat futures for which we have evidence was on 30 
December 1924.23 Keynes went on trading in this commodity—although 
discontinuously—up to 1939, when the commodity markets closed on the outbreak of 
war. 
We have divided the decade considered here into two sub-periods, one from the date 
of the first operation recorded in the ledgers to 3 August 1926, the other from 17 
October 1929 to 9 December 1935.  
In the interval between these two sub-periods, no investments in wheat futures are 
recorded in the ledgers, even though the years 1927-1928 saw Keynes active in futures 
contracts in other cereals.24 We have yet to arrive at a clear explanation of this gap in 
wheat trading but we may infer that it should have some causal relations with both his 
negative financial situation at the time25 and his dealings on the other grain products, 
but also with the depressed conditions characterizing the wheat market in those years. 
Indeed, as we have already seen, in the second half of 1920s the wheat market came up 
against the severe consequences of the introduction of protectionist measures. 
From 1924 to 1926 Keynes traded on the Winnipeg and Chicago futures markets. In 
the first seven operations recorded in the ledgers, from 30 December 1924 to 29 January 
1925, Keynes went short both on Winnipeg and Chicago markets (selling forward 
contracts basically for May deliveries and in one case for July delivery), revealing his 
bearish expectations on both places (see Graphs 1 and 2). Given that from December 
1924 to the end of January 1925 future prices were increasing on both markets 
(although more sharply in Chicago than in Winnipeg), we may conjecture that his 
                                                 
23 Before this date investments in the wheat futures market are not recorded in the ledgers, but Keynes 
had already been active since 1920 in futures markets on other commodities, like cotton, tin, copper, 
spelter, lead, sugar, rubber and in futures on currencies (KP, SE/11/2/4-30). At the end of 1924 he 
entered upon the grain markets: that same year he was appointed First Bursar of the King’s College and 
his involvement in speculative activity increased. 
24 Keynes operated in corn futures (on the Chicago market) and maize futures (on the Buenos Aires and 
London markets). For example, in 1928 Keynes bore losses for £2755 on the Chicago corn market in 
the first part of the year and realized profits for £2104 on the Buenos Aires maize market in the second 
part of the year (KP, TC/4/2/27). In the latter case Keynes adopted an investment strategy based on the 
renewal of long positions.  
25 In 1928-29 Keynes bore a severe financial setback, from which he fully recovered only after 1932. The 
two other important financial setbacks in Keynes’s career as an investor occurred in 1920-21 and 1937-
38 (Skidelsky 1992: 638). 
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strategy aimed at anticipating reversal in the trend prices.26 Then, from 10 February to 
16 March 1925, just when prices were falling on both places, confirming his 
expectations, Keynes progressively closed his positions, making a huge profit. In this 
case Keynes traded contracts of six-month maturity but he decided to offset these 
positions as soon as he had a chance of earning profits. On 17 March 1925, when the 
future price was low, Keynes opened a long position on the Winnipeg market for a 
contract of a longer maturity (October), expecting a future increase in prices, and he 
closed this position on 5 May, as soon as his expectation proved correct, again reaping 
some profits.  
 
Source: Keynes’s ledgers. Futures prices are drawn from the Corn Trade News (weekly edition), 
published on Wednesday. 
Note: The price refers to 1 bushel of wheat (= 60 pounds or 1016 kg). P1 denotes the futures price of 
the contract for the first available standard maturity on the Winnipeg market.  
 
From 24 August 1925 to 24 March 1926 Keynes started a second cycle of 
investment on the Chicago market, again assuming short positions (see Graph 2). He 
made four ‘short sales’ from the end of August 1925 to the end of December 1925 for 
                                                 
26 Skidelsky (1992: 640) points out that in the 1920s the ‘philosophy’ which characterized Keynes’s 
investment behaviour in general was that of acting against the opinion of the majority of people and, by 
these means, trying to anticipate the reversal in the future course of prices. 
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contracts of May delivery and then closed these positions in the following three months. 
During this second investment cycle futures prices on the Chicago market fluctuated 
above and below the prices fixed in the contracts sold forward by Keynes. 
Consequently, Keynes bore some losses in the first three operations he made, making 
profits only with the fourth. Then, from 5 May to 17 July 1926, he went long again by 
buying 2 contracts, but in one case he sold at the same price at which he had purchased 
and in the other he gained only a very small profit. In the last operation of this phase 
Keynes went short again by selling forward 10,000 bushels for December delivery on 
19 July 1926. He closed the position on 3 August, making some profits. Looking at the 
spread between spot and future prices (see Graph 2), we observe that along these 
investment cycles, in the presence of backwardation, Keynes decided to go short in the 
period August 1925-March 1926 and long in the period May-July 1926. In both cases, 
his open interest was greater when the positive differential between spot and future 
prices came higher. We also remark that in the only phase of contango of the whole 
period, between January and March 1925, he went short.  
 
Sources: Keynes’s ledgers. Futures prices are drawn from the Corn Trade News (weekly edition), 
published on Wednesday. Spot Prices are drawn from the Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute 
(1934). 
Note: The price refers to 1 bushel of wheat (= 60 pounds or 1016 kg). P0 denotes the spot price. P1 
denotes the futures price of the contract for the first available standard maturity on the Chicago market.  
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In relation to these investment cycles in wheat futures, Keynes recorded in the 
ledgers realized profits for £ 2290 in 1925 and realized losses for £ 163 in 1926, with a 
greater loss at the beginning of the year (following his unfortunate second investment 
cycle), partially offset by a gain at the end of the year (see Graph 3). 
 
 Note: Our calculation on the basis of data contained in Keynes’s ledgers. 
 
It must be remembered that at that time the gold standard system guaranteed a fixed 
parity between dollar and sterling, so the exchange risk for an investor like Keynes, 
who—as we have seen—in 1924-26 traded only in contracts denominated in dollars, 
was not so great.27 
Then, as recalled above, there came a break in Keynes’s investment activity and we 
find no more records on wheat futures in the ledgers until October 1929.28  
On 17 October, a few days before the Big Crash on the NYSE, Keynes recorded a 
forward purchase of 200 tons of wheat for February delivery on the Buenos Aires 
futures market and he closed the position a few days later, on 30 October. The reason 
for this single operation on a market that Keynes had never used before for futures 
wheat trading, following upon a suspension of almost three years in his trading in this 
commodity, is by no means clear. The only thing that we can infer from his behaviour is 
                                                 
27 The risk was not completely eliminated because some slight oscillations around the parity (the 
exchange rate that Keynes recorded for the wheat futures contracts he traded in May-August 1926 in 
the Chicago market was 1£= 4,86$, KP, TC/4/1/10-41) were usual and could easily affect an investment 
activity like future trading based on the gain (or losses) deriving from the differentials between the 
opening and closing prices of a given contract. 
28 This break is confirmed by the statements and accounts of the Tilton Company (KP, TC/4/2/2 and 
TC/4/2/57). 
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that he had bullish expectations on this market but it is hard to reconstruct the elements 
on which he founded this opinion. We may conjecture that Keynes’s choice to invest in 
Buenos Aires wheat futures could have depended on his expectations of approaching 
financial difficulties for the North-American markets or on some privileged information 
he had acquired. Nevertheless, the increase in future prices in Buenos Aires failed to 
come about and Keynes judged it imprudent to wait beyond the end of the same month. 
So he rapidly closed the position he had opened less than two weeks before, losing 
some money in the process.  
After this operation there is another break in the records of the ledgers from the end 
of October 1929 to July 1931. This break seems much more explicable with the turmoil 
on the financial markets brought about by the Great Depression, which extended 
throughout 1930. In fact, as Keynes himself warned in his last Memorandum (1930):  
At the close of the crop year 1929-30 international wheat prices reached their 
lowest post-war level […] The decline in the volume of trade between 1928-9 and 
1929-30, over 300 million bushels, was the largest change recorded in the twentieth 
century […] There is nothing in the immediate outlook to lift prices to even a 
moderately high post-war level. (CWK XII: 644 and 647)  
His deeply pessimistic view also appears in a letter he wrote to Walter Case29 on 16 
December 1930: ‘[…] I cannot perceive the least reason in the world for expecting an 
early recovery. Nothing whatever is happening to make such a thing likely’. As far as 
commodities are concerned, he wrote: ‘I am somewhat sceptical as to a material 
recovery being brought about merely by restriction of supply. It will be very difficult to 
maintain any material recovery unless it be through an increase in the side of demand’ 
(KP, BM/2/175).  
One consequence of this difficult economic and financial situation was the decision 
of the British government to devaluate sterling, abandoning the gold standard and the 
fixed parity with the dollar on 21 September 1931. The fluctuations in the rate of 
exchange heightened the level of uncertainty in transactions for British investors and 
made trading in the international futures markets more challenging. Nevertheless, 
Keynes does not appear to have been discouraged by this additional difficulty: his long-
lasting training in foreign exchanges markets helped him cope with it. 
In fact, a few months before Great Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard, 
Keynes returned to wheat futures opening a long position on the Liverpool market on 3 
                                                 
29 Walter Case (1885-1937) was a banker, director of an American investment firm based in New York, 
the Case, Pomeroy & Co. In the period 1930-37 Keynes exchanged letters and cables with him 
containing information about wheat and commodities in general. 
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July 1931. The reason behind this decision can be inferred from a letter that Keynes 
wrote to Case dated 29 July:  
[…] I am more inclined to think than I was that it is just worth while having at the 
back of one’s head that a purchase in terms of sterling of commodities having a world 
price may be in conceivable circumstances a hedge against anything that might happen 
to sterling. This also applies to the question of buying wheat in Liverpool. On further 
consideration I think that I overstated the objections to Liverpool as a market. (KP, 
BM/2/121) 
As shown in graph 4, Keynes kept long positions over the whole period spanning 
from July 1931 to June 1932, in situations of both backwardation and contango. 
 
 
Source: Keynes’s ledgers. Spot and futures prices are drawn from the Corn Trade News (weekly edition), 
published on Wednesday. 
Note: P0 denotes the spot price. P1 denotes the futures price of the contract for the first available 
standard maturity on the Liverpool market. P2 denotes the futures price of the contract for the second 
available standard maturity on the Liverpool market. 
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On 2 December 1931 he also opened a long position on the Winnipeg market (see 
Graph 5) with a forward purchase of 15,000 bushels of wheat for May delivery at a 
price of 65 ¾ cents.  
 
Source: Keynes’s ledgers. Futures prices are drawn from the Corn Trade News (weekly edition), 
published on Wednesday.  
Note: The price refers to 1 bushel of wheat (= 60 pounds or 1016 kg). P1 denotes the futures price of 
the contract for the first available standard maturity on the Winnipeg market. 
 
On the same date Keynes registered in the ledger the opening of another long 
position in the Liverpool market with a forward purchase of 1 load of wheat to be 
delivered on May at a price of 6 pounds, which means that Keynes was betting on an 
increase in prices in both markets in the following six months. Although Keynes opened 
two positions on two markets on the same day, the combination of these operations did 
not take the form of a straddle.30  
                                                 
30 A straddle is the combination of two opposite positions on two different markets (and possibly two 
different dates) with a view to closing the positions simultaneously, speculating on the price 
differential. 
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On 28 January 1932 (i.e. far before the delivery date) he closed his position on 
Winnipeg at a price of 61½ cents, lower than the purchase price of two months before. 
Probably at the time he imagined that the future price on Winnipeg would fall even 
further in the following months and his strategy aimed to limit the losses.  
That same day (28 January) he still had bullish expectations on the Liverpool market 
and he opened another long position by buying forward 2 loads of Liverpool wheat for 
May delivery at a price of 5/2 ⅜ pounds. In April 1932, near the delivery date, he closed 
all his opened positions for May Liverpool wheat with alternate fortunes, because in one 
case (for the contract bought in September 1931) he sold at a price higher than the 
original purchase price, while in the other cases he sold at a lower price.31 From the 
different timing of the offsetting of these long positions on the two markets we may 
conjecture that, in February-March 1932, Keynes was still confident of having a chance 
of profit on Liverpool or that he was following a different investment strategy in the two 
markets. 
On 29 February 1932, Keynes closed the long position he had opened on 25 
September 1931 for 1 load of wheat for March delivery on the Liverpool market for a 
price higher than the buying price, gaining some profit and, at the same time, he opened 
another long position for 1 load for a longer maturity (July). He closed this latter 
position on 2 June 1932, when, approaching the month of delivery, his expectation of an 
increase in price proved correct. These operations made it clear that on the Liverpool 
market Keynes followed a roll-over strategy of long positions. 
On 9 November 1932, he returned to the Winnipeg market, trying the same strategy 
he had adopted on the same market one year before (in December 1931). He went long, 
buying forward 10,000 bushels for December delivery at a price of 47 ½ cents. This 
time he appeared more cautious in two respects: he bought a future contract of a lower 
quantity and a shorter maturity (two months rather than six months). It is to be noted 
that from December 1931 to November 1932 the future price on Winnipeg decreased 
from 65 ¾ to 47 ½ cents—a circumstance that could have justified Keynes’s bullish 
expectation. The sensible reasoning at the bottom of Keynes’s investment choice seems 
to have been that since the price had fallen sharply in the previous year it should 
necessarily rise back in the near future. In any case, as graph 5 shows, the future price 
on the Winnipeg market remained low for a while and Keynes decided to close his 
position on 30 November 1932 at a price of 44 ½, losing some money.  
                                                 
31 More precisely, he sold forward the wheat bought on December 1932 at a price only slightly lower that 
the buying price, but he sold at two prices substantially lower than the buying price the 2 loads that he 
had bought forward on 28 January 1932. 
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In spite of the evidence against it, Keynes remained convinced of the rationale of his 
investment choice (i.e. that the future price on the Winnipeg market was abnormally 
low) and shortly after, on 31 January 1933, when the future prices rebounded to 47 
cents (that is, the same level reached in November 1932), he again bulled the market. In 
fact, he opened a long position of 10,000 bushels, this time for July delivery. On this 
occasion, Keynes hit the mark: the future price started to climb back and he closed his 
position on 30 May 1933 at a price of 68 cents, making a huge profit. 
In July 1933 the future price for contracts of July delivery (practically the spot price) 
on the Winnipeg market shot up.32 On 15 July 1933 Keynes made a short sale of 10,000 
bushels for July delivery at the exceptionally high price of 98 cents and closed his 
position a few days later, on 24 July 1933, at 82 cents. In the Winnipeg market—as we 
have seen—Keynes acted as an investor trying to anticipate inversion in the price trend.  
After this period of intense investment in the Liverpool and Winnipeg markets, 
Keynes abandoned the wheat market for two years, until July 1935. In these years he 
traded heavily in cotton, spelter, corn and maize and, in the first part of 1935, also in 
cotton oil (KP, TC/4/3/99). 
After this break, on 8 July 1935 Keynes returned to wheat futures, buying forward a 
large quantity of wheat (50,000 bushels) on the Chicago market for September delivery, 
gambling on a future increase in prices. Only ten days later he closed his position at 85 
cents (that is, 5 cents higher that the buying price), making a huge profit. The choice of 
this timing and market and the motivations behind his bullish expectations may well 
have been closely connected with the institutional changes brought about in the 
Winnipeg wheat futures market on 5 July 1935, i.e. the establishment of the Canadian 
Wheat Board, which made Chicago the only market place entirely devoted to private 
trading in North-America.  
A different technique was adopted by Keynes one month later on the Liverpool 
market. From August to December of that year Keynes opened a series of long positions 
through contracts of 5 loads at a time (Graph 6). This behaviour testifies to Keynes’s 
increased financial capacity from the mid-1930s onwards. It must in fact be 
remembered that a cover of about 25 per cent was to be deposited to the broker for each 
given contract. 
 
                                                 
32 Thanks to the fact that delivery in the wheat market was possible until the last day of the month of the 
maturity, future contracts could even be exchanged during delivery month. 
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Sources: Keynes’s ledgers and Tilton Company statements. Spot and futures prices are drawn from the 
Corn Trade News (weekly edition), published on Wednesday. 
Note: P0 denotes the spot price. P1 denotes the futures price of the contract for the first available 
standard maturity on the Liverpool market. P2 denotes the futures price of the contract for the second 
available standard maturity on the Liverpool market. 
 
As a result of his investment policy, Keynes ended the year having bought forward 
55 loads of Liverpool wheat for March delivery and 5 loads for May delivery (KP, 
TC/4/3/100). Looking at the differential between spot and future prices on the Liverpool 
market, it is worth noting that there was almost always a contango situation. 
Unfortunately, the records in the ledgers stopped here and we cannot trace the exact 
dates on which he closed any given contract. In any case, analysing the weekly 
statements of the Tilton Company for the period December 1935-August 1936, we have 
reconstructed Keynes’s investment path. In the period January-March 1936 Keynes 
went on buying forward huge quantities, reaching an exposure of 80 loads of Liverpool 
wheat for different maturities (KP, TC/4/3/101-111). 
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At the end of March 1936,33 he took delivery of March wheat (which is a very rare 
event for a professional speculator).34 He immediately sold a part of it on the spot 
market and progressively the rest of the amount, as shown in Graph 6. Thus, from the 
end of March to the end of August, he bore very high storage costs.35 The episode 
referred to by Moggridge (CWK XII: 61), when Keynes wanted to measure the cubic 
capacity of the King’s College Chapel to store wheat, relates to this period of his 
investment activity. After March 1936, Keynes went on buying forward for longer 
maturities, applying again a clear roll-over strategy (KP, TC/4/3/115-133).  
 
 
5. Analysis of Keynes’s investment behaviour 
Graph 7 offers an overview of Keynes’s exposure (in terms of quantity) on the four 
markets in which he operated in the decade 1925-35.  
 
 
Source: Keynes’s ledgers and Tilton Company weekly statements. 
Note: We have converted bushels into UK loads (1 load = 8000 bushels). The scale adopted goes up to 
30 loads. 
                                                 
33 On 24 March 1936 (KP, TC/4/3/113) Keynes also opened a long position on the London wheat future 
market. In particular, he traded futures contracts on Manitoba wheat. 
34 Keynes took delivery also in the tin market in one case (see Cavalli and Cristiano 2012, in this volume). 
35 In a letter dated 26 April 1936, the secretary of the Tilton Company informed Keynes about the high 
level of storage costs on wheat, which amounted to about £250 at the end of March (KP, TC/1/58). 
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Keynes entered into the wheat futures markets by trading in the North-American 
markets, Winnipeg and Chicago, which were, as we have seen, more developed than the 
European ones during the 1920s. In the years 1924-26 his investment strategy was 
characterized by a substantial predominance of short positions on both markets (as a 
consequence of his bearish expectations on future prices), and does not seem to have 
been as sophisticated as one might have imagined considering the stage of development 
of these markets at that time.36 More specifically, in the first cycle of investments (from 
December 1924 to May 1925) the duration of the cycle was quite short (2-3 months) 
and the quantity traded relatively small (maximum 40,000 bushels/5 loads). The 
strategy followed was to anticipate the market trend, betting on a decrease in prices 
when they were rising. 
From August 1925 to August 1926 Keynes operated exclusively on the Chicago 
market. He took on pre-eminently short positions in the presence of a slight 
backwardation. At the beginning of May 1926, when he opened his only long position 
on this market, we observe a significant positive spread between the spot price and the 
future price (in the first three weeks it was +22 ⅛ c, + 25 ⅝ c, + 25c, see Graph 2, 
section 4). He closed this position on 17 July, when the spread between spot and futures 
prices had dropped drastically (+3 c). Only two days later, however, on 19 July he 
opened a short position which he closed two weeks later, when the spread turned 
negative (–½ c). In this second cycle of his investments Keynes adopted the same 
behaviour as in the previous one, the quantity traded remained small, and the only 
change to be seen was extension of the length of the investment cycle up to 6 months. 
The turning points in his positions on both investment cycles occurred in the same 
period of the year: March and August 1925 on the Winnipeg market and March and 
July/August 1926 on the Chicago market (see also Graphs 1 and 2, section 4). It is, in 
fact, to be remembered that in March some reliable information on the future crops of 
the same year began to be available and from July to August wheat was tendered in the 
US and Canada. Even though (from January to March 1925) he had simultaneously 
open positions on Winnipeg and Chicago for a while, Graph 7 shows that Keynes did 
not adopt any form of straddle between the two markets.  
                                                 
36 Stewart (1949: 3-4) made an interesting analysis, based on some case-studies for the period January 
1924-December 1932, of the different investment strategies on the Chicago wheat futures market 
implemented by speculators. In particular he distinguishes three different categories of speculators: 
‘Scalpers are traders who for the most part trade for themselves in the pit, buying and selling on small 
fluctuations in prices and ordinarily closing the day with even, or nearly even positions. Spreaders are 
traders who assume opposing long and short positions of the same amount in different markets or 
different futures in the attempt to obtain a profit from changes in the relative prices in the different 
markets or futures. Other speculators are all remaining traders, who buy and sell speculatively in the 
market—large or small, long-term or short-term, professional or amateurs’.  
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On the whole, we can conclude that in the 1920s Keynes aimed at ‘beating the 
market’, seeking to derive profits from his skill in forecasting the market trend. 
In the 1930s Keynes’s investment activity became more complex and diversified, 
reflecting both his increased ability as speculator and the further developments in the 
wheat futures markets.  
Keynes’s strategy in the Winnipeg market in 1931-33 followed the same pattern as 
in the 1920s. The duration of the investment cycle was very short and the quantity 
traded quite small (maximum 15,000 bushels/approximately 2 loads). Here, in contrast 
with the situation in the 1920s, we see a prevalence of long positions, but his strategy 
was always aimed at anticipating reversal in the price trend.  
In July 1935 on the Chicago market we observe (see Graph 7) once again a long 
position of a quantity of 50,000 bushels (approximately 6 loads) lasting only 11 days 
(from 8 to 19 July 1935), which brought him a huge profit. 
Following a different line, in the Liverpool market Keynes adopted a roll-over 
strategy both in the years 1931-32 and in 1935-36. The duration of the investment 
cycles was about one year. The striking difference between the two investment cycles in 
the Liverpool market lies in the quantities traded, amounting to a maximum of 7 loads 
in 1931-32 and 80 loads in 1935-36. One reason for this increase in his exposure 
between 1931 and 1935 lies in the restoration of his financial wealth after the setback he 
suffered during the Great Depression.  
A glance at the differential between spot and futures prices (see Graphs 4 and 6, 
section 4) suffices to appreciate the fact that Keynes followed a roll-over strategy of 
long positions both in situations of backwardation (as was the case for most of the 
period 1931-32) and in situations of contango (January-February 1932 and August-
December 1935). One possible explanation of the peculiarity of this behaviour on the 
Liverpool market lies in the extension of the time horizon of his investment decisions, 
which made him a long-term speculator.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Keynes was, as we have seen, a well-informed trader and his choice of a specific 
investment pattern—led, as is obvious, by the profit motive—was grounded on both 
quantitative and qualitative factors. More specifically, he paid attention to the stock 
levels, conditions of production in general, and prices (spot and future), but also to the 
institutional environment in which he operated. All these elements concurred to shape 
his strategy, which was differentiated according to both the general conditions of the 
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wheat market at a given time and the specific conditions of each market place in which 
he traded.  
In fact, what emerges from analysis of Keynes’s operations on the wheat futures 
markets in the decade considered is a substantial difference in his speculative behaviour 
when he traded respectively on the North-American markets and on the Liverpool 
market.  
On Winnipeg and Chicago he went basically short in the 1920s and long in the 
1930s, but he never followed a roll-over strategy of long positions. We may imagine 
that he deemed the conditions prevailing in both markets not be such that his theory of 
‘normal backwardation’ held and, as a consequence, were not suitable for adoption of a 
long-term type investment activity based on renewal of long positions.  
On the Liverpool market—where Keynes entered only at the beginning of the 
1930s—he exclusively adopted a roll-over strategy, in the presence of both 
backwardation (in 1931-32) and contango (in 1935). From this circumstance we may 
infer that he considered Liverpool a market in which the strategy implied in his theory 
of speculation was worth following. The reasons why the Liverpool market appeared to 
be less volatile than the North-American markets probably has to do with the specific 
characteristics of the wheat spot market in Great Britain and, in particular, with the fact 
that this country was able to rely on regular provisions, over the whole calendar year, 
coming from the producing countries of the Commonwealth (India and Australia) as 
well as the other exporting countries.37  
As far as the relation between Keynes’s theory and practice in the commodity 
markets is concerned, analysis of his trading in wheat futures confirms the fundamental 
tenet that backwardation is not a permanent feature of the commodity futures markets 
and, accordingly, the theory of ‘normal backwardation’ represented only a special case. 
In fact, in his practice of speculation, recourse to the strategy which is more consistent 
with his view of the speculator as a ‘risk-bearer’ is confined only to some specific 
situations. In fact, Keynes seemed to have been well aware of the ‘special 
circumstances’ which render each commodity, and even—as we have seen—each 
market-place ‘a special case’ (Keynes 1923: 264). 
 
 
                                                 
37 This circumstance also explains why the Liverpool price was considered the ‘barometer of the wheat 
world prices’ (Corn Trade News, Jubilee Issue, 1938: 5). 
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Keynes and Sraffa on the concept of commodity rate of interest 
Nerio Naldi 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In General Theory’s Chapter 17 (‘The Essential Properties of Interest and Money’), 
after arguments already developed in previous chapters, Keynes proposed to provide a 
further and presumably deeper explanation of how investments could settle at a level 
too low to allow for full employment. As a first step towards this end he stated that ‘an 
analogue of the rate of interest on money’ may exist ‘for every kind of capital asset’ 
(CWK VII: 222) and referred to Sraffa’s 1932 review of Hayek’s Prices and Production 
as the locus where the relationship between that magnitude (named by Keynes own-rate 
of interest or commodity-rate of interest) and the money rate of interest ‘was first 
pointed out’ (CWK VII: 223, n. 1). 
Economists interested in the concept of commodity rate of interest have generally 
taken for granted that Keynes had simply adopted the definition originally put forward 
by Sraffa. But two letters sent by Keynes to Sraffa in December 1931 give us a hint to 
explore the differences between their approaches to the subject. Considering these 
letters, an ambiguity in Sraffa’s definition becomes visible: it does not make clear if, in 
the context of a monetary economy, the commodity rate of interest, once approached 
through the route chosen by Sraffa, must be calculated by dividing the monetary cost of 
borrowing a commodity by the spot price or by the forward price of the commodity in 
question—and, in this sense, the very fact that Sraffa really meant to provide a 
definition of that concept cannot be taken for granted. But such a definition may acquire 
precision if, in the light of Keynes’s extant comments, an implicit statement that 
commodity rates should be expressed in terms of spot quantities is attributed to Sraffa. 
Keynes, on the contrary, both in the 1931 discussion with Sraffa and in the General 
Theory, clearly maintained that the concept of commodity rate of interest had to be 
expressed in terms of forward quantities. But when it emerges that the definition of that 
concept was an object of dispute between Keynes and Sraffa, it becomes important to 
                                                 
 (University of Rome, La Sapienza). I wish to thank, with no further implication, Enrico Bellino, 
Stephanie Blankenburg, Marco Dardi, Ghislain Deleplace, Luca Fantacci, Heinz Kurz, Maria Cristina 
Marcuzzo, Carlo Panico, Neri Salvadori, Bertram Schefold, Paolo Trabucchi. Financial support from 
Miur (Prin 2008) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply. 
110 
understand the grounds of their respective choices. In the case of Keynes, an answer to 
this question may be found in an understanding of commodity rates of interest as an 
extension of the ordinary definition of rate of interest on money, or, which amounts to 
the same thing, in a mechanical transposition of a relationship conceived with regard to 
a non-monetary economy into the context of a monetary economy.1 In the case of 
Sraffa, on the other hand, in order to explain both the peculiarities of his text and his 
determination not to accept the definition proposed by Keynes, we will put forward 
some conjectures based upon the idea that he shared Keynes’s view that commodity 
rates should be conceived as rates of interest paid on commodity loans, but that he 
believed that such a concept should be differently specified when applied to a non-
monetary economy and to a monetary economy. 
 
 
2. Sraffa’s approach to commodity rates of interest 
Sraffa, in his 1932 review of Hayek’s Prices and Production, was not pursuing the 
aim of presenting a particular theory, as that of criticizing Hayek’s analysis of the 
relationships between money, prices and levels of production. In particular, he came to 
discuss the concept of commodity rate of interest in order to criticize the way Hayek 
had distinguished between monetary and non-monetary economies and his proposal of 
fixing the money-rate of interest, in an economy where demand shifts from 
consumption to capital goods, at the level of the natural rate as could be identified in a 
non-monetary economy. According to Sraffa, Hayek had distinguished between 
monetary and non-monetary economies as if, in a monetary economy, capital demand 
and supply being expressed in terms of money, the action of banks could cause the 
actual, or money, rate of interest to diverge from the equilibrium, or natural, level, 
while in a non-monetary economy a similar divergence could not take place (Sraffa 
1932: 49).2 Sraffa was convinced that such a distinction was wrong, because in a non-
monetary economy more than one natural rate would exist and, out of equilibrium, 
those rates would diverge from one another: 
An essential confusion, is the belief that the divergence of rates is characteristic of a 
money economy […] If money did not exist, and loans were made in terms of all sorts 
                                                 
1 The latter statements should not sound contradictory: in a monetary economy, money is the only 
commodity whose rate of interest may be directly determined by the same formula which in a non-
monetary economy would apply to any commodity. 
2 In Hayek’s words: ‘In a money economy, the actual or money rate of interest (“Geldzins”) may differ 
from the equilibrium or natural rate, because the demand for and the supply of capital do not meet in 
their natural form but in the form of money, the quantity of which available for capital purposes may be 
arbitrarily changed by the banks’ (Hayek 1931: 20-21). 
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of commodities, there would be a single rate which satisfies the conditions of 
equilibrium, but there might be at any one moment as many ‘natural’ rates of interest as 
there are commodities, though they would not be ‘equilibrium’ rates. […] if loans were 
made in wheat and farmers […] ‘arbitrarily changed’ the quantity of wheat produced, 
the actual rate of interest on loans in terms of wheat would diverge from the rate on 
other commodities and there would be no single equilibrium rate. (Sraffa 1932: 49) 
The latter point was only asserted, and the reader might expect that Sraffa, in order 
to develop his critique, would further pursue the description and analysis of natural 
rates (or commodity rates) within a non-monetary economy. But what he actually did 
was considering the way the existence and variations of such rates of interest may be 
recognized in a monetary economy: 
In order to realise [how in non-monetary economies commodity rates may diverge from 
one another and from their equilibrium level] we need not to stretch our imagination 
and think of an organised loan market amongst savages bartering deer for beavers. 
Loans are currently made in the present world in terms of every commodity for which 
there is a forward market. (Sraffa 1932: 49-50) 
Indeed, following Sraffa’s text we may gather that, in a non-monetary economy, 
natural rates of interest, or commodity rates of interest, could be defined considering 
that a loan made in terms of a given commodity j ( SjQ ) would imply the agreement to 
return a given quantity of the same commodity ( FjQ ) at the end of the borrowing period, 
so that for each commodity the level of its own rate of interest ( ji ) would be: 
[1] S
j
S
j
F
j
j Q
QQ
i
  
But Sraffa’s argumentative strategy, as already noted, did not rely on such a 
formalization and indicated how commodity-loans may be recognized in nowadays 
economic activity, even though no loan as those underlying equation [1] is directly 
contracted: 
When a cotton spinner borrows a sum of money for three months and uses the proceeds 
to purchase spot, a quantity of raw cotton which he simultaneously sells three months 
forward, he is actually ‘borrowing cotton’ for that period. (Sraffa 1932: 50)3 
                                                 
3 The reason why cotton spinners should follow this line of conduct may not be as obvious as Sraffa 
seems to imply: their ordinary activity leads them to buy cotton to use and transform it, not to keep it 
for a period and sell it afterwards. An explanation for their selling cotton forward may be based on the 
observation that cotton spinners, assuming that prices of raw and wrought cotton move in the same 
direction, in order to hedge against future variations in the price of wrought cotton may sell forward the 
same amount of raw cotton bought spot. If prices go down, the profits obtained on the forward contracts 
may compensate for the loss on the price of wrought cotton, which has to be sold at a price lower than 
expected. If prices go up, the extra profits obtained selling wrought cotton will be cancelled out by the 
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Having identified such a loan, Sraffa indicated how the rate of interest paid on that 
operation, which he implicitly identifies as natural or commodity rate of interest, may 
be calculated in terms of cotton: 
The rate of interest which [the cotton spinner] pays, per hundred bales of cotton, is the 
number of bales that can be purchased with the following sum of money: the interest on 
the money required to buy spot 100 bales, plus the excess (or minus the deficiency) of 
the spot over the forward prices of the 100 bales. (Sraffa 1932: 50) 
He then argued that divergences between supply and demand for a commodity cause 
divergences between spot and forward prices and divergences between the natural rate 
of interest on that commodity, the natural rates on other commodities and the 
equilibrium rate of interest. In equilibrium, on the other hand, spot and forward prices 
will coincide and natural (or commodity) rates will all have the same value (equal to the 
money-rate of interest). On this basis, following Sraffa’s argument, we may take for 
granted that also in a non-monetary economy, in equilibrium, the relevant rates will be 
all at the same level (although, we may add, given that no unique standard would exist, 
it could not be said that they would be equal to a specific commodity rate). Similarly, 
also in a non-monetary economy, a disequilibrium in which production of some 
commodities is led to increase and that of other commodities is led to diminish would 
cause divergences among commodity rates.4 
We may probe deeper into the meaning of Sraffa’s description of the relation 
between spot and forward prices, money-rate of interest and commodity rate of interest 
by noting, first of all, that, as Sraffa is considering a monetary economy, the case he 
                                                                                                                                               
loss on the forward contracts. This explanation is closely mirrored in a passage from Marshall’s 
Industry and Trade: ‘A British miller [...] [h]aving ordered the purchase of a certain quantity of what he 
needs […] “hedges”, by selling at once in a central market an equal quantity of standard wheat for 
delivery at about the time at which he expects that the wheat, which he has just bought, will be in his 
elevator ready to be made quickly into flour. If wheat falls in the interval, his flour has to compete with 
that made from cheaper wheat; but, what he loses through that fall, is returned to him almost exactly by 
his gain on the “future” which he has sold. Conversely, if wheat rises in the interval, he has to pay on 
the sale of his “future” about as much as he gains from the corresponding upward movement of his 
flour. By buying a future he does not speculate; he throws on the shoulders of the general market the 
risks and the chances of the gain that would otherwise have come to him through general movements 
external to his own business’ (Marshall 1970 [1923]: 259-60; see also Hubbard 1928: 405; Garside 
1935: 320-2, 329, 383-4; Rees 1972: 101). I wish to thank Luca Fantacci and Cristina Marcuzzo, who 
pointed out to me this explanation and Marshall’s passage. We may wonder why Sraffa did not 
illustrate the point by also referring to the more obvious case of a cotton merchant buying cotton spot 
and selling it forward (see Garside 1935: 380-2). 
4 To mark this second part of his reasoning Sraffa uses the following words: ‘It is only one step to pass 
from this to the case of a non-money economy, and to see that when equilibrium is disturbed, and 
during the time of the transition, the “natural” rates of interest on loans in terms of the commodities the 
output of which is increasing must be higher, to various extents, than the “natural” rates on the 
commodities the output of which is falling; and that there may be as many “natural” rates as there are 
commodities’ (Sraffa 1932: 50). 
113 
examines does not coincide with the operation of borrowing 100 bales of cotton as may 
be conceived with regard to a non-monetary economy. In a monetary economy only 
money is directly borrowed and subsequently returned augmented by an interest—
cotton is not. In this context, as indicated by Sraffa, in order to borrow 100 bales of 
cotton we must first of all borrow the quantity of money we need to buy them spot 
( Scbales P100 ); the cost of this operation being m
S
cbales iP100 . Then we must consider the 
difference between the price we pay to buy the 100 bales spot and the price at which we 
sell them forward (with delivery at the date corresponding to the end of the borrowing 
period): )(100 Fc
S
cbales PP  . If the spot price is higher than the forward price, this is an 
additional cost of the operation; if the spot price is lower than the forward price, this is 
an earning which reduces the total cost. The crucial magnitude in Sraffa’s definition is 
then the total monetary cost of the operation:  
[2] [ )( Fc
S
cm
S
c PPiP  ] bales100  
No other cost might be of any interest to an agent whom, in a monetary economy, 
whishes to borrow cotton. Sraffa, however, possibly in order to establish a link between 
the commodity loan he had outlined with regard to a monetary economy and the case of 
a non-monetary economy, argued that that cost may be turned into a rate of interest by 
expressing it in terms of bales of cotton. As a matter of fact, however, as noted by 
Potestio (1989: 261),5 he did not explicitly state if, to that effect, we should divide the 
total monetary cost of the operation by ScP  or by 
F
cP . The results would be 
approximately equal, but not exactly equal:6 
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While Sraffa’s argument has generally been understood as pointing to the latter 
magnitude (see, for instance, Barens and Caspari 1997; Bonifati 1991; Eatwell 1987; 
Kregel 1982; Kurz 1995, 2010; Naldi 2001; Panico 1988; Ranchetti 2001), only 
Deleplace (1986, 1988), Majewski (1988) and Oka (2010) seem to have opted for the 
former view.7 But Keynes’s letters to Sraffa on the content of his article give the 
impression that Sraffa did not favour the solution provided by equation [4]. 
                                                 
5 Potestio quotes an unpublished manuscript by Ian Steedman entitled Own Interest Rates and Concepts 
of Equilibrium where the same point had already been raised. 
6 The difference between the two increases with the difference between spot and forward prices, but it 
tends to zero when the length of the time interval considered for the payment of interest approaches to 
zero (Fisher 1965 [1896]: 360-1; Oka 2010: 2 n.1). 
7 In both cases, however, no reason was given for choosing one of the two options. 
114 
3. Keynes’s letters to Sraffa 
The extant correspondence between Keynes and Sraffa has been reviewed by 
Ranchetti (2005) and the most interesting point which emerged with regard to Sraffa’s 
1932 article relates precisely to the definition of the interest rate on loans of bales of 
cotton. 
Keynes, reading the final typescript of Sraffa’s article (SP D3/9/192/1-22),8 seems 
to have believed that Sraffa did not express himself with sufficient clarity: 
I have pencilled some small verbal changes, either for the sake of the English or for the 
sake of clearness. The only material point is the rewording which I suggest on page 16. 
But here I think I must be giving the meaning which you intend. (Letter from Keynes to 
Sraffa, 18.12.1931, SP D3/11/65/56; quoted in Ranchetti 2005: 130) 
Accordingly, he suggested to substitute Sraffa’s formulation with an alternative 
sentence which read as follows: 
The rate of interest which he pays, per hundred bales of cotton, is the number of 
forward bales that can be purchased with the interest on the money required to buy spot 
100 bales, plus the excess over 100 (or minus the deficiency) of the number of forward 
bales which can be purchased for the same price as 100 spot bales (SP D3/9/192/16; 
quoted in Ranchetti 2005: 131). 
Keynes’s suggestion, however, was not accepted by Sraffa and the formulation at 
page 16 of his typescript was reproduced with no important differences also in the 
published article. 
If it is clear that Sraffa was not convinced by Keynes’s proposal, the letter just 
considered does not illuminate the source of their disagreement. But a second letter, 
written by Keynes while sending to the printer the typescript of the article, touched 
exactly on that point: 
As regards the forward bales, I am sending the first of your alternatives to the printer, 
but will you in proof again consider my alternative, since I am not yet persuaded that it 
is wrong? It is a characteristic of interest to be payable in arrear, and not in advance. If it 
is payable in advance we call it discount. Thus it seems to me to be of the essence of the 
case that the amount of interest be calculated in forward bales; that is to say we have to 
find how many forward bales can be obtained by parting with a given number of spot 
bales. (Letter from Keynes to Sraffa, 21.12.1931, emphasis in the original, SP 
D3/11/65/52; quoted in Ranchetti 2005: 131-2)9 
                                                 
8 SP refers to Piero Sraffa Papers (Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge). 
9 Sraffa’s second alternative, which can still be seen in Sraffa’s own copy of the typescript, was not 
significantly different from the first (SP D3/9/191/16; D3/9/192a). 
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These are the remarks which suggest that Sraffa did not share Keynes’s view that 
the result had to be expressed in terms of forward bales and, by implication, they lead 
us to think that Sraffa believed that the relevant magnitude had to be expressed by a 
number of bales contracted for spot delivery. Indeed, this emerges from what Keynes 
presented as the criterion apt to be applied to solve the controversy: does the borrowing 
cost, in the case at hand, emerge as payable in advance (in which case it would generate 
a discount) or in arrear (in which case it would generate an interest)?10 
Once the question is put in these terms, Keynes’s view seems to be unassailable: the 
cost of borrowing 100 bales of cotton, understood as the amount of money indicated by 
Sraffa, actually emerges only at the end of the period; how could it be treated as if it 
could buy a number of bales of cotton spot (i.e., at the beginning of the period)? If 
Sraffa had a different opinion, Keynes’s letters do not seem to provide any hint as to its 
grounds. The question, however, may be further considered. 
 
 
4. The grounds for Sraffa’s approach: some hypotheses 
First of all, we may stress that the fact that Sraffa believed that the cotton-rate of 
interest could be expressed in terms of bales contracted for spot delivery is not as 
obvious at it may appear from Keynes’s second letter. The text published by Sraffa, just 
like the typescript he had submitted to Keynes and all the preparatory notes known to us 
(SP D3/9), does not state that the cotton-rate of interest should be defined in terms of 
spot bales. This possibility emerges from Keynes’s comments, and it may be recognized 
in the text of Sraffa’s article only if we assume that when Sraffa mentioned the number 
of bales that can be purchased with the amount of money corresponding to the cost of 
borrowing cotton he implicitly referred to spot bales. To study the question it may then 
be appropriate to consider two different directions of enquiry. First, we may consider 
which reasons might have led Sraffa to refrain, in his 1932 article, from providing a full 
specification of a formula apt to calculate the value of the natural, or commodity, rate of 
interest. Second, we may consider which reasons might have led Sraffa, in private 
discussions to favour a definition of that rate in terms of spot bales. 
Let us start from the question of the absence, in Sraffa’s 1932 article, of the full 
specification of a formula apt to calculate the value of commodity rates of interest in a 
monetary economy. To explore this direction of research, we must start from some 
                                                 
10 This remark rules out the possibility that the price referred to by Sraffa could have been the spot price 
currently quoted at the time of delivery referred to in the relevant forward contract, which, in Keynes’s 
opinion, would give rise to a payment in arrear just like the forward price. 
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premises. First of all, we may take as a fact that Sraffa’s wording, when he referred to 
the number of bales that can be purchased with the amount of money corresponding to 
the cost of borrowing cotton, was genuinely ambiguous and that he was aware of that 
ambiguity (indeed, had he not already been aware of it, the remarks contained in 
Keynes’s two letters could not have failed to alert him). Granting this, we may stress 
that Sraffa did not discuss commodity rates of interest in order to develop a theory of 
those magnitudes, but only to show the inconsistency of Hayek’s approach and of his 
prescriptions for monetary management. Given this aim, it may be argued that 
establishing a relationship between divergences between spot and forward prices, 
demand and supply for commodities, and commodity rates of interest was sufficient to 
serve Sraffa’s purpose. Indeed, within the compass of his analysis, it would have been 
irrelevant whether the monetary cost of borrowing cotton was divided by the spot or 
forward price of cotton: in both cases the relationships between commodity rate, money 
rate and spot and forward prices would have been going in the same directions and the 
same would have applied to the effects of differences between spot and forward prices. 
Furthermore, this conclusion is also consistent with the possibility that Sraffa preferred 
contrasting Hayek’s views on rates of interest in a non-monetary economy by studying 
commodity-loans in a monetary economy because he was convinced that discussions of 
non-observable cases should be dealt with with special caution, if not avoided at all.11 In 
this sense, an additional reason to refrain from presenting a complete formula designed 
to calculate the value of commodity rates of interest in a monetary economy could have 
been that he was determined to avoid any risk of mechanical applications of such a 
formula to the case of a non-monetary economy. 
This explanation addresses Sraffa’s approach exactly as it emerges from the text of 
his article. The same explanation, however, cannot account for Keynes’s remarks as far 
as they may be interpreted as implying that Sraffa, in private discussions, had 
maintained that an alternative definition of the concept of commodity rate of interest 
was to be preferred to the one proposed by Keynes, and, in particular, that the monetary 
economy analogue of the concept of commodity rate of interest as defined in a non-
monetary economy should be arrived at by expressing the cost of borrowing a 
commodity in terms of spot quantities of that very commodity. 
                                                 
11 In the opening pages of his article Sraffa had accepted the idea of ‘a comparison between the conditions 
of a specified non-monetary economy and those of various monetary systems’ (Sraffa 1932: 43), but 
within the discussion of commodity rates he almost ridiculed the perspective of a direct examination of 
such a case: ‘we need not to stretch our imagination and think of an organised loan market amongst 
savages bartering deer for beavers’ (Sraffa 1932: 49). 
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As already noted, if, in a monetary economy, we wish to borrow cotton, we must 
start by borrowing money. The cost of the whole operation is a monetary cost, and in 
order to express that cost as a rate it may be obvious to divide it by the amount of 
money initially borrowed. If we borrow money in order to borrow (or, more precisely, 
buy and later sell) 100 bales of cotton, the monetary rate of interest paid on that 
operation may be calculated by dividing its monetary cost by Scbales P100 , as in equation 
[5]. In this sense, dividing by ScP  would be incomplete; dividing by 
F
cP  or by 
F
cbales P100  would be meaningless. 
[5] S
cbales
bales
F
c
S
cbales
S
cm
c P
PPPii
100
100)(100   
Such a rate may be understood as a commodity rate because it pertains to the 
operation of borrowing a commodity. Sraffa’s reference to that rate as a number of 
bales and, consequently, to the division of the cost of borrowing cotton by the price of 
cotton (which we may now take to have been ScP ) rather than by the amount of money 
initially borrowed ( Scbales P100 ) may be understood as a way to emphasize the analogy 
between that rate as may be calculated within a monetary economy and the rate which 
would apply on a commodity-loan in the case of a non-monetary economy. Use of 
analogy instead of full analytical exposition is a shortcut that Sraffa could take because 
he was not developing a theory; he was just manoeuvring on Hayek’s ground in order to 
criticize him. His statement, however, could also be justified by the fact that, when the 
quantity of cotton initially borrowed (or, more precisely, bought) is 100 bales, or could 
be reduced to 100 bales,12 the rate envisaged as a number of bales numerically 
corresponds to the value of the cotton-rate of interest as defined in equation [5]. 
Dividing the monetary cost of borrowing cotton by ScP  would then reflect two aspects 
of Sraffa’s argument. On the one hand, it would reflect Sraffa’s view that in a monetary 
economy the commodity rate of interest is a monetary rate of interest. On the other hand, 
it would reflect Sraffa’s strategy of developing an argument concerning a non-monetary 
economy by considering data and facts as may be observed in a monetary economy—
i.e., it would reflect his way to bridge the gap between an observable case and a non-
observable case. 
This seems to offer a sound explanation for Sraffa’s supposed preference for 
dividing the monetary cost of borrowing cotton by ScP , as seems to be implicit in 
Keynes’s letters. Keynes would then be wrong in stating that Sraffa was depicting a 
                                                 
12 Sraffa’s wording was as follows: ‘the rate of interest which he pays, per hundred bales of cotton, is the 
number of bales that can be purchased with the following sum of money […]’ (Sraffa 1932: 50, our 
emphasis). 
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reward paid in advance rather than in arrear—i.e., a discount, rather than an interest. 
The real point separating their approaches seems to be that the operation that, following 
Keynes’s letters, can be recognized as envisaged by Sraffa may be described as 
borrowing cotton, but it only implies buying cotton today and selling that very quantity 
of cotton at the end of the period, while it is money which is initially borrowed and later 
returned augmented by an interest. Keynes, on the contrary, conceived an operation 
implying, at the end of the period, the calculation of the quantity of cotton which should 
be sold in order to repay the amount of money initially borrowed and the corresponding 
monetary interest—that is to say, it implied the equivalent of returning an augmented 
amount of cotton (not of money!) at the end of the borrowing period. This may not be 
immediately evident if Keynes’s view is formalized on the basis of Sraffa’s approach to 
the concept of commodity rate of interest (as in equation [4]). But the point was crystal 
clear to Keynes, who stated that ‘we have to find how many forward bales can be 
obtained by parting with a given number of spot bales’ (letter from Keynes to Sraffa, 
21.12.1931). This is the way he was to follow in the General Theory and we may see 
how it relates to equations [1] and [4]: 
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If Keynes, having in mind equation [1], wanted to calculate FQ , he may have seen 
that to that effect the monetary cost of borrowing cotton was to be divided by FP .13 
This presupposition probably led him to overlook the fact that Sraffa’s wording was not 
directed at identifying a number of bales of cotton as such but a percentage, and, 
consequently to overlook the possibility that Sraffa’s approach was radically different 
from his own. 
To put it in other words, Keynes proposed to replicate within a monetary economy 
what may be conceived as the structure of commodity-loans in a non-monetary 
economy. Such an operation, as shown by equation [6], may be successfully 
accomplished using data observable in a monetary economy. But the scheme—even 
though formally correct—would be totally unconnected to the logic of observable 
economic behaviour in a monetary economy, where, in ordinary circumstances, no one 
calculates that sort of returns. It is for this reason—we may presume—that Keynes’s 
view might have been judged by Sraffa as wrong (letter from Keynes to Sraffa, 
                                                 
13 As a matter of fact, dividing the monetary cost of borrowing cotton by FP we obtain SF QQ  , not 
FQ . 
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21.12.1931). Sraffa’s approach, on the other hand, would follow the logic of the 
assessment of costs and profitability as universally applied in monetary economies, 
where agents are interested in monetary costs and returns and pay no attention to 
commodity-costs and commodity-returns. 
 
 
5. Keynes’s definition of commodity rate of interest in Chapter 17 of 
the General Theory 
To complete our discussion we may now consider how the concept of commodity 
rate of interest was defined by Keynes in Chapter 17 of his General Theory within an 
argument aimed at showing that the rate of interest on money may pose particular 
obstacles to the attainment of a volume of investment sufficient to allow for full 
employment. To this effect Keynes developed a comparison between properties of 
money and of capital assets in general. Such a comparison was based on the idea that as 
‘the money-rate of interest […] is nothing more than the percentage excess of a sum of 
money contracted for forward delivery […] over what we may call the ‘spot’ or cash 
price of the sum thus contracted for forward delivery […] for every kind of capital asset 
there must be an analogue of the rate of interest on money’, so that, for every 
commodity we would have ‘a rate of interest in terms of itself,—a wheat-rate of interest, 
a copper-rate of interest, a house-rate of interest, even a steel-plant-rate of interest’ 
(CWK VII: 222-3).14 In this sense, the money rate of interest (equation [7]) and the 
wheat-rate of interest (equation [8]) may be expressed by the same kind of relation: 
[7] S
m
S
m
F
m
m Q
QQi   
[8] S
w
S
w
F
w
w Q
QQi   
Obviously, however, while equation [7] describes a phenomenon which may be 
directly observed in a monetary economy, given that in such an economy commodities 
are not directly borrowed, the same cannot apply to equation [8]. In the latter case, 
FQ cannot be directly observed; to calculate it we must go through a roundabout route 
based on knowledge of spot and forward prices and money-rate of interest. 
Such a route is illustrated by Keynes with a numerical example where 100£ is the 
price of 100 quarters of wheat for spot delivery ( Sw
S
w PQ ); 107£ (to be paid a year hence) 
                                                 
14 The rate of interest that an asset may command, measured in terms of itself, is called by Keynes own-
rate of interest. Accordingly, money rate of interest and commodity rate of interest are other names for 
own-rate of interest when the latter refers, respectively, to money or to a commodity such as wheat. 
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is the price of 100 quarters of wheat for forward (a year hence) delivery ( Fw
F
w PQ ); and 
5% is the money-rate of interest ( mi ). 
Given these data, if today we possess 100£, we can alternatively turn them into 100 
quarters of wheat spot, or in 105£ for forward delivery (a year hence) which can be used 
to buy 98.13 quarters of wheat for forward delivery (1051.07 = 98.13). This means that 
100 quarters of wheat spot are equivalent to 98.13 quarters for forward delivery. This 
example may be translated in a formula (where q stands for quarters of wheat) for the 
wheat-rate of interest, which turns out to be –1.87%: 
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This formula reflects Keynes’s words15 and corresponds to the following equation: 
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Equation [10] is perfectly equivalent to equations [4] and [6] and implies that 
Keynes assumed as starting point the definition of what a commodity rate of interest 
would be in a non-monetary economy and adapted it to the case of a monetary economy 
without modifying its analytical structure.16 In particular, it reflects the point of view 
Keynes had expressed discussing with Sraffa in December 1931: as Keynes aimed at 
calculating FQ  (or SF QQ  ), the monetary cost of borrowing a commodity had to be 
divided by FP . 
Concluding his illustration of the definition of commodity rates of interest, Keynes 
appended the already mentioned footnote recalling Sraffa’s 1932 review of Hayek’s 
book: ‘This relationship was first pointed out by Mr Sraffa, Economic Journal, March 
1932, p. 50’ (CWK VII: 223, n. 1). Knowing that in December 1931 Keynes had 
                                                 
15 ‘£100 spot will buy £105 for forward delivery, and £105 for forward delivery will buy 105107 100 […] 
quarters for forward delivery. Alternatively £100 spot will buy 100 quarters for spot delivery’ (CWK 
VII: 223). As a matter of fact, however, Keynes’s numerical conclusion is somewhat at variance with 
the data and the algorithm of equation [9]: ‘Thus 100 quarters of wheat for spot delivery will buy 98 
quarters of wheat for forward delivery. It follows that the wheat-rate of interest is minus 2 per cent per 
annum’ (ibid.; emphasis in the original). We may conjecture that this result, if not the product of a 
simple numerical approximation, reflected Keynes’s implicit adoption of Fisher’s formula 
aiaij   (where mij  , wii  and S
w
S
w
F
w
P
PPa  ) mutilated of the term ai  (Fisher 1965 [1896]: 
9; Fisher 1907: 359; Fisher 1930: 39). 
16 Equation [10] corresponds to the definition applied by Fisher (1965 [1896]; 1907; 1930) and by modern 
intertemporal equilibrium theorists (see Barens and Caspari 1997: 283-8). 
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disagreed with Sraffa precisely on the analytical structure of the definition of 
commodity rates of interest, this statement is somewhat surprising. We may only accept 
it if we consider that the relationship between money rate of interest, spot and forward 
prices, and commodity rate of interest shows the same signs in both Sraffa’s and 
Keynes’s approaches, or that Sraffa, at least with regard to the argument developed in 
the General Theory, had come to accept Keynes’s point of view. In both cases, given 
the ambiguity of Sraffa’s own presentation, no real incompatibility with his 1932 article 
would emerge.17 
Having defined the concept of commodity rate of interest, Keynes went on arguing 
that there is no reason why we should expect that at any moment in time those rates will 
be the same for every commodity: ‘the relation between “spot” and “future” contracts, 
as quoted in the market, is notoriously different for different commodities’ (CWK VII: 
223). This, indeed, is the same result reached by Sraffa in his 1932 article. 
Then, parenthetically, Keynes referred to the fact that a similar variety of rates may 
be easily observed in markets for currencies (CWK VII: 224). The latter point is 
interesting because an antecedent to Keynes’s attention to commodity rates may be 
recognized in his April 1922 article ‘The Forward Market in Foreign Exchanges’ 
(reprinted the following year as part of Chapter 3 of his Tract on Monetary Reform).18 
In that paper a concept of own-rate of interest was not explicitly defined and discussed, 
but Keynes’s later formula may be understood to be implicit in his 1922 analysis of the 
relations between spot and forward exchange rates and the levels of national and foreign 
short term interest rates, which he described as ‘a mathematical calculation of interest 
rates’ (Keynes 1922: 105).19 
Indeed, Keynes’s definition of commodity rate of interest corresponds to the 
identification of a state of indifference between investing 1£ in money or in wheat 
(equation [11]), or between investing 1£ in the UK or in the USA (equation [12]): 
                                                 
17 Sraffa’s extant manuscript notes on Keynes’s General Theory do not comment on the footnote 
mentioned above. But in a paragraph of those notes the concept of commodity rate of interest, as 
employed by Keynes in Chapter 17 of his book, is described as defined in the normal way (SP I 
100/10). Other references to commodity rates in the same manuscript do not help to clear the point. 
18 On this relationship see Kregel (1982: 452-5). 
19 In his April 1922 article, Keynes used data on spot and forward exchanges in Milan he had been 
provided by Sraffa (CWK IV: 108; letter from Keynes to Sraffa, 14.2.1923, SP Add.ms.a.427/7). The 
latter circumstance is consistent with testimonies that, on the occasion of their first meeting (most 
probably in August 1921), Keynes was particularly impressed by Sraffa’s considerations on the forward 
markets for currencies (Ingrao and Ranchetti 1996: 520; Ranchetti 2005: 119, 136 n. 1; Naldi 2001: 26, 
37 n. 16). A similar reconstruction is contained in one of the obituaries which appeared after Sraffa’s 
death: ‘on a visit to England in 1921 he met Keynes and took his fancy with a discussion of hedging on 
the forward exchanges’ (The Times, 6 September 1983). 
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But the analogy between Keynes’s commodity rates of interest and currency rates of 
interest conceals a difference which reflects the importance of the fact that, in a 
monetary economy, commodities cannot be directly borrowed, while currencies can. As 
we have already noted, commodity rates can only be constructed through observation of 
money-rate of interest and spot and forward prices of the commodities in question. 
Accordingly, as it appears from equation [11], when we apply Keynes’s formula we 
automatically obtain the equilibrium value for the commodity rate we are considering 
(i.e., the value which marks the indifference between investing in money or in the 
commodity in question).20 However, given that in a monetary economy commodity 
rates, as conceived in equation [8], do not have an autonomous existence,21 their values, 
as we may construct them, cannot be compared with any actual rate and cannot guide an 
agent’s behaviour in any way. In this sense, we may say that a mechanical transposition 
of commodity rates of interest from a non-monetary to a monetary context, as in the 
case of Keynes’s definition, even though formally correct, generates a concept void of 
operative content. On the contrary, in the case of currencies, just like in equation [7], 
own-rates can be directly observed and have an operative content: the comparison 
between observable values and calculated equilibrium values may guide an agent in 
international arbitrage operations. Similarly, an operative content may be recognized 
also in Sraffa’s approach to the definition of an analogue of a non-monetary economy 
commodity rates of interest as may apply in a monetary economy. This is not surprising, 
if we think that Sraffa’s definition is directly rooted in economic behaviour as may be 
actually pursued in a monetary economy. Of course, as we have seen in note 3 above, 
this rate measures spinners’ cost of hedging against variations in the price of their 
manufactured product. But, in principle, it might also allow them to compare their 
industrial profits (calculated on the capital directly invested in buying raw cotton) with 
the alternative of acting as merchants whose ordinary business is buying and selling raw 
cotton and may gain the cotton rate of interest as defined by Sraffa. Cotton merchants, 
                                                 
20 See Barens and Caspari (1997: 293). 
21 We may consider that the same point was stressed by Lerner (1952) stating that Keynes’s commodity 
rate of interest is the money rate of interest measured in terms of a particular commodity, so that his 
wheat-rate of interest, for instance, should more properly be called wheat rate of money interest: the 
rate of interest on money-loans measured in terms of wheat. 
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in turn, might use the same rate in order to compare the returns from their activities with 
the alternative of lending money. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
A peculiar aspect of the way Sraffa approached the definition of the concept of 
commodity rate of interest in his 1932 article is that he pointed out that to obtain a 
natural rate of interest (or commodity rate of interest) the monetary cost of borrowing a 
commodity should be divided by the price of that commodity, but he did not specify 
whether it should be the spot or the forward price. At first sight this may appear to be a 
deficiency in Sraffa’s article. But considering the context and the aim he was pursuing 
we may conclude that a more precise definition was not necessary. On the other hand, 
we have seen that two letters sent by Keynes to Sraffa suggest that in private 
discussions Sraffa had maintained that the definition of the concept of commodity rate 
of interest, or, more precisely, of the analogue of such a concept as could be identified 
with regard to a monetary economy, should be arrived at by dividing the monetary cost 
of borrowing cotton by the spot price of cotton rather than by its forward price. If this 
was the case, we may presume that Sraffa opposed the alternative view because—being 
based upon a mechanical transposition of a relationship conceived with regard to a non-
monetary economy—it was completely unconnected to the logic of economic behaviour 
in a monetary economy. On the contrary, Sraffa’s approach would have been 
unequivocally rooted in a monetary economy.22 
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Kaldor and the relationship between ‘normal backwardation’ 
and the theory of storage 
Carlo Cristiano and Paolo Paesani 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Standard explanations of the relationship between commodity prices at different 
delivery dates (e.g., Clark et al. 2001) are based on the theory of storage. The theory 
posits that stocks of commodities have a productive value, a convenience yield, deriving 
from the possibility of meeting unexpected demand while avoiding the cost of frequent 
revisions in production and of manufacturing disruptions and varying inversely with the 
level of stocks (Geman 2005). At the same time, holding stocks entails financial and 
storage costs (carrying costs). These costs, net of convenience yield, determine the 
difference between futures prices at different delivery dates through arbitrage 
operations.  
The theory of storage was developed between the 1940s and the 1960s, mainly by 
the US economist Holbrook Working, in alternative to the Keynes-Hicks theory of 
‘normal backwardation’ (Telser 1958; Cootner 1960). The main difference between the 
two theories may be summarized as follows. Whereas the theory of normal 
backwardation posits that futures prices tend to systematically underestimate future 
expected prices (proxied by spot prices), as producers hedge against the risk of price 
declines by selling forward at a discount, the theory of storage assumes no such bias. As 
inventories decline (increase), their convenience yield increases (falls) and spot prices 
tend to rise above (fall below) futures prices net of carrying costs. Having introduced 
the notion of convenience yield, Nicholas Kaldor (1939) is generally considered the 
initiator of the theory of storage (e.g., Fama and French 1987; Ng and Pirrong 1994; 
Geman and Ohana 2009; Jarrow 2009; Benavides Perales 2010) and as such separated 
from Keynes and assimilated to Working on the theory of forward markets.  
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This separation is puzzling for two main reasons and deserves to be investigated as 
such. First, Kaldor introduced the notion of convenience yield in his attempt to 
formulate a generalised theory of forward markets, capable of contemplating normal 
backwardation as a special case. Second, in elaborating his theory, Kaldor brought 
together two typically Keynesian elements: the risk premium paid by producers to 
hedge against the risk of price declines, and net carrying costs (storage costs net of 
convenience yield) which are the negative of ‘Mr Keynes’ “own rate of interest” in Ch. 
17 of the General Theory’ (Kaldor 1939: 3 fn. 4). 
In exploring these issues, the paper reconstructs the link between the debate on the 
theory of forward markets, that took place in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s, and the 
theory of storage, as developed by H. Working. This link is particularly relevant for its 
connections with the continuing debate on the relative role of fundamentals versus 
speculation in determining commodity prices. As we show below, at least two 
competing theories of the relationship between spot prices and futures prices existed in 
the 1940s, one giving prominence to speculation and heterogeneous expectations, one to 
fundamentals and homogeneous expectations.  
Interestingly, we find that that Kaldor’s own theory was capable of encompassing 
both these theories as special cases and that Kaldor’s separation from Keynes on the 
theory of forward markets occurred when Working grafted the notion of convenience 
yield onto a non-Keynesian theoretical framework, based on the observation of the US 
wheat market. This was meant to describe a competitive market dominated by 
professional dealers offering storage facilities and sharing the same (correct) price 
expectations rather than a market dominated by speculators and hedgers trading on the 
basis of heterogeneous expectations and trying to get rid of redundant stocks, which is 
what Kaldor had in mind. In this sense Kaldor should not be regarded as the initiator of 
the theory of storage but rather of a theory of voluntary stock holding and speculation 
much closer in spirit and substance to Keynes than to Working. This conclusion is 
particularly important in view of the fact that Working’s theory is one of the first 
applications of the efficient market hypothesis. To the best of our knowledge, Kaldor’s 
role in the development of the theory of commodity pricing has never been investigated 
in a systematic way, nor have its implications for the evolution of the theory of forward 
markets. 
Based on these considerations, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 discusses the Keynes-Hicks theory of normal backwardation, focusing on the role of 
stocks, and briefly mentions Keynes’s theory of the own rate of interest. Section 3 
investigates the genesis of the concept of convenience yield and Kaldor’s initial 
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formulation of a ‘generalised theory of the forward market’. Section 4 reconstructs how 
Kaldor came to reformulate his theory in the context of a Symposium that took place in 
1940 and whose results were published in The Review of Economic Studies. Section 5 
explores the theory of storage and its linkages with Kaldor. Section 6 concludes the 
paper.  
 
 
2. The Keynes-Hicks theory of normal backwardation 
Keynes’s early analysis of commodity markets focused on price volatility and its 
bearings on short term credit and the market for hedging. In an article published in 
19231 Keynes brought to attention the huge value of the annual flow of commodities 
extracted or harvested from the soil compared to the amount of fixed and floating 
capital in the hands of producers (1923: 255). This placed a heavy burden on the market 
for short term loans, and created a situation in which producers were de facto compelled 
to hedge their risks if they wanted to have access to bank loans, for bankers were not 
willing to take upon themselves the risks connected with price volatility. 
The hedging technique described by Keynes in 1923 is one in which the price risk is 
eliminated by means of forward sales at discount price. As Keynes put it, ‘The producer 
[…] is prepared to accept a somewhat lower price in advance than what, on the balance 
of probability, he thinks the price is likely to be when the time comes’ (1923: 261), the 
difference between the two prices being the risk premium. Insofar as producers hedged 
their production by selling it forward to merchants or other producers located at a lower 
stage of the process of production, the whole business could be carried out without 
speculators. But Keynes noticed that the time horizon of producers and that of the 
merchants did not usually match. This gave scope to speculators, acting as risk-bearers, 
to enter the market and earn a part of the risk premium as defined above.  
Compared with a more traditional idea of speculation, based on the assumption that 
speculators entertain different and more accurate expectations on prices, Keynes’s 1923 
article introduced an element of innovation. Now, hedgers and speculators could even 
have the same price expectation, while the profit of the speculator would result from 
investments in futures contracts, each purchased at the downward biased future price 
tendered by the hedgers. In Value and Capital, Hicks would generalize the same 
argument as follows:  
                                                 
1 ‘Some Aspects of Commodity Markets’ (Keynes 1923). 
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If we are to allow for uncertainty of expectations […] we must not take the most 
probable price as the representative expected price, but the most probable price ± an 
allowance for the uncertainty of the expectation, that is to say, an allowance for risk[; 
while] the percentage by which the representative expected price falls short of or 
exceeds the most probable price, is not determined solely by the opinion of the planner 
about the degree of uncertainty. It is also influenced by his willingness to bear risks. 
(Hicks 1946: 126-7) 
When applied to speculation and hedging, this entails that  
it is of the essence of speculation, as opposed to hedging, that the speculator puts 
himself into a more risky position as a result of his forward trading […]. He will 
therefore only be willing to go on buying futures so long as the futures price remains 
definitely below the spot price he expects; […] and it will not be worth his while to 
undertake the risk if the prospective return is too small. (Hicks 1946: 138)  
Keynes returned to the problem of hedging by means of forward sales in the context 
of a wider analysis of the causes of fluctuations of investments in Chapters 27, 28, and 
29 of the Treatise on Money, where the expression ‘normal backwardation’ was 
employed for the first time. In volume I of the Treatise Keynes gave a general definition 
of fixed, working, and liquid capital—‘We shall call goods in use fixed capital, goods in 
process working capital, and goods in stock as liquid capital’ (CWK V: 116)—referring 
the reader to vol. 2, Chapter 28 for a ‘more detailed definition’ of working and liquid 
capital:  
I define working capital as being the aggregate of goods […] in course of production, 
manufacture, transport and retailing, including such minimum stocks, whether of raw 
materials or of finished products, as are required to avoid risks of interruption of 
process or to tide over seasonal irregularities […]. It does not include surplus stocks, 
which constitute liquid capital. (CWK VI: 103-4) 
Keynes thus distinguished between that part of stocks that is deliberately held—and 
therefore included in working capital, because it is supposed to be useful in certain 
circumstances—and that part which is a ‘surplus’ over this amount and therefore 
involuntarily held. The point that Keynes was making is that ‘[i]f, as the result of a 
previous miscalculation, such stocks come into existence, the price of the goods 
continues to fall until either consumption increases or production falls off sufficiently to 
absorb them’ (CWK VI: 130). The reduction of price below the normal level that 
producers would be willing to accept in order to get rid of their surplus stocks, depends 
on the costs of carrying these stocks. These costs include—along with insurance and 
warehouses charges, allowances for deterioration, and interest charges—the cost of 
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hedging (risk premium), that Keynes considered particularly relevant.2 Because of these 
costs, holders of liquid capital tend to get rid of it as rapidly as possible with the effect 
of depressing prices. As carrying costs are much higher than usually admitted—Keynes 
argued—price fluctuations are also much wider than they would otherwise be. 
Restating the same argument in terms of the forward markets, Keynes discussed the 
case of producers who hedge themselves by selling forward, making a distinction 
between two cases: one in which ‘there are not redundant liquid stocks’, and one in 
which ‘there exist redundant liquid stocks’ (CWK VI: 128-9). In the former case there 
will be backwardation, which will only be limited ‘by the unwillingness of the buyer to 
pay the higher spot price rather than postpone the date of his purchase’ (CWK VI: 
128)—and in the special case of a market in equilibrium, the one that Hicks would 
consider in Value and Capital (1946: 138), the backwardation will be at its ‘normal’ 
level. In the latter case,  
The existence of surplus stocks must cause the forward price to rise above the spot price 
[…] ; and this contango must be equal to the cost of the warehouse, depreciation and 
interest charges of carrying the stocks. But the existence of a contango does not mean 
that the producer can hedge himself without paying the usual insurance against price 
changes. On the contrary, the additional element of uncertainty introduced by the 
existence of stocks and the additional supply of risk bearing which they require mean 
that he must pay more than usual. In other words, the quoted forward price, though 
above the present spot price, must fall below the anticipated future spot price by at least 
the amount of the normal backwardation; and the present spot price, since it is lower 
than the quoted forward price, must be much lower than the anticipated future spot 
price. (CWK VI: 129) 
Indicating current price by CP, forward price by FP, expected price by EP, 
warehouse, depreciation and interest costs by c and the risk premium by r, when liquid 
capital exists, prices stand in the following relation 
 CP < FP < EP 
 CP + c = FP = EP – r 
This explanation of the spread between current and future prices already included, 
along with the risk premium, the cost of carrying stocks. The importance of this latter 
element was downplayed, if not altogether overlooked, in Hicks’s Value and Capital.3 
                                                 
2 On this point, Keynes took issue with Hawtrey’s theory of liquid stocks, based on the idea that the 
amount of stocks held by producers is inversely proportional to the level of the rate of interest. See 
Hawtrey’s Currency and Credit and Trade and Credit and CWK VI: 117-23. 
3 For Hicks ‘Stocks may indeed be left in the shops unsold; but they are unsold because people prefer to 
take the chance of being able to sell them at a future date rather than cut prices in order to sell them 
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By contrast, Kaldor would consider carrying costs an essential component of his theory 
of forward markets, a theory based on the development of the Keynes’s ideas in the 
Treatise and in Chapter 17 of the General Theory. In that chapter, discussing the 
concept of own rate of own interest (the return of an asset in terms of itself) Keynes 
isolated three attributes which different types of assets possess in different degrees:  
i) Some assets produce a yield or output q, measured in terms of themselves, by 
assisting some processes of production or supplying services to a consumer. 
ii) Most assets, except money, suffer some wastage or involve some cost through the 
mere passage of time (apart from any change in their relative value), irrespective of 
their being used to produce a yield; i.e. they involve a carrying cost c measured in 
terms of themselves. […]. 
iii) Finally, the power of disposal over an asset during a period may offer a potential 
convenience or security, […] there is, so to speak, nothing to show for this at the end 
of the period in the shape of output; yet it is something for which people are ready to 
pay something. […] We shall call it liquidity premium l. (CWK VII: 225-226) 
Based on these concepts, Keynes argued that the own rate of interest of any 
commodity is q – c + l. As shown in Section 3 below, Kaldor’s convenience yield 
corresponds to the element q in Keynes’s formulation, while the ‘net carrying costs’ in 
Kaldor’s theory speculation and forward markets derives from the Keynesian definition 
of the own rate of interest of any commodity.  
 
 
3. Kaldor on speculation, risk and convenience yield 
Kaldor re-elaborated the Keynesian concepts of fixed, working and liquid capital, 
normal backwardation and own rate of own-interest in the first part of his 1939 essay on 
Speculation and Economic Stability (Kaldor 1939). In the context of this re-elaboration, 
he formulated a generalized version of Keynes’s theory of the forward market which 
consists of three main elements: 1) the notion of speculative stocks, 2) the introduction 
of the concepts of convenience yield and net carrying costs, 3) the establishment of the 
idea that hedgers can be both forward sellers and forward buyers. 
Kaldor defined speculative stocks of assets as ‘the difference between the amount 
actually held and the amount that would be held, if other things being the same, the 
                                                                                                                                               
now’ (1946: 131). While this is not inconsistent with Keynes’s argument, Hicks did not enter into the 
practical problems connected with the variations of prices that might become necessary in order ‘to sell 
them [the stocks] now’. Moreover, Hicks did not follow Keynes on the definition of carrying costs, and 
held fast to the notion that the level of stocks of intermediate products is ‘determined through the rate 
of interest’ (1946: 118).  
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price of that thing were expected to remain unchanged’ (Kaldor 1939: 1) and discussed 
the two conditions for an asset to be the object of speculation: 1) perfect or semi-perfect 
marketability, and 2) low carrying costs. Perfect marketability requires that the asset be 
an article of general demand, fully standardised or capable of full standardisation. Low 
carrying costs require that the asset be durable and valuable in proportion to bulk. 
Carrying cost proper consists of wastage and storage cost.  
But net carrying cost also depends on a third factor: the yield of goods. In normal 
circumstances, stocks of all goods possess a yield, measured in terms of themselves, and 
this yield which is a compensation to the holder of stocks, must be deducted from 
carrying costs proper in calculating net carrying costs. The latter can, therefore, be 
negative or positive. (Kaldor 1939: 3)  
While Kaldor recognized that his definition of net carrying cost is ‘the negative of 
Mr Keynes’ “own rate of own-interest” in ch. 17 of the General Theory—except that no 
allowance is made here for the factor termed “liquidity premium”4’ (Kaldor 1939: 3 fn. 
4)—the relationship between the notion of speculative stocks and Keynes’s taxonomy 
of capital assets in the Treatise is more complex. Kaldor distinguished between goods 
which are used in production and goods which are used up in production. Fixed capital, 
in the sense of the Treatise, belongs to the first category and cannot be used for 
speculative purposes as it lacks standardization. Working and liquid capital, instead, 
belong to the second category and, being standardized, can be used for speculation. Like 
working capital, speculative stocks are held voluntarily and ‘have a yield , qua stocks, 
by enabling the producer to lay hands on them the moment they are wanted and thus 
saving the cost and trouble of ordering frequent deliveries, or of waiting for deliveries’ 
(Kaldor 1939: 4). Unlike working capital, however,  
the amount of stocks which can thus be ‘useful’ is, in given circumstances strictly 
limited; their marginal yield falls sharply with an increase in stocks above 
‘requirements’ and may raise very sharply with a reduction of stocks below 
‘requirements’ […] Hence as we defined ‘speculative stocks’ as the excess of stocks 
over normal requirements […] we may say that with working-capital-goods carrying 
costs are likely to be positive when speculative stocks are positive, and negative when 
they are negative. (Kaldor 1939: 4) 
Having related his own notions of speculative stocks and convenience yield to 
Keynesian categories, Kaldor went on to discuss the relationship among current, future 
                                                 
4 A possible explanation for this omission may be that Kaldor developed his theory of speculation 
focusing on perfectly marketable (i.e. very liquid) goods. The relationship between liquidity and risk 
premia, however, is a complex one. On this see Kaldor (1939: 4 fn. 5) and Kaldor (1960).  
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and expected price, under the assumption of a single expectation for the market as a 
whole. Kaldor recognized that  
The expectations of different individuals composing the market are normally different 
of course. But it is permissible to speak of a single expectation for the market as a 
whole, since cet. par. there is always a definite amount of any good that would be held, 
at any particular expectation, if all individuals’ expectations were the same. (Kaldor 
1939: 1 fn. 1)5 
 
If expectations were quite certain, speculative activity would so adjust the current 
price that the difference between expected price and current price would be equal to the 
sum of interest and carrying costs […] minus the yield […] If expectations are 
uncertain, the difference […] must cover, in addition, a certain risk premium. (Kaldor 
1939: 5)  
In algebraic terms, this reads as follows: 
 EP – CP = i + c + r = i + c' – q + r 
Where, EP is the expected price, CP is the current price, r is the risk premium 
(related to price fluctuations and increasing with the dispersion of expectations around 
the mean and the size of commitments), i is the interest cost, c net carrying cost, c' 
carrying cost proper (wastage and storage) and q the convenience yield.6 The presence 
of risk creates the incentive for market participants to develop facilities, in the form of 
forward contracts, to transfer risk from risk-adverse to risk neutral (or less adverse) 
agents in return for the payment of a premium. As to this, Kaldor distinguished among 
three different cases.  
If speculative stocks are zero, i.e. EP = CP, then – c = i + r, i.e. the negative of 
carrying cost must be equal to the sum of interest cost and risk premium, and since i and 
r are always positive, the carrying cost must be negative, i.e. the yield must exceed the 
sum of storage cost and primary depreciation by the required amount. In this case FP = 
CP – r, the forward price must fall short of the current price by an amount which Mr. 
Keynes calls normal backwardation’. (Kaldor 1939: 6)  
In algebraic terms,  
 FP – CP = i + c' – q, hence FP = EP – r 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that differences in individual risk premia make transactions possible even if all 
individual price expectations are equal. It should also be noted that, while Kaldor made explicit 
assumptions about expectations this was not the case with Keynes.  
6 In Keynes’s formulation i was included in c.  
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The proposition that the forward price must fall short of the expected price by the 
amount of the marginal risk premium, […] is probably true in the majority of markets; 
in the case of certain industrial raw materials, however, where the outside buyers are 
contractors with given orders for the period ahead, the ‘hedgers’ may be predominantly 
forward buyers, and the ‘speculators’ spot buyers and forward sellers. Now the 
‘carrying costs’ for these speculators may be higher than the carrying costs for the 
market generally. This is because the yield of stocks of raw materials (which in our 
definition is included in net carrying costs) consists of convenience, […] and this 
convenience is largely lost if the stock held is already sold forward. (Kaldor 1939: 6)7 
 FP – CP = i + c', hence FP = EP – r + q 
As in the first case, EP = CP (normal conditions, balanced markets), speculative 
stocks are zero and what stocks are traded have a positive convenience yield. In this 
case, however, contrary to the previous one, the yield accrues to forward buyers 
(hedgers) rather than speculators. This implies: 1) that the forward price will be higher 
than the expected prices (reflecting the hedgers’ eagerness to buy) and 2) that contango 
will be observed. Contango will also be observed when speculative stocks are positive, 
their yield is zero (q = 0), the current price falls below the forward price by an amount 
equivalent to (positive) carrying costs, and the forward price falls below the expected 
price irrespective of whether hedgers are forward buyers or forward sellers.  
 FP – CP = i + c', and FP = EP – r 
At this stage, Kaldor’s theory of the forward market is already a generalisation of 
Keynes’s own, built on a less selective definition of stocks and a more complex vision 
of hedging practices. As to the similarities, both theories focus on hedgers and 
speculators, trading risks on financial markets, rather than on dealers, earning revenues 
for providing storage facilities, and both theories relate speculation to the business 
cycle, through its impacts on price and output.  
 
 
4. The Symposium 
Kaldor’s 1939 essay became the object of intense debate and of a Symposium on the 
Review of Economic Studies. J.C.R. Dow’s contribution to the Symposium deserves 
particular attention (Dow 1940) for the arguments used to criticize Kaldor’s theory and, 
in particular, the idea that for some industrial raw materials, where the outside buyers 
                                                 
7 Kaldor specifically related the possibility of transferring q to stocks of raw materials, which assist 
production and whose usefulness comes from being readily available, rather than to of financial assets, 
where the yield always stays with stock holders.  
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are contractors with given orders for some period ahead, stock-holders (speculators 
selling forward) loose the convenience yield to hedgers (forward buyers) and forward 
prices exceed expected prices.  
Dow acknowledged that forward sales would transfer the yield of stocks from stock-
holders to hedgers, but claimed that futures rather than forward contracts, a difference 
ignored by Kaldor (Dow 1940: 186-7), were the standard instruments to hedge stocks. 
Selling futures rather than forward, stock holders retained control of their stocks and of 
the convenience yield, while ‘there is always the possibility that the forward price will 
be above the expected price; and always, with the normal sort of risk, the futures price 
will be below both’ (Dow 1940: 187). By ignoring the difference between futures and 
forward contracts, Kaldor had therefore treated as general a very specific case. 
Dow’s second line of criticism was based on the notion of negative risk, the risk that 
prices rise rather than fall (positive risk). Negative risks affect two categories of agents: 
1) manufacturers using the commodity as input, and 2) speculators sell futures contracts 
without owning the stocks. Symmetrically, positive risks, affect producers and buyers of 
futures contracts. Assuming identical price expectations (as Kaldor had done) and 
different degrees of risk aversion, Dow showed that when positive and negative risks 
were equivalent futures prices would fluctuate between EP – r and EP + r , whereas in 
case positive risks prevailed (the normal case for Dow) futures prices would be lower 
than expected prices (as in the case of normal backwardation). Only in very specific 
circumstances, much more specific than what Kaldor had envisaged, would negative 
risks prevail.  
Kaldor’s curt response to Dow8 and to ‘some further discussions on the subject with 
Mr. R. G. Hawtrey’ (Kaldor 1940: 196) gave him a chance to refine his theory of the 
forward market.  
The main defect in my previous account was the insufficient allowance made for the 
difference in expectations of different individuals. […] I still believe that for certain 
problems in the theory of speculation, this concept of the ‘representative expectation’ is 
perfectly legitimate. […] From the point of view of the theory of the forward market, 
however, it is not legitimate; for the determination of the forward price, and in 
particular, the relation of the forward price to the expected price will not be the same in 
the case where everybody’s expectations are equal as in the case where the 
‘representative expectation’ is an average of different individual expectation […] In 
                                                 
8 On this see Kaldor (1940: 197 fn. 4, 198 fn. 2, 199 fn. 2). 
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both cases individuals participating in the forward market can be divided into two 
groups: ‘speculators’ and ‘hedgers’.9 (Kaldor 1940: 196)  
When all individuals have the same expectations ‘forward transactions can only 
arise between hedgers and speculators owing to differences in the “marginal risk 
premium”’ (Kaldor 1940: 197). ‘Insofar as hedgers are both sellers and buyers of 
futures, their opposite risks mutually cancel each other out, hence the futures price in 
transactions between hedgers and hedgers can vary anywhere between’ (Kaldor 1940: 
198) EP – r (the lowest price hedgers accept when selling forward) and EP + r (the 
highest price hedgers accept to pay when buying forward). As to which of the two cases 
is likely to prevail, Kaldor stated  
In my earlier paper I have said that in the majority of markets, the hedgers will be 
forward sellers; and only in the case of certain raw materials […] can it be the other 
way round. I should now like to modify this statement. The hedgers are likely to be 
predominantly buyers, rather than sellers. (Kaldor 1940: 197)10  
If hedging influences the position of the futures price FP relative to EP, a second 
factor hitherto not discussed by Kaldor—arbitrage—determines the level of FP relative 
to current prices CP. Arbitrageurs buy spot and sell futures simultaneously, holding 
stocks until the date of delivery. They run no risks of the sort hedgers and speculators 
trade among themselves and their presence limits the extent to which futures prices may 
rise above current prices when stocks are relatively abundant. ‘While there is no limit, 
apart from expectations to the extent to which the futures price may fall short of the 
current price, it cannot exceed the current price by more than the sum of interest plus 
carrying costs’.11 If the arbitrageur, by holding stocks, obtains the advantages, as well as 
the disadvantages, which other holders of stock obtain from their holding, his ‘carrying 
cost’ will consist of the cost of storage and wastage minus the yield, so that 
 FP – CP = i + c' – q 
but since, in all cases 
                                                 
9 Kaldor defined hedgers as ‘those who have certain commitments, independent of any transactions in the 
forward market, either because they hold stocks of the commodity, or are committed to produce the 
commodity, or are committed to produce, in the future, something else for which the commodity is 
required as a raw material... Speculators, on the other hand, have no commitments apart from those 
entered into in connection with forward transactions’ (Kaldor 1940: 196).  
10 Kaldor provided two main motivations for this change of mind: (1) ‘technical uncertainties connected 
with production are much greater in the stages of production prior to the stage where the futures market 
is situated than in subsequent stages’ (Kaldor 1940: 197), (2) producers, especially producers of 
agricultural crops, may compensate price fluctuations with output fluctuations, moreover, if output risk 
prevails the ‘risks borne by producers are enlarged, and not reduced, by hedging’ (Kaldor 1940: 197). 
11 If FP exceeded CP + i + c', riskless profits could be earned by buying spot, selling forwards and 
holding stocks to maturity. 
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 EP – CP = i + c' – q + r 
 FP = EP – r 
In this case, which applies to securities in particular, the futures price falls short of 
the expected price by an amount equivalent to the marginal risk premium irrespective of 
whether hedgers are predominantly buyers or sellers. But ‘where the yield consists 
simply of “convenience,” the arbitrageurs would enjoy no such convenience, on stock 
bought solely for arbitrage purposes’ (Kaldor 1940: 199). This implies the possibility 
that the futures price rises above the expected price. Expressing this possibility in 
algebraic terms  
 FP – CP = i + c' 
 EP – CP = i + c' – q + r 
 FP = EP – r + q 
In this re-stating the two cases, Kaldor moved forward with respect to his 1939 
formulation.  
I still maintain, therefore, that in the case everybody’s expectation are assumed to be the 
same, the conclusions stated in my earlier paper were correct. […] In markets were 
hedgers are predominantly sellers, or even when they are predominantly buyers but the 
yield is a money return which automatically accrues to all holders, the futures price 
must fall short of the expected price by the marginal risk premium. In markets where 
hedgers are predominantly buyers and the yield of stocks consists of convenience, the 
future price can exceed the expected price. […] In the latter case, […] FP will be either 
EP + r, or EP – r + q, whichever is less. (Kaldor 1940: 200) 
In the more realistic case of heterogeneous expectations, multiple types of 
transactions are possible ‘not only between hedgers and hedgers, and hedgers and 
speculators, and hedgers and arbitrageurs, …, but also between speculators and 
speculators; and transactions of the latter type may swamp all others’ (Kaldor 1940: 
200). In this case, which we may surmise Kaldor had come to consider as the most 
relevant one, FP will fluctuate between EP – r (the average demand price of bull 
speculators, the counterpart of bear speculators and hedger sellers) and EP + r (the 
average supply price of bear speculators, the counterpart of bull speculators and of 
hedger buyers).  
 EP – r ≤ FP ≤ EP + r 
With speculation and heterogeneous expectations being given a prominent position 
and the introduction of arbitrageurs , Kaldor’s final formulation of the theory of forward 
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markets significantly downplays the role of the convenience yield. On the specific issue 
of normal backwardation Kaldor concluded  
The doctrine first propounded in Mr. Keynes’ Treatise on Money, and taken over by 
Professor Hicks […] has only a limited application. It is not valid if there is a marked 
divergence in individual expectations; and even if unanimity of expectations is assumed 
it will only necessarily hold if markets where hedging is predominantly on the selling 
side or where the yield of stocks enters automatically in arbitrage costs. (Kaldor 1940: 
201) 
Hawtrey (1940) acknowledges Kaldor’s effort in modifying his theory of the 
‘expected price’ but retains his perplexities about the assumption of uniform price 
expectations. Hawtrey objects to this hypothesis on the basis of a series of arguments 
which may be summarized as follows:  
Not only are there sure to be some people who have formed no expectations at all 
in regard to the economic quantity concerned, but those who have will have formed 
very incomplete expectations. […] The most complete expectations will take the form 
of estimates of the respective probabilities of a series of results. But different people’s 
estimates will not relate to the same series of results. Nor will they relate to the same 
future dates […] In the particular case of dealers in a forward market, the trader who 
hedges does so for the express purpose of being relieved from estimating future price 
movements. […] And the expectations formed by the professional dealers and the 
speculators themselves do not take the form of an estimate of what the price will be at 
some future dates. The speculative buyer merely anticipates a rise and the speculative 
seller a fall. (Hawtrey 1940: 203) 
Hawtrey’s contribution concludes the 1940 Symposium with what appears as a 
further generalization of Kaldor’s own theory, based on the identification of two 
limiting cases, reflecting very different degrees of uncertainty regarding commodity 
prices, in the context of the same theory. ‘When the future movement of prices becomes 
very uncertain, there are wide differences of opinion among dealers, and both bulls and 
bears hope for big gains. … When there is very little difference of opinion among 
dealers as to price movements, there may practically be no speculation’ (Hawtrey 1940: 
204). In the first case, speculators dominate the market, prices fluctuate a lot and price 
margins may be regarded as risk premiums. In the second case, transactions involve 
hedger buyers (manufacturers) trading with hedger sellers.12 Dealers, who carry the 
                                                 
12 As to hedger sellers, Hawtrey writes: ‘the hedging sellers are almost entirely the holders rather than the 
producers (of stocks)’ (Hawtrey 1940: 204) and justifies this significant departure from Keynes’s main 
focus on producers as hedgers on the basis of a series of arguments presented on page 204 of his essay. 
Kaldor had reached analogous conclusions focusing on agricultural producers. 
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stocks and sell them forward, relieve manufacturers of the cost of holding the stocks and 
receive their compensation through the premium of the forward price over the spot 
price. It is only when the ‘shortage of spot supplies becomes severe enough to outweigh 
the entire carrying cost that a “backwardation” or excess of the spot price over the 
forward price appears. The scarcity must be temporary.’ (Hawtrey 1940: 205).  
Hawtrey’s two cases are particularly interesting as they indicate the two directions 
along which the theory of forward markets evolved in the 1940s and 50s. On one side, 
Working’s works on the wheat markets (see Section 5 below), focusing on: 1) storage 
cost and convenience yield as the main determinants of the difference between 
commodity prices at different delivery dates, 2) efficient markets dominated by dealers 
offering storage facilities, sharing the same (correct) expectations about prices and 
market fundamentals. On the other side, the British literature putting emphasis on: 1) 
speculation and volatility as the main determinants of commodity prices, 2) relatively 
efficient markets populated by distinct categories of traders (hedgers vs. speculators), 
operating on the basis of heterogeneous expectations.  
An application of the British approach to the theory of commodity prices can be 
found in an article by Gerda Blau that was published, once again in the Review of 
Economic Studies, four years after the Symposium (Blau 1944). From a theoretical 
point of view, this article did not add new ideas to the debate. To a large extent, Blau’s 
paper built on the Kaldorian framework as it has been described above. Only, it 
downplayed the importance of convenience yield and placed more emphasis on 
expectations, as well as on the relative weight of hedgers, speculators, arbitrageurs, in 
determining futures prices.  
The downplaying of convenience yield was the result of focusing on futures instead 
of forward markets. Provided that, in futures markets, standardized commodities are 
dealt with, and that the difficulty of obtaining new supplies of these standardized 
commodities at arm’s length is supposed to be very low in these markets, the 
convenience of holding stocks turns out to be very low. On the other hand, the great 
emphasis on the role of expectations, and especially on the possible existence of 
different expectations among the agents operating in the same market, somehow 
reinforced Kaldor’s conclusion that the Keynesian theory represented a special case.  
More specifically, situations in which the opposing forces of bull and bear 
speculation dominate, thus placing FP somewhere between EP – r and EP + r, were 
very plausible. At the same time, however, Blau came to the conclusion that commodity 
markets could not easily become the sort of ‘casino’ markets described in chapter 12 of 
Keynes’s General Theory. Rather than that, Blau came back to some of the seminal 
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ideas of Keynes’s 1923 article, where speculation could not act effectively in limiting 
price instability but could nonetheless reduce the producers’ risks connected with it 
(Blau 1944: 23-6).  
As Keynes also had argued, price instability is a necessary condition for speculation, 
so there is a (plausibly quite high) minimum level of volatility that has to be accepted if 
speculation has to exist. On the other hand, the ‘danger’ that speculation could augment 
market instability instead of reducing it  
[…] is likely to be more severe in an organised market of railway shares than in an 
organised market for an agricultural crop because the railway shares’ value for the 
community as a whole is likely to depend on expectations over a period of 10-20 years 
or more while the agricultural crop’s value […] is likely to depend on expectations over 
the crop year and hardly more than one year after. (Blau 1940: 25) 
Blau was here probably referring to the Keynesian idea of radical uncertainty over 
longer periods (CWK VII: 147-64; Keynes 1937). Especially in the case of crops, the 
life of a commodity traded in futures exchange is much shorter, and this increases the 
probability that the individuals operating in the markets will rely on their knowledge of 
fundamentals instead of falling into the beauty contest situation described by Keynes in 
the General Theory. This conjecture finds supports in Blau’s subsequent observation 
when she writes: ‘[…] despite all limitations, hedging can, on the whole, be regarded as 
an effective insurance against major price fluctuations, and because of the lowered risk 
the hedger can do a larger amount of transactions with the same amount of capital’ 
(1944: 26). Once again developing an idea that was put forth by Keynes in 1923, Blau 
observed that ‘A further reason for the lowering of costs’ is that ‘the hedge is generally 
accepted […] as a collateral by crediting banks’, and went further to say that ‘the 
security derived from hedging may diminish the cautious trader’s natural disinclination 
to carry stocks which has been characterised by Keynes as one of the faults of the 
competitive system’ (Blau 1944: 26; see also Keynes 1938). 
It is not at all clear whether Keynes or Kaldor would have endorsed Blau’s opinions 
about the relative efficiency of commodity markets,13 and it is not our object to answer 
this question. On the other hand, these conclusions are interesting enough, from the 
                                                 
13 Keynes became convinced that commodity markets were characterized by endemic excess volatility, 
due to the reluctance of traders to hold stocks, and proposed to correct what he saw as a market failure 
by means of government-sponsored buffer stocks (Keynes 1938). Blau was aware of Keynes’s opinion 
when she wrote: ‘the security derived from hedging may diminish the cautious trader’s natural 
disinclination to carry stocks which has been characterised by Keynes as one of the faults of the 
competitive system’ (Blau 1944: 26). Kaldor came to the endorse Keynes’s vision in the 1970s (on this, 
see Spraos 1989). 
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standpoint of the present reconstruction, because they base a reappraisal of the 
economic function of commodity markets on a view of their functioning that, as it will 
be shown presently, is very different to the one that Working was developing in the 
same years.  
 
 
5. The theory of the price of storage 
As the debate on commodities and futures markets was going on in Britain, parallel 
research on this issue was being conducted in the USA, notably by Holbrook Working. 
Based on his knowledge of the US wheat market, Working (1948, 1949a) formulated 
the theory of the price of storage to explain the difference between spot and futures 
prices. This theory consists of three elements: 1) the idea that all prices, spot prices 
included, react to market expectations in approximately the same way, irrespective of 
the time of delivery, 2) that their difference depends on carrying costs net of 
convenience yield, and 3) that net carrying costs can be positive or negative.  
The origin of this theory can be traced back to Working (1942) where the author, 
building on previous research (Working 1934, Hoos and Working 1940), refuted the 
prevailing idea (that Working attributed to Hawtrey 1938, among others) that ‘spot 
prices are not generally supposed to reflect anticipations of the future in the same 
degree as futures prices’ and concluded that ‘the difference between prices of 
successive wheat futures at any given time seems to reflect the existing market appraisal 
of the prospective marginal cost of carrying wheat from one delivery month to the next’ 
(Working 1942: 47).  
In the context of this analysis, Working observed cases of negative carrying costs in 
connection with low stock levels that were in blatant contradiction with the cost of 
carrying theory, and related this to the need of maintaining a minimum amount of stocks 
to ensure regular production (Working 1942: 42-3). This argument was akin to that put 
forth by Kaldor to introduce the notion of convenience yield but a post-script to the 
1942 article, the Appendix note on pp. 51-52, bore witness to the fact that Working had 
written that paper before coming into contact with Kaldor (1939) and the Symposium. 
In this note Working subscribed to Hawtrey’s criticism of Kaldor’s treatment of market 
expectations and downplayed the importance of risk as a factor determining futures 
prices. The note made no mention of the notion of convenience yield.  
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Building on these results, Working (1948: 2) compared four different theories to 
explain the case of negative carrying costs, which he defined inverse carrying 
charges,14 in the market for wheat, listing them as follows: 
(1) ‘Cash and futures prices, though related, are not equivalents aside from the time 
element, at least in the United States wheat market.’ 
(2) ‘The future, as against the present, is discounted.’ 
(3) Expectations regarding future demand and supply conditions tend to have more 
effect on prices of deferred futures than on cash prices or on near futures. 
(4) An inverse carrying charge is a true negative price of storage, arising from the fact 
that stocks may have a high marginal ‘convenience yield’.  
 
Working refuted the first explanation on the basis of technical considerations and of 
his knowledge of hedging practices on the US wheat market. In particular, he found that 
futures were commonly sold (bought) in connection with a purchase (sale) on the cash 
market only when the discount (premium) of the spot price on (over) the futures prices 
was expected to fall (increase). Working saw this form of discretionary hedging as 
arbitrage ‘in fact as well in form because its occurrence depends on a judgement 
regarding the relation between two prices’ (Working 1948: 5). As shown below, this 
was the first step of a general redefinition and generalization of the concept of hedging 
that continued at least until Working (1962).  
As to the second explanation, traced back to Vance (1946) and Keynes (CWK VI), 
based on futures prices being downward biased, Working concluded that this could not 
‘explain more than a very small inverse carrying charge’ (Working 1948: 13). Working 
refuted the third explanation, that expectations should affect prices for different forward 
dates differently, on the basis of the same arguments, as he had used in 1942 and 
recognized that ‘heavy surplus stocks may force spot and futures prices into a pattern of 
relationship determined by the costs of carrying stocks’ (Working 1948: 13). 
Generalizing this argument, Working introduced a theory in which inter-temporal price 
relations depend exclusively on the price of storage (carrying costs). Finally, he 
explained the possibility of inverse carrying charges by explicitly referring to Kaldor 
and to his notion of convenience yield (Working 1948: 20-1).15  
                                                 
14 As Working states ‘In the technical language of American futures markets, carrying charge refers to a 
difference at a given time between prices of a commodity for two different dates of delivery. […] In 
British usage, ‘contango’ and ‘backwardation’ refer to positive and inverse carrying charges 
respectively’ (Working 1948: 1).  
15 When stocks are low, and their convenience yield positive and very high, net carrying costs (storage 
cost minus convenience yield) will be negative (backwardation). 
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Indicating by P1 a spot or forward price, by P2 a forward price for a date later than 
that to which P1 applies and by Ps carrying charges (price of storage), Working 
summarizes his framework with the following formula 
 P1 + Ps – P2 = 0 
As Working put it, the previous equation  
gives no information by itself regarding the economic influences which determine any 
one of the variables included, but it affords a basis for explaining any one of them in 
terms of known explanations of the other two […] Treatment of the carrying charge as a 
price of storage involves providing a direct explanation of Ps instead of relying on 
explanations in terms of differences between the explanations of P1 and P2. Direct 
explanation … is simpler and more reliable than indirect explanation and it opens the 
possibility of explaining either P1 or P2 in terms of the other and of Ps These advantages 
prove substantial in practice. (Working 1948: 22-3) 
Working saw Ps as a function of outstanding stocks and as the main independent 
factor determining the difference between spot and futures prices.  
Working (1949a) clarified the relationship between Ps, P1 and P2 in the context of 
an analysis of hedging by professional dealers supplying storage services. Based on 
practical examples, Working showed how futures prices at different delivery dates 
could guide a dealer in his decisions by providing ‘a basis for anticipating his return for 
storage which is far superior to any estimate which could be made in the absence of a 
good hedge in a futures market or of an outright forward sale […] and a means through 
hedging, of assuring receipt of that return’ (Working 1949a: 1257-8).16  
Working (1953) noted three relevant facts about hedging in commodity futures 
markets: 
First, […] hedging of the sort here considered is not properly comparable with 
insurance. It is a sort of arbitrage. […] Secondly, hedging does not eliminate risks 
arising from price variability. Risk is less than on stocks held unhedged but it still 
exists. […] Thirdly, hedging is not necessarily done for the sake of reducing risk. 
(Working 1953: 325)  
                                                 
16 In particular, Working discussed the problem of a dealer, holding stocks at the end of November and 
deciding whether to sell in December or to hold on until May, and showed how this decision depended 
on whether the difference between futures prices for delivery in May and December was sufficient to 
cover carrying costs, under the assumption that spot prices at the end of April stood in the same 
relationship to future prices in May as spot prices in November stand to future prices in December. 
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Based on these observations, Working defined hedging as ‘the purchase or sale of 
futures in conjunction with another commitment, usually in the expectation of a 
favourable change in the relation between spot and futures prices’ (Working 1953: 326).  
In his 1962 synthesis of the ‘New Concepts Concerning Futures Markets and Prices’ 
developed over the previous thirty years, Working clarified that he saw hedging as a 
‘multipurpose’ activity done to seek profit from stock holding and speculation, to avoid 
loss, and to reduce risk, and ‘defined as the use of futures contracts as a temporary 
substitute for a merchandising contract’ (Working 1962: 432). In the same context, he 
noted that ‘futures prices tend to be highly reliable estimates of what should be expected 
on the basis of contemporarily available information concerning present and probable 
future demand and supply’ (Working 1962: 432). This definition is relevant as it 
connects Working’s investigation of commodity futures markets with a parallel strand 
of his research activity concerning the time-series properties of financial prices. As part 
of this investigation, Working came to the conclusion that prices forming on perfectly 
functioning markets move as random walks and that price changes are completely 
unpredictable (Working 1949b), findings that would be at the core of the ‘efficient 
market hypothesis’.17 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
The main conclusions of our paper may be summarized as follows. In 1939, Kaldor 
proposed a generalization of the Keynes-Hicks theory of normal backwardation relating 
differences between spot and futures prices to the type of hedgers prevailing in the 
market. In particular, where hedger sellers prevailed Kaldor thought futures prices 
would fall below spot prices, taken as proxy of future expected price (normal 
backwardation). Where hedger buyers prevailed, however, futures prices would tend to 
rise above spot prices. This generalization was based on three main assumptions: 1) 
homogeneous expectations, 2) risk averse hedgers, 3) speculators insuring hedgers in 
return for a premium. In response to several lines of criticism to his 1939 contribution, 
Kaldor reconsidered his views, introducing the possibility of heterogeneous 
expectations. This led him, and other British authors, to admit the possibility of 
speculators trading among themselves rather than with hedgers and to downplay the role 
of fundamentals in determining commodity emphasizing that of speculation and the role 
of a third category of operators, arbitrageurs.  
                                                 
17 For a recognition of the role of Working in the development of the efficient market hypothesis see 
Samuelson (1982). 
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Meanwhile, in the US, Working developed a model of wheat prices at different 
delivery dates based on the assumption of homogeneous expectations and of trading 
taking place among professional dealers, offering storage facilities in competition 
against each other, producers and consumers. Working observed that spot and futures 
prices moved in step and that, normally, spot prices fell below futures prices due to 
storage cost (contango). The fact that sometimes this was not the case confronted 
Working with a puzzle which he named reverse carrying charge. Working’s discovery 
of the notion of convenience yield allowed him to solve this puzzle, without abandoning 
his preferred theoretical framework and the idea that fundamentals rather than 
speculation are the main determinants of wheat price.  
Kaldor’s separation from Keynes on the theory of forward markets therefore 
occurred when Working introduced the concept of convenience yield onto a non 
Keynesian theoretical framework. This model, one of the first applications of the 
efficient market hypothesis, differed from Kaldor’s final formulation in not assigning 
any specific role to professional speculators in the price formation process. Moreover, 
whereas Kaldor and other British economists working on the theory of forward markets 
formulated a complex taxonomy of different cases, classified on the basis of the identity 
of market participants, on the prevalence of one type of trader over the other (e.g. 
hedgers versus speculators), on the type of hedging technique and on the type of 
commodity, Working’s theory was based on a specific market structure (dealers selling, 
manufacturers buying), on a specific hedging technique (discretionary hedging) and on 
a specific commodity (wheat). 
Explaining how Working’s theory of storage, including the notion of convenience 
yield, came to prevail on Kaldor’s more general approach is not the object of this paper. 
However, our reconstruction seems to indicate two possible (and possibly concomitant) 
explanations. First, the theory of the price of storage is based on observable and 
measurable factors rather than on expectations and individual risk premiums. Second, 
the theory of the price of storage is consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis.  
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A new test of the theory of storage comparing historical and 
contemporary data 
Giulio Cifarelli and Paolo Paesani* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we adopt an historical perspective to analyse commodity price 
volatility and its relationship with market fundamentals. In particular, we work on a 
balanced sample, comparing the 1920s (1921-1929) with the present decade (2000-
2011) and focusing on two staple commodities, cotton and tin.1 
The main reasons to expect a change over time in the relations of interest are related 
to the growing financialization of commodity markets observed in recent years 
(UNCTAD 2009; Tang and Xiong 2010) and to the absence, in the 1920s, of a fully 
developed theory of fair pricing and market efficiency orientating trading strategies. At 
the same time, the two periods are comparable in terms of available trading instruments, 
if not of rapidity in the transmission of relevant information, and in terms of a trading 
environment free of State intervention.2 
Our analysis is grounded in the theory of storage. This theory illuminates the benefit 
of holding stocks of physical commodities. Inventories have a productive value, a 
convenience yield, deriving from the possibility of meeting unexpected demand, while 
avoiding the cost of frequent revisions in the production schedule and of manufacturing 
disruptions (Geman 2005). At the same time, holding stocks involves carrying costs, 
that is physical storage costs and financial (opportunity) costs. According to the theory 
of storage, the difference between future and spot prices mirrors carrying costs net of 
                                                 
* Giulio Cifarelli (University of Florence), Paolo Paesani (University of Rome, Tor Vergata). The authors 
are grateful to Alessandro Girardi, Maria Cristina Marcuzzo, and Simone Salotti for useful suggestions. 
The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 The paper is part of a wider research project investigating, among other issues, J.M. Keynes’s trading 
activity on commodity markets, his views on the causes and consequences of volatility, his proposals 
about possible remedies. The fact that Keynes was particularly active on the cotton and tin markets and 
that most of his trading activity took place in the 1920s motivates the choice of our sample. 
2 We chose not to extend the sample to the 1930s because of the massive State intervention which 
occurred then in response to the collapse of prices. 
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convenience yield. The latter, in turn, depends on available stocks which also affect 
volatility. 
This work makes two main contributions to the empirical literature on commodity 
prices. The first consists in constructing a new database on the spot and future prices of 
cotton and tin for the 1920s, drawing on the historical archives of The Times. The 
second contribution consists in testing: 1) whether the diffusion of information across 
commodity markets is significantly different between the two periods, 2) whether the 
relationship between volatility and net storage costs is consistent with the predictions of 
the theory of storage and with Samuelson’s (1965) maturity effect. 
We present an innovative test of this theory—as set out in Pindyck (2001)—based 
on the interrelation between net storage costs and spot price returns conditional 
volatility. Our approach follows Ng and Pirrong (1994) in so far as we analyse 
interactions between net storage costs and the conditional variability of commodity 
prices but introduces a more restrictive sign assumption. Moreover, the structure of our 
model is more closely related to the dynamic properties of the time series. As to this, 
whereas Ng and Pirrong (1994) regress the rate of change of spot and futures prices on 
lagged net storage costs in order to avoid multicollinearity problems in the second stage 
GARCH analysis, we use bivariate VECM and standard Constant-Conditional 
Correlation (CCC) GARCH models (Bollerslev 1990) to obtain unbiased 
parameterizations of respectively the short-run return dynamics and the corresponding 
volatilities. The a priori requirement that the correlation between the time series be 
constant is not unduly restrictive in our context since the fair pricing ensures that futures 
and spot prices co-move over time. An accurate analysis of the correlation between net 
storage costs and spot returns conditional variances is set out over the full sample and, 
in order to accommodate periods of stress, using rolling correlations. A priori causality 
is not imposed on the analysis, since both variables are simultaneously affected by the 
outstanding stock of commodities. 
The main findings of the paper may be summarized as follows. As expected, the 
diffusion of information is slower and less complete in the 1920s than in present times. 
This results from the observed behaviour of returns and from the structure of the 
estimated VECM and GARCH parameterizations. Using full sample correlations, the 
theory of storage seems to capture the dynamics of data with the exception of historical 
tin. Rolling correlations, however, qualify this result in two ways. First, dynamic 
correlation for historical tin corroborate the theory of storage but for one notable 
exception in 1925. Second, the recent inroads of financial agents in commodity markets 
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seem to have affected the cotton market, reducing the impact of fundamentals on 
pricing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains an essential review 
of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology. Section 4 
reports the preliminary empirical analysis of the data. Section 5 analyses their 
conditional first and second moments. The full sample and rolling correlations between 
net storage costs and spot returns conditional variances are set out in Section 6, and 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
Holbrook Working was the first to propose the theory of storage (Working 1948; 
1949a) building on the notion of convenience yield introduced by Kaldor (1939). The 
convenience yield can be defined as the stream of implicit benefits, in terms of planning 
security and stock-out avoidance, accruing to consumers or producers from holding a 
stock of a given commodity. On this see Cristiano and Paesani (2012). The theory of 
storage was developed, from the 1940s to the 1960s (Brennan 1958; Telser 1958; 
Cootner 1960), in alternative to the Keynes-Hicks theory of ‘normal backwardation’ and 
has become standard reference ever since.3 According to the theory of storage, the 
difference between future and spot prices mirrors carrying costs (storage costs plus 
interest rate) net of convenience yield. Ceteris paribus, when inventories are abundant 
the convenience yield is small and futures prices tend to exceed spot prices for a given 
interest rate. In the opposite case, when stocks are scarce the convenience yield is high 
and spot prices tend to exceed futures prices.4 An additional effect, discussed by Ng and 
Pirrong (1994: 209), relates stocks availability to price variability. Ceteris paribus, as 
buffers provided by stocks decline, the elasticity of supply decreases and prices become 
more volatile for a given demand shock. Combining the two effects a negative relation 
between volatility and net storage costs obtains. This relationship is central to our paper 
and is going to be accurately explored in the following sections. 
Geman (2005: 25) identifies three main strands in the literature on commodity price 
volatility and market fundamentals. The first strand models the convenience yield as a 
                                                 
3 See Williams (1986), Bresnahan and Spiller (1986), Williams and Wright (1989), Brennan (1991), 
Deaton and Laroque (1992) among others. On the concept of ‘normal backwardation’ see Keynes 
(1923, 1930), Hicks (1939), Blau (1944), Hirshleifer (1989). 
4 On this see Fama and French (1988: 1077 Fig. 1) and the literature cited therein. 
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random exogenous quantity (e.g. Gibson and Schwartz 1990). A second approach 
directly analyses the role of inventory in explaining commodity spot price volatility 
(Geman and Nguyen 2005). Finally, Routledge et al. (2000) propose an equilibrium 
model in which the convenience yield appears as an inventory-dependent endogenous 
variable.  
A statistical study performed by Fama and French (1987) shows that the variance of 
prices decreases with inventory levels. Williams and Wright (1991) analyse a quarterly 
model with a yearly production of the commodity and identify that price volatility 
regularly increases after harvest time until the next one. Milonas and Thomadakis 
(1997), modelling convenience yields as call options, find empirical support for the 
hypothesis that convenience yields are related negatively to stocks and positively to spot 
price volatility. For analogous findings see Heaney (2002). As shown below our 
assessment of the theory of storage and our results are consistent with this approach. 
 
 
3. The dynamics of the theory of storage 
 
3.1 Theoretical considerations 
Indicating by Ft,T the futures price contracted at time t for delivery at time t+T and 
by St the spot price, fair pricing and the theory of storage imply that the two prices are 
related in the following way (Clark et al. 2001) 
[1] F୲,୘ ൌ S୲eሺ୩౪,౐ା୰౪,౐‐ୡ౪,౐ሻத 
Where kt,T represents storage costs as a proportion of the price of the commodity, rt,T 
is the riskless rate of interest, ct,T is the proportional convenience yield and (Tt)/365 is 
equal to the difference between the delivery date (or time to maturity) T and the current 
date t. In logarithmic terms, the above relationship can be used to define net storage 
costs zt  
[2] ݖ௧ ൌ ௧݂ െ ݏ௧ െ ݎ௧,்߬ ൌ ൫݇௧,் െ ܿ௧,்൯߬ 
where ft = log Ft,T and st = log St. This relationship posits that markets are 
sufficiently liquid and that prices convey all relevant information. The theory of storage 
and the associated tests would be affected by failure of these hypotheses. 
We model the dynamic relationship between volatility and net storage costs 
extending Pindyck (2001), who distinguishes between spot markets for commodities 
and markets for storage. Our theoretical model consists of the following three equations: 
[3] ܵ௧ ൌ ܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ଵఈ ሺ ௧ܰ െ ௧ܰିଵሻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
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[4] ܿ௧ ൌ ଵߪ௧ଶ െ ଶ ௧ܰ ൅ ߛ௧ 
[5] z୲ ൌ k୲‐c୲ 
Equation [3] establishes a direct relationship between the spot price St in first 
difference and the change in outstanding stocks ∆Nt, taken as a proxy of net demand. 
The random vector εt captures unexpected shifts in demand and supply. Equation (4) 
reflects the direct relationship between (spot) price volatility  and the (unobservable) 
marginal convenience yield ct and the inverse relationship between ct and the level of 
outstanding stocks Nt. The random vector γt captures unexpected changes in the demand 
and supply of storage. Equation [5] defines net storage costs zt as the difference between 
gross storage costs kt and convenience yield. Gross storage costs are assumed to be a 
fixed proportion of the price of the commodity. All the parameters in Equations [3] to 
[5] are assumed to have a positive sign. 
Solving the model [3] to [5] we obtain the equation, which clarifies the dynamics 
between volatility and net storage costs under the assumption that the theory of storage 
holds 
[6] ∆ݖ௧ ൌ ∆݇௧ ൅ ߙଶ∆ܵ௧ െ ଵ∆ߪ௧ଶ ൅ ߱௧ 
Where ω is a linear combination of the stochastic components of the model 
 ߱௧ ൌ െߙଶߝ௧ െ ∆ߛ௧. 
 
3.2 Statistical methodology 
The statistical methodology we employ to investigate the linkages between volatility 
and commodity price dynamics consists of three steps. First, after preliminary analysis 
of the time series properties of the data, we estimate a bivariate Vector Error Correction 
model (see Equations [7] and [8]) to filter away any serial correlation of the spot and 
futures returns, controlling also for the common stochastic trend driving prices in the 
long-run. Inter-temporal arbitrage should bring about cointegration between spot and 
futures prices. 
[7]  ∆s୲ ൌ a଴ ൅ ∑ a୨∆s୲‐୨ ൅୬୨ୀଵ ∑ g୩∆f୲‐୩ ൅୫୩ୀଵ πଵ ቀf୲‐ଵ‐b଴‐bଵs୲‐ଵቁ ൅ u୼ୱ,୲ 
[8]  ∆s୲ ൌ a଴ ൅ ∑ a୨∆s୲‐୨ ൅୬୨ୀଵ ∑ g୩∆f୲‐୩ ൅୫୩ୀଵ πଵ ቀf୲‐ଵ‐b଴‐bଵs୲‐ଵቁ ൅ u୼ୱ,୲ 
The residuals of the VECM equations, us,t and uf,t, are used in a second step to 
obtain measures of volatility using the bivariate CCC-GARCH model set forth below 
(see Equations [9] to [12]) 
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[9] u୲ ൌ ቂu୼ୱ,୲	u୼୤,୲	ቃ ; 				ቀu୲ቚΩ୲‐ଵቁ~Nሺ0, H୲ሻ; 		H୲ ൌ Δ୲RΔ୲		 
 
[10] 	R ൌ ൤ 1 ρ୼ୱ,୼୤ρ୼ୱ,୼୤ 1 ൨ ;									Δ୲ ൌ ൤
h୼ୱ,୲ 0
0 h୼୤,୲൨ 
 
[11] 	R ൌ ൤ 1 ρ୼ୱ,୼୤ρ୼ୱ,୼୤ 1 ൨ ;									Δ୲ ൌ ൤
h୼ୱ,୲ 0
0 h୼୤,୲൨ 
 
[12] h୼୤,୲ଶ ൌ ω୤ ൅ α୤u୼୤,୲‐ଵଶ ൅ β୤h୼୤,୲‐ଵଶ  
Finally, we calculate full sample and rolling correlations between the conditional 
volatilities and net storage costs as defined in Equation [2] above. Equation [6] cannot 
be estimated directly since, given the definition of zt, St would not be orthogonal to the 
residual t5 This being the case, a correlation analysis between zt and h2s,t is the correct 
approach to investigate the implications and the explicatory potential of the theory of 
storage where, following Pindyck (2001) and Equation [6] we expect to find a negative 
sign. Two types of correlation are investigated, static (Equation [13]) and dynamic. 
[13] 	ρ ൌ 1‐ ଺∑ ୢ౪మ౤౪సభ୬య‐୬  
where dt , according to Spearman, is the difference between the ranks of the tth pair 
of the set of n pairs of elements. The Spearman correlation coefficient is non parametric 
and provides consistent results when the pair of variables are related by any monotonic 
function. The exact sampling distribution can be obtained without requiring preliminary 
knowledge of their joint probability distributions. Static correlations are computed over 
the full sample (t = 1, 2, …, n) and the effects of relevant events that impact on the 
relations of interest may cancel out. The likely presence of volatility clustering in the 
series (and of its impact on their co-movement) suggests complementing the static 
analysis by m-period rolling correlations where m is equal to 52 weeks.6 These are 
calculated according to Equation [1]  
                                                 
5 The choice of instruments for assets priced in efficient markets is somewhat arbitrary, which hinders the 
implementation of a standard instrumental variable procedure. Indeed, spot price first differences show 
little serial correlation, and the traditional use of own lagged values as instruments becomes 
inappropriate. 
6 Each time t rolling correlation is centered at mid-sample, i.e. is computed over a window that runs from 
t–(m/2) to t+(m/2)–1. 
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[14] 	ρሺmሻ୲ ൌ 1‐	
଺∑ ୢ౪శ౟మ
ౣ
మ ‐భ
౟స‐ౣ/మ
୫య‐୫  
The corresponding standard errors, used for inference purposes, are approximated 
by  
 	seሺρሺmሻ୲ሻ ൌ ටଵ‐஡ሺ୫ሻ౪
మ
୫  
 
 
4. Preliminary statistical analysis 
To test the dynamic relationship between volatility and market fundamentals we 
employ weekly data on spot, one month and three month futures prices for cotton and 
tin, observed over two distinct periods: 7 January 1921-31 December 1929; 2 January 
2000-15 September 2011 (See Appendix 1). 
The historical cotton and futures prices and the interest rate, used to compute net 
storage costs, come from the online archives of The Times (Sections: home commercial 
markets, money markets). Cotton prices refer to the Liverpool American Future 
Contract (100 bales, 48,000 pounds) and are quoted in British pounds.7 Tin prices are 
quoted in pounds per tonne. The interest rate is the Three month Discount Bank Bill 
rate. 
The contemporary cotton spot and futures prices come from the US Department of 
Agriculture and the Intercontinental Exchange (NYSE: ICE) respectively and are quoted 
in US cents per pound. The contemporary tin prices come from the London Metal 
Exchange (LME) and are quoted in US dollars per metric tonne. Eurodollar (Three-
month Eurodollar Deposit Rate, London) and Three month Treasury Bill rates are used 
to compute the net storage costs for, respectively, tin and cotton. Prices are provided by 
Datastream and interest rates by Fred Database. 
According to the ADF unit root tests, the logarithms of the spot and futures prices 
turn out to be I(1) in levels and I(0) in first differences, a stylized finding of financial 
time series (tests available from the authors upon request). As expected zt time series are 
always stationary. 
Returns are measured as weekly first differences of log prices. If markets are 
efficient, prices should behave as martingales and the corresponding first differences 
                                                 
7 Hubbard (1923: 288-95) provides full details on this type of contract and on the functioning of the 
Liverpool exchange for American Futures Contracts on Cotton. 
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should be serially uncorrelated, i.e. have fair game properties. From an economic point 
of view, these properties imply that any serial correlation due to noise trading should be 
wholly eliminated by compensatory trading by informed arbitrageurs/speculators. 
Comparing the four sets of returns the following characteristics emerge (see Tables 1 
and 2).  
Table 1: Analysis of returns. Cotton 
 
1921-1929 2000-2011 
 ∆st ∆ft1 ∆ft3  ∆st ∆ft1 ∆ft3 
Mean –0.0002 –0.0002 –0.0002 Mean 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 
Std dev 0.0386 0.0389 0.0378 Std.dev. 0.0450 0.0475 0.0421 
Skew 0.0102 –0.0874 –0.1569 Skew 0.1614 –0.2922 –0.3313 
Kurt 4.666 4.521 5.070 Kurt 3.987 7.282 7.221 
JB 54.1 45.7 85.5 JB 27.4 474.7 464.0 
Auto (1) 0.133 0.102 0.086 Auto (1) 0.031 0.049 0.011 
Auto (3) 0.012 0.008 0.017 Auto (3) 0.017 –0.003 –0.006 
Auto2 (1) 0.260 0.253 0.189 Auto2 (1) 0.045 0.109 0.212 
Auto2 (3) 0.229 0.202 0.114 Auto2 (3) 0.083 0.013 0.089 
Notes: Skew: Skewness; Kurt: Kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; Auto (n): Ljung-Box test 
statistic for n-th order serial correlation; Auto2 (n): Ljung-Box tests statistic for n-th order serial 
correlation of the squared time series; bold print indicates statistically significant test at the 5 per cent 
level. 
 
First, in both time periods standard deviations are comparable and futures standard 
deviations decrease with maturity, which corroborates Samuelson’s hypothesis 
(Samuelson 1965). Second, the JB tests statistics show that deviations from normality, 
due to both skewness and excess kurtosis, are larger for contemporary than for historical 
data. Third, heteroskedasticity looms large in all cases. We detect, however, a 
significant difference in the serial correlation of the returns. The historical data are 
inconsistent with the martingale hypothesis, which casts some doubts on the efficient 
dissemination of information on commodity prices in the 1920s as risk-free arbitrage 
opportunities seem to persist over time. 
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Table 2: Analysis of returns. Tin 
1921-1929 2000-2011 
 ∆st ∆ft1 ∆ft3  ∆st ∆ft1 ∆ft3 
Mean –0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0004 Mean 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022 
Std dev 0.0244 0.0236 0.0224 Std dev 0.0418 0.0417 0.0409 
Skew –0.6250 –0.4712 –0.4803 Skew –0.7270 –0.7203 –0.7409 
Kurt 5.469 4.576 4.774 Kurt 6.696 6.820 6.867 
JB 149.3 65.8 79.4 JB 401.0 423.7 435.9 
Auto (1) 0.107 0.191 0.174 Auto (1) –0.074 –0.071 –0.060 
Auto (3) 0.015 0.046 0.039 Auto (3) 0.048 0.038 0.050 
Auto2 (1) 0.120 0.279 0.154 Auto2 (1) 0.164 0.160 0.135 
Auto2 (3) 0.105 0.115 0.081 Auto2 (3) 0.246 0.246 0.252 
Notes: Skew: Skewness; Kurt: Kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; Auto (n): Ljung-Box test 
statistic for n-th order serial correlation; Auto2 (n): Ljung-Box tests statistic for n-th order serial 
correlation of the squared time series; bold print indicates statistically significant test at the 5 per cent 
level. 
 
 
5. Analysis of the short run conditional mean and conditional 
variance dynamics 
Since the information matrix of our system is block diagonal (see Equations [7] to 
[12] above) with respect to the conditional mean and conditional variance parameters, it 
is possible to adopt a two-step estimation approach with no reduction in efficiency 
(Pagan and Schwert 1990). 
Table 3: Characteristics of the Vector Error Correction Models 
Cotton 
1921-1929 2000-2011 
 ∆st , ∆ft1 ∆st , ∆ft3 ∆st , ∆ft1 ∆st , ∆ft3 
VAR order 3 3 1 1 
Cointegration 
characteristics 
Restricted 
constant 
No cointegration 
Restricted 
Constant 
Restricted Constant 
Tin 
1921–1929 2000–2011 
 ∆st , ∆ft1 ∆st , ∆ft3 ∆st , ∆ft1 ∆st , ∆ft3 
VAR order 3 1 2 2 
Cointegration 
Characteristics 
Restricted 
constant 
Restricted Constant 
Linear 
deterministic trend 
Linear 
deterministic trend 
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The preliminary estimation of the VECM equations is performed using the FIML 
Johansen procedure. We cannot report, for evident lack of space, the estimates of the bi-
variate Vector Error Correction Models that have been used to parameterize the short 
run dynamics of the spot and futures price rates of change. The corresponding Johansen 
cointegration tests are set out in Appendix 2. The cointegration characteristics and the 
autoregressive order of the VECMs are summarized in Table 3. The order of the 
systems computed with historical data is consistently higher than the order of those 
obtained with contemporary data, corroborating the hypothesis, mentioned above, of a 
speedier diffusion of information in recent times along with more efficient arbitrage. 
The conditional variability of the VECM residuals is then parameterized with the 
help of the bivariate CCC-GARCH model, as specified above. Tables 4 and 5 provide 
some relevant results. 
Table 4: GARCH analysis. Cotton 
1921-1929 
 ߱ ߙ ߚ ߩ௱௦,௱௙ E(t)=0 E(2t)=1 JB LLF 
∆st , ∆ft1         
h2s,t 
0.0002 
(21.09) 
0.362 
(31.54) 
0.575 
(124.54) 
0.957 
(880.13) 
–0.139 0.983 
19.548 
[0.00] 
2364.2 
h2f1,t 
0.0002 
(21.22) 
0.303 
(38.78) 
0.604 
(139.50) 
 –0.142 0.982 
13.821 
[0.00] 
 
∆st , ∆ft3         
h2s,t 
0.0004 
(28.88) 
0.258 
(15.79) 
0.495 
(43.61) 
0.929 
(403.48) 
–0.061 
 
0.998 
 
37.469 
[0.00] 
2259.9 
h2f3,t 
0.0002 
(21.75) 
0.214 
(17.51) 
0.617 
(68.61) 
 –0.067 0.998 
37.789 
[0.00] 
 
2000-2011 
 ߱ ߙ ߚ ߩ௱௦,௱௙ E(t)=0 E(2t)=1 JB LLF 
∆st , ∆ft1         
h2s,t 
0.0003 
(13.96) 
0.105 
(8.34) 
0.755 
(65.93) 
0.038 
(0.94) 
0.036 1.000 
20.016 
[0.00] 
2059.1 
h2f1,t 
0.0001 
(9.19) 
0.102 
(12.65) 
0.838 
(109.49) 
 0.024 1.001 
17.902 
[0.00] 
 
∆st , ∆ft3         
h2s,t 
0.0001 
(9.50) 
0.090 
(18.82) 
0.844 
(112.26) 
0.028 
(0.75) 
0.035 1.000 
8.609 
[0.01] 
2154.9 
h2f3,t 
0.0002 
(11.22) 
0.154 
(11.66) 
0.753 
(64.77) 
 0.035 1.000 
13.900 
[0.00] 
 
Notes: t-ratios in parentheses and probability values in square brackets. 
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Table 5: GARCH analysis. Tin 
1921-1929 
 ߱ ߙ ߚ ߩ௱௦,௱௙ E(t)=0 E(2t)=1 JB LLF 
∆st , ∆ft1         
h2s,t 
0.0002 
(33.43) 
0.120 
(9.19) 
0.401 
(27.26) 
0.943 
(576.04) 
0.002 1.002 
39.901 
[0.00] 
2733.6 
h2f1,t 
0.0002 
(31.93) 
0.114 
(9.29) 
0.505 
(40.75) 
 0.001 1.002 
9.068 
[0.01] 
 
∆st , ∆ft3         
h2s,t 
0.0003 
(30.37) 
0.156 
(7.27) 
0.263 
(12.88) 
0.903 
(357.46) 
0.003 1.002 
93.762 
[0.00] 
2612.9 
h2f3,t 
0.0002 
(33.12) 
0.131 
(8.98) 
0.526 
(40.29) 
 –0.0004 1.002 
24.795 
[0.00] 
 
2000-2011 
    E(t)=0 E(2t)=1 JB LLF 
∆st , ∆ft1         
h2s,t 
0.0002 
(78.94) 
0.056 
(24.67) 
0.808 
(423.97) 
0.990 
(5565.4) 
-0.003 1.001 
338.407 
[0.00] 
3460.5 
h2f1,t 
0.0002 
(71.18) 
0.062 
(21.42) 
0.780 
(307.09) 
 -0.002 1.001 
379.677 
[0.00] 
 
∆st , ∆ft3         
h2s,t 
0.0001 
(3.33) 
0.060 
(3.84) 
0.835 
(24.04) 
0.984 
(335.42) 
-0.004 1.002 
323.919 
[0.00] 
3333.4 
h2f3,t 
0.0001 
(3.07) 
0.060 
(3.67) 
0.830 
(19.94) 
 0.000 
1.002 
 
359.326 
[0.00] 
 
Notes: t-ratios in parentheses and probability values in square brackets. 
 
The usual misspecification tests suggest that the standardized residuals t are well 
behaved and that the heteroskedasticity of the original return time series is captured by 
the model (E(t)=0, E(2t)=1 and the corresponding Jarque-Bera (JB) statistics are 
systematically smaller).8 Of great interest is the difference in persistence between the 
historical and contemporary estimates, with  (which measures volatility persistence) 
                                                 
8 The conditional normality of the standardized residuals, however, is rejected by the Jarque-Bera test 
statistics, and the t-ratios reported in the tables are based on the quasi-maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). 
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significantly lower in the former case. Conversely coefficient  (which gauges the 
impact of innovations) is much larger with historical than with contemporary data. 
These findings reflect the difference in the dissemination of information which, as 
already documented above, was less rapid and pervasive in the 1920s than in the present 
day. This implies that new information had a much larger impact on pricing and on 
volatility, the latter being, in turn, less affected by its own lagged value. 
It is noteworthy, finally, that the GARCH structure of the contemporary cotton and 
tin returns shares the stylised characteristics of financial assets: a large persistence 
coefficient, a small coefficient of the innovations, their sum being close to one. 
The theory of storage as developed by Working, is based, among other things, on 
the assumption of market information efficiency (Working 1949b). 
As a consequence, the inefficiencies detected in the 1920s might impair the quality 
of our results. In other words, we expect to find a stronger corroboration of our a priori 
with contemporary rather than with historical data. 
 
 
6. Correlation analysis 
Correlation analysis provides some interesting results on the co-movement between 
conditional return volatility and net storage costs and allows to test the dynamics 
implied by Equation [6] above. If, in a given time period, inventories are significantly 
above their average value, we posit that: 1) net storage costs zt exceed their average 
value (irrespective of the sign of their average) and 2) volatility h2s,t is likely to be 
smaller than its average value. The covariance and the correlation are thus expected to 
be negative. This holds true also in the opposite case.9  
Based on this argument, we interpret observed positive correlations as deviations 
from market fundamentals due to additional financial considerations, possibly related to 
risk factors and/or to inefficiencies in the pricing of information.10 This corresponds to 
                                                 
9 If inventories are significantly below their average value: 1) storage costs net of convenience yield will 
be lower than their average and 2) volatility will be above its average value. 
10 The empirical approach by Ng and Pirrong (1994), disregarding sign considerations, would interpret 
incorrectly this finding as a validation of the theory of storage. As is well known, (expected) returns are 
positively related with risk. Increases in volatility can thus be associated with positive basis changes 
which, in turn, induce a positive correlation between net storage costs and spot return volatility. 
Moreover, a stylised aspect of recent commodity price behaviour is the leading role of futures price 
movements which reflect changes in market outlook. 
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cases where increases in volatility are associated with falls in the convenience yield, i.e. 
to cases where the coefficient of Equation [4] is negative, violating our a priori.11  
Table 6 shows full sample Spearman and Pearson correlation between the 
conditional variances of the spot rates of return h2s,t and net storage costs at time t.12  
 
Table 6: Full sample correlation coefficients 
Cotton 
 Maturity Spearman Pearson 
1921-1929 
h2s,t 1 
–0.1506 
(–3.28) 
–0.0390 
(–0.84) 
h2s,t 3 
–0.1291 
(–2.81) 
0.0224 
(0.48) 
2000-2011 
h2s,t 1 
0.0948 
(2.35) 
0.0107 
(0.26) 
h2s,t 3 
–0.0782 
(–1.93) 
–0.4002 
(–10.77) 
Tin 
 Maturity Spearman Pearson 
1921-1929 
h2s,t 1 
0.0379 
(0.82) 
–0.0078 
(–0.17) 
h2s,t 3 
0.0704 
(1.52) 
0.0774 
(1.67) 
2000-2011 
h2s,t 1 
–0.2373 
(–6.02) 
–0.0681 
(–1.68) 
h2s,t 3 
–0.4130 
(–11.18) 
–0.3309 
(–8.64) 
    Note: t-ratios in parentheses. 
 
                                                 
11 This claim is based on the stylized observation that low stocks entail high volatility, low storage costs 
and high convenience yield. 
12 We repeated the analysis replacing zt with its one-period lagged values (estimates available upon 
request). No significant differences appear with respect to results discussed in the main text. 
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We include both one and three months spreads in the analysis in order to assess 
whether, as expected, the convenience yield rises with maturity (see Milonas and 
Henker 2001, among many others), focusing on results obtained with the Spearman 
procedure for the reasons mentioned in Section 3. The findings seem to corroborate the 
maturity effect. 
In the case of cotton, the theory of storage is borne over both periods, with the 
exclusion of the contemporary one month contract. In the case of tin, the theory of 
storage does not seem to apply for historical data whilst contemporary data strongly 
support it. This might be partly explained by the observed improvement in the 
contemporary transmission of information. 
In order to investigate the effects on the relations of interest of the large price 
gyrations (see Figures A1 to A4 of Appendix 1) and of the observed volatility clustering 
(see Tables 1 and 2), we perform the dynamic Spearman rolling correlation analysis as 
detailed by Equation [14] above, using three months futures contracts. The results, 
based on a 52 weeks window (m = 52), are reported in Figures 1 to 4 below. 
Historical data exhibit an irregular pattern.13 In the case of cotton (Figure 1), the 
theory of storage is strongly rejected only in 1926 and again in the early months of 
1928. In both cases this appears to be connected with falling prices (see Figure A1), 
high volatility and excess stock accumulation (see Table A1). In the case of tin (Figure 
2), in line with full sample results and with our conjecture about the likely blurring 
impact of market disfunctions, most rolling correlations are statistically not significant. 
Contemporary cotton data (Figure 3) are less informative. The theory of storage is 
rejected for long bouts of time, especially in 2001, 2003 and from the second quarter of 
2007 to 2010, mostly in connection with periods of price declines as in the case of 
historical data.14 The theory of storage fares better for tin, especially from 2003 to 2005 
and from the second half of 2007 to 2010. This reflects the highly efficient structure of 
the London Metal Exchange. 
 
                                                 
13 For evident lack of space we have chosen to comment only four of the sixteen possible correlations as 
reported in Table 6 above. 
14 The significant and positive correlations of these periods might be explained by the financial risk 
consideration mentioned above. 
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Figure 1: Dynamic correlations for cotton, 1921-1929 
 
 
Figure 2: Dynamic correlations for tin, 1921-1929 
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Figure 3: Dynamic correlations for cotton, 2000-2011 
 
 
Figure 4: Dynamic correlations for tin, 2000-2011 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between commodity price volatility and 
market fundamentals, proxied by the interest rate adjusted basis, comparing the 1920s 
with the present decade focusing on cotton and tin. In this context we develop an 
innovative test of the theory of storage grounded on recent strands of the literature. Our 
first result is to find that the series have widely different properties which reflect the 
speedier diffusion of information in the markets today. This emerges both from the 
analysis of the dynamics of returns and from the structure of the GARCH 
parameterization of their conditional volatilities. Our second finding is to show that, 
based on full sample correlations, the theory of storage seems to capture the dynamics 
of data with the exception of historical tin. Rolling correlations, however, qualify this 
result and suggest that recent inroads of financial agents in commodity markets might 
have affected the cotton market, giving prominence to financial risk factors. 
 
 
References 
Blau, G. (1944) ‘Some Aspects of the Theory of Futures Trading’, Review of Economic Studies, 
12 (1): 1-30. 
Bollerslev, T. (1990) ‘Modeling the Coherence of Short-run Nominal Exchange Rates: A 
Multivariate Generalized ARCH model’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 72 (3): 498-
505. 
Bollerslev, T. and Wooldridge, J.M. (1992) ‘Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation and 
Dynamic Models with Time-Varying Covariances’, Econometric Reviews, 11 (2): 143-172. 
Brennan, M.J. (1958) ‘The Supply of Storage’, American Economic Review, 48 (1): 50-72. 
Brennan, M. J. (1991) ‘The Price of Convenience and the Pricing of Commodity Contingent 
Claims’, in D. Lund and B. Oksendal (eds.) Stochastic Models and Option Values, New 
York: Elsevier. 
Bresnahan, T. and Spiller, P. (1986) ‘Futures Market Backwardation Under Risk Neutrality’, 
Economic Enquiry, 24 (3): 429-441. 
Clark, E., Lesourd J.-B., and Thiéblemont, R. (2001) International Commodity Trading, 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Cootner, P.H. (1960) ‘Returns to Speculators: Telser versus Keynes’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 68 (4): 396-404. 
Cristiano, C. and Paesani, P. (2012) ‘Kaldor on the Difference between Normal Backwardation 
and the Theory of Storage’, paper presented at the Annual Conference of the European 
Society for the History of Economic Thought, Saint Petersburg 16-20 May 2012. 
168 
Deaton, A. and Laroque, G. (1992) ‘On the Behavior of Commodity Prices’, Review of 
Economic Studies, 59 (1): 1-23. 
Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. (1987) ‘Commodity Futures Prices: Some Evidence on Forecast 
Power, Premiums, and the Theory of Storage’, Journal of Business, 60 (1): 55-74. 
Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. (1988) ‘Business Cycles and the Behavior of Metals Prices’, 
Journal of Finance, 43 (5): 1075-1093. 
Geman, H. (2005) Commodities and Commodity derivatives, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Geman, H. and Nguyen, V. (2005) ‘Soybean Inventory and Forward Curve Dynamics’, 
Management Science, 51 (7): 1076-1091. 
Gibson, R. and Schwartz, E.S. (1990) ‘Stochastic Convenience Yield and the Pricing of Oil 
Contingent Claims’, Journal of Finance, 45 (3): 959-976. 
Heaney, R. (2002) ‘Approximation for Convenience Yield in Commodity Futures Pricing’, 
Journal of Futures Markets, 22 (10): 1005-1017. 
Hicks, J.R. (1939) Value and Capital: An Inquiry into Some Fundamental Principles of 
Economic Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hirshleifer, D. (1989) ‘Determinants of Hedging and Risk Premia in Commodity Futures 
Markets’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 24 (3): 313-331. 
Hubbard, W.H. (1923) Cotton and the Cotton Market, New York and London: D. Appleton and 
Co. 
Kaldor, N. (1939) ‘Speculation and economic stability’, Review of Economic Studies, 7 (1): 1-
27. 
Keynes, J.M. (1923) ‘Some Aspects of Commodity Markets’, The Manchester Guardian 
Commercial, European Reconstruction Series, Section 13, 29 March, as reprinted in The 
Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Managing Editors E.A.G. Robinson and D. 
Moggridge, Vol. XII. Economic Articles and Correspondence, Investment and Editorial, 
255-66, London: Macmillan. 
Keynes, J.M. (1923-30) Special Memoranda on Stocks of Staple Commodities, as reprinted in 
The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Managing Editors E.A.G. Robinson and 
D. Moggridge, Vol. XII. Economic Articles and Correspondence, Investment and Editorial, 
267-647, London: Macmillan. 
Keynes, J.M. (1930) A Treatise on Money, London: Macmillan. 
Milonas, N. and Henker, T. (2001) ‘Price Spread and Convenience Yield Behavior in the 
International Oil Market’, Applied Financial Economics, 11 (1): 23-36. 
Milonas, N. and Thomadakis, S. (1997) ‘Convenience Yields as Call Options: An Empirical 
Analysis’, Journal of Futures Markets, 17 (1): 1-15. 
Ng, V.K. and Pirrong, S.C. (1994) ‘Fundamentals and Volatility: Storage, Spreads and the 
Dynamics of Metals Prices’, Journal of Business, 67 (2): 203-230. 
Pagan, A.R. and Schwert, G.W. (1990) ‘Alternative Models for Conditional Stock Volatility’, 
Journal of Econometrics, 45 (1): 267-290. 
Pindyck, R. (2001) ‘The Dynamics of Spot and Futures Markets: A Primer’, Energy Journal, 22 
(3): 1-30. 
169 
Routledge, B.R., Seppi, D.J., and Spatt, C.S. (2000) ‘Equilibrium Forward Curves for 
Commodities’, Journal of Finance, 55 (3): 1297-1338. 
Samuelson, P.A. (1965) ‘Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly’, 
Industrial Management Review, 6 (2): 41-49. 
Tang, K. and Xiong, W. (2010) ‘Financialisation of Commodities’, available online at: 
http://www.voxeu.org 
Telser, L. (1958) ‘Futures Trading and the Storage of Cotton and Wheat’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 66 (3): 233-255. 
UNCTAD (2009) ‘The Financialization of Commodity Markets’, in Trade and Development 
Report – 2009, UNCTAD/TDR/2009, 52-84. 
Williams, J. (1986) The Economic Function of Futures Markets, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Williams, J.C. and Wright, B.D. (1989) ‘A Theory of Negative Prices for Storage’, Journal of 
Futures Markets, 9 (1): 1-13. 
Williams, J.C. and Wright, B.D. (1991) Storage and Commodity Markets, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Working, H. (1948) ‘The Theory of Inverse Carrying Charge in Futures Markets’, Journal of 
Farm Economics, 30 (1): 1-28. 
Working, H. (1949a) ‘The Theory of Price of Storage’, American Economic Review, 39 (1): 
1254-1262. 
Working, H. (1949b) ‘The Investigation of Economic Expectations’, American Economic 
Review, 39: 150-166. 
170 
Appendix 1+ 
 
The Special Memoranda on Stocks of Staple Commodities, written by J.M. Keynes 
for the London and Cambridge Economic Service, provide essential information on the 
fundamental dynamics of commodity markets in the 1920s (Keynes 1923-30). Total 
stocks of American cotton declined as a result of falling crops and increasing 
consumption between 1921 and 1923. This contributed to rising prices and was 
followed by three years of very abundant crops which pushed prices down in spite of 
increasing consumption. Finally, the curtailment of crops and of stocks contributed to 
the partial recovery of prices between 1927 and 1929 (see Figure A1 and Table A1). In 
the case of tin, the upward trend in prices, observed between 1922 and 1926, was 
accompanied by consumption increasing at a more rapid pace than production and by 
diminishing stocks. The surge in production between 1927 and 1929 contributed to 
observed inversion in the price trend (see Figure A2 and Table A1). According to data 
reported in Table A2 both world production and consumption of cotton have been 
moving in step over the sample period, increasing from an average of 93.7 and 94.9 
(million of 480 lb bales) respectively, between 2000 and 2003, to an average of 114.8 
and 115.5, between 2004 and 2010. The sharp fall in stocks registered in 2009 and 
2010, the result of falling production in 2008-2009 and of steady consumption, possibly 
coupled with a bout of speculative activity, accompanied the observed surge in prices at 
the end of the sample period (see Figure A3 and Table A2). Coming to tin, world 
production has ebbed and flowed over the sample period. Meanwhile, consumption has 
been systematically higher than production, with the sharpest imbalances observed 
between 2006 and 2008, and again at the end of the sample period. This, together with 
global financial factors, might contribute to explain the two peaks in prices observed 
over the sample period (see Figure A4 and Table A2). 
                                                 
+ We would like to thank Carlo Cristiano, Nicolò Cavalli and Leonardo Maria Giuffrida for their help in 
collecting the data. 
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Figure A1: Cotton prices, 1921-1929 
 
 
Figure A2: Tin prices, 1921-1929 
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Figure A3: Cotton prices, 2000-2011 
 
 
Figure A4: Tin prices, 2000-2011 
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Table A1: Flows and stocks, 1921-1929 
 Cotton(1),(2) Tin(3),(4) 
 Production Consumption 
Stocks at end 
of season 
(1 Aug) 
Production Consumption 
Stocks at 
end of year 
1921 8,442 12,556 7,066 – – 43,500 
1922 9,738 12,666 3,081 130,000 132,000 45,400 
1923 10,128 10,955 2,554 127,500 139,000 36,000 
1924 13,639 13,256 3,141 140,000 144,500 32,000 
1925 16,122 13,730 5,666 144,500 154,500 22,000 
1926 17,977 15,780 7,637 143,000 146,500 18,500 
1927 12,956 15,407 5,020 157,500 155,000 21,000 
1928 14,478 15,076 4,417 175,000 167,500 29,000 
1929 14,749 13,023 6,613 188,000 181,000 36,000 
Notes: (1) American cotton 1,000 bales; (2) Source (Keynes 1923-30: 585); (3) Tons of 2,240 lb; (4) 
Source (Keynes 1923-30: 604). 
 
Table A2: Flows and stocks, 2000-2011 
 Cotton(1),(2) Tin 
 Production Consumption 
Stocks at end 
of season 
(1 Aug) 
Production(3) Consumption(4) 
Stocks at 
end of year 
2000 89.1 90.8 49.4 277 – – 
2001 98.7 93.7 54.5 281 277.9 – 
2002 91.0 97.6 47.6 241 275.8 – 
2003 96.7 97.2 48.1 257 296.6 – 
2004 121.6 107.9 60.6 287 318.2 – 
2005 116.4 115.0 61.9 297 332.1 – 
2006 121.8 122.8 62.3 296 355.8 – 
2007 119.7 121.1 60.7 307 360.5 – 
2008 107.1 107.3 60.5 273 338.4 – 
2009 101.5 118.4 44.0 279 307.2 – 
2010 115.5 116.1 43.4 261 – – 
Notes: (1) Source: http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2010/December/cotton_full12-10.pdf; (2) 
Millions of 480 lb bales, Total world; (3) Sources: United States Geological Survey Mineral Resource 
Program, British Geological survey, Millions of metric tons, Total world; (4) Source: www.itri.co.uk 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A3: Johansen cointegration tests: trace test statistics 
Cotton 
 
Hypothesized 
No. of 
Cointegration 
Relationships 
Trace 
Statistic 
5 per cent 
Critical Value
N. of 
lags in 
VAR 
Deterministic Trend 
Assumption 
1921-1929 
st , ft1 
None 
at most 1 
48.6949* 
3.1434 
20.2618 
9.1645 
3 Restricted constant 
st , ft3 
None 
at most 1 
18.1090 
3.2364 
20.2618 
9.1645 
3 Restricted constant 
2000-2011 
st , ft1 
None 
at most 1 
90.2499* 
1.6098 
20.2618 
9.1645 
1 Restricted constant 
st , ft3 
None 
at most 1 
37.4795* 
1.6191 
20.2618 
9.1645 
1 Restricted constant 
Tin 
 
Hypothesized 
No. of 
Cointegration 
Relationships 
Trace 
Statistic 
5 per cent 
Critical Value
N. of 
lags in 
VAR 
Deterministic Trend 
Assumption 
1921-1929 
st , ft1 
None 
at most 1 
82.0492* 
1.8175 
20.2618 
9.1645 
3 Restricted constant 
st , ft3 
None 
at most 1 
82.8599* 
0.9883 
20.2618 
9.1645 
1 Restricted constant 
2000-2011 
st , ft1 
None 
at most 1 
182.2550* 
0.04675 
15.4947 
3.8415 
2 Linear deterministic trend
st , ft3 
None 
at most 1 
50.7235* 
0.0573 
15.4947 
3.8415 
2 Linear deterministic trend
 Note: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level. 
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‘The fluctuations in the prices of the principal raw materials which are produced and 
marketed in conditions of unrestricted competition are quite staggering’, observed John 
Maynard Keynes at the eve of the Second World War. In fact, he calculated that, over 
the previous ten years, price fluctuations of four significant commodities, measured by 
the excess of the year’s high over the year’s low, had been 42 per cent for cotton, 61 per 
cent for lead, 70 per cent for wheat and 96 per cent for rubber, with an average price 
range for the four commodities of 67 per cent (Keynes 1938: 458-9). Over the twelve 
months up to May 2011, price variations measured by the same criterion for the same 
four commodities have been 173 per cent, 59 per cent, 125 per cent and 89 per cent 
respectively—with an average of 112 per cent, almost double than at Keynes’s time.1 
Indeed, in the wake of the current financial and economic crisis, commodity markets 
have undergone unprecedented oscillations (Figure 1). Such sharp fluctuations of prices 
represent a major element of uncertainty and distress for producers and consumers alike, 
particularly when they affect foodstuffs or raw materials on which the nutrition or 
livelihood of entire populations depend. 
The problem, however, is not new. Markets for primary commodities are 
structurally exposed to dramatic imbalances: the alternation of abundance and shortage, 
with the price volatility which it entails, appears to be, over the centuries, a persistent 
feature of commodities as opposed to manufactures (Jacks et al. 2009: 13).  
Throughout history, the evil consequences of agricultural cycles have been fought 
primarily by centralized redistribution. Already in ancient Greek and Roman cities, the 
supply and distribution of grain was entrusted to a public official, known as praefectus 
annonae from the time of Augustus till the end of the Empire. The office survived, 
under various names, through the Middle Ages and up to the early modern era. This 
vital function was performed by the management of public granaries that functioned as 
                                                 
* (Bocconi University, Milan). 
1 Calculations based on the monthly time series of the IMF Primary Commodity Prices (available online 
at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp; accessed 19/07/2011). 
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buffer stocks, collecting grain in years of plenty to redistribute it in years of famine.  
 
Figure 1: Index of primary commodity prices 
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Source: IMF, Index of market prices for fuel and non-fuel commodities (2005 = 100) (available online at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp; accessed 19/07/2011). 
 
The practice was abandoned only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with 
the gradual emergence and diffusion of the doctrine of free trade. Competitive 
commodity markets have undoubtedly produced benefits by reducing rents, promoting 
innovation, and enhancing productivity. On the other hand, however, they have failed to 
avoid the continuous alternation between over- and under-production.  
Ideally in competitive markets the price mechanism should operate to adjust 
consumption and output in a manner to absorb temporary misalignments, by 
encouraging buyers and discouraging sellers when the price falls and the other way 
round when the price rises. At the same time the price mechanism should balance 
productive capacity to long-run demand and ensure production at the least possible cost, 
by throwing inefficient producers out of the market. That the actual functioning of price 
mechanism is different from the ideal model is obvious to any observer of the large 
fluctuations which affect the prices of primary commodities even over short periods of 
time, particularly in periods of economic uncertainty and financial instability. 
It is quite obvious, then, that the issue should rise to the fore in the turbulent 
interwar period. What is perhaps less known is that, throughout those years, Keynes 
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devoted great attention to this problem, producing a series of contributions that have not 
yet received the attention they deserve. In fact, Keynes regarded commodity price 
oscillations as a factor of imbalance that played a major role in amplifying the trade 
cycle and aggravating the depression. And even with respect to this peculiar factor, he 
came to believe that neither unfettered competition nor centralized planning were 
capable of providing an adequate cure. He therefore suggested to resort, as an ideal 
middle way, to the institution of buffer stocks, i.e. stocks of foodstuffs and raw 
materials stored and managed by an international organization. During World War II, he 
proposed, on behalf of the Treasury, the establishment of an International Commodity 
Control along similar lines. Yet the proposal was not strongly endorsed even by the 
British government and soon disappeared from the agenda of post-war trade 
negotiations.  
The purpose of this paper is to review the neglected contributions of Keynes 
concerning the functioning of commodity markets and the need to establish 
international buffer stocks. I start by tracing the writings that Keynes devoted to these 
issues over two decades (section 1). In the light of these texts, I try then to reconstruct 
Keynes’s thought concerning the causes and consequences of commodity price 
fluctuations (2) and the possible solution represented by buffer stocks (3).2 Finally, I 
shall analyse the discussions that followed Keynes’s proposal, concentrating on three 
aspects: the relationship between buffer stocks and restrictions (4); the relevance of 
buffer stocks as an instrument to contrast the trade cycle (5); the finance of buffer stocks 
and the relationship between the Commodity Control and the Clearing Union (6). 
 
 
1. Keynes’s writings on buffer stocks 
The stabilization of commodity prices is not commonly regarded as an important 
theme within Keynes’s broader concern for macroeconomic stability. Yet, for two full 
decades, between 1923 and 1943, Keynes repeatedly addressed this issue, analysing the 
wide fluctuations of prices and stocks of staple goods, condemning the ensuing 
problems for both producers and consumers, investigating the causes of those 
fluctuations and the ineffectiveness of speculation in reducing them, and suggesting 
possible remedies, particularly in the form of buffer-stock schemes. The continuity of 
his interest for the matter and the originality of his contributions have been 
                                                 
2 A previous draft of the first part of this paper appeared in Fantacci and Rosselli (2009). 
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appropriately emphasized by Sabbatini (1989) and by Dimand and Dimand (1990).3 
However, those authors overlook several relevant writings, both published and 
unpublished, which span over two decades and may help appreciate more fully the 
peculiarity of Keynes’s explanation for commodity price fluctuations and the rationale 
for his buffer-stock proposals.4 Here we shall attempt to provide a general review of all 
the various writings, both academic and political, that Keynes dedicated to this issue, 
together with the peculiar instances that occasioned them, in order to be able, in the next 
two sections, to analyse their content and the policy indications that they suggest. 
As an economist, Keynes was particularly concerned with the stability of the 
economic system as a whole. However, his interest for the functioning of commodity 
markets began as a practitioner rather than as a theoretician (Fantacci, Marcuzzo and 
Sanfilippo 2010). Already in 1920, he started to invest in various commodities, ranging 
from metals to cotton to wheat. His first written contribution on the subject came only a 
few years later, in March 1923, with an article in The Manchester Guardian 
Commercial, European Reconstruction Series, entitled ‘Some Aspects of Commodity 
Markets’ (Keynes 1923a). At the same time, Keynes started to edit a series of Special 
Memoranda on Stocks of Staple Commodities for the London and Cambridge Economic 
Service. He produced altogether seven issues between April 1923 and September 1930, 
where he collected and commented periodical data on the volume of surplus stocks 
throughout the world, with a view to provide information ‘of the utmost importance 
both to businessmen and to economists’ (Keynes 1923b: 267).  
From his practical acquaintance with commodity markets, both as an investor and as 
the editor of these enquiries, Keynes must have drawn quite early the impression that 
competitive markets did not provide adequate incentives for the private storage of raw 
materials that could have contributed to even out fluctuations in their production. In 
fact, only three years passed before he published a further article, this time discussing 
the scope for government intervention on commodity markets. It was written in reaction 
to a declaration by Herbert Hoover, then US Secretary of Commerce, who criticized all 
forms of output or price control. Keynes’s contribution appeared in The Nation and 
Athenaeum in June 1926 with the title ‘The Control of Raw Materials by Governments’ 
                                                 
3 Brief accounts of Keynes’s interest for commodity policy, mainly focused on the schemes he developed 
during World War II, are provided also by Tonveronachi (1981) and by Kaldor (1983) in their reviews 
of vol. XXVII of the Collected Writings. 
4 We have already suggested (Fantacci, Marcuzzo, Rosselli and Sanfilippo 2012) the strong coherence 
between those proposals and the theoretical framework developed by Keynes, particularly in the 
Treatise on Money and in the General Theory. 
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(Keynes 1926), and aimed at underlining the peculiar merits of buffer-stock schemes, 
with respect to other commodity policies, in supplementing the lack of private storage. 
Keynes stressed the chronic insufficiency of commodity stocks also in crucial 
passages of his major theoretical writings. Chapter 29 of the Treatise on Money 
indicates the obstacles to the accumulation of stocks of raw materials as a factor that 
aggravates the trade cycle. In a special section, he also discusses the role of forward 
markets, arguing that their existence does not help to reduce the fluctuations of 
commodity prices on spot markets. Chapter 17 of The General Theory discusses the 
advantages of money with respect to commodities as a means of storing wealth, and the 
depressing consequences on investments and employment.5 These two texts provide a 
thorough analysis of the problem of the insufficient incentives to the private holding of 
stocks, but they do not mention buffer stocks as a possible solution. 
It was in 1938 that Keynes turned to advocate ‘The Policy of Government Storage 
of Foodstuffs and Raw Materials’ in an article published under this title in the 
September issue of The Economic Journal. The occasion was provided by the Essential 
Commodities Reserve Bill being approved by the House of Commons in May with the 
purpose of building up strategic reserves in the prospect of war. Keynes argued that a 
similar policy would be equally desirable to ‘tackle the problems of peace’ (Keynes 
1938: 463), and developed a detailed scheme to promote private storage of raw 
materials in public warehouses. Due to Keynes’s health problems, the paper was read by 
Gerald Shove at the August meeting of Section F of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science, and received positive comments both by participants and in 
several newspaper articles, ‘nearly all expressing cautious agreement’ (letter from 
Keynes to Shove, 23 August 1938, in JMK 30/PS/6/249-50).6 Most prominently, 
Keynes’s proposal was presented and discussed in the cover article of The Economist on 
August 20, 1938, significantly entitled ‘The New Joseph’, as it credited Keynes for 
having raised an issue that ‘since the days of Joseph […] has hardly received the 
attention it deserves’. Keynes also sent copies to a number of authorities, hoping that his 
proposal might be put into practice, yet to no avail.7  
The design and negotiation of post-war economic arrangements offered Keynes a 
further occasion. Already in the early drafts of the proposal for a Clearing Union, he 
                                                 
5 Keynes’s views in this respect will be more widely discussed in the next section. 
6 References beginning with JMK are to the documents preserved in the papers of John Maynard Keynes, 
Modern Archive, King’s College, Cambridge UK. 
7 In particular, he sent copies of the paper to Oliver Stanley, President of the Board of Trade, to Sir 
Thomas Inskip, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, and to Henry Wallace, US Secretary of 
Agriculture, and author of a similar scheme for wheat, ‘the ever-normal granary’ (CWK XXI: 470-6). 
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envisaged a role for international buffer stocks (Keynes 1941: 39-40). Harrod 
encouraged him to work on a parallel scheme, entirely devoted to commodities (Harrod 
1951: 531). Between January 1942 and February 1943, Keynes produced a plan for the 
international regulation of primary products, elaborating nine successive versions in the 
attempt to take account of major criticisms and to win broader support for the proposal.8 
The last draft was eventually endorsed by the British government, but it was even less 
successful than the Clearing Union within Anglo-American post-war planning. In fact, 
the buffer-stock plan not only was not adopted, but it was never put forward as a formal 
British proposal (Skidelsky 2000: 239). Perhaps even the commitment of Whitehall was 
not all so strong, if it is true, as Meade reports, that, when the buffer-stock plan was 
taken in front of the Cabinet, ‘Churchill, who was preoccupied with aspects of the war 
itself, took little notice and was heard to ask afterwards “What’s all this about Butter 
Scotch?”’ (Williamson 1983: 132). However, let us proceed in order and, before 
describing Keynes’s proposed solution to commodity price fluctuations and how it 
failed to be adopted, let us consider his explanation of their causes and effects.  
 
 
2. Causes and consequences of commodity price fluctuations 
Already in his first article, Keynes observed that commodity markets had been 
affected by wide price fluctuations, especially in the recent past, and advanced an 
explanation along the following lines: the post-war boom had raised prices, stimulating 
supply and retarding demand; however, this had failed to re-establish a parity between 
the two, since supply had continued to rise, overshooting demand; the resulting 
accumulation of abnormal stocks had then caused prices to decline; yet, in the absence 
of a timely adjustment of supply, prices had continued to fall even below costs of 
production; eventually, then, production was drastically reduced and, for certain 
commodities, almost suspended, greatly undershooting consumption; as a consequence, 
prices had started to rise abruptly and showed no evidence of slowing down, since 
production only gradually adjusted to increased demand (Keynes 1923a: 264). Keynes 
thus anticipated, with regard to the specific case of post-war commodity markets, the 
analysis that was later generalized and developed into a formal model, in particular by 
Kaldor, and that came to be known as the ‘cobweb cycle’.9 
                                                 
8 Title, date, archival and bibliographical reference for each draft are provided in Fantacci, Marcuzzo, 
Rosselli and Sanfilippo 2012, table 1. For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the main 
differences between them, see Hirai 2008. 
9 The cobweb model was developed by Kaldor (1934), with explicit reference to Schultz (1930) and Ricci 
(1930), as an explanation for the fluctuation of agricultural prices under the assumption of adaptive 
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However, it was only in his 1926 article that Keynes not only described the cycle 
but also provided some hints as to its possible fundamental causes. In particular, he 
underlined two peculiar features of commodity markets, the concurrence of which is 
required to produce wide fluctuations of prices: ‘an inability of the market to carry 
surplus stocks and an inability of the producers, acting separately, to restrict production 
quickly’ (Keynes 1926: 549). In other terms, in Keynes’s view, the chain of events 
described above crucially depends on the concomitance of two conditions, which 
typically characterize commodities: (i) the slow adjustment of production to variations 
in demand, and (ii) the impossibility to smoothen changes in supply by recurring to 
surplus stocks, i.e. by accumulating stocks when demand falls in order to draw from 
them when demand rises. 
The first condition, the inability of producers to rapidly accommodate variations in 
demand, may follow from the high capital intensity or from the long duration of the 
productive process, as in the case of seasonal crops. Such a delay in the adjustment of 
production may have dramatic effects in terms of price fluctuations: e.g. an initial 
miscalculation on the part of producers resulting in overproduction (Q0) will cause 
prices to fall, and, until the scale of production cannot be corrected, prices will continue 
to fall. When eventually output is curtailed, prices will have fallen to such a level that 
the quantity produced (Q1) may well be insufficient to satisfy demand at that price level. 
Therefore, underproduction takes the place of overproduction without even passing 
from an intermediate position of balance between supply and demand. As a 
consequence, prices will rise to a level (P2) which is excessive as the former price (P1) 
was insufficient. ‘In the long run this violent oscillation in price and in supply will be as 
injurious to the consumer as to the producer. Obviously the world will be better off on 
the whole if it can be prevented’ (Keynes 1926: 548-9).10 
 
                                                                                                                                               
expectations of producers. Similar fluctuations had been described earlier in stock-breading, with the 
analysis of what is known as the ‘pork cycle’ by Hanau (1928). 
10 For the distinction between production adjustments in the short period and in the long period, Keynes is 
obviously indebted to Marshall, as observed by Skidelsky (2000: 234); the reference is, in particular, to 
the Principles of Economics (Marshall 1920: book V, chapter V, §§ 27-36). 
184 
Figure 2: The ‘cobweb cycle’ 
 
 
It is worth noting that the problem is not a low elasticity, but rather a slow reactivity 
in the adjustment of supply to price variations: for most commodities, consumption is 
continuous, production is discrete. The decisive factor is the length of the production 
process, which retards adjustment of supply to changes in demand: the consequence is 
not simply that a long time is required, after a shock, for equilibrium between supply 
and demand to be re-established, but that prices may fluctuate widely without ever 
assuring equilibrium.11 
The second crucial assumption for the existence of the cobweb effect is the lack of 
available stocks of commodities. If conspicuous stocks of commodities were held, they 
could serve as a buffer, expanding and diminishing to accommodate decreases and 
increases of demand, well before any possible variation in the scale of production. On 
the other hand, since for most commodities available stocks are very limited in 
proportion to the annual output, adjustments of supply depend entirely on variations of 
production, and hence are discontinuous, whereas prices react immediately to bring 
demand at a level with available supply.  
                                                 
11 As also Kaldor (1934: 134) observes, the cobweb model only applies to cases ‘where adjustments are 
completely discontinuous on the side of supply and instantaneous on the side of demand’. It is the 
discontinuity of changes in production that produce the cobweb effect, whereas the relative elasticity 
(or viscosity) of supply and demand determines whether the cycle converges (or diverges). 
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Due to the fact that stocks are normally fixed at quite low levels, any slight variation 
in either direction may be taken as an index to impending price instability: any increase 
(or decrease) in the volume of stocks for a specific commodity suggests an excess of 
production over consumption for that commodity (or vice versa), and hence a 
downward (or upward) pressure on its price. It is not surprising, then, that in those same 
years Keynes started compiling data on ‘Stocks of Staple Commodities’. In the 
introduction to the first issue, Keynes indicated their fluctuations not merely as a 
symptom but as a factor of price volatility: ‘movements in the volumes of stocks have 
an immense influence on the course of price changes’ (Keynes 1923b: 267). 
Now, given the wide fluctuations of commodity prices, one could think that they 
would provide sufficient scope for the speculative holding of stocks, in the expectation 
of price rises, and that in turn such speculation would contribute to smoothen price 
fluctuations. Why then is the market unable to carry adequate surplus stocks of 
commodities? In order to address this question, we must turn together with Keynes to 
the role of speculation on commodity markets, distinguishing operations on spot and on 
forward markets. 
Speculation on spot markets involves the actual purchase and sale of a commodity, 
in view of profiting from price variations. The speculative holding of stocks is counter-
cyclic if speculators buy on the downward slope of the cycle, anticipating a price rise, 
and sell on the upward slope, anticipating a price decline. As long as this occurs, 
Keynes admits that speculation may indeed have a stabilizing effect on commodity 
prices. However, in 1923, he observed that this was not in fact happening for various 
contingent reasons: political uncertainties deterred speculators from buying on declining 
prices, their financial position was weakened by the current slump, and they were 
perhaps induced by previous slumps to expect prices to decline below production costs 
before they started to rise again. For all these reasons, even if they knew that prices 
were below their equilibrium level, speculators waited to buy until ‘famine’ arose 
(1923a: 265; 1923b: 270). 
In general, in order for speculators to be induced to purchase, not only must they 
have an expectation of an increase in prices, but the expected increase must be large 
enough to compensate them for the costs of carrying the commodities (deterioration, 
warehouse and insurance charges) and for the opportunity costs of not investing in other 
assets (Keynes 1926: 549). Moreover, one must consider the risk of further unexpected 
price declines, since the length of time for which the holding will be necessary and the 
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price at which the commodity will eventually be sold are both highly uncertain (Keynes 
1930a: 121-4; Keynes 1938: 457).12 
In the Treatise, Keynes considered also whether the existence of forward markets 
could serve to stabilize commodity prices on spot markets. His argument distinguishes 
two situations, with and without redundant stocks, but the answer is negative in both 
cases. Forward prices reflect expectations: indeed, Keynes suggested that they could be 
considered, on average, to be equal to expected spot prices, minus a risk premium 
reflecting the willingness of the seller to renounce part of the expected return on the sale 
in exchange for certainty. Therefore, forward prices would anticipate a convergence 
towards equilibrium, increasing in reaction to excess demand and decreasing in reaction 
to excess supply. However, Keynes argued that forward prices do not set either floors or 
ceilings to the fluctuations of spot prices. If there are no liquid stocks, suggesting a 
shortage of supply, forward prices will indeed rise, but spot prices may rise indefinitely 
above them as long as buyers are unwilling or unable to postpone their purchases. On 
the contrary, if there are liquid stocks, reflecting an excess supply, forward prices may 
indeed decline, but spot prices will have to fall below them, otherwise those carrying 
stocks would have an incentive to sell them spot and buy them back forward, rather than 
incurring in carrying costs (Keynes 1930: 128-9). Hence, spot prices will not be 
prevented from fluctuating widely even by the existence of forward markets. 
The consequences of commodity price fluctuations are the aspect which is least 
discussed by Keynes in his writings on the subject. However, this was not because he 
regarded them as unimportant, but because he considered them self-evident. As he 
wrote in the introduction to the first extant draft of his proposal: ‘The whole world is 
now conscious of the grave consequences of this defect in the international competitive 
system’ (Keynes 1942: 113). In any case, several important implications may be drawn 
together from Keynes’s scattered remarks, and grouped under two headings: the 
problems affecting specific (however broad) types of countries or agents, and those 
affecting the economic system as a whole. 
The first order of problems bore the severest implications for producers and 
producing countries. As already observed, periodic slumps might cause prices of 
primary goods to fall below production costs, and hence ‘below what could provide a 
reasonable standard of life’ (Keynes 1943: 169). On the other hand, a sudden and 
                                                 
12 ‘Uncertainty’, whatever the source, may reduce the incentive to hold stocks of commodities only 
insofar as there is an alternative form of holding wealth—namely money—which is assumed to be 
unaffected by such ‘uncertainty’. This is why, as we shall discuss later, Keynes’s analysis of 
commodity markets is closely related to his theory of liquidity preference, and in particular to the 
observations of Chapter 17 of the General Theory. 
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violent price change in the opposite direction would penalize buyers of staples, although 
these were normally in a better position to pass on a cost increase, by raising the prices 
of manufactures. Both buyers and sellers could, of course, hedge against unanticipated 
price fluctuations by entering into futures contracts and thus fixing their prices in 
advance. However, this would still imply a cost, in the form of a risk premium paid to 
speculators. Therefore, the cost of price fluctuations, or of hedging against them, could 
be burdensome, particularly for those countries that based great part of their economies 
on the production of specific commodities. 
A second evil follows from price fluctuations as such, regardless of their direction, 
affecting not alternately different groups but indifferently the entire economy: short-
term volatility of commodity prices, according to Keynes, is a major factor in 
aggravating the trade cycle. As Keynes argues in the Treatise, price fluctuations have a 
vicious circle effect on the holding of stocks: if price fluctuations are amplified by the 
exiguity of liquid stocks (which fail to compensate for lengthy adjustments of output), 
the holding of stocks is discouraged by price volatility (which increases the ensuing 
risks) (Keynes 1930a: 121-4). In turn, the lack of accumulation of liquid stocks implies 
that there is no support to demand (and prices) during the downturn, and that there is no 
immediate supply of working capital during the upturn (and hence that there is a strong 
upward pressure on prices) (Keynes 1930a: 116). Recovery is thus retarded and the 
trade cycle is amplified. 
The argument is developed further in Chapter 17 of the General Theory, where the 
high carrying costs of commodities compared to money are shown to ‘play an essential 
part’ in the possibility of equilibrium with underemployment. The production of new 
capital assets, including stocks of commodities, is not profitable, and hence is 
interrupted, whenever their marginal efficiency falls short of the money rate of interest; 
and the latter is kept high by the fact that money, as an asset, entails higher liquidity and 
lower carrying-costs than commodities: ‘what matters is the difference between the 
liquidity-premium and the carrying-costs; and in the case of most commodities, other 
than such assets as gold and silver and bank-notes, the carrying-costs are at least as high 
as the liquidity-premium’ (Keynes 1936: 237). In other terms, demand and employment 
may be depressed by the fact that money is preferred to commodities, as a store of 
value, since the former yields a positive return (thanks to its liquidity) while the latter 
yield a negative return (due to their carrying-costs). The practical implications of this 
had been clear to Keynes already since his first interest for the functioning of 
commodity markets, when he observed that the combination of these two circumstances 
result in a conspicuous demand for credit by producers and traders, for the purpose of 
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carrying large stocks for a long time until they reach their final consumer. Therefore, a 
sharp rise in commodity prices increases the demand for credit, and thus raises its price, 
contributing to create the conditions for a crisis, by depressing together consumption 
and investments (Keynes 1923a: 256-9). 
For all these reasons, Keynes was brought quite soon to believe that competitive 
markets were not capable of maintaining the stability of commodity prices which was 
required to assure a reliable provision of foodstuffs to consumers and to allow the 
planning of production, both by the producers and by the users of raw materials. 
Therefore, since he was convinced that this failure was caused by inadequate private 
motives towards the accumulation of commodities, he started to look for a possibility of 
supporting the storage of primary goods by means of public intervention and 
international coordination. And, from the beginning, he explicitly advocated this policy 
both as a means to reconcile the interests of consumers and producers and as a measure 
to prevent or at least dampen the trade cycle. 
 
 
3. Keynes’s buffer-stock proposals 
The first time Keynes mentioned the need to contrast commodity price fluctuations 
by enhancing co-ordinated storage facilities was in his introduction to the Memorandum 
on Stocks of Staple Commodities published in June 1924: ‘It seems as if relative prices 
could be kept a good deal steadier if the organisation for carrying stocks at a moderate 
cost were on a larger scale’ (Keynes 1924: 315). 
In 1926, Keynes made a further and more explicit endorsement of buffer stocks in 
his article for The Nation and Athenaeum, ‘The Control of Raw Materials by 
Governments’. Replying to the indiscriminate condemnation of government controls 
recently made by Hoover, Keynes urged to distinguish policies aimed at defending 
monopolistic profits from those aimed at avoiding the evil effects of wide price 
fluctuations for both producers and consumers. Whereas the purpose of output 
restrictions was ‘to make abnormal profits’, the purpose of buffer stocks would be ‘to 
avoid abnormal losses’. Keynes ascribed such losses to the ‘inability of the market to 
carry surplus stocks’ (Keynes 1926: 549) and hence advocated government intervention 
to ‘supplement the deficient carrying power of the market’ (ibid.: 550).13 
                                                 
13 The same criticism against restriction schemes is repeated in the introduction to the Memorandum on 
Stocks of Staple Commodities of September 1930. Such schemes eventually proved ineffective in 
preventing a fall in prices, in the face of the general decline in demand associated to the world 
depression following the stock market crash (Keynes 1930b). 
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In 1938, Keynes could cite not only the negative examples of restriction policies 
(such as private monopolies, cartels, quotas, price agreements aimed at protecting the 
interests of producers of specific commodities), but also the recent adoption of policies 
that he considered more favourably: the accumulation of stocks by governments to use 
in time of war, or to protect producers or—what was even more desirable for Keynes—
to smoothen fluctuations of demand and supply. As significant examples of the latter, 
Keynes mentioned Wallace’s ever-normal granary and the Bank of Sweden program for 
the purchase of stocks of commodities as a part of their reserves (Keynes 1938: 462-3). 
Keynes’s proposal was to provide for government storage of private stocks. The 
latter would remain in the ownership of depositors, but would be stored at special 
conditions: they would be exempt from warehouse charges, or subject only to a nominal 
charge, and they would benefit from an advance by the government up to 90 per cent of 
the market price of the commodity delivered into storage, free of interest or at an 
interest equal to the rate on Treasury bills. The advantages would be to secure a supply 
of raw materials, not only to face the war but also to contrast the trade cycle, at a low 
cost for the government, and to facilitate the course of private trade, rather than 
interfering with it. The scheme could be regarded as a form of foreign investment, with 
the advantage of being situated at home. The acquisition of the commodities might 
cause an outflow of gold. However, this need not imply a reduction of reserves. Indeed, 
Keynes was inclined ‘to regard the policy of holding liquid stocks of raw materials as a 
natural evolution of the policy of holding liquid stocks of gold outside the banking 
system’ (Keynes 1938: 469).14 
This last aspect of the proposal was rather an object of concern for Keynes’s critics, 
since it might seriously undermine the prestige of gold and possibly lead to another gold 
scare. However, the main preoccupation seemed to be that the management of buffer 
stocks might be deviated from its noble purpose to the defence of more special interests, 
particularly those of producers, aimed at maintaining artificially high prices by the 
accumulation of stocks.15 The same concern was shared by the article in The Economist 
(see section 1 above), which however expressed a substantial appreciation for Keynes’s 
diagnosis of the problem. The Economist acknowledged that the competitive system 
                                                 
14 Keynes’s proposal is close, yet not identical, to the commodity reserve currency advocated, in those 
same years, in particular by Benjamin Graham (1937). In 1943-44, Keynes explicitly confirmed his 
sympathy for this type of proposal, yet questioned its political viability and certain aspects of its 
implementation in a debate with Benjamin Graham, Frank Graham and Friedrich Hayek in The 
Economic Journal (CWK XXVI: 30-40; see also Fantacci, Marcuzzo, Rosselli and Sanfilippo 2012). 
15 These observations, together with other minor criticisms related to more specific aspects of Keynes’s 
proposal, were made at the seminar where the paper was read, and were reported to Keynes by Harrod 
in a letter dated 20 August 1938 (in Besomi 2003: 833-4). 
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puts a discount on the holding of commodities, and hence that stocks are chronically 
insufficient, except when markets are controlled by monopolies, which however 
contrast with the general interest. It also acknowledged that a greater volume of stocks 
would be important, both in war and in peace, especially for a country of consumers of 
staples such as Britain. However, the article expressed apprehension for the fact that 
‘some bureaucrat sitting in Whitehall or in the Thames House, should be equipped with 
the finance and the authority to become the world’s supreme jobber’ and that, instead of 
bringing demand and supply closer together, buffer stocks ‘having originated as an 
attempt temporarily to increase demand, [may] remain as a permanent addition to 
supply’. 
These criticisms may be better reviewed in the light of Keynes’s later proposals for 
a buffer-stock scheme. In fact, in his 1938 paper, Keynes had only proposed that the 
government provide storage facilities for the accumulation of private stocks, and not 
that it should act as a jobber, buying and selling massive amounts of commodities in the 
name of the public (with the risk of acting, in fact, in the interest of powerful lobbies). It 
was only in the proposals of an International Commodity Control elaborated during the 
war that Keynes envisaged the actual purchase of commodities by a centralized 
authority and entered into the details of how the buffer-stock scheme should be 
managed. 
Discussions about buffer stocks were resumed in British government circles during 
World War II, in relation with the problem of export surpluses. The blockade and the 
disruption of trade channels caused producing countries to experience difficulties in 
selling their entire production. In order to prop up the blockade and to support 
Dominions and Allies who suffered the greatest surpluses, Britain started purchasing 
and accumulating stocks of commodities, in view of using them for post-war relief. 
An official sub-committee was set up for this purpose, with a budget of £200 
million: on 9 November 1940 Sir Frederick Leith-Ross was appointed chairman and 
Keynes became Treasury representative (CWK XXVII: 3). 
With respect to commodities, the war had the same effect as a severe trade cycle. 
The remedy adopted by Britain was anti-cyclical, since it consisted essentially in 
absorbing excess supply during the conflict in view of satisfying the excess demand that 
was to be expected after the end of the hostilities. 
From his very first contributions to the debate, Keynes insisted that it was not just a 
matter of providing contingent relief in times of war. Commenting on the British 
attempt to involve the United States in a concerted approach to the problem of 
surpluses, he wrote to S. D. Waley at the Foreign Office on 25 November 1940: 
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If we really want to get U.S.A. in, we ought to make it seem more interesting and of real 
significance to the world as a whole. As it is, we are simply appearing as suppliants 
pleading with them once more to give us financial assistance and to pull chestnuts out of 
the fire. On my view of the matter that is not at all a correct view of the situation. If this 
is anything at all it is a world scheme of the greatest possible post-war significance. 
(CWK XXVII: 5)16 
One of Keynes’s primary concerns, throughout the first stages of the debate on 
export surpluses, was to overcome the logic of subsidization to producers—‘we must 
cease to be their milch cow’, he wrote to his Treasury colleagues on 26 February 1941 
(CWK XXVII: 15)—or at least to distinguish between subsidies, aimed at supporting 
producers, and price policies, aimed at damping short-term price fluctuations: ‘The 
question how far subsidies should be disentangled from price policy is another issue. I 
should like to see them disentangled […] I am rather frightened by the atmosphere of 
comprehensive and open-hearted philanthropy which seems to prevail’ (CWK XXVII: 
17). 
Another peculiarity of Keynes’s approach to the problem of export surpluses was 
that he immediately associated it with the problem of US current account surpluses. In a 
letter dated 1 April 1941, he drew the attention of Leith-Ross on ‘the outstanding 
economic problem of the post-war world—how the U.S.A. is to redress her unbalanced 
creditor position’ (CWK XXVII: 19). The idea was that producers were having trouble 
selling their commodities, because the US were not spending or lending enough money 
to finance the purchase of those commodities. In other terms, if producers were 
accumulating surplus stocks of commodities, the US were accumulating surplus 
balances of money, by running systematic trade surpluses. As we shall see, Keynes’s 
buffer stock scheme and the Clearing Union can be seen as an attempt to address the 
two issues jointly, as two specular aspects of the same problem. 
During his stay in Washington for the negotiation of American loans to Britain, 
Keynes met Dean Acheson at the State Department to discuss the problem of export 
surpluses. Keynes sketched out three different approaches to the problem: to lend 
money to producing countries; to buy their commodities regardless of any actual need 
for them; to build a partnership between producers and consumers. The first two lines of 
conduct were regarded by Keynes as a form of temporary relief, whereas the third 
would have aimed at a permanent solution of the problem. The first two approaches 
were those adopted by the US and the UK respectively; the third was the one that 
Keynes recommended. To this end, he envisaged the establishment of buffer stocks, 
                                                 
16 Keynes had made the same point in a letter to Leith-Ross on 23 November 1940 (CWK XXVII: 6). 
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along the lines of the ‘ever-normal granary’ proposed by Vice President Wallace when 
he was Secretary for Agriculture. As L. P. Thompson reports in his minutes of the 
meeting: ‘Mr Keynes had in mind particularly (i) the problem of post-war relief and 
reconstruction in Europe and (ii) a permanent scheme of the ‘ever-normal granary’ type. 
[…] Mr Keynes believed that there might be found in this surplus scheme the 
beginnings of a comprehensive scheme for equalising the prices of the main 
commodities throughout the world’ (CWK XXVII: 22). Keynes insisted on this point in 
a letter that he wrote to Acheson on 4 June 1941 as a reminder of the ‘main upshot’ of 
the conversation:  
The international discussions relating to particular commodities […] might naturally 
lead on to a more ambitious plan for stabilising within reasonable limits the prices of 
leading internationally traded raw materials and even for some kind of international 
holding cartel which would apply the idea of the ever normal granary to the 
international field. (CWK XXVII: 24)  
The schemes that were elaborated during the war, however, differed in two 
important respects from Keynes’s proposal of 1938. First, they were intended from the 
outset as international facilities, not only offered to all the producing countries, but also 
managed collectively by an international body comprising producers and consumers.17 
Second, such organization was supposed not merely to store the commodities on behalf 
of participating countries, but to purchase them on its own account.  
The accumulation of stocks of commodities along these lines appeared as a possible 
solution to the problem of surpluses. At the same time, it presented the further benefit of 
preparing to meet the excess demand that was to be expected after the war was over. In 
more general terms, quite apart from the contingent situations created by the war, buffer 
stocks came to be seen as a convenient way to smoothen the cycles that typically 
characterize the production of foodstuffs and raw materials even in times of peace, by 
absorbing excess output in periods of abundance in view of releasing the reserves to 
supplement inadequate supply in times of scarcity.  
The function of buffer stocks, together with the meaning of their name, is explained 
quite clearly in a letter of 29 November 1941 from Sydney Caine, Financial Advisor to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Leith-Ross: 
comparatively small changes in production or consumption are needed to turn an 
‘unmanageable’ surplus into a shortage or vice versa. This in turn emphasises the 
                                                 
17 Whether the management should be restricted to the US and to the UK or entrusted to a truly 
international organization was a matter of discussion. In any case, it was never conceived as a unilateral 
initiative on the part of the British government. 
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importance of stocks and their proper management in acting as a buffer or cushion to 
absorb the shocks of changes in either consumption or production […] the centre of 
interest is shifting more and more to this question of the proper management of stocks. 
(T 247/9: 2; emphasis added)18 
This letter also testifies to the growing interest for buffer stock schemes as a way of 
managing commodity markets. Keynes was, of course, a major advocate, since he saw 
them as ‘a middle course between unfettered competition under laissez-faire conditions 
and planned controls which try to freeze commerce into a fixed mould (CWK XXVII: 
111). Accordingly, he spent all his efforts to win support for the idea within the British 
government, in view of proposing it within Anglo-American talks as a fundamental 
pillar of post-war planning. As he wrote to Caine on 3 December 1941: ‘We ought to 
aim in my opinion at moving Americans to favour commodities schemes which are 
worked primarily, as you suggest, by control of stocks leaving normal market 
organisation as free as possible apart from that’ (T 247/9: 4). 
Competitive commodity markets had the benefit of allowing for free negotiations 
and of favouring low-cost producers and hence providing incentives for continuous 
increases in productivity, but were liable of producing wide price fluctuations in prices 
to the detriment of producers and consumers alike. As Caine wrote to Keynes on 22 
January 1942: ‘the real objection to the competitive system is that it is inherently 
opposed to security and stability. Equally, however, it has the great virtue that it is 
opposed to stability in the sense of stagnation’19 (T 247/9: 11-12). Restriction schemes, 
on the other hand, had the advantage of stabilizing prices, but also the drawback of 
imposing high prices and discouraging innovation. Buffer stocks seemed capable of 
combining the virtues of stability and change, by avoiding price fluctuations in the short 
term, beyond predetermined limits, even while permitting corrections in the long term, 
in order to accommodate major shifts in technology and taste. 
It was with this intention that, in those same days, Keynes followed Harrod’s 
recommendation to dig up his proposal of 1938 and wrote the first draft of a plan for the 
establishment of an International Commodity Control, with the task of managing buffer 
stocks. 
The Commodity Control was to define a basic price for each commodity. In the 
earlier drafts, Keynes suggested that the basic prices should be set according to the cost 
of production, ascertained by ordinary accounting methods. He later accepted the 
                                                 
18 All archival references beginning with T refer to documents held at the National Archives, Kew, 
Richmond (UK). 
19 This sentence was included almost literally by Keynes in the fifth draft of the plan (Keynes 1942: 131). 
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suggestion of Sidney Caine of the Colonial Office to avoid establishing a general 
criterion ex ante for all commodities, but rather to aim at allowing the basic price to 
converge towards the marginal cost by a process of trial and error.20 In the first extant 
draft, dated 14 April 1942 and circulated as an official Treasury memorandum, it was 
specified that the basic price could be adjusted up to ±5 per cent over the year. The 
adjustment would occur according to prescribed rules, but with ample margins of 
discretion for the managers of the scheme, who would have to reduce the basic price if 
stocks were increasing beyond a stipulated figure or at more than a stipulated rate, but 
would remain free to determine the degree of the correction and to deliberate changes at 
any time, in exceptional circumstances, even by more than 5 per cent (Keynes 1942: 
117-8). The control would buy whenever the price fell 10 per cent below or sell 
whenever it rose 10 per cent above that price. Within these limits, free and competitive 
markets would handle the trade (Ibid.: 116).21 
Both ranges were criticized by some for being too narrow and by others for being 
too wide. Keynes suggested that the percentages were to be intended as an indication 
and not as a bind for the managers of the scheme, who should be entitled to larger 
changes if required (CWK XXVII: 110). It was minimum prices, rather than maximum 
prices, that attracted most criticisms: they were regarded as a possible cause of 
overproduction, which would have made it necessary to complement buffer-stock 
schemes with output restrictions. The objection, already raised by The Economist 
against Keynes’s 1938 proposal, was again voiced with respect to his 1942 scheme by J. 
W. F. Rowe of the Ministry of Economic Warfare.22 Keynes replied that if, after falling 
10 per cent below the basic price, the price of a commodity was still so high as to 
unduly encourage output of high-cost producers, this was a sign that a reduction of the 
basic price was needed: ‘Under my plan the price would be reduced until it no longer 
had this stimulating effect. I should say that that, and not restriction, is the right remedy’ 
(ibid.: 109). An excess supply was to be cured by a price reduction, rather than by an 
output restriction. This confirms Keynes’s conviction that commodity policies should 
not hamper the play of market forces in the long run, but only avoid meaningless price 
fluctuations in the short run. The general purpose of his proposal was to favour 
stabilization in lieu of restriction (see also Keynes 1942: 113-4). 
                                                 
20 See letter from Caine to Keynes, 22 January 1942 (Public Record Office, T 247/9/A5). 
21 These principles of management remained unaltered throughout the various versions. The precise 
quantitative limits varied, yet they were always indicated by Keynes explicitly just for the sake of 
illustration. 
22 Rowe had collaborated with Keynes at editing the Special Memoranda on Stocks of Staple 
Commodities for the London and Cambridge Economic Service, from 1925 to 1930. 
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The Bank of England criticized Keynes’s buffer-stock proposals for being too 
laissez-faire, since they left room for private trading, and favoured instead ‘a solution 
by way of international agreements on price and quantity’. Keynes’s reply was resolute: 
International agreements, by which prices were absolutely fixed and quotas rigidly 
determined for every producer and perhaps for every consumer also, so as to freeze or 
stereotype world trade into a mould—what mould, calculated on what principles, I have 
no idea—seem to me terrifying, not least from our own special point of view. I suspect 
that this bias towards rigidly controlled state trading on Russian lines influences the 
general critical approach. The same bias seems to appear in [the Bank’s] Deputy 
Governor’s letter. In reply to [this] I can only plead guilty of aiming at a plan which 
does take a middle course between unfettered competition under laissez-faire conditions 
and planned controls which try to freeze commerce into a fixed mould. (CWK XXVII: 
111) 
It is not my intention here to describe in detail the provisions of the plan, nor to give 
account of how it was modified through its successive drafts. I shall concentrate, 
instead, on the aspects of the proposal that were at the same time more distinctive and 
more controversial, and that therefore have an important part both in the discussions 
that accompanied the redrafting and in the eventual demise of the plan. As anticipated, I 
shall focus on three points: the relationship between buffer stocks and restrictions; the 
relevance of buffer stocks as an instrument to contrast the trade cycle; the finance of 
buffer stocks and the relationship between the Commodity Control and the Clearing 
Union.23 
 
 
4. Buffer stocks and restriction schemes 
That Keynes’s plan did not provide sufficient scope for the regulation of production 
was the main criticism that it had to face throughout the entire period of its elaboration. 
Already a month after the circulation of the first draft, Rowe advocated a combination 
of buffer stocks and regulation: ‘it appears to be more practicable to attack the problem 
of price instability by a combination of output regulation and the holding of buffer 
stocks’.24 Rowe suggested that stabilization should concern not only prices of products, 
but also incomes of producers and proposed a system of quotas as a means to that end 
(T 247/9: 47). More generally, Rowe raised the issue of income distribution among 
producers facing a different structure of costs and yields as a further objective of 
                                                 
23 A previous draft of the last part of this paper was included in Deambrogio and Fantacci (2011). 
24 Letter to Keynes of 20 February 1942 (T 247/9: 44). 
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commodity policy, apart from the need to balance the interests of producers against 
those of consumers. 
However, the strongest supporter of restriction was Sir Donald Fergusson at the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Keynes described Fergusson’s ideas as ‘barmy’,25 he suggested 
that they would imply a ‘Russian’ (scilicet Soviet) form of planning and he accused 
them of being impracticable: ‘The complete international planning of every agricultural 
crop, and indeed the output of every other primary product throughout the world, is all 
very well. But it is hard to think of anything less likely to be acceptable’.26 Keynes was 
not overstating for the sake of irony. Fergusson was indeed in favour of Soviet-style 
centralized planning on a global scale, as the following passage shows:  
in my view it is not only desirable, but a matter of urgent practical necessity, to prepare 
schemes for the regulation of production and export quotas to come into operation 
immediately after the war. There has got to be an expansion of the production of most 
foodstuffs and, in my view, it is of vital importance that this expansion should be 
properly planned. Each country must know what its agricultural policy and production 
programme for a period of years is to be and this, in turn, must mean regulation of 
production and quotas. (T 247/10: 56) 
Fergusson was not equally fair in representing Keynes’s position. Whether he did it 
intentionally or not, he failed to appreciate the true nature of Keynes’s plan, for instance 
when he questioned its viability on the ground ‘that hardly any country will be willing 
to delegate to an international economic body control over their food supplies or 
agricultural policies’ (T 247/10: 57). The object of the Commodity Control (despite 
what the somewhat unfortunate name might suggest) was not to interfere with national 
commodity policies, but to provide a reliable international framework for them to be 
conceived and implemented. Keynes conceded that international restriction may 
sometimes be inevitable. Yet he did not think of it as the rule, but rather as the 
exception (T 247/9: 57).27 
Not only: the establishment of buffer stocks, and the greater ease afforded by them 
to international trade, might even make restrictions unnecessary, by removing the 
                                                 
25 The expression is used in an undated letter to Sir Wilfred Eady that Moggridge dates January 1943 
(CWK XXVII: 166). It is quite probable, however, that the letter was written at least six months earlier, 
since already on 30 June 1942 Fergusson wrote to Keynes: ‘I do not suppose that there is any 
possibility of reconciling what you describe as my “barmy” views with your thesis’ (T 247/9: 148). 
26 Letter from J. M. Keynes to D. Fergusson, 14 January 1943 (T 247/10: 69-70). 
27 Following this idea, in the last draft of the proposal Keynes included a section on ‘The quota regulation 
of exports’, where he conceded that ‘for an obstinate disequilibrium between supply and demand at a 
price level reasonably tolerable to producers […] we might have to fall back on the organised 
restriction of production’ (CWK XXVII: 186-7). 
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causes that had traditionally induced countries to adopt them. As Harrod observed, in 
the decade before the war, ‘there was great uncertainty about the future of prices; great 
increases could not be ruled out; the Treasury plan is designed to remove such anxieties. 
For all these reasons some of the extravagancies of protection may fall away of their 
own without the necessity of our imposing “regulation”’ (T 247/9: 101). The advantages 
of the buffer stock plan in terms of price stabilization could even be used deliberately as 
a counterpart to induce producers to renounce restrictions. Producers have an interest in 
keeping prices high, but they also have an interest in keeping prices stable. The ability 
of the buffer stock scheme to secure the latter could be offered as a counterpart for a 
concession on the former: ‘Its offer of stability may be regarded as a reasonable quid 
pro quo to producers for resting content with a lower price than they would otherwise 
have aimed at’ (T 247/10: 16, emphasis in the original).28 
In fact, if only the question is considered without prejudice, there is no need to 
oppose restrictions to buffer stocks as if they were incompatible alternatives. As Harrod 
observed, they serve two different purposes. ‘The buffer-stock plan and restriction 
schemes are directed to different problems, namely oscillation and chronic over-
production’ (T 247/9: 115). ‘The former is directed against oscillation of prices and 
producer incomes due to seasonal, climatic and cyclical causes; the latter are directed 
against a persistent tendency to over-production in the face of inadequate demand’ (T 
247/9: 110). 
 
 
5. Buffer stocks as a way of contrasting cyclical crises 
This leads us to the second point, which was, not by chance, the object of particular 
concern on the part of Harrod: the importance of buffer stocks as an instrument to 
contrast the trade cycle. It was Harrod, in fact, who urged Keynes to mention this 
explicitly in his proposal, as he had done in the article of 1938. In a ‘Note on Sir Donald 
Fergusson’s Note’ dated 19 July 1942, Keynes goes so far as to state that the main goal 
of the buffer stock scheme is to dampen the trade cycle: ‘It is devised primarily as a 
major instrument for dealing with the trade cycle in the decade after the “transitional” 
period’ (T 247/10: 15). 
Yet, according to Harrod, buffer stocks were not merely one way, but the best way 
to smoothen the trade cycle:  
                                                 
28 Of course, producers could reach the same goal of stabilizing sales prices by stipulating contracts on 
commodity futures markets, where ‘for the sake of certainty, the producer, not unnaturally, is prepared 
to accept a somewhat lower price in advance than what, on the balance of probability, he thinks the 
price is likely to be when the time comes’ (Keynes 1923a: 261). 
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I come more and more in my own mind to lay stress on this as the supreme mode of 
curing the trade cycle. The amounts involved in public works are so disappointingly 
small and the period of gestation from the trade cycle point of view so troublesomely 
long. The buffer stock on the other hand could create hundreds of millions of pounds of 
investment almost overnight, smoothly, automatically, without fuss or flurry, 
consultation or debate, exactly as the circumstances require. (T 247/9: 7) 
What does Harrod mean, when he says that the buffer stock creates investment? 
Surplus stocks of commodities do not yield a substantial revenue. In fact, they have a 
negative yield, measured by the carrying costs.29 And this is precisely the reason why 
private individuals have no incentive to hoard commodities, but prefer to keep their 
wealth in other, more profitable forms. Yet, even if it is an international organization 
that takes up the task of accumulating commodities, it is difficult to view it as an 
investment. Indeed, hoarded commodities are neither consumed nor invested, but 
represent a net subtraction to output. So at what condition can Harrod describe them as 
investments? At the condition that they are purchased with new money, possibly created 
by the Clearing Union.  
 
 
6. Money and commodities: Commod Control and the Clearing 
Union 
Harrod not only insists on the need to contrast the trade cycle, but he sees in the 
joint operation of buffer stocks and the Clearing Union an unrivalled means to that 
purpose. As he writes on 2 June 1942:  
It is a further beauty of the scheme that by centralizing the finance of the various 
commodity controls (and, if possible, linking it to that of the Clearing Union) it secures 
that purchases during the depression release what is for the time being ‘new’ money, not 
money withdrawn from incomes elsewhere. This infusion of new money is precisely 
what is needed , to combat depression, and I do not believe that any other practical way 
has ever been suggested of securing an infusion of like magnitude. (T 247/9: 100) 
According to Harrod, the Clearing Union would favour the operation of a buffer 
stock scheme not only by providing funding, but also by encouraging free trade, and 
hence by discouraging protectionist measures and output restrictions: in the pre-war 
decade ‘foreign payments were becoming progressively more difficult, and nations were 
bound as a precautionary measure to secure that as many of the bare essentials as 
                                                 
29 As argued by Keynes in Chapter17 of the General Theory (Keynes 1936: 237). 
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possible were produced at home; we hope that the Clearing Union, or whatever 
arrangement serves in its stead, will produce easement here’ (T 247/9: 101).  
Harrod regards the Commodity Control and the Clearing Union as complementary 
institutions, together with the third pillar of the post-war economic order envisaged by 
Keynes, namely the International Investment Board:  
The remedies at their disposal are interactive and mutually dependent. For example the 
nature, intensity and timing of the currency adjustments which the Union may require of 
an excess debit country must depend on the plans, if any, of the Investment Board in 
regard to that country. The plans of the Investment Board will depend on its diagnosis 
of the current phase of the Trade Cycle. They will also depend on the amount of 
purchasing power likely to be released (or absorbed) by the Commodity Control, and 
conversely. It is clearly important that the measures devised by each of the three 
institutions should be part of a common concerted policy. (T 247/9: 31) 
Together with the Clearing Union and the Investment Board, the Commod Control 
would have been an instrument of monetary policy. The buffer stocks would have acted 
as a sort of official reserve: any increase would have implied a monetary expansion and 
any decrease a contraction.  
The use of the Clearing Union to finance buffer stocks met the fierce opposition of 
the Bank of England. In a letter from Catterns, at the Bank, to Hopkins, at the Treasury, 
dated 2 April 1942, the argument reads as follows:  
We feel strongly that a scheme of this sort should not be closely associated with any 
international clearing scheme. It would be difficult enough in any event for an 
international currency organisation to gain in its initial years enough confidence to 
persuade the principal countries to entrust it with the bulk of their reserves; but it would 
have little or no chance of doing so if there were any risk of its assets being locked up in 
commodities. (T 247/9: 75-6) 
The Bank fails to acknowledge that a clearing scheme does not involve the 
accumulation of ‘reserves’ by surplus countries, but merely of credits with the clearing 
centre. Within a clearing scheme, the ‘assets’ of creditor countries correspond to the 
‘liabilities’ of the debtors. Now, it might seem vexing to oblige a country with a positive 
trade balance to keep that balance in the form of a credit with the clearing centre. 
However, this way of reasoning is gravely misleading, since those credits only arise 
thanks to the existence of the clearing centre: just as the latter affords debtor countries 
the facility of spending money that they have not previously earned, symmetrically it 
allows creditor countries to sell goods or services that they would not have otherwise 
been able to sell. In other words, the ‘reserves’ kept with the clearing centre only exist 
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thanks to the clearing centre itself. That said, if part of those assets are backed by 
commodities, it should be all the better for the safety of the creditors. Understandably, 
Keynes suggests Hopkins to reply along the following lines:  
I find the objection […] concerning the relationship of the proposals to the Clearing 
Union very perplexing. If some part of the liabilities of the Clearing Union were 
covered by assets in the shape of stocks of commodities, instead of by mere book debts 
from potentially insolvent countries, I should have supposed that this would improve the 
security of those with credit balances. I do not follow why a creditor of the Clearing 
Union should feel more comfortable if his balance is covered by an unsecured liability 
of Brazil than if it is covered by bags of coffee. (T 247/9: 78) 
Further objections to funding buffer stocks by issuing money come from Crick of 
the Ministry of Food. Crick proposes to assign financing of the buffer stocks to 
governments rather than monetary authorities, so as to avoid ‘unnecessary and possibly 
undesirable extension of functions’ of the latter (T 247/9: 85). Why does Keynes 
propose that the funding come from monetary authorities? Perhaps because he wants to 
associate the accumulation of commodity stocks with monetary expansion. This, indeed, 
is what Keynes argues in the brief notes on Crick’s comments that he sends to Hopkins 
on 12 May 1942:  
one considerable advantage of the proposed scheme would be lost, namely, that those 
governments which are financially weaker would suffer no reduction of their foreign 
purchasing power when demand falls off. The fact that international purchasing power 
is stabilised is an important aspect of the present proposal, which would be lost if the 
scheme is divorced from the Clearing Union. (T 247/9: 86) 
The Treasury plan does not envisage the financing of buffer stocks by governments, 
but it does admit the possibility of making recourse to loans on international markets. 
Here the criticisms come from Waley, at the Treasury. In a letter to Keynes dated 11 
January 1943, Waley raises two objections to the possibility of funding the buffer stocks 
by issuing bonds.  
First, the service of the loan would have to rely on one or both of the following 
sources: (i) profits from the management of the buffer stocks, which may not be 
substantial, or even positive, especially during years of depression and hence of strong 
commodity accumulation by the Control; (ii) revenues from export duties of the 
participating countries, which in turn are only usable to service an international 
commodity loan if they are exacted in a freely convertible currency. Now, both of these 
sources may eventually prove to be lacking. 
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Second, the loan may not have adequate guarantees for several reasons: either the 
Commodity Control does not initially have an established record of credit repayment 
and cannot be called to respond of its liabilities in front of any obvious international 
court; or the US could be unwilling to offer guarantee for the loan; or the UK could be 
incapable of offering adequate guarantee, since it will quite probably be a debtor and 
not a creditor country in the immediate post-war period. 
For all these reasons, Waley is ultimately in favour of financing the buffer stocks 
through the issue of new money by the Clearing Union, despite certain drawbacks: 
On the whole I am inclined to prefer the original idea that finance should be found by 
the Clearing Union despite the fact that a Central banking Institution ought not in 
principle to tie itself up in long term finance, and the more general danger that the 
Clearing Union idea may come to grief if it is regarded as an international philanthropist 
with a bottomless pocket. (T 247/10: 52-3) 
However, the supposed drawbacks indicated by Waley may be somewhat 
misleading. By financing the buffer stocks, the Clearing Union would indeed be 
providing long-term loans (or, rather, loans of indefinite length). And, yet, these long-
term loans would not be like that type of bank credit, which is usually intended to 
finance fixed capital investments with little guarantees and uncertain outcome. On the 
contrary, they would be more akin to mortgages, i.e. long-term credits with a strong 
guarantee, where the main risk is connected with a possible depreciation of the asset 
that serves as pledge. In this respect, despite the different maturity, mortgages are more 
similar to short-term commercial credit than to long-term investment loans. Mortgages 
are traditionally regarded as the most secure form of assets for a bank, and have been 
occasionally used also by central banks as a form of backing for the issue of banknotes. 
The loans of the Clearing Union to the Commodity Control would ultimately be 
guaranteed by the commodities purchased and stored in the buffer stocks.  
Far from being precarious, this guarantee could be regarded as safe as the gold 
reserves used by the soundest central banks to back their currencies. Indeed, it would be 
even safer, since gold reserves are traditionally fractional, whereas the commodities 
stored within the buffer stocks would cover the full value of the money issued to finance 
their purchase (minus the possible depreciation on the market, up to the limit of the 
oscillation allowed for by the Commodity Control, and hence not more than 10 per 
cent). Moreover, commodities represent a far more diversified investment compared to 
gold reserves. 
As far as the second point raised by Waley is concerned, one could ask: is it more 
‘philanthropical’ to purchase the commodities that a people has produced with the sweat 
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of the forehead or to purchase the bonds that a government has issued with a stroke of 
the pen? Is the issue of money more liable of being inflationary, i.e. ‘bottomless’, in the 
former case or in the latter? 
In his rejoinder to Sir Waley’s perplexities concerning the financing of buffer 
stocks, Keynes confirms that even he considers preferable that it should come from the 
Clearing Union. However, he also insists that it should not be difficult to find willing 
lenders if the Commodity Control were to make recourse to loans from international 
markets. In fact, there seems to be scope for a substantial demand for bonds backed by 
commodities and remunerated at a variable rate, dependent on the price of the 
underlying basket of commodities. 
For many years past there has been talk of setting up some sort of tabular standard 
based on the price of a composite commodity, in terms of which long-period loans 
might be negotiated, so that in each year interest and capital would be paid in terms of 
money at rates fluctuating in accordance with changes in the money value of the tabular 
standard adopted. It has been generally agreed that there was something to be said for a 
loan of that kind, in certain contexts at any rate, and that it might be attractive to some 
investors as offering an insurance against a depreciation in the value of money. It seems 
to me that, if the Buffer Stock Control was raising a loan, here was an ideal opportunity 
for experimenting along these lines. For, unlike most borrowers, the security against 
their loan […] would go up and down in the same proportion as their liability when 
there were changes in the value of money. (T 247/10: 53-4) 
The last remark reflects Keynes’s concern to avoid the ‘competitive struggle for 
liquidity’ that arises, as he described in 1932, when the value of liabilities is fixed in 
terms of money, whereas the value of assets fluctuates on the market, and hence the 
expectation of decreasing prices is sufficient to effect sales and hence actual falls in 
prices in a deflationary spiral (Keynes 1932: 39). 
For all these reasons, the Clearing Union is seen as the natural source of funding for 
the buffer stocks. However, this does not warrant to infer that the establishment of the 
Clearing Union is a necessary condition for the establishment of the Commodity 
Control, and hence that the failure of the former automatically entailed the renunciation 
to the latter. In fact, Keynes also envisaged that buffer stocks may be financed from 
some other source of purchasing power, in the case that the Clearing Union should not 
be established: ‘Purchases are to be financed through the Clearing Union, or, if that 
does not come into existence, by central banks working in co-operation’ (T 247/10: 17). 
Once again, a more concrete and detailed proposal comes from Harrod, who 
suggests that, even if the Clearing Union is not established, the financing of the buffer 
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stocks could be entrusted to a mutual credit scheme functioning along the same 
principles:  
Hopkins raises the important question whether the whole scheme depends on the 
Clearing Union. Broadly I think it does. But supposing we are driven to some 
arrangement for mutual credit (and we must at least have that if there is to be any 
Anglo-American co-operation at all), then I think the finance of the buffer stock could 
be modelled accordingly. […] My suggestion would mean applying the same principle 
mutatis mutandis that you have if there is a Clearing Union, namely the use of the de 
facto surpluses on the balance of payments. (T 247/9: 132-3) 
Despite the many oppositions, the ninth and final version of the plan was endorsed 
by the Committee on Reconstruction Problems, and printed on 6 February 1943.30 One 
month later, its proposals were submitted to the War Cabinet by the Chairman of the 
Committee, William Allen Jowitt, ‘with a recommendation for their acceptance as a 
basis for discussion with the United States of America and other members of the United 
Nations’.31 In the meantime, a United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture had 
been summoned for the following May at Hot Springs, Virginia. On 8 April, the Cabinet 
asked that the buffer-stock plan be considered by a Committee concerned with 
commercial policy, and on 30 April, on behalf of the Committee, the Chancellor 
Kingsley Wood recommended to the government ‘that our delegation to the Food 
Conference […] should be given discretion to hand a copy of the plan […] to the State 
Department’.32 Lionel Robbins, who was a member of the British delegation to the 
conference, reports in his diaries how they decided not to lay out the plan, but simply to 
present its main principles, since they wanted to promote a general buffer-stock 
authority covering all commodities, and not a separate governing body for agricultural 
products, which would have been quite certainly dominated by the interests of the 
producers (Howson and Moggridge 1990: 13 and 42). Eventually, the conference set the 
basis for a purely consultative body, FAO, and one of the main tasks with which it was 
entrusted was to study the place that buffer stocks ought to have in international 
commodity arrangements (United Nations 1943). 
 
 
                                                 
30 ‘The International Regulation of Primary Products’, Public Record Office, CAB 66/34/34/47: 6-23. All 
references beginning with CAB refer to documents held at the National Archives, Kew, Richmond, UK. 
31 ‘Memorandum by the Minister without portfolio’, Public Record Office, CAB 66/34/34/47: 4. 
32 ‘Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer’, Public Record Office, CAB 66/36/35: 3. 
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Richard Kahn and the stabilization of commodity prices 
Annalisa Rosselli* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Although Richard Kahn played an important role in spreading the Keynesian ideas 
which permeate his works—Keynes referred to him as ‘his favourite pupil’—nowadays 
he is an author little studied and nearly forgotten, perhaps because his fame was 
overshadowed by the towering figures and strong personalities of his Cambridge 
colleagues Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor. Thus, it is not surprising that an 
important part of his activity in the 1950s—both as a researcher and as a policy 
advisor—is practically unknown. His interest in the stabilization of the prices of 
primary commodities has been investigated only once (Palma 1994) and the archive 
material related to it has been only partially, and sometimes inaccurately, examined. 
Yet, this is interesting material which sheds light both on Keynes’s influence upon 
Kahn and on Kahn’s originality. The Keynesian influence is apparent in Kahn’s choice 
of an International Buffer Stock as the instrument for avoiding ‘excessive’ price 
fluctuations, following a proposal put forward by Keynes himself in the pre-war period 
(Keynes 1938). Kahn’s originality is expressed in the way he proposes that the 
International Buffer Stock should be managed, which differs both from Keynes’s 
approach and from the views prevailing in those years about the working of buffer 
stocks.  
It is the aim of this paper to fill this gap in our knowledge of Kahn’s activity and 
post-war approach to economic policy in the spirit of Keynes, with his emphasis on 
correcting market failures without destroying market mechanisms. 
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2. The unfinished book 
The fluctuations in the prices of primary products, their causes and consequences 
and how best to curb them, are the subject of a book which kept Kahn busy for nearly 
nine years, but which he never published. In his book Kahn advocates the creation of 
buffer stocks managed, for each commodity in question, by an ‘authority, endowed with 
suitable financial backing, which can buy the commodity when, in some sense or other, 
it is cheap—or appears to be so—, can hold it in stock, and can then sell from its stock 
when the price appears to be relatively high’ (RFK 2/12/2/1).1 
The book was never completed. Related notes and correspondence, half-finished and 
completed chapters make up five bulky files which are preserved among Kahn’s papers. 
However, it is not easy to reconstruct the story of the book’s composition. There remain 
large gaps that the available documentation does not enable us to fill. In particular, the 
causes which deterred Kahn from publication are not clear, so that we do not know 
whether Kahn was dissatisfied with the final result or publication was prevented by 
other contingent reasons. 
There is evidence that Kahn began working on the book in 1952, on the invitation of 
the FAO, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. The FAO’s 
interest in the subject is not surprising. Ever since the Hot Springs conference convened 
in 1943 to promote its establishment, the FAO had always been concerned with the 
problem of stabilizing the prices of primary products2 whose fluctuations deeply 
affected the income of producers in less developed countries and impaired food 
provision. However, being more the creation of the ‘minds of experts and scientists’ 
than the result of governmental action (Marchisio and Di Blase 1991: 4), the FAO was 
devoid of political power. Two of its most ambitious projects in the post-war years—the 
establishment of a World Food Board which would have de facto managed the world 
agricultural economy and an International Commodity Clearing House—had failed 
because of opposition from the United States, which feared having to bear most of the 
cost, and from the United Kingdom, which had no interest in price stability and did not 
want to lose the opportunity of importing raw materials at very low prices. In the early 
1950s the FAO had relinquished any project of international governance of food 
provision and had confined its function to that of advising governments and providing 
non-binding recommendations. The FAO began to follow closely those few agreements 
which were being implemented on a commodity-by-commodity basis. There was rising 
                                                 
1 References beginning with RFK are to the documents preserved in Richard Kahn’s papers, Modern 
Archive, King’s College, Cambridge UK.  
2 See United Nations 1943, Resolution XXV. 
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concern that the aim of these agreements was more the allocation of the surplus 
production and the defence of the interests of producers than the stabilization of prices 
and the prevention of shortages of agricultural commodities. For this reason the FAO 
economics department, together with one of its most competent and active officers, 
Gerda Blau,3 chief of the Commodities Branch, decided to direct its research towards 
bringing price stabilization and production efficiency back to the forefront. 
Blau went to visit Kahn in Cambridge in January 1952 and persuaded him to write a 
report on the issue. They agreed that the results of his work would appear as ‘a printed 
monograph, published under your [Kahn’s] name’.4 The deadline was Spring 1952, but 
Kahn asked for (and obtained) a postponement to July 1952, the first of many more to 
come. Intense academic activity and, above all, the usual perfectionism which always 
made him feel dissatisfied with what he had written delayed Kahn’s work. Gerda Blau 
gave Kahn all the support she could: she provided him with the help of a research 
assistant who sent him relevant material and two lists of bibliographical references;5 she 
accepted the fastidious financial and travel arrangements proposed by Kahn; and, above 
all, she never ceased to encourage him. However, it was only in the Summer of 1953 
that the first four chapters of the 11 listed in the provisional table of contents were sent 
to Rome.6 In this early version, following the indications of Gerda Blau, Kahn criticizes 
the interpretation of buffer-stock schemes as a means to increase the income of 
producers, to the detriment of efficiency in the allocation of resources. Although 
concerned with the disastrous effects of the low price of primary products on the income 
of developing countries, Kahn was very careful in keeping the main goal of buffer 
stocks—to reduce price fluctuations in the interest of consumers and producers alike—
distinct from the more ambitious ‘ancillary objectives’ of the fight against poverty, or 
the building up of stocks to relieve famine, which required other means.  
The four chapters were welcomed enthusiastically by Gerda Blau. She wrote, in a 
very optimistic mood:  
this paper, with some adjustment in presentation, may well turn out one of the best 
things that happened to FAO in a long time. […] What I particularly like about it, is the 
fact that for once it will certainly not be a study which merely appeals to FAO’s 
                                                 
3 Gerda Blau entered FAO in 1947 and worked for it until her retirement. She took her Ph.D. at the 
London School of Economics and began her career by publishing an important article on futures trading 
in the Review of Economic Studies in 1944. She was a good friend of many Cambridge economists, 
including Joan Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor, Ruth Cohen, who were frequently her guests in Rome while 
working as consultants for FAO. 
4 Letter from Gerda Blau to Richard Kahn, 27 February 1952, FAO Archives, File 0_53_1_A_1. 
5 Letters of 4 February and 28 March 1952 in RFK 2/13. 
6 The titles of the 4 chapters are: 3) Ancillary objectives; 4) The technique of Buffer Stocks; 5) Buffer 
Stocks and the balance of payments 6) The problem of separate markets (RFK 2/12/3). 
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standard clientele of Ministries of Agriculture and producers’ organizations who have 
been repeating their half-baked and ineffective exhortations re[garding] buffer stocks 
for so many years, but that instead its arguments will surely penetrate to, and rouse, 
some of the hard core of the much more hard-boiled and influential people in Treasuries 
and Boards of Trade.7 
The same enthusiasm was shared by another economist who had just joined the 
FAO staff—H. Tyszynsky, an expert in commodities.8 He prepared a summary of 
Kahn’s paper9 and confirmed that it was a ‘most valuable contribution to our study of 
international commodity policy’.  
However, one year passed before two new chapters were sent to FAO headquarters. 
Added to the revised and rearranged old material, they make up what Kahn named—on 
the cover of the file—‘the long version’, in 5 chapters and an Appendix (RFK 2/12/2/1-
163). This time they got a rather chilly reception in Rome, perhaps also as a result of the 
changed international political climate which is well expressed by the final report of the 
Commission on Foreign trade appointed by the US government (the so-called Randall 
Commission). In 1954, the report had concluded that all international commodity 
agreements had to be opposed in principle, since they were against the freedom of 
individual initiative, and in practice, since they were often a means to receive aid from 
the United States.10 Gerda Blau confessed to having many doubts about the practical 
workability of buffer stocks as described in Kahn’s paper. Moreover, she disagreed with 
the choice made by Kahn of presenting his scheme as opposed mainly to laissez-faire 
policies. She found that the approach to fight was not liberalism but nationalism and 
protectionism, however disguised. The real support for laissez-faire policies was indeed 
inexistent at the time. The surpluses of commodities which were being generated were 
not the result of slack demand but of ‘very powerful national policies’ which gave 
incentives to producers out of touch with the world trade situation. As long as these 
national policies were adhered to, ‘what can a buffer stock do about their effect?’11 The 
scheme had other points she could not agree with, in particular the discretion left to the 
managers of the Buffer Stock (see below), but she still hoped to publish the book under 
the auspices of FAO as a contribution to the debate. She asked for a summary of the 
main arguments, in order to sound out the reactions of her superiors, whom she 
expected to share her doubts.  
                                                 
7 Letter from Gerda Blau to Richard Kahn, 25 July 1953, FAO Archive. 
8 He published two articles on international commodity agreements in Economica in 1949 and 1950. 
9 Letter from Tyszynski to Gerda Blau, 14th October 1953, FAO Archive. 
10 However, in spite of its recommendations of lowering US tariffs, the report was the result of a 
compromise with the protectionist wing of the Congress.  
11 Letter from Gerda Blau to Richard Kahn, 6 July 1954, FAO Archive. 
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More favourable comments came from Tyszynsky, perhaps less concerned than 
Gerda Blau with the political implications of the proposal. He grasped the novelty of the 
scheme suggested. In his opinion the strongest argument in favour of buffer stocks, 
provided by Kahn and largely overlooked in previous discussions of the subject, was 
that this scheme not only stabilized prices, better than the market forces of speculation 
could ever do, but simultaneously allowed for a more efficient organization of 
productive resources as a result of a greater feeling of stability of the producers.12 
We do not know whether Kahn ever prepared the summary Gerda Blau had asked 
for. There is a gap in our reconstruction, since the relevant files in the FAO archives for 
the years 1954-59 appear to be missing.13 We know that the project was resumed in 
1956, when Kahn came back to Cambridge after spending one year in Geneva where he 
had been working for the United Nations, although by then the chances of publishing 
the results with the support of FAO were almost nil. In fact, Gerda Blau wrote to Kahn 
to send her any new material in an envelope marked ‘personal’, ‘the buffer stock study 
having become a slightly delicate subject here—but I managed, hopefully, to save some 
printing money for it’.14 With or without FAO support, Kahn continued his research 
and, in the Easter and Michaelmas terms of 1956, he devoted his course on Economics 
of Government Intervention to the buffer stocks.  
Joan Robinson played an active part at this stage of the work, well beyond her usual 
role of preferred interlocutor for Kahn. The notes for one of his lectures are in her 
handwriting (RFK2/14/91-95) and she assembled cuttings from the ‘long version’ to 
provide the ‘short version’ of the book (RFK 2/12/1/4-101) which, however, was 
submitted in Kahn’s name.15 Although even this third version, by Kahn’s admission, 
still needed ‘a certain amount of patching up’ (RFK2/13/57), it is the only one which 
resembles a complete book and was probably sent to Rome in the Summer 1957.  
The revisions were never made, though, and we do not know the reason, whether 
opposition inside FAO which made the publication unlikely or lack of time on Kahn’s 
part, or both. The changed political climate of the Cold War, so different from the 
enthusiasm for international cooperation of the last years of the war, is acknowledged 
by Robinson-Kahn in the Introduction, where it is admitted that the buffer-stock concept 
                                                 
12 Letters from Tyszynski to Gerda Blau, FAO Archive, 30 September and 30 October 1954 FAO 
Archive. 
13 The files with the correspondence of Gerda Blau in the years 1954-59 have not been preserved in the 
FAO archives and after 1953 no mention of Kahn’s work can be found in the minutes of the meetings 
of the Branch Directors of the FAO Economics Department. 
14 Letter from Gerda Blau to Richard Kahn, 5 November 1956 (RFK2/13/56). 
15 Contrary to what is said in Palma (1994: 117), the ‘short version’ was written after the ‘long’ one. This 
new version of the book is in five chapters: Introduction, The case for buffer stocks, Some objections, 
Ancillary objectives, The technique of buffer stocks. 
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‘flourished in the idealist climate of opinion of those times’ (RFK2/12/1/4). We know 
that after this last attempt Kahn, perhaps discouraged, diverted his efforts to individual 
commodity schemes, to which he applied the ideas he had developed. In 1959 he 
worked for the International Sugar Council and wrote them a report arguing that a 
buffer-stock scheme was superior to export quotas and particularly appropriate for 
sugar, whose price broadly fluctuated over the year. Around the same time, he finished 
a ‘pretty lengthy’ report on the International Tin Agreement (see section 4 below).  
Gerda Blau was kept informed and appreciated Kahn’s new policy proposals. In the 
meanwhile international relations between the two blocks showed signs of improvement 
and in the climate of détente prevailing also within FAO at the end of 1959, she felt free 
to invite Kahn to go back to their old project. She wrote in December:  
Have you decided anything about publishing? I know we have relinquished our rights 
but if you’d still like to consider it, we probably would be interested again in publishing. 
There is renewed interest and it seems that the ‘Camp David’16 spirit would make it 
possible for the Americans no longer to look upon an FAO publication on buffer stocks 
as part of the Cold War against them. (RFK 13/13/25-6)  
This time Kahn’s reply to Gerda Blau—on December 23rd, 1959—left no hope: 
‘[…] I am afraid that the idea that I had of getting something on buffer stocks really 
ready for publication about now has had to be abandoned’ (RFK 13/13/28). 
The manuscript was finally abandoned and Kahn’s research on buffer stocks 
remains today one of the less known parts of his activity.17 
 
 
3. Kahn’s case for buffer stocks: the analysis of price volatility  
Kahn’s case for buffer stocks can be organized around three questions: 
a. Why do prices fluctuate so much? 
b. Why speculation does not succeed in stabilizing prices? In particular, which is the 
role of future markets? 
c. Which are the consequences for consumers and producers? 
We will analyse them in turn. 
 
                                                 
16 In September 1959 Dwight Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev met at Camp David marking a new 
phase in the relationship between the USA and the USSR. 
17 Palma 1994 is the only study of the manuscript, although largely incomplete. No mention of the 
research on buffer stocks is found in Pasinetti (1987). However, in the interview that Kahn gave to 
Cristina Marcuzzo in 1987 (Marcuzzo 1988: 47), Kahn said that he was intrigued by the subject and 
mentions his activity for FAO. 
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a. The starting point for Kahn, as for Keynes, is a failure of the market for primary 
products to reach a stable equilibrium. Kahn investigates the reasons for this market 
failure in terms of traditional partial equilibrium analysis, to which he adds a strong 
Keynesian flavour. Partial equilibrium analysis focuses on the elasticities of demand 
and supply. If the elasticities are low, chance changes in demand or supply have a 
strong impact on the price of the commodity, since large variations in price are 
necessary to eliminate even small gaps between demand and supply. Demand for 
primary commodities is inelastic, since they usually make only a small fraction of the 
total cost of the final goods, in whose production they enter as inputs. Great changes in 
the price of the primary commodity have a small effect on the final price that consumers 
pay and, therefore, on their demand.18 Likewise, producers are highly specialized and 
highly competitive. They cannot move their resources to other productions and this 
makes the supply very inelastic. Therefore, they are obliged to take any price they can 
fetch. Changes in demand and price fail to stimulate or reduce output in a significant 
manner. 
So far it is standard partial equilibrium analysis, which can explain short-term 
fluctuations of prices. When expectations are brought into the picture, it can be 
understood why these fluctuations do not iron themselves out over time and Kahn’s 
analysis comes closer to that of Keynes. Expectations of producers, who face the 
uncertainty of the future, are exceedingly affected by the current situation. When prices 
are high, there is a tendency to be too optimistic and to overinvest . When they are low, 
financial pressure and lack of incentives induce producers to neglect maintenance, so 
that when the demand recovers, the re-establishment of an adequate productive capacity 
is slow and costly. The outcome is a permanent mismatch between supply and demand: 
it is the ‘cob-web’ effect that Keynes had already described in his 1938 article (Keynes 
1938). 
 
b. Private speculation could help, since speculators perform the useful task of 
carrying the commodities from times of abundance, when they are bought at low prices, 
to times of scarcity, when they can be sold at higher prices. Kahn compares their 
function to that of transport facilities. However, as Keynes had already remarked, high 
storage costs, together with risk and borrowing costs which increase as the stocks are 
being piled up, prevent profit-seeking speculators from providing their service—a 
public good—in the amount which is necessary to stabilize prices, above all when it is 
most needed in times of depression. 
                                                 
18 This reference to demand rigidity was not present in Keynes. 
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The stabilizing action of professional speculation is hampered by three obstacles: 
finance; need for diversification; short-sightedness.  
Finance is a serious limitation on any speculative market. Indeed the normal situation at 
a time when the price of a commodity has fallen heavily is how to avoid bankruptcy for 
some of those who are involved in the crash rather than how to take advantage of an 
excellent opportunity of making money. The professionals at those times are usually 
harassed rather than ebullient. (RFK2/12/2/29) 
The funds of the professional speculators are borrowed and limited, which increases 
the natural reluctance at putting all the eggs into one basket. ‘As an expert speculator 
takes up a bigger and bigger position in a commodity because of its apparent cheapness, 
he becomes more and more cautious in placing reliance on his bullish expectations’ 
(RFK2/12/2/30). 
While a public agency can take a long-term view and buy when the price begins to 
fall, professional speculators knows that the price can decrease even further, under the 
pressure of large stocks which are being liquidated because ‘held in unsteady hands’. 
Before the speculators decide to step into action, the drop in prices can be dramatic. The 
existence of futures markets does not help in times of falling prices, since they enhance 
‘bearish’ sentiments. 
 
c. Against the consequences of price instability—periodic disasters for producers, 
serious shortages for consumers—Kahn is convinced that the creation of buffer-stocks 
is beneficiary. Unlike restriction schemes and quotas, which benefit producers at the 
expense of consumers, ‘the essence of the buffer-stock scheme is that it benefits 
producers and consumers alike, and increases efficiency all round’ (RFK2/12/1/26). It 
benefits producers, because, in terms of utility, gains and losses of equal amount do not 
compensate each other, and producers are better-off if they are saved from catastrophic 
losses even if they have to give up wind-fall profits when prices are rising. It benefits 
consumers, and efficiency in general, because average costs are lower when prices are 
stable and productive capacity is adequate to long-term demand, since high-cost 
producers, who can survive only if prices are exceptionally high, must leave the market. 
Kahn’s arguments are clearly presented in a solid theoretical framework, but they 
are not entirely new. We find more or less the same arguments in some of the 
publications that Kahn read to prepare for his book (Porter 1950: 95-97; Staley 1937: 
92-99). What is new and highly controversial, is his idea of how the buffer-stock 
administrators should manage it. In Kahn’s view, they should be endowed with large 
discretionary powers and not have to follow any pre-determinate rule. All plans for 
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buffer stocks required fixing floor and ceiling prices. On the contrary, discretion, which 
was to be used in exceptional cases in Keynes’s plan, becomes the rule for the 
behaviour of the managers of the buffer-stock in Kahn’s proposal. 
 
 
3. The technique of buffer-stock operation in principle 
In fact, Kahn’s scheme differs from other buffer-stock schemes19 in two major 
respects: 
a) it must ‘aim at solvency in the ordinary commercial sense’ (RFK2/12/1/66); 
b) it is run by an authority who fixes a buying and selling price, but who is free to 
intervene in the market at any price in the range between them and who is also free 
to modify the ‘ceiling’ and ‘floor’ prices without obeying to any automatic rule. 
Other schemes, in Kahn’s opinion, implicitly assume that the buffer-stock authority, 
that Kahn refers to simply as ‘Buffer Stock’, can rely on unlimited resources, which is 
extremely unlikely. Yet, it is only in this case that the trade-off between the two 
objectives of the Buffer Stock—the aim of price stability and that of its own survival in 
the long-run—can be easily reconciled. Kahn is well aware that the Buffer Stock 
operates in a market where there are not only individual agents who buy the commodity 
for their own use, but also other speculators who gain from temporary deviations of the 
price from its long-term trend. When the price gets close to the ‘floor’, speculators who 
are convinced that the Buffer Stock will defend the ‘floor’, will be only happy to 
accumulate stocks of the commodity, relying on the hope of future increases in price 
and on the expectations that the Buffer Stock will prevent them from incurring into any 
loss. By doing so and buying the commodity, they will help to stop the fall of its price. 
In this case, the Buffer Stock performs its task of price stabilization very effectively, but 
it contributes to the profits of the speculators without any gain for itself to cover its own 
costs.  
If traders are convinced instead that the ‘floor’ will be lowered, they will unload all 
their stocks to the Buffer Stock which can go on buying only if its funds are unlimited. 
If they are not and eventually the ‘floor’ is lowered to avoid heavy losses, the Buffer 
Stock will have saved itself at the cost of price instability since ‘there is little security in 
a floor which drops under your feet whenever you try to set foot on it’ (RFK2/12/1/69). 
How then to reconcile limited resources and price stability? 
                                                 
19 See the authors quoted above and also Harrod (1948) and St Clare Grondona (1958). 
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Kahn suggests the introduction of dealing prices which, if they must be fixed, are set 
wide apart, just to indicate to the market what are possible extremes of price 
fluctuations. Their determination is neither a political matter of bargaining between 
producers and consumers, nor does it follow an automatic rule, but it depends on the 
judgment of the experts who are selected to manage the buffer stock. 
When the price moves in a range between the dealing prices, the authority must not 
be passive, but must operate by trying to reconcile moderate opportunities for gain, 
which require risk-taking and some price instability, with its main objective of reducing 
price fluctuations in the general interest. Kahn proposes the policy of ‘coming in late as 
a buyer and selling in good time’ (RFK2/12/1/72). If the authority waits to buy, it may 
hope for a spontaneous re-adjustment of the market, and save its resources for when 
they are most necessary as the price threatens to fall dramatically. If it sells as soon as 
the price begins to rise, it can make a small profit besides slowing down the rise of the 
price.20  
There is no doubt on which side Kahn stands between discretion and automatic rules 
binding the Buffer Stock. In contrast with the positions held by Harrod (1948) (who 
maintains that dealing prices must be subject to a variation limit of 3 per cent) or Porter 
(1946) (who maintains that dealing prices should be the average of market prices) or St 
Clare Grondona (1958) (who advocates automatic rules for price adjustments), Kahn 
wants to give to the buffer-stock authority the discretion to deal as it thinks best. This is 
the only way to avoid situations where the market is unanimously convinced of the 
direction and amount of the price changes. ‘It is bad enough if the market can guess 
which way the cat is going to jump if it jumps at all, it is fatal if they not only know this 
for certain but also how far it is going to jump and when’ (RFK2/12/1/87). 
If the Buffer Stock wants to survive in a speculative market, and does not have 
unlimited resources, it must keep the market guessing. Changes in the dealing prices 
must be infrequent, unexpected, as unpredictable as possible.  
It may seem paradoxical that stability is promoted by an arbitrary behaviour. But the 
objective of the authority is to ensure that those who believe there will be a change in 
dealing prices will hold this belief with great uncertainty, and this uncertainty will be 
increased by the interventions of the Buffer Stock. The behaviour of the agents can be 
affected not just by influencing the content of expectations, but the confidence with 
which the expectations are held.21  
                                                 
20 On the role of the Buffer Stock as speculator in the public interest see Fantacci et al. (2012). 
21 Keynes’s influence on this point could not be clearer. Keynes distinguishes between a probability 
statement and the ‘weight of the argument’, i.e., the evidence on which the probability statement is 
based. See Roncaglia (2009: 496-7). 
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There are many similarities between Kahn’s views on the working of the 
commodities market expressed in his unfinished book on Buffer Stocks and the 
description of financial markets in his article on Liquidity preference written—and 
published—in the same years (Kahn 1954). In both cases we have two kinds of 
economic agents who operate in the market. In the financial markets there are 
speculators who hope for capital gains and who make their predictions about the future 
behaviour of bond prices on the basis of accurate calculations. But there are also 
‘orphans and widows’ who ‘do not have a clue’ as to what may happen, and, for lack of 
a better alternative, prefer to think that the present situation will persist and do not 
change the composition of their portfolio. 
Similarly, in the commodities markets, there are professional speculators who are 
experienced traders and gather all the available information on the state of stocks, 
supply and demand. On this basis they form their predictions. Yet, there is also ‘the 
manufacturer, the consumer, the grower […] who […] “lives from hand to mouth”’ 
(RFK2/12/2/29).They make ‘an important contribution to the average, and it is on the 
whole a contribution which is highly colored by the expectation that prices will go on 
moving as they have been’ (Ibid.).  
In both markets if a ‘best guess’ could be held with absolute certainty, it would lead 
to a yes/no behaviour. In the financial markets if speculators think the rate of interest 
will fall, they invest all their funds in securities; if they think that it will rise, they sell 
securities for money. Similarly, in the commodities market, if speculators could be 
certain that the Buffer Stock will defend the floor, they would buy all the stocks of the 
commodity in question (and this would certainly happen if the Buffer Stock were 
endowed with unlimited resources); if they could be certain that the floor would be 
lowered, they would sell all their stocks. In the former case speculators would be allied 
with the Buffer Stock, in the latter they would compel the Buffer Stock to abandon its 
defence of the price, even if it did not intend to. How can the Buffer Stock use 
speculation to its own advantage, when its resources are limited? It must influence 
expectations, and in this task it is helped by the fact that ‘the future is uncertain and that 
speculators are hesitant’ (RFK2/12/2/34) . As Kahn notes on his article on Liquidity 
preference, the division is not just between agents22; it is also inside their minds and no 
‘best guess’ can be held with absolute certainty. ‘Innate skill may be great but it still has 
the laws of chance to contend against’ (RFK2/12/2/30). The Buffer Stock can be 
successful in curbing price fluctuations only if it convinces the market that it can be 
successful. The skill Buffer Stock managers require is not just the knowledge of the 
                                                 
22 This point is clearly made in Dardi 1994.  
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market, like any other speculator, but the ability to influence opinions and expectations. 
And it is from this perspective that Kahn assessed the only actual experience of 
international buffer stocks in the 1950s: the ‘Tin agreement’. 
 
 
4. Dealing with real Buffer Stocks: the International Sugar Agreement 
and the International Tin Agreement  
After failing to have his book accepted, Kahn preferred the lower-key approach of 
making ‘special studies of particular aspects from time to time’,23 in the belief that his 
arguments in favour of international intervention on the commodity markets would 
appear more convincing if supported by practical illustrations rather than theoretical 
arguments. Although even these attempts were not particularly successful and Kahn 
failed to convince his political interlocutors, his faith in the potential of buffer stocks as 
a means to dampen fluctuations of primary products did not waver, as testified by two 
memoranda which he prepared in 1959. Both memoranda remained unpublished. One 
was written for a meeting of the International Sugar Council in September 1959, the 
other was a report on the working of the International Tin Agreement. The former is 
interesting because it testifies that Kahn was still convinced in 1959 of the feasibility of 
a buffer-stock scheme; the latter is much longer and more articulated; it is the 
application to an actual case of the principles explained in the book which never 
appeared.  
The International Sugar Agreement was based on ‘restricted quotas’. The aim of the 
agreement was to constrain the price within a range between a ‘floor’ and ‘ceiling’ price 
per pound of sugar of a given quality. The countries which had signed the agreement 
were obliged to restrict their production up to a maximum of 20 per cent whenever the 
price overtook the floor. In September 1959 the International Sugar Council—which 
managed the agreement—proposed to supplement the quota restriction with a 
multilateral options scheme, i.e., obligation to buy (or sell) sugar for a given amount 
whenever the price reached the boundaries of the fixed range. Kahn was invited to 
participate in a meeting where the proposal was discussed, and he criticized it. In his 
written comment he argued that fluctuations in the price of sugar were mainly seasonal 
and reflected fluctuations in the existing stocks which were subject to abrupt variations, 
depending on the expectations and fears of the speculators who often take a ‘wrongful 
and disharmonious view’ (RFK 2/19/850). Under these circumstances, Kahn deemed 
that the options scheme was neither useful nor appealing enough to the countries 
                                                 
23 Letter of Richard Kahn to Gerda Blau , 23 December 1959, RFK/13/13/28. 
219 
involved to be accepted. He suggested an alternative approach, but also concluded his 
report with an Appendix ‘designed to draw attention to the superior , but not necessarily 
conflicting, merits of a buffer-stock scheme’(RFK2/19/839). In the Appendix—which is 
less than one page long—Kahn reiterated his belief in the effectiveness of a Buffer 
Stock, funded with the proceeds of the sales of sugar at the highest price, to keep the 
price in a range even narrower than the one envisaged by the agreement.  
Kahn’s ideas, along the same lines, are more clearly expressed in what he himself 
called his ‘Tin report’.24 The International Tin Agreement (hence ITA) had come into 
force in July 1956, after nine years of study and negotiations. It was ratified by 
countries which represented 90 per cent of the world production of tin and 45 per cent 
of its consumption (the United States, although a big importer, for ‘emotional reasons’, 
says Kahn, preferred a behaviour of ‘benevolent neutrality’ (par. 5)).  
Agreement implied the establishment of a Buffer Stock which was the focus of 
Kahn’s attention, and probably also of the FAO which commissioned the report, whose 
interest for us lies in the careful reconstruction of the operations of the tin Buffer Stock 
and the reasons that Kahn provides for its successes and failures. The concluding 
assessment was that the Buffer Stock had ‘not been unsuccessful in weathering a 
difficult period’ (par. 41), but that many problems could have been avoided if the ITA 
had been conceived and managed in a less cautious way. Indeed, the whole report is a 
comparison between the Buffer Stock as it actually existed and the ‘ideal’ buffer stock 
that Kahn advocated and hoped to see established for several other commodities. The 
differences between the two were of three kinds: 
a) the objective of the Buffer Stock. The actual buffer stock was conceived by the 
ITA as ‘ancillary to a restriction scheme’, since the ITA worked primarily through 
export control. When the Buffer Stock held more than 10,000 tons of tin (approx. 7 per 
cent of the yearly consumption), the Council of the participating governments 
interpreted this as a signal of a persistent discrepancy between supply and demand and 
fixed a ‘total maximum permissible amount’ for exports. Quotas of the restricted 
production were allocated among the producers. Given that the determination of this 
permissible amount was subject to time-lags and errors, the aim of the Buffer Stock was 
to level out the ensuing fluctuations of prices,25 and not to keep the output reasonably 
stable. On the contrary, the Buffer Stock advocated by Kahn had the aim of completely 
obviating the need for restrictions, ‘by carrying the whole onus of the difference 
                                                 
24 RFK2/19. References are to the numbered paragraphs of the report. 
25 ‘The function of the Buffer Stock, considered realistically, is to round off the rough edges which are 
created by the operation of restriction scheme’ par. 49 
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between unrestricted production and consumption and of fluctuations in privately held 
stocks’ (par. 52). It was debatable which commodities were best suited for a buffer 
stock of this kind.26 Since a growth in demand for tin was easily foreseeable in the near 
future, it was worthwhile preserving the productive capacity which would be destroyed 
if the price of tin were allowed to fall to a very low level. However, in the case of tin, 
the discrepancy between supply and demand was estimated by Kahn as probably too 
large to be absorbed by a Buffer Stock and he considered some restriction scheme 
unavoidable. Therefore, while the ‘ideal’ Buffer Stock aimed to stabilize output or its 
rate of growth, the real Buffer Stock had the less ambitious aim of restricting the range 
of price variations, while production was adjusting to demand.  
b) the size of the Buffer Stock and the funds at its disposal. The maximum size for 
the holdings of the ITA Buffer Stock was approximately 15 per cent of the yearly 
production. Kahn thought that it should have been at least three times as large. The 
funds, collected by the producers before the ITA entered into force, with no contribution 
from the consumers, were also too small. A larger Buffer Stock would have mitigated 
the need for restrictions as large as those enforced (they reached 43 per cent of the 
yearly production), besides proving itself a profitable business when the price rose 
again. From the point of view of the producers, the larger the Buffer Stock the more 
stable the level of production, although at the cost of slackening the subsequent rise of 
the price. But Kahn thought that this was a cost worth paying. 
c) the discretionary powers of the manager of the Buffer Stock. This is the most 
original and innovative part of the whole report. Under the ITA, the discretionary 
powers of the manager were limited. There was a floor and a ceiling price, and the 
manager was obliged to buy tin at the floor price, as long as he had funds available, and 
to sell tin at the ceiling price, as long as his supplies lasted. The interval between the 
floor and the ceiling price was divided into three parts: in the upper third the manager 
could sell tin, in order to prevent steep variations in price; in the lower third he could 
buy tin, for the same reason; in the middle third he could do nothing unless explicitly 
authorized by the Council. 
Kahn noted that these provisions, conceived to keep the price within a narrow range, 
had the opposite result of increasing the size of its fluctuations. The aim of the ITA was 
‘to achieve a reasonable degree of stability of prices’ but, in Kahn’s view, not enough 
emphasis had been put on the term ‘reasonable’. The buffer-stock manager interpreted 
his mandate as the obligation, not the possibility, to buy and sell as soon as he was 
                                                 
26 Kahn thought that coffee, cocoa and cotton were particularly well suited, while the case for tin was 
more problematic. 
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allowed to do so; these were also the expectations of the market. These expectations, 
held with strong conviction, were damaging for the operation of the Buffer Stock, since 
they enhanced the destabilizing effects of speculation.  
On the other hand Kahn thought that the Manager should have ‘complete discretion 
to operate, if and when he wished to do so, in either direction anywhere between the 
floor and the ceiling prices’ and that ‘speculators, traders and users should be in a state 
of doubt as to the Manager’s policy and actions’ (par. 71). The Manager should try to 
use the forces of speculation to help him stabilize the market. When the price hits the 
floor, speculators should be reasonably expected to begin to buy the commodity, in 
view of a subsequent price increase—especially if they know that supply has been 
restricted and a demand surplus can be reasonably foreseen. If they do not begin to buy 
and their bearish sentiment persists , it is for two reasons. One reason is that they think 
that the prospective gain will not be high enough, if the Manager begins to sell tin as 
soon as the price enters into the higher third of the interval, in order to please the 
consumers. Therefore the floor and ceiling prices should be set wide apart, the Manager 
should wait to sell and speculators must be left with the hope of high price increases, at 
least for a short period. The damage to consumers who have to pay a high price for a 
few days is more than offset by the shorter duration of the restrictions, since the extra 
production is absorbed by the piling-up of the stocks.27 The other reason for the 
persistence of a bearish attitude is that speculators may expect that the floor could be 
lowered, because the Buffer Stock runs out of funds. In this case they wait in the hope 
of purchases at a lower price. Kahn suggests that the Manager should not be obliged to 
buy tin at the floor price until his funds are exhausted, but he should be free to suspend 
the support to the floor price and to buy at a lower price, with the positive results of 
making a good profit when the price increases and of confounding the speculators, 
while preserving the floor price. Kahn is well aware that  
Complete abolition of this obligation, much though there is to be said for it, would 
involve so radical a departure from the conventional concept of a buffer-stock scheme 
as not to be worth consideration here—not at any rate in connection with a buffer-stock 
scheme which is merely ancillary to scheme for control of exports, itself designed taken 
by itself to keep the price between specified floor and ceiling prices’. (par. 79)  
Kahn’s ‘ideal’ Buffer Stock, as it emerges in the Tin report, is endowed with very 
substantial resources that can be increased by successful market operations. Its Manager 
                                                 
27 In the actual working of the ITA Buffer Stock, instead, the price range was not large enough. It was 
made even narrower by the decision of the Council to give to the Manager the power of selling tin 
when the price was still in the middle third. 
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should be completely free to operate on the market, in an unpredictable manner; 
information about the holdings of the Buffer Stock should be kept secret; speculators 
must know only that the Buffer Stock exists and that it is powerful, so that their bullish 
or bearish sentiments can be exploited in favour of the aims of the Buffer Stock, not 
against them.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
There is no doubt indeed that in this proposal Kahn draws his inspiration from 
Keynes in many respects. The knowledge he had acquired through Keynes and with 
Keynes on the actual working of commodity markets is at the basis of his plan. Like 
Keynes, Kahn never assumes an economic agent with perfect foresight. On the contrary, 
his traders and speculators in commodities take decisions under uncertainty and act 
under expectations which can be influenced by public intervention.  
Kahn adds to the broad lines of Keynes’s plan his usual attention to details, and he is 
not satisfied until all possible cases are taken into account; his analysis and experience 
of how speculators act and think persuade him that the managers of the buffer stock 
must be endowed with greater freedom of action than Keynes had envisaged.  
If we want to look for evidence of how strong Keynes’s influence over Kahn is, we 
must seek it in his approach to the problem. When the market fails, it must be corrected, 
not destroyed. The consequences of the failure, social and economic, cannot be 
passively accepted. The correction must not entail self-inflicted scarcity and poverty , as 
export restriction and quotas would do. The market for primary products is inefficient, 
since there is not enough hoarding in the economy, given that the speculators cannot 
afford the costs of financing and storage which increase with time and size of their 
positions. The necessary hoarding must then be provided at a lower cost by a public 
authority, which can survive only if it becomes a speculator among other speculators, 
not for its own profit, but in the general interest.  
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Back to which Bretton Woods? Liquidity and clearing as 
alternative principles for reforming international finance 
Massimo Amato and Luca Fantacci* 
 
 
1. Currency unit vs reserve asset 
The most direct and compelling motive for a ‘return to Bretton Woods’ comes not 
from a need of historical erudition, but from the present state of the economy. The 
current crisis, and the persistence of global imbalances despite the shock represented by 
the crisis, has raised the issue of the reform of the international financial system. Not 
only a certain number of scholars, but also many journalists, economic advisors and 
policymakers have advocated ‘a new Bretton Woods’ to assert the necessity of new 
rules. Too few, however, remember that the Bretton Woods Conference, besides 
defining the norms and designing the institutions that were to rule international finance, 
was also characterized by the deliberate intention of establishing that peculiar norm and 
institution which is international money.1 
This fact deserves, for at least four reasons, far more attention than it normally 
receives: 
• money is the first economic norm and institution: without a money providing a 
common measure, there is no condition for trade or finance; and the way money is 
designed deeply affects the structure of economic relations and the operation of all 
other norms and institutions; 
• the monetary system that was established in 1944 collapsed in 1971, and has not 
been replaced; 
• the lack of an international money is one of the major factors of current global 
imbalances; 
• the institution of an international money is not something that happens by itself: 
Bretton Woods was the only instance in history in which it was deliberately 
accomplished by an international conference, and it required then a great deal of 
thinking and negotiating. 
                                                 
* Massimo Amato (Bocconi University, Milan), Luca Fantacci (Bocconi University, Milan). 
1 Helleiner (2010) provides further explanations of why the calls for ‘a new Bretton Woods’ have failed to 
bring about a major reform of the international monetary and financial system. 
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Among G-20 countries, several have raised in particular the issue of reforming the 
international monetary system. The most explicit analysis and proposal on this front has 
come, perhaps, from the governor of the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, in a 
speech published last March on the official site of the Bank, just before the G-20 
summit in April 2009 (Zhou 2009). 
The document goes straight to the point: 
The outbreak of the current crisis and its spillover in the world have confronted us with 
a long-existing but still unanswered question, i.e., what kind of international reserve 
currency do we need to secure global financial stability and facilitate world economic 
growth, which was one of the purposes for establishing the IMF? (Zhou 2009: 1) 
Before looking into the details of the proposal, it is possible to infer the two main 
characteristics of the new money advocated by Mr Zhou from the expression he uses to 
designate it. He speaks of an ‘international reserve currency’. The new money is thus 
characterized by two qualifications that may seem rather obvious, but should not be 
taken for granted. The new currency, whatever form it may take, is intended by Mr 
Zhou to be: 
a) an international currency, and 
b) a reserve currency.  
The first characteristic is strongly emphasized by Mr Zhou. The idea is that 
international economic relations require international money, and that a real 
international money cannot and should not also be a national money. The use of a 
national money as an international money gives rise to an impasse that Mr Zhou 
describes, appropriately evoking the Triffin dilemma: 
Issuing countries of reserve currencies are constantly confronted with the dilemma 
between achieving their domestic monetary policy goals and meeting other countries’ 
demand for reserve currencies. On the one hand, the monetary authorities cannot simply 
focus on domestic goals without carrying out their international responsibilities; on the 
other hand, they cannot pursue different domestic and international objectives at the 
same time. They may either fail to adequately meet the demand of a growing global 
economy for liquidity as they try to ease inflation pressures at home, or create excess 
liquidity in the global markets by overly stimulating domestic demand. The Triffin 
Dilemma, i.e., the issuing countries of reserve currencies cannot maintain the value of 
the reserve currencies while providing liquidity to the world, still exists. (Zhou 2009: 1) 
It is significant that text presents the problem from the point of view of the country 
that issues the currency used as an international reserve asset. This may well be 
intended not only as a concession to the balance of payment problems of the US, but 
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also to suggest that China, as a rising economic power, does not intend to replace the 
US in the uncomfortable position of having to provide a new international reserve asset 
with its own currency. It is as if Mr Zhou were saying that China is totally unwilling to 
enter, in the twenty-first century, in the same mess that has already troubled the 
economies of UK in the nineteenth and of US in the twentieth century. 
On the other hand, the second characteristic seems to be taken for granted by Mr 
Zhou. In fact, as a solution to global imbalances and as a way out of the Triffin 
dilemma, he suggests the establishment of an international reserve currency: 
The desirable goal of reforming the international monetary system, therefore, is to 
create an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and 
is able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies caused 
by using credit-based national currencies. (Zhou 2009: 2) 
It is at this point that Mr. Zhou recalls the historical precedent of Bretton Woods: 
Back in the 1940s, Keynes had already proposed to introduce an international currency 
unit named “Bancor”, based on the value of 30 representative commodities. 
Unfortunately, the proposal was not accepted. The collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system, which was based on the White approach, indicates that the Keynesian approach 
may have been more farsighted. (Zhou 2009: 2) 
This recollection has the merit of reminding us that at Bretton Woods there was not 
only one plan, but two radically different plans, based on two radically different 
principles, moreover suggesting that the plan adopted was perhaps the wrong one. This 
is why ‘Back to Bretton Woods’ cannot be simply a slogan, calling for a revival: it 
requires to reopen a discussion in view of a decision. The question is, then: ‘Back to 
which Bretton Woods?’ 
Mr Zhou seems to have no doubts in proposing a return to Keynes’s plan. In 
principle we subscribe to this point of view, and yet we must be sure to understand what 
Keynes really proposed.  
In Mr Zhou’s reconstruction, Bancor seems to be confused with the tabular standard 
that Keynes had outlined in the Treatise on Money in 1930 (Keynes 1930: 351-354). In 
fact, Bancor is not a basket of commodities, but a pure unit of account. Quite 
appropriately, Mr Zhou refers to it as a ‘currency unit’. However, as we shall argue, a 
currency unit is not the same thing as a reserve currency, but is in fact incompatible 
with it. Throughout this paper we will try to show that reserve currency and currency 
unit are mutually exclusive, both logically and historically. It is important therefore to 
distinguish between the two, in order to understand which one we need to avoid the 
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accumulation of global imbalances, allowing both goods to be traded and debts to be 
paid. 
Indeed, to provide a means to allow global trade and to absorb global imbalances 
was also the explicit goal of the American plan for Bretton Woods and of the agreement 
that was eventually signed, as expressed in Article 1. Now Mr Zhou suggests that 
Keynes’s plan might have been more appropriate and effective to reach those same 
goals. Yet he fails to explain why. Our main argument is that Keynes’s plan would have 
been better exactly because the money that it would have established, Bancor, was not a 
reserve currency, but a currency unit. Mr Zhou uses two different expressions, yet 
without asking whether they are in fact compatible. 
This is precisely what we will enquire, by going back to Bretton Woods or rather 
back to the theoretical elaborations and the political discussions that prepared the 
conference. However we can anticipate here a definition of both kinds of currencies, in 
order to suggest the relevance of the distinction. 
Whether it is national or international, a reserve currency is a store of value: this 
means that, even if it is intended as a means of payment for the settlement of 
international debts, it is always possible for a country not to spend it and to accumulate 
it indefinitely, thus building up the global imbalances that it would be intended to 
reabsorb. 
Instead, a currency unit is an instrument for the denomination of debts. It is therefore 
impossible by definition to own it or even more to accumulate it. It is intended 
exclusively to measure the value of actual goods and services and to facilitate their 
exchange, but it is not itself a commodity. In this sense, it allows imbalances to be 
created in order to facilitate trade, but it requires and allows those imbalances to be duly 
reabsorbed. It is not part of the wealth neither of a specific nation nor of the 
international community as a whole. 
This is why we agree with Mr Zhou when he suggests that Keynes’s plan might 
have been ‘more farsighted’. In fact, Bancor was not conceived only as an international 
currency as distinct from a national currency. It was also conceived as a currency unit as 
opposed to a reserve currency.  
In this sense, the story of Bretton Woods, with respect to the goals that it was 
supposed to achieve, is the story of a failure: it is the story of how, instead of an 
international currency unit, a national reserve currency was eventually established as 
international money. 
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In the next sections we shall enquire how this happened (2), what the implications 
were for the possibility of global imbalances (3), and what possible remedies this story 
suggests (4). 
 
 
2. Keynes vs White 
In the diplomatic run-up towards Bretton Woods, the establishment of an 
international currency unit appeared to be, at least at a certain stage, a common concern 
of both the parties involved. Both the British and the American proposals had, at least in 
certain drafts, provisions concerning the adoption of an international unit of account: 
Bancor in the Clearing Union and Unitas in the Stabilization Fund. It appears somewhat 
paradoxical that the adoption of an international unit of account should be discarded 
already in the course of the Anglo-American negotiations that lead to the publication, in 
April 1944, of the Joint Statement that eventually provided the working draft for the 
Bretton Woods conference. If both the British and the US representatives agreed on the 
opportunity of introducing an international unit of account, why did they discard this 
hypothesis in the course of their bilateral talks, even before submitting it to the other 42 
delegations summoned at Bretton Woods?2 
A possible answer may perhaps be sought for in the different roles assigned to the 
international unit of account in the two schemes. As Horsefield has pointed out: ‘for 
Keynes this would have been a true medium of exchange […] for White it was no more 
than a standard of value’ (Horsefield 1969a: 64). This is usually understood as a further 
confirmation of Keynes’s alleged inflationary spur, as opposed to the sound principles 
of orthodox finance supported by White. According to this interpretation, the Keynes 
plan provided for the creation ex nihilo of a new international medium of exchange, 
whereas the White plan remained soundly anchored to the available quantity of the old 
international medium of exchange, i.e., gold. 
It is true that the introduction of an international unit of account was essential to the 
Proposal for an International Clearing Union, from the very first version, sketched out 
by Keynes in 1941, while, on the contrary, it was purely accessory to the White Plan. 
The first Draft Proposal of the latter (dated April 1942) had no provision at all for an 
international currency. In fact, it was followed by a commentary which included a very 
                                                 
2 Some of these delegations at Bretton Woods did advance proposals for the adoption of an international 
unit of account. They however lacked the force to contrast an omission, which was clearly not due to 
mere distraction. The sponsors of the Fund did not just lack good reasons to introduce an international 
unit of account: they apparently had good reasons to refuse it. 
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sceptical section on ‘A new international currency’ (White 1942: 78-82). The adoption 
of an international currency is described by White as: 
a) useless, if it were to be introduced merely as a unit of account to supplement 
national currencies, since this would not reduce calculations in foreign trade nor 
exchange rates instability; 
b) impracticable, if it were to be introduced as a medium of exchange to substitute 
national currencies, since this would imply a renunciation of monetary sovereignty; 
c) worthwhile, if it were to be introduced as a medium of exchange to complement 
existing national and international currency. 
This last point deserves closer consideration, since it appears as a substantial 
concession towards the essence of the Clearing Union Proposal. As White explicitly 
states, it would have allowed to reabsorb global imbalances inherited from the war, in 
the form of a concentration of gold in the US:  
it may be worthwhile giving the Bank note-issuing powers—based on some gold 
reserve—solely in order to make the world’s monetary gold stock do more work, and at 
the same time help correct the maldistribution of gold. (White 1942: 79) 
This was, indeed, the main purpose of the Clearing Union. It was in view of 
attaining this goal that, according to Keynes, an international currency was needed. And 
even this was promptly recognized by White:  
if the Bank were to be established and given the authority to issue notes [or, as we shall 
see, to provide overdraft facilities, in the logic of the Clearing Union], what unit should 
it be? It would be preferable to adopt a new unit. The adoption of a new international 
unit of currency of account [sic] would probably meet with little opposition, whereas an 
attempt to use any one of the existing currencies, such as dollars, sterling or francs for 
that purpose would be opposed on the grounds that it would seem to give the country 
possessing that currency some slight advantage in publicity or trade. (White 1942: 81-
82) 
Showing perhaps little intellectual honesty, White accused the Clearing Union of 
proposing (b), which was clearly to be refused, whereas it was in fact proposing (c), 
which he himself recognized as desirable. And, showing little practical consistency, 
after having praised (c) in 1942, he pursued (a) in the later drafts.3 
Unitas was introduced as the ‘Monetary Unit of the Fund’, in a separate section 
under this title, only in the third draft (dated 11 December). Unitas was to have a fixed 
                                                 
3 This was done, as we shall suggest, only to be able to easier show the uselessness and to abandon the 
idea of a new international money altogether, in favour of surreptitiously promoting the dollar as an 
international currency. 
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gold equivalent of 137 1/7 grams of fine gold, corresponding to a dollar equivalent of 
$10. The choice of a gold equivalent corresponding to a round dollar equivalent 
suggests that the second equivalent was considered more important than the first: Unitas 
was just another way of saying $10. This is perhaps the reason why ‘the significance of 
the Unitas in the Stabilization Fund was a source of some perplexity to the United 
Kindgdom’ (Horsefield 1969a: 41). As Phillips observed, it was merely a unit of 
measure, except in the clause providing for deposits of gold, where it became ‘a 
warehouse receipt for gold’ – a clause which disappeared in the subsequent versions of 
26 June and 10 July, being substituted by the provision for gold convertibility of 
national currencies at par (Ibid.). 
What is the reason for introducing a monetary unit which is in fact nothing else than 
another name for gold? Perhaps it was only smoke in the eyes for the British, while US 
officials remained fundamentally critical against the introduction of an international 
currency. They feared the possible inflationary effects of an accumulation of balances, 
and they believed that there would be strong opposition against the use of government 
funds to purchase an international currency (different from gold), in view of sterilizing 
its effects. 
At a meeting with US representatives in Washington in February 1944, Keynes 
proposed modifications to the Fund, in view of making Unitas more similar to Bancor. 
The objections of US officials revealed their opposition to the adoption of an 
international money as such: in their view, the British, ‘unable to secure the 
redistribution of real gold, proposed to create a substitute out of thin air’ (quoted in 
Horsefield 1969a: 65). 
By this time, US representatives appear to have already abandoned even the idea of 
an international money. It was the British who insisted on the adoption of Unitas, in 
view of introducing and preserving the distinction between national and international 
money. The British feared that entrusting the Fund with members’ currencies could 
threaten the autonomy of national monetary policy. On the contrary, White considered 
the adoption of an international unit of account, over which the US would have no 
control, as a surrender of monetary sovereignty (thus implicitly suggesting that 
American monetary sovereignty would suffer no limitation).4 
The issue remained unsettled throughout February and March. British officials 
regarded it as a matter of so fundamental importance that it ought to be deferred to the 
                                                 
4 See H.D. White, Some Notes on the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, May 
1946, Princeton papers, Box 10, File 27 (Horsefield 1969a: 65). 
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decision of the Ministers.5 This, in turn, would have required a comprehensive revision 
of the problems arising from Clause VII of the Lend-Lease arrangement, and hence an 
attention that Ministers could not afford, under the war events of Spring 1944 
(Horsefield 1969a: 65). The American government pressed for reaching an agreement, 
until Britain accepted the version without Unitas, which was published on 21 April. 
The publication of the Joint Statement in London on the following day was 
introduced by an Explanatory Note by United Kingdom Experts,6 in which the 
functioning of the Fund was related to that of the Clearing Union, and it was shown that 
‘these two arrangements represent alternative technical setups, capable of performing 
precisely the same functions’ (Horsefield 1969b: 129). 
Even if this declaration may well have been inspired by political prudence, in the 
attempt to reach a mediation, it is nonetheless true that the Joint Statement was still 
consistent with the main objectives of the Clearing Union. The fact that Britain 
eventually accepted to do without an international unit of account does not mean that 
they were willing to renounce their main goals: the autonomy of national economic 
policy, and the possibility of reconciling the goals of domestic economy and the needs 
of foreign trade. The points on which British delegates insisted at Atlantic City seem to 
confirm this, being primarily aimed at preserving the right of members to modify their 
exchange rates as they may consider necessary or advisable in view of domestic balance 
(Horsefield 1969a: 82-83). 
Between the Joint Statement and the Articles of Agreement, another sea change 
occurred in this very crucial aspect of the international monetary system: from gold as 
the only standard of value to a gold-dollar standard, in other terms from an international 
to a national reserve currency.7 
The change was accomplished in two steps. Both surprisingly quiet, apparently 
straightforward, without discussion, and without trace in the proceedings of the 
Conference (United Nations 1948). 
The first step was probably made on the train trip towards Bretton Woods, by the 
members of the US delegation that were responsible for preparing the draft to be 
submitted at the Conference. The addition of a reference to ‘gold-convertible 
currencies’ (i.e., in 1944, only the dollar) to the article defining the ‘common 
                                                 
5 This makes it all the more surprising that it should be settled, between Atlantic City and Bretton Woods, 
without even being discussed by the delegates, and reinforces the hypothesis, according to which the 
issue was passed under silence because it was too important to be left open to discussion (Van Dormael 
1978: 200-203). 
6 Reprinted in Horsefield (1969b: 128-31). 
7 The problems experienced several decades before with a ‘limping bimetallism’ could have contributed 
to dissuade from adopting a double standard. 
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denominator’ for international exchanges was presented as a joint US and UK 
amendment to the draft, among other amendments proposed by other delegations that 
had had the opportunity to see the draft beforehand. It is however quite puzzling that, 
after having agreed on a common plan at their previous meeting, they should have also 
agreed to change it. It is comprehensible that the plan could be accompanied by 
amendments proposed by either the US or the UK on specific points of divergence. But 
a joint amendment to a joint statement sounds like nonsense. It is easy to imagine that 
the British officials would have never backed it. In fact, they had already explicitly 
opposed any reference to ‘gold-convertible’ currencies. 
The second step consisted in the outright substitution of ‘the U.S. dollar’ to ‘gold-
convertible currencies’ (thus excluding any other currency that should gain 
convertibility thereafter). This second step was taken presumably during the last days of 
the Conference, at night, by a special committee. Again, without discussion. 
As Moggridge reports: ‘despite the delay in finishing the Conference, there were 
still not complete copies of the Articles of Agreement ready when the delegates signed 
them at the end’ (Moggridge 1989: 96). This is confirmed by Keynes himself, in a 
memorandum on the International Monetary Fund dated 29 December 1944:  
We, all of us, had to sign, of course, before we had had a chance of reading through a 
clean and consecutive copy of the document. All we had seen of it was the dotted line. 
Our only excuse was the knowledge that our hosts had made final arrangements to 
throw us out of the hotel, unhouselled, disappointed, unanealed, within a few hours. 
(Keynes 1944: 149) 
Why this hasty outcome? Why was an existing national currency eventually 
preferred to a new international unit of account? In order to answer, it is necessary to 
consider in detail the consequences of the two options for international economic 
relations. This is the object of the next session. 
 
 
3. International Clearing Union vs International Monetary Fund 
What were the consequences of adopting a national reserve currency rather than an 
international currency unit? Let us analyse the functioning of the two plans, paying 
particular attention to the way in which each of them deals with the common declared 
goal of allowing the imbalances implied by the physiological operation of international 
trade, but in view of their reabsorption. 
Keynes’s proposal for the post-war international monetary regime envisaged the 
establishment of an International Clearing Union. Each country would hold an account 
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with the Clearing Union. The accounts would be denominated in an international unit of 
account called Bancor. The equivalence between Bancor and the currency of each 
country would be set at a certain par. The initial balance of each account would be set to 
zero Bancor. International trade transactions would be settled by transfers of a 
corresponding amount of Bancor, from the account of the importing country to the 
account of the exporting country. Each country would be granted an overdraft facility, 
i.e. the possibility of spending Bancor that it had not yet earned, thus recording a 
negative balance with the Clearing Union. A country with a negative balance would be 
called a deficit country; a country with a positive balance would be called a surplus 
country. Each country would be granted the possibility of accumulating a (negative or 
positive) balance up to the level of its quota equal to its relative weight in international 
trade. 
Within the system thus designed, international money would be created every time a 
deficit country used the overdraft facilities provided by the Clearing Union to pay for its 
imports towards a surplus country. Money creation would thus take the form of an 
increase in the positive Bancor balance of the surplus country with the Union. 
Symmetrically, a destruction of international money, and hence a reabsorption of the 
temporary imbalances, would occur whenever a payment would take place in the 
opposite direction, from a surplus country to a deficit country, reducing the positive 
balance of the former and the negative balance of the latter. Every other type of 
payment, from a deficit country to another deficit country or from a surplus country to 
another surplus country, would only involve a transfer of negative or positive balances, 
without affecting the overall volume of money outstanding. 
Hence, in any given moment, the total amount of international money would be 
equal to the aggregate trade imbalances within the Union (i.e., to total deficits = total 
surpluses). Money creation would thus be closely tied to trade, with the purpose of 
providing financial breathing room for trade deficits. Within such a system, it is not the 
availability of money that allows trade, but rather trade that gives rise to the money 
required. 
Until now, we have only considered the mechanisms for the creation of money. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that they should appear inflationary, as indeed they were 
accused to be by the critics of the Keynes plan. Of course, if this had been the entire 
plan, those critics would have been right. But we still have to look at the rest of the 
picture. 
In fact, the Clearing Union was not intended to encourage systematic deficits, but 
only deficits of a temporary nature. Accordingly, to avoid the accumulation of 
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permanent deficits, the Keynes plan included not only limits but also interests to be paid 
on negative Bancor balances. Such interests were intended to serve as an inducement, 
for deficit countries, to converge towards a balanced trade. 
However, the facilities provided by the Clearing Union were intended to serve the 
interests of both surplus and deficit countries, since they would have allowed the former 
to sell just as they would have allowed the latter to buy, goods that could not have been 
exchanged without the existence of the Union. Hence, not only deficit countries, but 
also surplus countries were required to collaborate in re-establishing the balance of the 
system. 
Accordingly, to avoid the accumulation of permanent surpluses and the ensuing 
stagnation of excess money, the Keynes plan included also limits and fees to be paid on 
positive Bancor balances. Such fees were intended to serve as an inducement for surplus 
countries, to contribute to the convergence towards a balanced trade, and were designed 
to perform as a sort of drain for excess money (i.e., imbalances) within the Union. 
On the basis of common sense, the fact of imposing on creditor countries the same 
obligations of debtor countries may appear arbitrary and unjust. However, this common 
sense is not an innate wisdom responding to a natural justice, but it stems from a 
peculiar conception of money, which in turn is tied to the historical embodiment of 
monetary institutions in the form of a reserve asset, i.e., of liquidity.  
In fact, the obligation of the creditor is perfectly justified in a system where the 
balance is defined in terms of clearing (i.e., accounts equal to zero): since surplus and 
deficit countries are all out of balance, the burden of correcting the imbalances should 
be distributed symmetrically between them. 
This is precisely the intention that inspires Keynes in designing this peculiar feature 
of the Clearing Union: 
a country finding itself in a creditor position against the rest of the world as a whole 
should enter into an obligation to dispose of this credit balance and not to allow it 
meanwhile to exercise a contractionist pressure against the world economy and, by 
repercussion, against the economy of the creditor country itself. This would give us, and 
all others, the great assistance of multilateral clearing. (Keynes 1941: 47, emphasis in 
the original) 
The credits do not arise from having spontaneously lent a money, which could have 
been used for any other purpose, or even not used at all, i.e. a reserve currency; they 
arise from having carried out a trade transaction that only the existence of the Clearing 
Union has made possible thanks to the existence of a currency unit. Hence, there is no 
reason to remunerate those credits. 
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In fact, the credit required by international trade is not made available by surplus 
countries, but by the existence of the Clearing Union itself. Keynes himself described 
the properties of his plan in the following terms: ‘The peculiar merit of the Clearing 
Union as a means of remedying a chronic shortage of international money is that it 
operates through the velocity, rather than through the volume, of circulation’ (Keynes 
1943: 31). 
The amount of money becomes irrelevant in the sense that the functioning of the 
Clearing Union and its capacity of supplying an adequate money for international 
transactions does not depend on the initial endowment of means of payments (e.g. in the 
form of gold reserves or of reserve assets in general). 
Keynes is not unaware of the current relations of power, reflected in the 
endowments of gold reserves and credits at the end of the war. The US are the owners 
of over 80 per cent of all global monetary gold: hence they have a legitimate interest 
that this gold accumulated under the old monetary law is not simply wiped out by the 
new. For this reason, Keynes envisages the possibility of converting the old money into 
the new, by depositing in the Clearing Union gold and receiving an equivalent credit 
balance in Bancor. However, in order to ensure the enforcement of the new rule, he also 
establishes that such a conversion should be irreversible. In other terms, gold should be 
convertible into Bancor, but Bancor should not be convertible into gold. The only shift 
that makes any sense is from the old to the new, and not vice versa. 
Hence, without disregarding the status quo, and the given distribution of power, 
Keynes aims at inaugurating a new monetary order where distribution of power 
responds to different rules as in the past. 
 
By contrast, the plan approved at Bretton Woods depended from the outset on the 
collection of a predefined quantity of money in an International Monetary Fund. It did 
not create an international currency, but merely gave the possibility of swapping the 
national currencies deposited in the Fund in order to perform international settlements. 
The basket of gold and currencies collected in the Fund provided thus a sort of reservoir 
for international reserve assets, in the form of national currencies that could be 
exchanged one for the other within given limits.  
Each country subscribed to a certain quota of the Fund, depositing the 
corresponding amount in the Fund, 25 per cent in gold and 75 per cent in its own 
currency. Each country was thus entitled to purchase from the Fund the currency of 
another country, for the purpose of effecting a payment towards that country. The 
amount of its own currency in the Fund increased accordingly. Deficit (and surplus) 
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countries were therefore characterized by the fact of holding more than (or less than) 75 
per cent of their own quota in their own currency with the Fund. 
However, the conditions for deficit and surplus countries in the Fund, unlike those 
in the Clearing Union, were strongly asymmetrical: a deficit country was obliged to 
repurchase its own currency from the Fund and was subject to a cost for the operation, 
which was structured, therefore, as a ‘hidden loan’; instead, a surplus country was not 
subject to any obligation or to any cost, and hence had no incentive to restore a balanced 
trade nor to reabsorb previously accumulated imbalances. On the contrary, there is an 
incentive to maintain surplus balances, in order to earn a rent. 
The provisions of the Articles of Agreement to deal with persistent and widening 
surpluses were contained in the so-called ‘scarce currency clause’ (article VII). It is 
often stated that creditor countries were not adequately involved in the adjustment of 
post-war imbalances because this clause was never fully enforced. In fact, it was 
perhaps the most important and effective clause of the whole Agreement. The real 
problem was that the application of this clause implied a suspension of the rest of the 
Agreement. According to its provisions, if the currency of a country became scarce 
(because of a persistent trade surplus of that country that induces all other countries to 
demand its currency) the Fund may borrow or purchase the scarce currency and allow 
the other members to impose protectionist measures. All these provisions amounted to a 
perpetuation of international imbalances and to an organization of global trade which 
contrasted sharply with the purposes of the Agreement and with the instruments 
originally designed to accomplish them. 
Moreover, the scarcity of a currency (namely the US dollar) was not only possible, 
but probable. Indeed, the total resources of the Fund were set at such a low level, that it 
had no chance of meeting the requirements of international trade. Hence, from the very 
beginning, post-war international settlements had to rely on an alternative reserve asset, 
in the form of the national currency of the greatest surplus country, i.e. the United 
States.  
Perhaps at this point we have all the elements to explain why the reference to gold in 
the Articles of Agreement was inevitably by-passed by the reference to the dollar: gold 
reserves were insufficient to manage the imbalances required by the expansion of global 
trade and post-war reconstruction. 
The shortfalls of the articles of agreement of Bretton Woods paved the way to a 
creation of international reserve assets, which occurred not inside but outside the 
framework of the Fund, and without any restriction or link to the trade of actual goods, 
mainly through the development of the euro-dollar market. Unlike the Clearing Union 
238 
based on Bancor as a currency unit, the prevailing system based on the dollar as a 
reserve currency had no built-in mechanism designed to ensure both the circulation and 
drainage of international money. In other terms, despite their common goals, the latter 
was not capable of reabsorbing global imbalances, but rather allowed its currency to be 
indefinitely hoarded as a reserve asset by foreign central banks. 
This perspective may help understand post-war disequilibria not as the result of 
deviations from the rules of the game, but as an inevitable concomitant of its operation. 
In particular, the intrinsic problems of a reserve currency system, as they have appeared 
since its inception, may give account of apparent paradoxes, namely why it was possible 
to pass from a dollar shortage to a dollar glut, i.e. from a lack of international reserve 
assets to an excess of international reserve assets and hence from a net creditor position 
to a net debtor position of the US; and why, vice versa, the current crisis has detonated 
in the form of a sudden shift from a superabundance of international money to a sudden 
draught of international capital movements. 
Moreover, the fact of having seen the limits inherent in a reserve currency may help 
understand the current political and scientific impasse in the face of growing global 
imbalances. When international money is conceived and implemented as a quantity of 
reserve assets, there seems to be always too little or too much of it and never an 
adequate measure. The reasons for this difficulty are manifold: 
1. it is difficult to estimate in advance how much international reserve currency is 
needed, especially when the need is not clearly defined; 
2. it is difficult, once the requirements have been estimated, to adjust the actual amount 
accordingly, or to define the rules of its creation, so as to accommodate the 
fluctuations in its requirements; 
3. the same quantity may result either insufficient or excessive according to its actual 
use in circulation. 
On the other hand, the fact of having appreciated the virtues of the clearing 
mechanism based on an international currency union may help us to imagine a way out 
of the structural flaws of the present system, and not merely a way of containing its 
most dramatic effects. This allows us to reconsider more in detail the constructive part 
of Mr Zhou’s proposal, with a better understanding of its actual scope and limits. 
 
 
4. Bancor vs Special Drawing Rights 
The proposal advanced by Mr Zhou is to enhance the use of Special Drawing Rights 
as an international reserve asset: ‘The SDR has the features and potential to act as a 
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super-sovereign reserve currency. Moreover, an increase in SDR allocation would help 
the Fund address its resources problem and the difficulties in the voice and 
representation reform’ (Zhou 2009: 2). 
To this end, Mr Zhou recommends to: ‘Actively promote the use of the SDR in 
international trade, commodities pricing, investment and corporate book-keeping [and 
to] create financial assets denominated in the SDR to increase its appeal’ (Zhou 2009: 2-
3). 
The strengthening of the role of the SDR in international economic relations 
requires, moreover, a redefinition of the governance of its issuing process and of the 
balance between the countries and currencies supporting it. This is why Mr. Zhou 
further suggests that: ‘The basket of currencies forming the basis for SDR valuation 
should be expanded to include currencies of all major economies’ (Zhou 2009: 3). 
The first part of the proposal was already endorsed by the G-20 in April 2009 and 
was implemented shortly thereafter. With a general SDR allocation taking effect on 28 
August and a special allocation on 9 September 2009, the amount of SDRs has 
increased almost tenfold, from SDR 21.4 billion to SDR 204.1 billion. 
The use of SDRs as a reserve asset can certainly serve to substitute part of the 
conspicuous reserves in dollars held throughout the world and particularly in Asia. It 
may therefore allow to ease the bilateral tensions between China and the U.S. 
However, despite the extraordinary increase, total SDR allocations are still 
dramatically insufficient to reabsorb the global imbalances accumulated in over sixty 
years of dollar standard. Despite having increased by a factor of ten, they are still ten 
times lower than the overall foreign exchange reserves of China alone, and fifteen times 
lower than the foreign indebtedness of the US. 
Moreover, and more seriously, it is far from clear that even an expanded use of 
SDRs as a reserve asset would avoid the accumulation of further imbalances. In fact, 
unlike the provisions of the Clearing Union, the IMF rules do not impose on countries 
that accumulate SDRs in excess of their original allocation any kind of charge or 
constraint; on the contrary, if a member’s SDR holdings rise above its allocation, it 
earns interest on the excess. 
In addition, if the volume of SDRs should increase, there would also be an 
increasing concern to assure their acceptability. To avoid an inflation of SDRs it would 
be necessary, as the Chinese proposal suggests, to increase their use, not only as a 
means of payment for the actual trade of goods and services, but also to denominate 
financial assets. In any case, it would be essential to assure their constant convertibility 
into equally appealing national currencies. In other terms, it would be necessary to 
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assure the liquidity of both the SDRs and of the currencies that are included in the 
basket and that represent de facto the ultimate form of international liquidity, as long as 
SDRs are conceived as a basket of national currencies. 
It is for this reason that the Chinese request to include the yuan in the SDR-basket 
have been challenged by the counter-request to assure full convertibility of the yuan on 
foreign exchange markets.8 But this would amount to requiring the yuan to increasingly 
assume the function of an international currency, which is exactly what the Chinese 
proposal intends to prevent, with a view to avoiding the substitution of current 
international imbalances with new international imbalances. 
A way out of this dilemma could be to transform the SDR from a reserve asset to a 
currency unit in the image of Bancor. This would involve the following steps: 
• to make SDR the ultimate means of denomination and payment of international 
debts, i.e., the international money; 
• to establish, accordingly, a one-way convertibility, from national currencies into 
SDRs, but not from SDR to national currencies; 
• to introduce symmetric charges on SDR balances above and below original 
allocations; 
• to link new issues of SDRs to international transactions or to purchase of primary 
goods as real reserve asset by the IMF or by another international organization. 
 
In any case, the primary objective of a sound monetary regime should be to define 
the rules not only of money creation, but also of its circulation and destruction, in order 
to ensure that the imbalances are always reabsorbed. In order to achieve this objective, 
as we have tried to show in this paper, two crucial features are required: 
• not only the distinction between international money and national currencies, 
• but also the existence of a pure international unit of account, that cannot by 
definition serve as a reserve asset. 
 
At Bretton Woods, the conjunction of these two features allowed Keynes to design 
an international financial system in which the interests of each single country are not set 
at variance with those of other countries and with the well-being of international trade 
as a whole. This plan was rejected in favour of a system that was supposed to serve the 
same goals while in fact its operation has led in the diametrically opposite direction. 
The oft-invoked new Bretton Woods should perhaps not merely re-propose the Keynes 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Marsh and Seaman (2009). 
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plan, but it ought to reinterpret its main principles according to the present economic 
and political situation of the world. 
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Reforming the International Monetary System. A stock-flow-
consistent approach 
Sebastian Valdecantos Halporn and Gennaro Zezza* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The debate on the urgency of reforms in the current International Monetary System 
(IMS) has revamped immediately before the Great Recession which started in 2007, due 
to the growing and persisting disequilibria in the current account balances of some 
major economies, notably the U.S. as a deficit country, and Germany, China and the oil 
exporters as surplus countries. The debate was further stimulated by an influential 
intervention by the governor of the People Bank of China (Zhao, 2006) but after an 
international agreement for an extraordinary allocation of reserves in Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) in 2009, the debate has faded away, while more urgent problems—such 
as the high and persistent level of unemployment first, and the sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe later—were brought to the forefront of the agenda. We aim to show that the 
current international monetary ‘non-system’, as it has been defined,1 still plays a 
relevant role in current macroeconomic problems, and a reform of the IMS is necessary 
to achieve more balanced growth at the world level. 
The current state of global imbalances is depicted in Figure 1, obtained from the 
latest (April 2012) I.M.F. World Economic Outlook database, which includes 
predictions up to 2017. Current account balances of key countries have been scaled by 
U.S. GDP, to make them directly comparable. Since the 1980s, the U.S. have 
experienced external deficits, which started to increase in magnitude from the mid 
1990s. The mirror image of the U.S. deficit is the surplus of oil and gas exporters—
Opec and Russia—and of China, while Japan slightly reduced its weight among export-
led-growth countries. Germany increased its surplus with the start of the Euro era, from 
1999. 
                                                 
* S. Valdecantos Halporn (Université Paris Nord, France), Gennaro Zezza (University of Cassino and 
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1 By Triffin (1960), quoted in Piffaretti (2009). 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, exchange rates have been 
floating, although some countries—notably in Europe—chose to enter into a managed 
floating system first, and adopted a common currency later. In a pure floating regime, 
we would expect the currencies of deficit countries to depreciate against the currency of 
surplus countries. However, since the demand for U.S. dollar arises not just from the 
U.S. current external account, but also from its financial account since foreign investors 
demand dollar denominated financial assets, the large and growing U.S. deficit has not 
been followed by a comparable depreciation of the dollar, as the data in Figure 2 show.  
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Figure 2 
 
On the contrary, the U.S. dollar appreciated in real terms up to 2002, and some 
countries running a growing surplus against the U.S.—notably China—managed to peg 
their currency up to 2007. 
In order to keep their currency from appreciating, many U.S. trading partners 
compensated the net demand for their currency stemming from their current account 
surplus with an equivalent net supply, used to purchase U.S. safe financial assets. The 
value of U.S. securities held by China in June 2011 had grown to 1.7 billion dollars, 
with Japan holding a slightly smaller amount at 1.6 bn dollars. Oil exporters hold a 
much smaller amount—given the size of their trade surplus. In Table 1 we report the 
holdings of U.S. long-term Treasury securities, which form the largest share of U.S. 
debt (other than equity) held abroad. The large share held in financial centres may be 
due—at least in part—to indirect holding of U.S. assets from surplus countries. 
It has been suggested that U.S. financial assets are demanded by emerging 
economies as an insurance against possible capital flights, rather than as a measure to 
keep their currency undervalued. Whatever the reason, a growth strategy based on the 
accumulation of foreign debt is fragile and doomed to generate crisis which will be the 
more severe the higher the level of foreign debt.  
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Table 1: Foreign holdings of U.S. Long-Term Treasury Securities  
by major holders in 2011. Per cent of U.S. GDP 
 2011 2006 2000 1994 
China 8.63 2.72 0.71 0.24 
Japan 5.42 4.00 2.22 1.80 
Brazil 1.40 0.25 0.07 0.00 
Oil exporters 0.96 0.55 0.32 0.28 
Taiwan 0.96 0.46 0.41 0.39 
Russia 0.90 0.03 0.03 0.00 
United Kingdom 0.78 0.35 0.74 0.64 
Switzerland 0.70 0.25 0.18 0.14 
Caribbean Fin. Centres 0.64 0.36 0.33 n.a. 
Luxembourg 0.58 0.39 0.14 0.02 
Belgium 0.56 0.09 0.07 0.13 
Int.l organizations 0.42 0.14 0.29 0.14 
Germany 0.38 0.28 0.55 0.65 
Source: Department of the Treasury; B.E.A. 
Notes: 1) values at end Dec 94; Mar 00; Jun 06; Jun 11, scaled by annual U.S. GDP. 2) 
Oil exporters include: Ecuador, Venezuela, Indonesia, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Gabon, Libya, and 
Nigeria. 3) Caribbean Financial Centres include: Bahamas. 
 
The country issuing the international currency, the United States at present, will not 
have an external constraint, as long as her creditors are willing to accept dollar-
denominated assets in exchange for exports to the U.S. However, the accumulation of 
U.S. financial assets in foreign countries will lead to capital losses, should the U.S. 
dollar devalue. And should foreign investors decide abruptly to stop rolling over their 
credit towards the U.S., financial turmoil may arise, unless the Federal Reserve is 
willing to fill any gap between supply and demand for U.S. financial assets. The current 
system has therefore been described as a ‘balance of financial terror’. This is a slightly 
different way to put the so-called ‘Triffin dilemma’ (Triffin 1960): Triffin noted that 
when the international currency is issued by a single country—as it is the case with the 
U.S. dollar—the international demand for that currency may not be compatible with the 
domestic targets for monetary policy in the issuing country. 
In a different perspective, again, if the world uses a single currency—the U.S. 
dollar—hoarding of that currency for precautionary reasons (or for whatever other 
reasons) put a deflationary bias on the system as a whole, as Keynes noted. According 
to the Fantacci’s (2011) interpretation of Keynes, it is the use of the currency as a store 
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of value—rather than as a mere numerary or medium of exchange—which generates a 
deflationary bias, which would disappear under different institutional arrangements. 
A similar set of problems has emerged, in our view, with the institutional 
arrangements that led to the adoption of the Euro, governed by an independent Central 
bank. As sovereign nations renounced to the possibility of devaluing their currency 
against their trading partners within the Euro zone (EZ from now on), the persistence of 
trade imbalances led to the accumulation of debts in the periphery, matched by credits 
in the core countries, notably Germany. When core countries stopped allowing capital to 
flow towards deficit countries, and required that deficit countries paid out their debt, a 
‘debt crisis’ started.2 
According to many commentators, all of the current problems were clear to Keynes 
as he laid down his proposal for the Bretton Woods conference. Keynes’s proposal was 
centred on an International Clearing Union which would issue an international 
currency—the Bancor—which could not serve as a store of value, and would be created 
(and destroyed) automatically with current account deficits or surpluses. Equally 
important was the principle that external imbalances were a problem to be solved by the 
surplus countries as well as the deficit countries, to avoid the recessionary impact which 
arises when the adjustment is pursued by deficit countries alone. 
As it is well known, the Keynesian plan was abandoned in favour of White’s plan, 
which was amended at the last minute to have a gold-backed U.S. dollar as the only 
international currency, with a new international reserve asset—labelled Special Drawing 
Rights—based on a basket of currencies that could be allocated to participating 
countries. The institutions which were set up to supervise international payments and 
provide liquidity to deficit countries which were running out of reserves—the World 
Bank and the IMF—were organized so that a country requiring external liquidity was 
forced to adopt restrictive policies, and the recessionary trait which Keynes wanted to 
avoid was instead embedded into the system. 
In the following we will briefly review, in Section 2, Keynes’s proposal, and briefly 
examine how the international monetary system evolved, in Section 3, reviewing the 
relevant literature on the prospects for reform. 
In Section 4 we present a formal model for the analysis of alternative organizations 
of the international monetary system, and in Section 5 we report some simulation results 
of our model. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 Space limitations prevent us from addressing the Euro zone problems in more detail. We will devote a 
different paper to this subject. 
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2. Main features of Keynes’s Bancor proposal 
A recent analysis of the debate which led to the Bretton Woods conference has 
recently been published by Fantacci (2011),3 from which all the crucial features of a 
Bancor system, as imagined by Keynes, are clearly laid down. However, to our 
knowledge this paper is the first attempt to summarize Keynes’s proposals in a formal 
setting which, given our stock-flow-consistent approach, has the merit of forcing us to 
propose a solution for all practical details. 
The main reason for a new currency—the Bancor—and a new international 
institution—the Clearing Union (CU)—is to avoid the recessionary impact which are 
implicit in any system where the medium of exchange is provided in insufficient 
quantities, or—which amounts to the same thing—is hoarded either because it is 
perceived as a safe store of value or for insurance reasons. 
Therefore, the Bancor should be only a unit of account that the CU uses to settle 
international transactions. It follows that, at least in principle, other existing 
currencies—including the U.S. dollar—would be used only domestically, and that there 
will be no need for international reserves. 
Any transaction between two countries through the CU—say exports of goods from 
country A to country B—would generate an increase in the Bancor balance for country 
A, and a corresponding decrease in the balance for country B. Bancors are thus 
created—with limitation as we shall see later—without any need for collateral. 
Each country would have a fixed—but adjustable—exchange rate between its own 
currency and the Bancor: there will be a threshold on each country’s Bancor balance—
say 3 per cent of that country GDP—which implies an automatic readjustment of the 
parity. If country A is running to large a surplus on its current account, and no other 
adjustment measures are taken (see below), the CU will have its parity appreciate 
against the Bancor, and a symmetric measure would be taken for countries running a 
deficit. 
A Bancor-based system would therefore have the usual advantages of a managed 
exchange rate system, with a reduced volatility with respect to a floating rates regime. 
The other important aspect of Keynes’s proposal is that both creditor and debtor 
countries should bear the cost of readjustment, in the present of current account 
imbalances. This can be achieved by having both creditor and debtor countries pay 
interest on any Bancor position different from zero—at a rate determined by the CU. 
Interest would be paid in Bancor, which means that the creditor country will see its 
                                                 
3 See also Piffaretti (2009). 
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balance with the CU reduced when interest are paid, while debtor countries will see 
their balance increase. It follows that—for the amount of interest paid on creditor 
positions—a country with a surplus would be giving part of its exports ‘for free’ by an 
amount given by interest payments. 
Interest payments will generate a ‘profit’ for the CU, which can—and should—be 
used to sustain less developed countries. Since these countries usually lack technology 
and/or capital which must be imported, crediting the Bancor position of these countries 
would provide the necessary purchasing power. 
In order to reduce imbalances, and avoid interest payments, surplus countries could 
also provide directly foreign aid to deficit/less-developed countries. In principle, they 
could also provide direct investment, or acquire financial assets. However, direct 
investment in a foreign country will imply a future stream of profits in the opposite 
direction, while the acquisition of financial assets will imply interest payments, as well 
as the future repayment of the debt. Allowing a Bancor-based system to coexist with 
these capital movements may not change significantly the unstable properties of the 
current dollar-based system: we plan to explore this issue in more detail in future 
research. 
Another issue which is debated is whether the Bancor should be backed by some 
collateral, such as gold or securities.4 In this paper we will assume that the Bancor is a 
pure fiat money, and we plan to explore other alternatives in future research. 
 
 
3. The debate on IMS reforms 
An early advocate of a reform of the International Monetary System (IMS) along 
Keynes’s lines was Davidson (1992-93).5 In his (2004) contribution, he reminds that, 
since the world economy is a closed system, Keynesian results of the recessionary 
effects of a propensity to over-save are relevant, irrespective of the exchange rate being 
fixed or flexible. He advocates a new system where countries running an external 
surplus have to share the cost of realignments by either (a) increasing their imports; (b) 
increasing foreign investment in deficit countries; or (c) increasing foreign aid. A 
similar position, stressing the need for coordinated solutions, can be found more 
recently in Kregel (2010). 
The more recent debate has seen a growing number of contributions with slightly 
different approaches. 
                                                 
4 See, among others, Rossi (2007) for some discussion. 
5 See also Davidson (1999); (2004). 
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Rossi (2009) stresses the relevance of Keynes’s ‘banking principle’, according to 
which final payment must take place in the currency of the vendor, rather than leaving 
the vendor with a claim on deposits in a different country and currency, as it is today. 
He suggests the creation6 of a Clearing Union (CU henceforth) which should issue a 
supranational currency backed by assets (securities). He notes that, under the Clearing 
Union, each country running a trade deficit will be supplying securities for an 
equivalent amount to the CU. On the other hand, the CU will be selling securities to 
surplus countries. No imbalance will occur. This last point, however, is problematic in 
our view, as it assumes that surplus countries are willing to accept CU securities (or 
debtor countries’ securities). Imbalances will not disappear because of the adoption of a 
consistent system for clearing international transactions. Rather, by establishing 
mechanisms for automatic adjustment of trade (or capital movements) imbalances. 
Alessandrini and Fratianni (2009a; 2009b) propose to establish a CU starting from 
an agreement between the U.S. and the ECB. They make it clear that a CU does not 
imply a unique monetary policy: ‘A single monetary policy applied to vastly 
heterogeneous countries amplifies divergences between countries with different levels 
of development’ (2009a: 20) which is also quite appropriate for the Euro area. The 
supranational currency they advocate would not replace domestic currencies: rather, 
establishing a CU should let countries acquire a degree of freedom in running monetary 
policy on domestic targets. 
In our view, the contributions of Bibow (2009) and Costabile (2009) share some 
common features and provide more detail. In their proposals, the CU would imply a 
semi-automatic mechanism for exchange rate realignments, whenever a country’s 
balance with the CU exceeds a given limit. Creation of supranational money would be 
endogenous. The new ‘currency’ would be overdraft money generated automatically by 
countries external deficits with the CU, up to a given quota. Interest rates would be 
applied to both deficit and surplus countries balances with the CU. Proceeds from 
interest payments would be used by the CU to support developing countries, thus 
ensuring that the coordinated realignment process advocated by Keynes and Davidson is 
in place. Finally, in this proposal no country should keep additional reserves, other than 
as their CU position. 
Mateos y Lago et al. (2009) stress the need to reduce the demand for international 
reserves for insurance purposes (the over saving in Davidson’s words) and explore 
different alternatives. Their results are summarized in a chart reproduced as Figure 3. 
 
                                                 
6 From an initial agreement between China and the U.S. 
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The figure shows how alternative settings in the IMS would compare relative to the 
current situation. Their analysis suggests that a system along the lines of Keynes’s 
Bancor would perform best with respect to: 
• eliminating the ‘exorbitant privilege’ given to a single country issuing a reserve 
currency; 
• eliminating global imbalances which imply that rich country have a current 
account deficit which implies in turn a transfer of financial capital from developing 
countries; 
• reducing the instability of the adjustment mechanisms in exchange rates; 
• improve the inter-temporal stability of currency values, and reduce exchange 
rate volatility; 
• providing better insurance by eliminating the need to accumulate reserves. 
However, they admit that the complex coordination problems required by 
establishing a CU and a Bancor are very relevant. 
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4. A stock-flow-consistent model with an international monetary 
institution 
Our model is in the tradition of open economy, stock-flow-consistent models 
pioneered by Godley (1999) and Godley and Lavoie (2003). The main feature of these 
models is the complete integration of the real sectors of the economy with the financial 
sector, so that the linkages between money and credit on one side, and investment and 
growth on the other, are clearly set out. Besides, in these models saving for all sectors 
accumulate into wealth (or debt for negative saving). This allows an appropriate 
formalization of future income payments arising from dividends, interest payments etc., 
and in addition it is assumed that the existing stocks of wealth and debt are relevant for 
future expenditure and saving decisions. The result is a class of models which describe 
the evolution of an economy through time, with no necessary distinction between a 
‘short period’ and a ‘long period’, since the latter is implied by a sequence of (out of 
equilibrium) short term adjustments. 
While many of the features of stock-flow models relate to accounting identities, and 
should therefore be common to any proper macro model, in our approach based on 
Godley and Lavoie (2007a), it is assumed, in the Keynesian tradition, that production is 
demand-led, and that discrepancies between expected values of, say, disposable income, 
and the realized value will not be cleared instantaneously by some price adjustment, but 
will result in an unexpected level of one (or more) stock of assets, and this deviation 
from ‘equilibrium’ will be taken into account for future decisions, so that the economy 
is path dependent. 
The path-breaking work of Godley (1999) and Godley and Lavoie (2003) showed 
how to model a watertight system with a complete, although simple, representation of 
both the current external balances and of the financial balances of two countries, and 
used the model to show that external imbalances for the country issuing an international 
currency can persist possibly without limits. They also showed that some results of the 
Mundell-Fleming textbook model do not hold, and offered insights on how to model 
alternative institutional or policy settings, such as fixed versus flexible exchange rates, 
and exogenous versus endogenous interest rates. 
Later work include Izurieta (2003), who developed a model of dollarization; chapter 6 
of Godley and Lavoie (2007b); Lavoie and Zhao (2010) who move to a three country 
model of China, Europe and the U.S. where the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and 
the euro is floating, while the Chinese Renminbi is pegged to the U.S. dollar; Lavoie and 
Daigle (2011) who model exchange rate expectations; Mazier and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2012) 
who expand Lavoie and Zhao (2010) to include endogenous inflation. 
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The current model expands on this literature—which shares a common modelling 
setting—to include an additional region and an international monetary institution, so 
that our model aims at describing the U.S., which is the only country issuing a reserve 
currency in our baseline scenario, Europe—or better the Euro zone—who has a floating 
exchange rate vis a vis the other currencies, China, who pegs its exchange rate to the 
U.S. dollar, and the ‘Rest of the world’, who also pegs to the U.S. dollar. The purpose 
of adding a fourth region7 is to allow for more flexibility and realism, as well as being 
able to eventually tackle the ‘n-th country problem’.8 
 
4.1 The model9 
As usual in SFC models, the accounting framework can be synthetically described 
with the help of matrices: a matrix for flows, reported in Table 2 for a representative 
country, and a flow-of-fund matrix, in Table 3, which implies—together with net capital 
gains on assets—a balance sheet matrix (not reported for space considerations). 
Table 2: A Social Accounting Matrix for a typical region 
 Prod. Hous. Firms Banks C. B. Gov. RoW C.A. Total 
1. Production  +C    +G +XN +I +GDP 
2. Households +W   
+divB 
+rB 
    +YH 
3. Firms +P        +YF 
4. Banks   +rL   +rB +rBF  +YB 
5. Central Bank    +rA  +rB +rBF  +YCB 
6. Government  +TH +TP +TPB +PCB    +YG 
7. Foreign      +rB   +YW 
8. Capital account  +SH +SF +SB 0 +SG -CA  +S 
Total +GDP +YH +YF +YB +YCB +YG +YW +I  
                                                 
7 A model aiming at discussing current global imbalances should represent simultaneously the countries 
we list plus oil exporting countries, who also exhibit external surpluses. This is left for future exercises 
which take into account the impact of oil prices on economic activity. 
8 Exchange rates for the first n-1 countries imply the n-th exchange rates, and therefore it is not possible 
for all countries to target given exchange rates, unless they are mutually consistent. We will turn back 
to this issue when we discuss different model closures. 
9 The model consists of approximately 230 equations and it is not reported here for space consideration, 
but it is available from the authors on request. A detailed technical description of the model will appear 
in Mazier, Valdecantos Holporn, and Zezza (forthcoming). 
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Table 2 is organized following the usual input-output practice of recording 
payments in the columns, and receipts in the rows. This allow a tight identification10 of 
who is paying to whom. For convenience, payments related to production are recorded 
in a separate row and column (#1), while all other payments are recorded in a transfer 
sub-matrix (from #2 to #7 in Table 2). Expenditure on real assets is recorded in column 
#1, while the corresponding row is expanded in Table 3 which details the flow of funds 
for our model. 
Before moving to the analysis of flow of funds, we can briefly describe the main 
assumptions of the ‘real sector’ in the model—which are rather conventional in the SFC 
literature. 
We assume that production is demand determined, and therefore we don’t have an 
explicit representation of (the change in the stock of) inventories. This assumption 
implies that the sum of the payments in row #1 in Table 2 equal the sum of income 
payments in column #1. 
The functional distribution of income is given,11 and the wage bill, together with 
interest and dividends paid by bans, determines household income, which is taxed (row 
#2 and corresponding column in Table 2). Households spend out of disposable income 
and wealth and the residual saving determines the end-of-period stock of household 
wealth. 
Non-financial firms do not distribute dividends, and have to pay taxes and interest 
on the existing stock of loans. Retained earnings are available for investment, which is 
determined by the profit rate, the cost of servicing the debt, an accelerator term and one 
version of Tobin’s q. 
We assume that banks distribute all of their profits—obtained from net interest 
payments—to households, although we keep the possibility of changing these 
assumptions in different versions by computing net bank profits and net wealth. 
The Central bank is assumed to transfer its ‘profits’ to the government. 
The government deficit is obtained as the difference between expenditure on goods 
and services, which grow at a constant, exogenous rate plus interest payments and tax 
receipts. Any deficit is financed by issuing new bills. 
Imports are determined on a bilateral basis from GDP and the exchange rate, since 
we assume fixed prices in this preliminary version of the model. 
                                                 
10 Tighter than what national accounts usually do, since only few countries report flows in a SAM 
framework, while most other countries report receipts and outlays separately for each sector. 
11 Although the model allows for exploring the impact of exogenous changes in this distribution. 
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Taken together, all these assumptions are sufficient to determine each sector 
financial balance—the capital account row in Table 2. Table 3 shows how this can be 
decomposed into financial assets and liabilities. 
 
Table 3: Flow of Funds for a typical region 
 Hous. Firms Banks C. B. Gov. RoW IMF Total 
Real assets  +∆K      +∆K 
Cash ∆H  ∆Hb –∆H    0 
C.B. advances   –∆A +∆A    0 
Bank deposits +∆M  –∆M     0 
Bank loans  –∆L +∆L     0 
Domestic g. bills   +∆B +∆Bcb –∆B +∆B  0 
Foreign g. bills   +∆BF +∆BFcb  –∆BF  0 
SDR    +∆SDR   –∆SDR 0 
Total +SH +SF +SB +SCB +SG -CA –∆SDR +∆K 
 
Our assumption that banks distribute all of their profits is consistent with our 
simplifying hypothesis on portfolio management. We assume that household keep their 
wealth in the form of cash or bank deposits, while banks have a more sophisticated 
portfolio, demanding both domestic and foreign bills, which are imperfect substitutes, 
according to their rates of return. 
The demand for loans is given by the desired investment which cannot be financed 
by retained earnings and loans are provided on demand, with no credit rationing. 
Banks are required to hold reserves as a share of deposits, and ask for advances from 
the Central bank whenever the amount of liquidity from deposits—or eventually own 
capital—is insufficient to provide loans plus satisfying their demand for domestic and 
foreign bills. 
Again, Central banks are willing to provide advances on demand with no restriction 
on credit. 
So far, our model does not depart from other open economy models already 
developed in the SFC literature. Our novel contribution consists in how we model 
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Central banks behaviour, and on the introduction of a supranational monetary 
institution, which we label ‘IMF’ for convenience. 
 
4.2 Closure of the baseline ‘U.S. Dollar Model’ 
The U.S. dollar model attempts to represent the international monetary system ‘as 
we know it’, i.e., a system in which a national currency (the U.S. dollar) is at the same 
time the international unit of account and medium of exchange. As it was noted by 
Keynes in the Treatise, if both functions are embedded in the same instrument, the latter 
also becomes a store of value. Therefore, in the current international monetary system 
the dollar is simultaneously: 
1) The currency in which international trade is undertaken. 
2) The unit of account for real and financial transactions. 
3) The store of value held by the central banks which decide to accumulate reserves 
(regardless of the various reasons that they may have to do so). It should be noted that 
in recent years there has been a slight move towards reserve diversification.12 
Thus, our standard model is one in which the People’s Bank of China and the 
Central Bank of the Rest of the World, whose exchange rates are fixed against the 
dollar, accumulate reserves under the form of dollars. However, as it is observed in 
reality, keeping the dollar notes idle yields no interest earning. Hence, the way in which 
international reserves are actually held is under the form of U.S. Treasury bills. 
It is now important to explain in detail how the model is closed, i.e., how stock-flow 
consistency is derived from the equations that constitute the model. Let us start with the 
EZ. 
We assume that the EZ has a floating exchange rate with the U.S. dollar, which is 
therefore determined as the value which clears the market for U.S. bills in Europe. The 
tight accounting of our model ensures that the current account of each country equals its 
financial account, and therefore if a price variable—such as one exchange rate—implies 
a balance for the financial account, accounting consistency ensures that the current 
account is also cleared, since trade volumes, demand for international assets and the 
exchange rate are simultaneously determined.13 The external balance of Europe will 
therefore be in equilibrium, once portfolio and trade adjustments are completed. 
Once this has been done, we need to explain how the equilibrium in the balance 
sheet of the European Central Bank (ECB) is reached. Recall that since the ECB 
                                                 
12 See Lavoie and Zaho (2010) for a model which addresses this issue. 
13 We have verified this statement through alternative closures of the model where the exchange rate was 
determined to clear the current account, and model behaviour did not change. 
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transfers its entire profits to the European government, its net wealth is constant over 
time. Therefore, we must ensure that the change in ECB’s total assets equals the change 
in total liabilities. This is obtained through equation 174, which states that the ECB 
buys euro-denominated bonds in such a way that its assets and liabilities are consistent 
with a constant stock of wealth. 
Let us now turn to the cases of China and the Rest of the World. Since their 
currencies are pegged to the dollar, the exchange rate can no longer ensure that their 
domestic bond markets are in equilibrium. Therefore, the adjustment in these markets 
has to be done by quantities, i.e., someone has to step in and purchase (sell) the excess 
supply (demand) of bonds. We assume that this agent is the central bank of each of 
these countries. Now, since the exchange rate is fixed, nothing guarantees that the 
current account is equal to the capital plus the financial account (which is an identity 
that needs to hold all the time). In order for this identity to hold, reserves need to be 
accumulated or depleted, depending on the performance of the current account. 
Reserves are accumulated under the form of U.S. Treasury bills. Although it may seem 
odd to write reserve accumulation in this way instead of referring to the current account 
surplus/deficit, given that the model is stock-flow-consistent it can be shown that our 
equations imply that the change in foreign reserves is equal to the gap between the 
current account and the capital plus the financial account (this one, excluding the 
demand for Treasury bills by the central bank which, in fact, is what we are defining as 
foreign reserves). Note, however, that the way in which our equations are written is not 
arbitrary—they imply, as it was described in the case of the Eurozone, that the balance 
sheet of the central banks is in equilibrium. 
We can finally turn to the description of the behaviour of the U.S., which in turn 
will be useful to derive the ‘hidden equation’ that characterizes every SFC model. As it 
was already described, under the present system the dollar plays several functions. 
Thus, it may well be the case that the domestic supply of dollar-denominated bills 
(which is a result of the budget deficit of the U.S. government) differs from the world’s 
demand for these assets. Thus, there is nothing that ensures that this market is in 
equilibrium. Hence, this also requires a quantitative adjustment carried out by some of 
the agents in the model. We will assume that the FED intervenes in the Treasury bills 
market by absorbing any excess supply or by selling part of its holdings in order to clear 
this market. We are now left with the task of ensuring that the balance sheet of the FED 
is in equilibrium, but we will show that this is redundant. Taking a look at the balance 
sheet of the FED, it is possible to observe that there are now endogenous variables left 
to be defined, i.e., the whole model has been already specified. Thus, it should now be 
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the case that the demand for Treasuries by the FED is such that the balance sheet of the 
FED is in equilibrium. This is the ‘hidden equation’ of this closure. 
 
4.3 Closure of the SDR model 
The SDR model attempts to represent one of the various alternatives that have been 
put forward during the last years based on a stronger role played by the SDR within the 
international monetary system. This proposal consists of taking up the idea of the 
substitution account, originally designed in the late 1970s. Under such a situation, 
governments and central banks would deposit dollar reserves in the IMF in exchange for 
claims denominated in SDR. Therefore, in a context where China and the Rest of the 
World accumulate foreign reserves, they would no longer be doing this under the form 
of U.S. Treasury bills but under the form of SDRs. Phrased differently, China and the 
Rest of the World would still be creditor countries but their credits would no longer be 
against the U.S., but the IMF. The IMF, once it receives the dollars from China and the 
Rest of the World, could either keep them or exchange them for U.S. Treasury bills. In 
essence the system would not work very differently to how it works today since in the 
end the U.S. would be bearing with the costs of an ever-increasing demand for global 
liquidity (i.e., if China and the Rest of the World keep on accumulating reserves, now 
under the form of SDRs, the U.S. would still be increasing its liabilities—the only 
change would be who its creditor would be). 
Since the system would be working quite similarly, the closure of this model is 
rather similar to the one of the dollar model. Let us discuss it in detail. 
As regards the Eurozone, the only change that should be noted is that the (non-
operative) foreign reserves are constituted in SDRs and not in U.S. Treasury bills. 
However, since the euro is flexible these reserves are constant. We can assume that the 
euro, being one of the currencies that compose the SDR (which, as we will explain 
soon, is a basket-currency), has a positive stock of SDRs which has been allocated 
exogenously. 
The cases of China and the Rest of the World are also similar to the dollar model. 
Since their exchange rates are fixed, the equilibrium in the bond market is ensured by 
the domestic central bank’s purchases/sales of domestic bonds. However, reserve 
accumulation is no longer materialized in U.S. Treasury bills, but in SDRs. Thus, we 
can observe that there will be an endogenous demand for SDRs every period, given by 
the current account surplus/deficits of China and the Rest of the World. Based on the 
idea of the substitution account, each issuance of SDR by the IMF is backed up by an 
equal purchase of U.S. Treasury bills by the IMF. Since the IMF pays no interests on 
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SDR issuances but earns a positive interest on its holdings of Treasuries, it can make a 
profit, and therefore will accumulate wealth over time. Since the growing wealth of the 
IMF has to be kept in some kind of asset, we assume that this asset is also the U.S. 
Treasury bills. 
Regarding the U.S., the situation is exactly the same one that we presented in the 
dollar model, with the slight difference that the composition of the demand for U.S. 
Treasury bills has now changed due to the introduction of the substitution account. But 
in essence, the idea remains the same: the FED ensures the equilibrium in the Treasury 
bills market and these interventions are such that its balance sheet is always in 
equilibrium. 
The last point that needs to be explained is how the SDR is constituted and how the 
exchange rates of each of the four national currencies with respect to the SDR are 
determined. First of all, it should be noted that in this model, the SDR is not playing the 
role of an international medium of exchange (the dollar is keeping its role in this regard) 
and not necessarily the role of an international unit of account. The sole change that the 
idea of the substitution account proposes is to modify the international store of value, 
but the underlying problems of the international monetary system would still be there. 
That is why we consider that a further move onwards, a move that takes us closer to 
Keynes’s idea of an international clearing union, should be taken. However, in terms of 
Fantacci (2011) this would imply the substitution of the principle of clearing for the 
actual principle of liquidity, which is not an easy decision to make (no matter how 
beneficial would be in economic terms). 
Now that it is clear what the SDR is in our model, we can explain how it is 
composed. We define the SDR with respect to the dollar as a basket currency composed 
in equal terms by the dollar and the euro, i.e., the strong currencies. Appropriate 
equations determine the exchange rates of the euro, the Renminbi and the currency of 
the Rest of the World with respect to the SDR, respectively. These conversion rates are 
then applied in all the equations that embody some kind of relationship between the 
national currencies and the SDR (for instance, central bank’s profits equations). 
 
4.4 Closure of the Bancor model 
We finally explore the implications of the introduction of an International Clearing 
Union (CU), roughly along the lines discussed in section 2 above. 
Recall that this proposal implies the elimination of the U.S. dollar or any other 
financial asset as the international money (which, in turn, as Keynes suggested, is the 
reason why the adjustment mechanisms that are observed in the actual system are 
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asymmetric, meaning that the burden of the adjustment process is only born by the 
debtor countries) and its substitution for an international unit of account, the bancor, 
that would be used as a tool for settling international payments. 
The introduction of an international clearing union, as it was suggested by Keynes, 
requires the compromise and coordination of all member countries. This institutional 
setting would tend to reduce global imbalances through three different mechanisms: 
1. The elimination of the dollar (or any other financial asset) as the international 
medium of exchange would automatically deprive it from its role of international store 
of value. Countries would no longer be able to hoard dollars since the latter would no 
longer circulate internationally. Instead, surplus countries would accumulate bancors in 
their accounts at the Clearing Union. The impossibility to hoard international reserves, 
regardless the performance of the current account, would be a first disincentive to run 
persistent surpluses. 
2. Unlike the case of a national clearing union (for instance, the banking system) 
where deposits are considered interest-bearing assets for the private sector, in the case 
of the international clearing union both credits and debits would be subject to interest 
payments. In other words, even though a country could be in a surplus situation, it could 
be argued that the positive stock of bancors has been lent by the clearing union (in the 
end, the surplus of the country is not against the clearing union, but against the rest of 
the world). Thus, both debtor and creditor countries would pay interests on their bancor 
balances (be them positive or negative). The fact that interest must be paid on these 
balances would encourage countries to keep them the closest to zero as it is possible. In 
order to do so, surplus countries could increase imports, undertake FDI projects abroad 
or send foreign aid to developing countries. 
3. If the two aforementioned mechanisms were not sufficient to reduce the size of 
global imbalances, countries would be allowed to devalue their currencies in such a way 
that the external adjustment is made through the price mechanism. 
To begin with, we introduce the international clearing union as the supranational 
institution where countries surpluses and deficits are registered under the form of bancor 
balances. These balances would be positive (negative) if the sum of the past stream of 
current account balances is positive (negative). Recall that in our standard model 
countries accumulated foreign reserves under the form of U.S. Treasury bills. Moreover, 
note that the change in the stock of foreign reserves was written as the difference 
between the change in all the remaining components of the balance sheet of each 
national central bank, assuming that the change in the central bank’s wealth was always 
zero (since it transferred all its profits to the government). It is important to remember 
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this closure of the model because here lays the main modification that we introduce 
when modelling the international clearing union. 
Table 4 presents a simplified version of the balance sheet of the five institutional 
sectors of one country. As it can be seen, bancors appear as an asset for the central bank. 
This does not mean that the bancor balance held at the ICU constitutes a actual asset for 
the country since this is not part of its wealth. But in order to preserve stock-flow 
consistency, it is necessary to register these bancors as an asset for the central bank. 
Otherwise, consistency would be lost since a surplus country would have registered a 
current account surplus that increases the domestic monetary base (liability for the 
central bank) while no balancing entry would be registered in the assets side, thereby 
reducing the central bank’s net worth. Hence, this is a first complication that we 
encounter when eliminating the circulation of international money. 
 
 
Table 4: A simplified balance sheet with Bancor holdings 
Households Firms Banks Government Central Bank 
 +K    
+Cash    –Cash 
  +Reserves  –Reserves 
+Deposits  -Deposits   
 –Loans +Loans   
  –Advances  +Advances 
  +Bonds –Bonds  
 
Hence, the basic model is closed as follows: 
i. All exchange rates are exogenously fixed to the bancor. Thus, each currency rate 
is also fixed with respect to the rest. 
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ii. Since the exchange rate is fixed, the central bank needs to intervene in order to 
clear the domestic bond market (recall that standard SFC models assume that the 
exchange rate is the price that clears the bond market). 
iii. The stock of bancors of each country is determined by the equilibrium in the 
balance sheet of the central bank. Note that all the remaining components are already 
given. Thus, the change in the stock of bancors acts as a residual. 
We can now introduce the adjustment mechanisms that stimulate countries to spend 
at least part of their surpluses instead of hoarding them at the ICU. Once these have 
been introduced, we expect global imbalances (which are represented by the trajectories 
of the current accounts) to be narrowed down. Basically, the ICU collects interests paid 
on existing Bancor balances (since not all the stock of bancors is necessarily depleted 
through the international trade mechanism described above) and transfers them as 
foreign aid. 
We assume that interests are distributed equally to all the countries whose GDP is 
below the world average. This criterion is taken in order to replicate the mechanism 
proposed by Keynes, whereby these flows of foreign aid would help developing 
countries in their catching up process. Thus, the first step that needs to be taken in the 
process of distribution of foreign aid is to find out how many countries would be 
recipients of these flows. 
Since these flows of foreign aid must take the form of goods (recall that this 
proposal for the reform of the international monetary system implies the elimination of 
international flows of money) the flow of foreign aid must somehow contribute to the 
development of the recipient country. We can do this by adding the flows of foreign aid 
to the stock of capital, as if it was an additional source of investment.  
Finally, the interest payments paid and the foreign aid received by each country 
must be computed in such a way that, as Keynes proposed, the country’s stock of 
bancors changes accordingly. For instance, if a country pays interests to the ICU its 
position must worsen (if the country was a creditor its credit should decrease, and if the 
country was a debtor its debt should increase). Since the change in the stock of bancors 
of each country is determined by the equilibrium of the balance sheet of the central 
bank, it is required that we incorporate the flows of interest payments and foreign aid 
into the balance sheet of the central bank. 
This closure of the model ensures its consistency. 
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5. Model simulation under alternative closures 
The aim of this section is to find scenarios that, based on the present configuration 
of the international monetary system, show the Triffin dilemma. In order to do so, we 
need to examine the impact of a situation in which the world's demand for the 
international currency (the dollar) increases while, at the same time, the issuer of that 
currency (the U.S.) pursues a restrictive monetary policy. This is a situation that could 
possibly happen and in such an event the result that we can foresee a priori is one of a 
global recession. The reason for this outcome would be given by the fact that the tighter 
credit conditions in the U.S. would discourage investment and economic growth, 
thereby improving the U.S.’ current account. However, such an improvement in the 
external position of the U.S. is incompatible with a situation in which China pursues an 
export-led growth strategy, which in turn requires a growing amount of international 
liquidity. This scenario represents, in turn, one of the key shortcomings of the current 
non-system. As it was pointed out by Keynes for the case of the Gold Standard, the 
present non-system implies an asymmetric adjustment process through which the whole 
burden falls over the debtor countries. In this case, in order to restore external 
equilibrium the U.S. should reduce its level of activity. 
We start with a stationary version of the ‘U.S. dollar model’ and assume that at a 
certain point of time, China decides to devalue the Renminbi by 5% in order to gain 
competitiveness such that exports are stimulated. Simultaneously, the U.S. responds to 
this policy by increasing its interest rate by 50 basis points. Therefore, from the 
perspective of the U.S., although China’s goods are now cheaper, the negative income 
effect that results from the restrictive monetary policy may end up in an overall decrease 
of imports from China. Figure 4 shows the impact of this shock on the level of activity 
both at the domestic and global level. 
As can be seen from Figure 4, the combination of a 5% devaluation of the Renminbi 
with a 50 basis points increase in the U.S.’ interest rate leads to a global recession. 
Although China experiences higher growth as a result of the better performance of its 
exports, the recession in the U.S. ends up outweighing the expansive effect of China. 
There are various reasons why these two shocks play in a negative direction for U.S. 
GDP. First of all, the appreciation of the dollar against the Renminbi deteriorates the 
competitiveness of U.S. exports (the evolution of the current account of the U.S. can be 
observed in Figure 5). Second, the higher interest rate reduces investment since the 
burden of firm’s debt becomes heavier. Finally, as a result of the lower level of activity, 
income falls thereby affecting household’s consumption. 
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The effect on the Rest of the World is also negative because since it has its currency 
pegged to the dollar, the devaluation of the Renminbi with respect to the dollar implies 
an appreciation of the currency of the Rest of the World against the Renminbi. 
Therefore, the current account of the Rest of the World worsens as well (see Figure 5). 
The situation in the Eurozone is better since its exchange rate is flexible against the 
dollar. Hence, following the increase in the interest rate of the U.S. the dollar 
appreciates slightly against the euro (due to the capital inflows to the U.S. that seek 
better returns), which improves Europe’s competitiveness against the U.S. However, 
this effect tends to fade away as the recession ends up reducing European exports to its 
three trading partners. As it can be seen in Figure 5, Europe’s current account is always 
very close to a balanced position since its exchange rate is flexible an no specific shocks 
have been introduced regarding the structure of its economy. 
Let us discuss more in detail the results shown in Figure 5. As regards China, its 
current account jumps into surplus because its currency has lost value (gained 
competitiveness) with respect to the currencies of its three trading partners. Regarding 
the U.S., in the period when the shock takes place the current account goes into deficit 
because whereas the impact of the devaluation of the Renminbi on U.S. imports is 
immediate, the impact of the increase in interest rates on investment is lagged (recall 
how the investment function was written). The ‘positive impact’ of the recession in the 
U.S. on its external position can be observed from the second period onwards since the 
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current account deficit narrows down. A similar situation explains why the current 
account deficit of the Rest of the World is slightly reduced from the second period 
onwards, i.e., the negative income effect that results from the current account deficit 
ends up settling the external position of the Rest of the World in a better situation with 
respect to the moment in which the shock takes place. 
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Let us now turn to the growing model with the dollar as the international currency. 
Note, however, that the configuration of the international monetary system is exactly 
the same. As a result, the comparison between Figure 6 and Figure 7 with respect to 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 shows that there is practically no difference between the two 
models. This, in principle, should be no surprise. 
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Figure 7 
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We next present the results of the same shock, but applied to the SDR-based model. 
Recall that in this case we are substituting the role of the dollar as the international store 
of value, but we are not changing the essential features of the international monetary 
system. Thus, we expect to get very similar results to the ones obtained in the previous 
model, which in our view represents the current state of affairs regarding the working of 
the international monetary system. And, in fact, that is what can be deduced from Figure 
8 and Figure 9, which look very similar to the previous ones. The small differences can 
be explained by the fact that some flows of interest payments experience slight changes 
(for instance, in the dollar based model China earns interests on its foreign reserves and 
in the SDR model reserves yield no interests at all). But, in essence, it is clear that the 
working of the international monetary system will not change by the simple fact that the 
dollar is taken away its role as an international reserve currency. What should be done, 
if there is a real will to reduce global imbalances and the recession-biased adjustment 
mechanism implicit in the current non-system, is to give the SDR a function that is 
closer to the one that Keynes proposed for the bancor.  
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Figure 9 
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5.2 Model simulation under the Bancor closure 
We finally present some preliminary results from simulating the ‘Bancor-based’ 
model.  
In this setting, we cannot replicate the previous experiments driven by devaluation, 
since the exchange rate management is now depending on each country’s Bancor 
balance at the CU. 
Instead, we compare the outcome of an expansionary fiscal policy in the U.S., which 
in the current exchange rate regime would imply an increasing current account deficit 
for the U.S. matched by accumulation of U.S. assets in surplus countries. 
In the Bancor-based model, the expansionary policy in the U.S. will have the usual 
effects of widening current account balances. However, when the U.S. exceeds its 
predetermined limit on its Bancor balance, the dollar automatically devalues. This 
boosts net exports in the U.S., and net imports in the other countries, restoring the 
balances (Figure 1014). The global impact on GDP in other countries is therefore 
                                                 
14 The current account of China, the Euro Zone and the RoW overlap in the chart. 
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limited, as the increase in net imports after exchange rate realignments compensates for 
the increase in net exports before the adjustment. 
This institutional setting will therefore make it impossible to pursue export-led 
growth in the medium term, which is one of the potential sources for accumulation of 
debt and instability. 
We tried to introduce into the model an automatic redistribution of CU profits to less 
developed countries. However, with the current parameter settings which assumes that 
all countries have similar features in the baseline, aid transfers tend to create oscillatory 
behaviour. We therefore leave a better specification of international transfers to future 
research. 
 
Figure 10 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have addressed the links between global imbalances, which have 
repeatedly been a co-determinant of financial instability and global recessions, and the 
current state of the International Monetary System. Several authors, usually in the 
Keynesian tradition, underline that the possibility of hoarding the international 
currency, be it for speculative, strategic or insurance reasons, is one of the determinants 
of the features of the current system. They therefore suggest, although with different 
technical details, possible reforms of the IMS along the lines of the original Keynes’s 
plan for the Bretton Woods Conference. However, this literature does not usually adopt 
a full, consistent model to evaluate the implications of monetary reforms on both the 
real and the financial sector of integrated economies pursuing non-coordinate policies. 
The aim of this paper has been to provide such a framework, in the tradition of 
stock-flow-consistent models pioneered by Godley (1999) and Godley and Lavoie 
(2003). We have set up a model of four blocks: the United States, the Euro zone; China 
and the ‘Rest of the World’. All countries trade with each other in both goods and 
financial assets, and for each economy we make simple assumptions on the behaviour 
of households, non-financial firms, banks, the central bank and the government. 
We chose to minimize the amount of specific assumptions about each block, in 
order to be sure that our simulation results would not depend on arbitrary priors (such 
as, for instance, a lower propensity to import in one block). The only specific 
assumptions are that China and the RoW peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar, while 
the euro is allowed to float. 
We then close our model assuming—as in the current system—that the U.S. dollar 
is the only international medium of exchange and store of value, so that a current 
account surplus in China, say, would be matched by an equivalent increase in U.S. bills 
held by the Chinese Central bank. With this closure we are able to replicate the ‘Triffin 
dilemma’: a restrictive monetary policy in the country issuing the international currency 
will have global recessionary effects. 
We next modify our model to study the potential impact of an increased role for 
SDRs as reserve currencies, and show that in this case the consequences of a restrictive 
monetary policy are very similar to the case where the U.S. dollar is the reserve 
currency. A monetary reform which does not question the necessity for surplus 
countries to share the cost of readjustment will not have any significant impact. 
We finally assume the introduction of an International Clearing Union and the 
Bancor, used to settle international payments, and confirm through simulation that this 
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setting would automatically adjust current account imbalances, preventing countries to 
pursue export-led strategies which necessarily imply financial instability. 
We still need to strengthen our results with alternative closures of the model in the 
Bancor regime, as well as expanding our model to take inflation and price 
competitiveness into account. This will be the object of future research. 
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